Purdue Quotes

She complained that because of Purdue’s message about the drug being “good for whatever ails you,” OxyContin was “creeping into a whole population of people where it doesn’t belong.

In May 2001, Hale filed what is believed to be the first Oxy-related wrongful-death lawsuit against Purdue Pharma, on behalf of Jackie Burton. “Purdue

1996:  Purdue releases OxyContin, timed-released oxycodone, marketed largely for chronic-pain patients. 1996:

On January 18, 1897, Indiana state representative Taylor I. Record argued in favor of changing the value of pi. Pi, which can be rounded to 3.14159, is the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter. Tyler believed that the number was inconveniently long; in House Bill 246, he asked that it be rounded up to 3.2. The bill passed the House but was defeated in the Senate when the chairman of Purdue University’s math department successfully pleaded that it would make Indiana a national laughingstock. The value of pi in Indiana remains the same as in every other state.

But Arthur Sackler is important to this story because he founded modern pharmaceutical advertising and, in the words of John Kallir, showed the industry “that amazing things can be achieved with direct selling and intensive direct advertising.” Years later, Purdue would put those strategies to use marketing its new opiate painkiller OxyContin.

2007:  Purdue and three executives plead guilty to misdemeanor charges of false branding of OxyContin; fined $634 million. 2008:  Drug overdoses, mostly from opiates, surpass auto fatalities as leading cause of accidental death in the United States. 2010:

The saga of their lives and the dynasty they would establish was also the story of a century of American capitalism. The three brothers had purchased Purdue Frederick back in the 1950s. “It was a much smaller company, originally,” Kathe said. “It was a small family business.

In 1996, Purdue had introduced a groundbreaking drug, a powerful opioid painkiller called OxyContin, which was heralded as a revolutionary way to treat chronic pain. The drug became one of the biggest blockbusters in pharmaceutical history, generating some $35 billion in revenue.

According to a study by the Associated Press and the Center for Public Integrity, Purdue and other drug companies that manufacture opioid painkillers spent over $700 million between 2006 and 2015 on lobbying in Washington and in all fifty states. The combined spending of these groups amounted to roughly eight times what the gun lobby spent. (By comparison, during the same period, the small handful of groups pushing for limits on opioid prescribing spent $4 million

Nevertheless, they boarded The Purdue Victory and sailed out of Boston harbor, provided for against all inclemencies but these they were leaving behind, and those disasters of such scope and fortuitous originality which Christian courts of law and insurance companies, humbly arguing ad hominem, define as acts of God.

And so it went. OxyContin first, introduced by reps from Purdue Pharma over steak and dessert and in air-conditioned doctors’ offices. Within a few years, black tar heroin followed in tiny, uninflated balloons held in the mouths of sugarcane farm boys from Xalisco driving old Nissan Sentras to meet-ups in McDonald’s parking lots. Others,

Death by drugs is now a national problem, but the crisis began as an epidemic of overprescribed painkillers in the distressed communities that were least likely to muster the resources to fight back. It erupted in rural fishing villages, coal communities, and mill towns—because Purdue’s sales strategy was to convince doctors that the nation’s injured miners and factory workers were better and more safely served by OxyContin than its weaker competitors. The company even maneuvered to convince the FDA to back this bogus claim.

Inside Purdue Frederick, power was determined entirely by one’s relationship to the family.

So without alerting the FDA, much less asking for permission, Purdue started manufacturing MS Contin at a plant in New Jersey and offered it for sale in October 1984.

She said Purdue looked at data and everything with their computers, and hand-picked targets like Lee County that were gold mines.

The fines against Purdue and its executives accounted for about 90 percent of the company’s profits from the time the drug went on the market

Government officials are more comfortable knowing that Giuliani is advising Purdue,” Udell pointed out. Giuliani, he maintained, “would not take an assignment with a company that he felt was acting in an improper way.

Four wonderful books on early Creek and Cherokee histories are Michael Green’s The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis; Claudio Saunt’s A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733–1816; Theda Purdue’s Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society, 1540–1866; and Angela Pulley Hudson’s Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves and the Making of the American South.

The Sacklers have done a pretty good job of sucking the life out of Purdue,” she said. “Year after year, month after month, they were draining hundreds of millions of dollars.” All that was left at this point, she said, was “essentially a shell.

The younger generation of Sacklers were becoming increasingly involved in the company. Richard officially joined the board in 1990, along with his brother, Jonathan, and Kathe and her sister, Ilene. The following year, the family created a new company, Purdue Pharma.

December 29, 1946: Snowing this morning. The year seems to be dying in a light white blanket. Only three more days of this year, then comes a new one. Then, what? No one knows. -- Diary of Bertha Kate Gaddis who passed away 6 months later, age 78, West Lafayette, IN.

Purdue filed papers with the FDA, asking the agency to refuse to accept generic versions of the original formulation of OxyContin—the version the company had been selling all these years—on grounds that it was unsafe. The company said that it was voluntarily withdrawing the original formulation from the market for reasons “of safety.

The Sacklers took the view that the same should go for OxyContin. To the degree that people are misusing the drug and overdosing, the blame lies with any number of potentially irresponsible parties—the prescribing doctor, the wholesaler, the pharmacist, the trafficker, the abuser, the addicted person—but not with the manufacturer. Not with Purdue. Much less the Sacklers.

After a year at Purdue, he was scrambling for a summer internship, but kept bombing interviews. He had resigned himself to working at a local Ace Hardware when his professor got a call from a friend at SpaceX saying it needed interns. Without waiting for any paperwork, Harriss got into his car the next morning, left his girlfriend behind, and drove from Indiana to Los Angeles.

To help burnish its image in the face of so many legal, financial, and public-relations problems, Purdue hired former New York mayor and Republican insider Rudy Giuliani and his consulting firm, Giuliani Partners. Just a few months after his lauded response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Giuliani’s job was to convince “public officials they could trust Purdue because they could trust him,

As for Curtis Wright, he had been giving some thought, lately, to leaving the federal government. After the approval for OxyContin went through, he resigned from the FDA. Initially, he joined a small pharmaceutical firm in Pennsylvania called Adolor. But he did not stay long. Barely a year later, he moved on, to a new position at Purdue Pharma, in Norwalk, with a first-year compensation package of nearly $400,000.

Passei a manhã inteira mergulhada no catálogo. De tempos em tempos o sinal tocava, me transferindo para outra sala de aula, e tão logo eu me sentava, abria de novo o guia no meu colo embaixo da carteira. Na verdade, eu nunca tinha pensado em tentar qualquer universidade que não a de Indiana ou a Purdue (minha mãe tinha estudado na primeira, e meu pai, na segunda), pois, por ficarem no meu estado, custariam bem menos.

Facing a growing number of lawsuits and investigations, Purdue Pharma heaped praise on its American hero and new political star: “We believe that government officials are more comfortable knowing that Giuliani is advising Purdue Pharma,” Udell gushed in a promotional brochure. “It is clear to us, and we hope it is clear to the government, that Giuliani would not take an assignment with a company that he felt was acting in an improper way.

Giuliani was looking to make a lot of money quickly. In 2001, he had a net worth of $1 million; five years later, he would report $17 million in income and some $50 million in assets. For Purdue, which was working hard to frame OxyContin abuse as a law enforcement problem, rather than an issue that might implicate the drug itself or the way it was marketed, the former prosecutor who had led New York City after the 9/11 attacks would make an ideal fixer.

In 1994, Friedman wrote a memo marked “Very Confidential” to Raymond, Mortimer, and Richard Sackler. The market for cancer pain was significant, Friedman pointed out: four million prescriptions a year. In fact, there were three-quarters of a million prescriptions just for MS Contin. “We believe that the FDA will restrict our initial launch of OxyContin to the Cancer pain market,” Friedman wrote. But what if, over time, the drug extended beyond that? There was a much greater market for other types of pain: back pain, neck pain, arthritis, fibromyalgia. According to the wrestler turned pain doctor John Bonica, one in three Americans was suffering from untreated chronic pain. If that was even somewhat true, it represented an enormous untapped market. What if you could figure out a way to market this new drug, OxyContin, to all those patients? The plan would have to remain secret for the time being, but in his memo to the Sacklers, Friedman confirmed that the intention was “to expand the use of OxyContin beyond Cancer patients to chronic non-malignant pain.” This was a hugely audacious scheme. In the 1940s, Arthur Sackler had watched the introduction of Thorazine. It was a “major” tranquilizer that worked wonders on patients who were psychotic. But the way the Sackler family made its first great fortune was with Arthur’s involvement in marketing the “minor” tranquilizers Librium and Valium. Thorazine was perceived as a heavy-duty solution for a heavy-duty problem, but the market for the drug was naturally limited to people suffering from severe enough conditions to warrant a major tranquilizer. The beauty of the minor tranquilizers was that they were for everyone. The reason those drugs were such a success was that they were pills that you could pop to relieve an extraordinary range of common psychological and emotional ailments. Now Arthur’s brothers and his nephew Richard would make the same pivot with a painkiller: they had enjoyed great success with MS Contin, but it was perceived as a heavy-duty drug for cancer. And cancer was a limited market. If you could figure out a way to market OxyContin not just for cancer but for any sort of pain, the profits would be astronomical. It was “imperative,” Friedman told the Sacklers, “that we establish a literature” to support this kind of positioning. They would suggest OxyContin for “the broadest range of use.” Still, they faced one significant hurdle. Oxycodone is roughly twice as potent as morphine, and as a consequence OxyContin would be a much stronger drug than MS Contin. American doctors still tended to take great care in administering strong opioids because of long-established concerns about the addictiveness of these drugs. For years, proponents of MS Contin had argued that in an end-of-life situation, when someone is in a mortal fight with cancer, it was a bit silly to worry about the patient’s getting hooked on morphine. But if Purdue wanted to market a powerful opioid like OxyContin for less acute, more persistent types of pain, one challenge would be the perception, among physicians, that opioids could be very addictive. If OxyContin was going to achieve its full commercial potential, the Sacklers and Purdue would have to undo that perception.

Three years ago, researchers at Purdue University began monitoring every hit sustained by two high school teams. The goal was to study the effect of concussions. But when researchers administered cognitive tests to players who had never been concussed, hoping to set up a control group, they discovered that these teens showed diminished brain function as well. As the season wore on, their cognitive abilities plummeted. In some cases, brain activity in the frontal lobes—the region responsible for reasoning—nearly disappeared by season’s end. "You have the classic stereotype of the dumb jock and I think the real issue is that’s not how they start out," explained Thomas Talavage, one of the professors of the study. "We actually create that individual.

And by the early 1970s our little parable of Sam and Sweetie is exactly what happened to the North American Golden Retriever. One field-trial dog, Holway Barty, and two show dogs, Misty Morn’s Sunset and Cummings’ Gold-Rush Charlie, won dozens of blue ribbons between them. They were not only gorgeous champions; they had wonderful personalities. Consequently, hundreds of people wanted these dogs’ genes to come into their lines, and over many matings during the 1970s the genes of these three dogs were flung far and wide throughout the North American Golden Retriever population, until by 2010 Misty Morn’s Sunset alone had 95,539 registered descendants, his number of unregistered ones unknown. Today hundreds of thousands of North American Golden Retrievers are descended from these three champions and have received both their sweet dispositions and their hidden time bombs. Unfortunately for these Golden Retrievers, and for the people who love them, one of these time bombs happens to be cancer. To be fair, a so-called cancer gene cannot be traced directly to a few famous sires, but using these sires so often increases the chance of recessive genes meeting—for good and for ill. Today, in the United States, 61.4 percent of Golden Retrievers die of cancer, according to a survey conducted by the Golden Retriever Club of America and the Purdue School of Veterinary Medicine. In Great Britain, a Kennel Club survey found almost exactly the same result, if we consider that those British dogs—loosely diagnosed as dying of “old age” and “cardiac conditions” and never having been autopsied—might really be dying of a variety of cancers, including hemangiosarcoma, a cancer of the lining of the blood vessels and the spleen. This sad history of the Golden Retriever’s narrowing gene pool has played out across dozens of other breeds and is one of the reasons that so many of our dogs spend a lot more time in veterinarians’ offices than they should and die sooner than they might. In genetic terms, it comes down to the ever-increasing chance that both copies of any given gene are derived from the same ancestor, a probability expressed by a number called the coefficient of inbreeding. Discovered in 1922 by the American geneticist Sewall Wright, the coefficient of inbreeding ranges from 0 to 100 percent and rises as animals become more inbred.

Sixth of Ten Elegies for Fire and Oxycodone The Greek myth goes like this you probably know it but I had to look it up Prometheus steals fire from Zeus and the other gods gives it to humans heaven's prowess now mortal Zeus sticks it to Prometheus cause he knows knowledge knows how sharp its edge can be chains him to a rock an eagle eating his liver all day the liver regenerates every morning the eagle keeps eating keeps eating keeps eating with the patent for Oxycontin set to run out in 2013 Purdue Pharma reformulates it gets a new patent lobbies the old drug illegal no one steals from the gods no one dulls the blade of knowledge - That summer my first desk job insurance intakes at a doctor's office the relief of air conditioning pharma reps catering our lunches released from the fear of dropping a ladder on a foreman of threading my thumbnail with another drill bit the good doc scheduled in five minute increments I retyped patient addresses all hill towns sixty miles off the waiting room so full and grumpy I wondered about the etymology of patient but never what makes a person drive hours through the mountains wait hours for a flicker with the doc I was not paid to wonder I quit before I ever typed your name

As it turned out, Mary Jo White and other attorneys for the Sacklers and Purdue had been quietly negotiating with the Trump administration for months. Inside the DOJ, the line prosecutors who had assembled both the civil and the criminal cases started to experience tremendous pressure from the political leadership to wrap up their investigations of Purdue and the Sacklers prior to the 2020 presidential election in November. A decision had been made at high levels of the Trump administration that this matter would be resolved quickly and with a soft touch. Some of the career attorneys at Justice were deeply unhappy with this move, so much so that they wrote confidential memos registering their objections, to preserve a record of what they believed to be a miscarriage of justice. One morning two weeks before the election, Jeffrey Rosen, the deputy attorney general for the Trump administration, convened a press conference in which he announced a “global resolution” of the federal investigations into Purdue and the Sacklers. The company was pleading guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States and to violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as well as to two counts of conspiracy to violate the federal Anti-kickback Statute, Rosen announced. No executives would face individual charges. In fact, no individual executives were mentioned at all: it was as if the corporation had acted autonomously, like a driverless car. (In depositions related to Purdue’s bankruptcy which were held after the DOJ settlement, two former CEOs, John Stewart and Mark Timney, both declined to answer questions, invoking their Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate themselves.) Rosen touted the total value of the federal penalties against Purdue as “more than $8 billion.” And, in keeping with what had by now become a standard pattern, the press obligingly repeated that number in the headlines. Of course, anyone who was paying attention knew that the total value of Purdue’s cash and assets was only around $1 billion, and nobody was suggesting that the Sacklers would be on the hook to pay Purdue’s fines. So the $8 billion figure was misleading, much as the $10–$12 billion estimate of the value of the Sacklers’ settlement proposal had been misleading—an artificial number without any real practical meaning, designed chiefly to be reproduced in headlines. As for the Sacklers, Rosen announced that they had agreed to pay $225 million to resolve a separate civil charge that they had violated the False Claims Act. According to the investigation, Richard, David, Jonathan, Kathe, and Mortimer had “knowingly caused the submission of false and fraudulent claims to federal health care benefit programs” for opioids that “were prescribed for uses that were unsafe, ineffective, and medically unnecessary.” But there would be no criminal charges. In fact, according to a deposition of David Sackler, the Department of Justice concluded its investigation without so much as interviewing any member of the family. The authorities were so deferential toward the Sacklers that nobody had even bothered to question them.

Tyler solved the equations easily, writing out orderly explanations for every step. He was studying mechanical engineering, set to graduate near the top of his class, and soon after would start a PhD at Purdue.

Having accepted a graduate fellowship in the Department of Philosophy at Cornell, I duly presented myself to begin studies for a Ph.D. One of our assignments during the first semester was to read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason from cover to cover, along with Norman Kemp Smith's commentary thereon, which was almost as voluminous. Pondering this literature, it did not take me long to conclude that these Kantian ratiocinations, brilliant though they may be, have little to do with that Sophia—that more-than-human Wisdom—of which authentic philosophy, by its very designation, is literally the love. And so, three weeks into the semester, I resigned my fellowship and left Cornell University. "I had always been attracted to the natural world, to forests and mountains especially; and so I resolved to proceed to the great Northwest, henceforth to earn my keep as a lumberjack. No doubt I had an unrealistic and overly romanticized conception of what this entails; but in any case, at that point fate abruptly intervened. I had made my intentions known to my brother, who at the time was studying chemical engineering at Purdue University. He immediately proceeded to the chairman of the physics department to tell him about my case, going so far as to put my letter in his hands. The verdict was instant: 'Tell you brother to present himself in my office Monday morning to assume his duties as a teaching assistant.' It seems the voice of Providence had spoken: despite my very mixed feelings regarding the contemporary academic world, I was destined to pass most of my professional life in its precincts—but not in departments of philosophy!

Eighty years ago on July 2, 1937 Amelia Earhart, the first female aviator to fly solo across the Atlantic Ocean, disappeared while attempting to circumnavigate the world in a Lockheed Model 10- Electra. Her expedition, sponsored by Purdue University, a public research university located in West Lafayette, Indiana, was brought to an end when this daring woman aviator and her navigator and navigator Fred Noonan disappeared near Howland Island in the central part of the Pacific Ocean. Since that time it was generally assumed that she had crashed at sea and simply disappeared beneath the waves of an unforgiving ocean. All the speculation ended on Sunday July 9, 2017 when Shawn Henry, a former executive assistant director for the FBI, brought world attention on the “History Channel” to a photograph that apparently shows Earhart and Noona on the dock of Jaluit Atoll, overlooking the SS Kaoshu towing a barge, with what looks like the Electra they had been flying. The intensive research and analysis that Shawn Henry and his team conducted presents compelling evidence and leaves no doubt but that Amelia Earhart and Fred Noonan had survived the crash. The team’s research also presents evidence that Amelia Earhart was held as a prisoner of war on the island of Saipan by the Japanese and died while in their custody.

But Purdue was a privately held company entirely owned by Kathe Sackler and other members of her family. In 1996, Purdue had introduced a groundbreaking drug, a powerful opioid painkiller called OxyContin, which was heralded as a revolutionary way

pain specialists were validating the commercial research and development that Richard and his colleagues were doing at Purdue.

Eddie Takesue. Takesue had joined Purdue as director of clinical research in 1975.

According to the former executive, Purdue eventually went over the agency’s head, appealing to the political leadership in the Reagan administration. “They were putting pressure on the White House,” the executive said. This strategy succeeded.

Richard Sackler was a key proponent of Purdue Frederick’s transition into pain management.

Purdue argued that the patented Contin coating on a dose of OxyContin would obviate the risk of addiction.

Purdue Pharma. Based in Connecticut, it was the source of the vast majority of the Sackler fortune.

Purdue also explicitly instructed sales reps to target family physicians who were likely to be naive about opioids, “opioid naive”—doctors who had little experience prescribing this kind of medication. To

The Committee on Oversight and Reform of the U.S. House of Representatives announced that it would hold a hearing on “The Role of Purdue Pharma and the Sackler Family in the Opioid Epidemic

entities, including entire states, sued Purdue. The nation was soon swimming in OxyContin. It was cheap, available everywhere, and readily used by crushing, chewing, snorting, or even injecting.

But after Purdue released the reformulated version of OxyContin in 2010, as the patent on the original formulation was set to expire, the company made an audacious about-face. Purdue filed papers with the FDA, asking the agency to refuse to accept generic versions of the original formulation of OxyContin—the version the company had been selling all these years—on grounds that it was unsafe. The company said that it was voluntarily withdrawing the original formulation from the market for reasons “of safety.” On the very day that the patent for the original formulation was set to expire, the FDA, ever obliging, declared that the benefits of the old version of OxyContin “no longer outweigh” the risks.

To the best of my abilities, I made it sad and true to the laughable mess of addicted youth. Also bitter. In one of my strips, Crash is filling his pill-mill scrip and the pharmacy lady leans over to warn him, “This one’s strong, hon. The Purdue rep takes it so he can sleep nights.

Gradually, Richard’s team cultivated Curtis Wright. Early on, when Wright saw Purdue’s first draft of the OxyContin package insert, he had remarked that he’d never seen an insert that contained so much promotional and marketing material. Wright told the company that all of this obviously promotional language would have to go. But, in the end, it stayed.

Of course, OxyContin was stronger than morphine. That was a simple fact of chemistry—but one that the company would need to carefully obscure. After all, there are only so many cancer patients. “We are better off expanding use of OxyContin,” Friedman wrote. The real jackpot was “non-malignant pain.” OxyContin would not be a “niche” drug just for cancer pain, the minutes of an early Purdue team meeting confirm. By the company’s estimates, fifty million Americans suffered from some form of chronic pain. That was the market they wanted to reach.

It wasn’t just the implicit threat that rankled Maura Healey. It was the fact that the Sacklers were playing a shell game: they were throwing their lot in with Purdue when it suited them to do so and distancing themselves from the company when it didn’t.

One recent study provides an answer. Professors Michael J. Cooper of the University of Utah, Huseyin Gulen of Purdue University, and P. Raghavendra Rau of the University of Cambridge studied 1,500 large companies and how they performed, in three-year periods, from 1994 to 2011. They then compared these companies’ performance to other companies in their same fields. They discovered that the 150 companies with the highest-paid CEOs returned about 10 percent less to their shareholders than did their industry peers. In fact, the more these CEOs were paid, the worse their companies did. Companies that were the most generous to their CEOs—and whose high-paid CEOs received more of that compensation as stock options—did 15 percent worse than their peer companies, on average. “The returns are almost three times lower for the high-paying firms than the low-paying firms,” said Cooper. “This wasteful spending destroys shareholder value.” Even worse, the researchers found that the longer a highly paid CEO was in office, the more the firm underperformed. “The performance worsens significantly over time,” they concluded.

In August 2008, physicists Jere Jenkins and Ephraim Fischbach, of Purdue University, burst on the scene with an incredible claim. Decay constants are not so constant! Through detailed analysis, they found that the decay rate of radioactive manganese-54 (54Mn) fluctuates in correlation with solar flares (Jenkins and Fischbach 2008). And that was not all. It was also found that the decay rates of radioactive silicon-32 (32Si) and radioactive radium-226 (226Ra) vary over time and that the variations correlate with the changing distance between the Earth and the Sun (Jenkins et al. 2008). When the Earth is closest to the Sun (in January), the decay rate increases; when the Earth is farthest from the Sun (in July), the decay rate decreases. These are incredible, absolutely astounding results with profound ramifications.

Now it is known that we cannot absorb some of the most important nutrients in salad greens unless the dressing or the meal it’s eaten with contains some type of fat. Olive oil, according to a 2012 Purdue University study, does the best job of making those compounds more bioavailable. It takes almost seven times more soybean oil, by contrast, to get the same results. Soybean oil is the most common oil in commercial salad dressings.

The egg industry itself funded research on Salmonella and the various ways to cook eggs. What did they find? Salmonella in eggs can survive scrambled, over-easy, and sunny-side-up cooking methods. Sunny side up was found to be the riskiest. The industry-funded researchers bluntly concluded: “The sunny-side-up method should be considered unsafe.”84 In other words, even the egg industry itself knows that its product, prepared in a manner that millions of Americans eat on any given day all across the country, is unsafe. Actually, we’ve known this for some time. Twenty years ago, Purdue University researchers determined that Salmonella can survive in cooked omelets and french toast.85 Salmonella may even survive in eggs boiled up to eight minutes.86

Purdue eventually would be able to list among its alumni both the first and the last men to walk on the Moon.

When you turn over rocks and look at all the squiggly things underneath, you can either put the rock down, or you can say, ‘My job is to turn over rocks and look at the squiggly things,’ even if what you see can scare the hell out of you.”25 That quote, from Pitney Bowes executive Fred Purdue, could have come from any of the Pitney Bowes

McKinsey also estimated how many customers might develop addiction to, or die from, OxyContin. At one point the consultant suggested Purdue pay its drugstore distributors rebates of $14,000 for every addiction and fatal overdose OxyContin caused, to ensure that chains like CVS and others would keep distributing the pill.

The most beautiful brunette on the face of Planet Earth stood very close to me. Her dark wavy hair cascaded to her shoulders. Her liquid brown eyes sparkled. Her full lips smiled a wonderfully warm smile. She said hello Purdue. I shrugged. I said hello Brandy.

A hedge fund, Hildene Capital Management, which had invested some of the family’s wealth, said that it was no longer comfortable doing business with the Sacklers. Brett Jefferson, the fund’s manager, revealed that someone close to the firm had suffered an “opioid-related tragedy,” and said, “My conscience led me to terminate the relationship.” Even Purdue’s banker, JPMorgan Chase, cut ties with the company.

As a result, levels of addiction and death were statistically low among African Americans. It appeared to be a rare instance in which systemic racism could be said to have protected the community. But people of color were disproportionately affected by the war on drugs. Purdue executives might have evaded jail time for their role in a scheme that generated billions of dollars for Madeleine’s family, but in 2016, Indiana’s governor, Mike Pence, signed a law reinstating a mandatory minimum sentence for any street

People microwaved the pills, baked them in the oven, stuck them in the freezer, soaked them in all manner of solvents. But if Purdue’s narrow objective was to prevent people from breaking down the pills, then this new coating seemed to work. In fact, there were telling indications, almost immediately, in Purdue’s own sales data, which suggested that some habitual OxyContin users were frustrated by the tamperproof pills.

It was now in the grip of a full-blown opioid epidemic. Millions of Americans had become addicted to OxyContin and other opioids, whether they had done so through recreational abuse or under a doctor’s care. Indeed, whatever the Sacklers might have wanted to tell themselves about their own intentions and the nature of the business they were in, this large population of addicted people was part of the reason that Purdue’s sales were still so strong. The numbers didn’t lie.

And heroin was a street drug, sold out of the back of a car by anonymous young Mexicans of uncertain immigration status, whereas OxyContin had been approved by no less an authority than the Food and Drug Administration. The Sacklers were legitimate businesspeople, pillars of American society. Even after the felony conviction for Purdue, as controversy continued to swirl around OxyContin, Richard Sackler served on the advisory board of the Yale Cancer Center.

More than one person who worked at Purdue during this era likened the experience to the acidly humorous HBO show Succession, in which a trio of overindulged adult children vie, haplessly, to seize control of a conglomerate

Her father died in 1987, she pointed out, long before the introduction of OxyContin, and she and her siblings had agreed to sell their one-third stake in Purdue to her uncles soon thereafter. So, none of Arthur’s heirs had profited from OxyContin, she insisted.

As I make clear throughout the book, OxyContin was hardly the only opioid to be fraudulently marketed or widely abused, and my choice to focus on Purdue is in no way a suggestion that other pharmaceutical companies do not deserve a great deal of blame for the crisis. The same could be said for the FDA, the doctors who wrote prescriptions, the wholesalers that distributed the opioids, and the pharmacies that filled the prescriptions. There’s plenty of blame to go around. I do share the view, however, of many doctors, public officials, prosecutors, and scholars that Purdue played a special role, as a pioneer. All

Purdue knew the people of the French Quarter pretty well.

According to a study by the Associated Press and the Center for Public Integrity, Purdue and other drug companies that manufacture opioid painkillers spent over $700 million between 2006 and 2015 on lobbying in Washington and in all fifty states. The combined spending of these groups amounted to roughly eight times what the gun lobby spent. (By comparison, during the same period, the small handful of groups pushing for limits on opioid prescribing spent $4 million.)

With government investigators circling, Purdue needed a counterweight, someone important enough to give it cover. That someone turned out to be the former New York City mayor, Rudy Giuliani. “We believe that government officials are more comfortable knowing that Giuliani is advising Purdue Pharma,” one senior Purdue official said.

A typical carbon map, such as that produced in 2002 by the Vulcan Project at Purdue University, sends a very clear signal: countryside good, cities bad. For a long time, these were the only maps of this type, and there is certainly a logic in looking at pollution from a location-by-location perspective. But this logic was based on an unconsidered assumption, which is that the most meaningful way to measure carbon is by the square mile. It isn't. The best way to measure carbon is per person.

came, Galen and Oniel would both have to be killed. It was the only way to stop their threat for good. If they were allowed to keep on living out there in the world, they’d shown that their hatred for Purdue and his friends would only continue to fester until there was nothing they could

When you turn over rocks and look at all the squiggly things underneath, you can either put the rock down, or you can say, ‘My job is to turn over rocks and look at the squiggly things,’ even if what you see can scare the hell out of you.”25 That quote, from Pitney Bowes executive Fred Purdue,

Some 80 percent of Americans addicted to opioids began with prescription painkillers, not with illegal street drugs. Essentially, pharmaceutical executives acted like Colombian drug lords, with legal approval. Many cities and states, including Baltimore, are now suing Purdue and other pharmaceutical companies to recover some of the costs of treating the opioid epidemic, but no one can ever give Daniel back what he lost.

Today, evangelical Christians, Catholics, and other conservative students are routinely subjected to programs on campuses that amount to little less than overt intolerance and intellectual persecution. For example, recently at the University of Pennsylvania, Cornell University, and Dartmouth College, campus activists stole and burned conservative student newspapers without facing any significant penalty from administrators. The idea expressed in these newspapers and by these students were obviously unwelcome by the thieves in question, but they also were, apparently, not deemed worthy of toleration by the schools' presidents, provosts, and deans. At Purdue, Vanderbilt, and Syracuse, as well as smaller universities like Castleton in Vermont, many Christian campus organizations cannot operate without violating expansive "non-discrimination" policies. Administrators at many colleges now require all student organizations to draft constitutions on the basis of sexual morality. All lifestyles and worldviews are acceptable except those of orthodox Catholics, Evangelicals, and other conservatives who want to live their lives in a manner consistent with the biblical standards of sexual fidelity and the traditional morality prescribed in Scripture. Such missional clarity is simply not tolerable in these bastions of tolerance.

The best students I observed when I attended Purdue were returning veterans from World War II, empowered by the G. I. Bill to attend the university of their choice. The students were truly motivated, street-smart in an international sense, and knew how to work hard. Subsequently it is has been my opinion that attending and finishing a high-quality high school should be followed by multiple years of either military service or its equivalent involving manual labor in civilian life before being allowed to take university level classes. Manual labor provides clarity of thought regarding a career.

Another study from Gallup and Purdue University found that the type of college students attended (e.g., public versus private; highly selective versus less selective) made very little difference to their workplace engagement and well-being. The factors that best predicted well-being were those more intrinsic to the college experience itself, such as: 1) having a professor who showed personal interest in them, stimulated them to learn, and encouraged them; 2) having an internship or job in college that allowed them to apply what they were learning; and 3) being actively involved in extracurricular activities or projects that took a semester or more to complete.

Between 1996 and 2002, Purdue funded more than twenty thousand pain-related educational programs, almost ten a day, seven days a week. During the same years, Purdue conducted

Purdue doubled its sales force during those years, from 318 to 767 pharmaceutical reps. In the trade, the reps are called detailers, and they’re typically good-looking, gregarious, and well-dressed. They remember the names of the clinic receptionists and secretaries and nurses. Purdue expected each drug rep to develop a list of 105 to 140 physicians within a specific sales region and call each one every three or four weeks.

Purdue paid its reps better than most drug-makers paid theirs—by 2001, an average salary of $55,000 and an average bonus of $71,500. Purdue spent a half-billion dollars on the one-on-one sales strategy between 1996 and 2001.

Purdue drilled its reps on two selling points. One, OxyContin was the first narcotic that wouldn’t hook patients. And two, fewer than 1 percent of pain-management patients get addicted anyway.

By 2002, six years after its release, Purdue was selling almost $1.5 billion of the drug each year—eight times the volume the company had projected. The single drug represented 80 percent of Purdue’s net sales. It was the biggest-selling brand-name controlled substance on the market. The once sleepy drugmaker was now a powerhouse, and it wasn’t about to concede that its star product had a major flaw. OxyContin’s

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August 2004. Purdue University reports success in using rhodium to kill viruses with light from inside a body.

Research from Purdue University suggests that emotional well-being can be achieved with a salary of $60,000 to $75,000 per year, with peak satisfaction at $95,000 per year. Beyond these amounts, more money does not necessarily lead to increased happiness.

Where there is money, there’s conflict. And I knew that the more powerful an individual, family, or corporation, the more attached they are to that power. They’ll do anything to keep what they have, and they don’t fight fair. They fight to win.

The logic of Fordism gained the upper hand, and by the 1970s, Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, a brilliant but benighted agronomist from Purdue University, was announcing to American farmers the new national policy, “Get big or get out.”10