Part 3 1984 Quotes

Quien controla el pasado, controla el futuro. Quien controla el presente, controla el pasado (Cap 3, primera parte - 1984)

the difficulty of the language has a more rhetorical character, the criticism of human nature is less nuanced than in 3.82, the sentence about envy is anticlimactically simplistic. Connor 1984, p. 102, n. 60, in arguing that 3.84 is a remnant of an early draft asks the hard questions: who else would have or could have written such a passage, how did it become part of our text? I can only respond here that Thucydides’ mind is ultimately at least more accessible to us than the procedures of unknown editors. Does any other passage in Thucydides, representing whatever stage of composition, add so little sense with so much strain? And could the Thucydides who in 3.82–83 saw the development of civil-war mentality as a macabre perversion of progress have evolved from a Thucydides who in 3.84 viewed mankind

The first thing to note about Korean industrial structure is the sheer concentration of Korean industry. Like other Asian economies, there are two levels of organization: individual firms and larger network organizations that unite disparate corporate entities. The Korean network organization is known as the chaebol, represented by the same two Chinese characters as the Japanese zaibatsu and patterned deliberately on the Japanese model. The size of individual Korean companies is not large by international standards. As of the mid-1980s, the Hyundai Motor Company, Korea’s largest automobile manufacturer, was only a thirtieth the size of General Motors, and the Samsung Electric Company was only a tenth the size of Japan’s Hitachi.1 However, these statistics understate their true economic clout because these businesses are linked to one another in very large network organizations. Virtually the whole of the large-business sector in Korea is part of a chaebol network: in 1988, forty-three chaebol (defined as conglomerates with assets in excess of 400 billion won, or US$500 million) brought together some 672 companies.2 If we measure industrial concentration by chaebol rather than individual firm, the figures are staggering: in 1984, the three largest chaebol alone (Samsung, Hyundai, and Lucky-Goldstar) produced 36 percent of Korea’s gross domestic product.3 Korean industry is more concentrated than that of Japan, particularly in the manufacturing sector; the three-firm concentration ratio for Korea in 1980 was 62.0 percent of all manufactured goods, compared to 56.3 percent for Japan.4 The degree of concentration of Korean industry grew throughout the postwar period, moreover, as the rate of chaebol growth substantially exceeded the rate of growth for the economy as a whole. For example, the twenty largest chaebol produced 21.8 percent of Korean gross domestic product in 1973, 28.9 percent in 1975, and 33.2 percent in 1978.5 The Japanese influence on Korean business organization has been enormous. Korea was an almost wholly agricultural society at the beginning of Japan’s colonial occupation in 1910, and the latter was responsible for creating much of the country’s early industrial infrastructure.6 Nearly 700,000 Japanese lived in Korea in 1940, and a similarly large number of Koreans lived in Japan as forced laborers. Some of the early Korean businesses got their start as colonial enterprises in the period of Japanese occupation.7 A good part of the two countries’ émigré populations were repatriated after the war, leading to a considerable exchange of knowledge and experience of business practices. The highly state-centered development strategies of President Park Chung Hee and others like him were formed as a result of his observation of Japanese industrial policy in Korea in the prewar period.

…el laberíntico mundo del doblepiensa. Saber y no saber, tener plena conciencia de algo que sabes que es verdad y al mismo tiempo contar mentiras cuidadosamente elaboradas, mantener a la vez dos opiniones sabiendo que son contradictorias y creer en ambas, utilizar la lógica en contra de la lógica, repudiar la moralidad en nombre de la moralidad misma, creer que la democracia era imposible y que el partido era el garante de la democracia, olvidar lo que hacía falta olvidar y luego recordarlo cuando hacía falta, para luego olvidarlo otra vez. Y, por encima de todo, aplicar ese mismo proceso al propio proceso. Esa era la mayor sutileza: inducir conscientemente a la inconsciencia, y luego, una vez más, volverse inconsciente del acto de hipnosis que acabas de realizar. Incluso la comprensión del término doblepiensa implicaba el uso del doblepiensa (Cap 3, primera parte - 1984)

Winston reparó de pronto en que la muerte de su madre, hacía casi treinta años, había sido trágica y triste de un modo que ya no era posible. Intuyó que la tragedia pertenecía al pasado, a una época en la que aún había intimidad, amor y amistad, y en la que los miembros de una familia se apoyaban unos a otros sin necesidad de tener un motivo (Cap 3, primera parte - 1984).

Entering college students show the same trend: in 2016, only 37% said that “becoming successful in a business of my own” was important, down from 50% in 1984 (adjusted for relative centrality). So, compared to GenX college students, iGen’ers are less likely to be drawn to entrepreneurship. These beliefs are affecting actual behavior. A Wall Street Journal analysis of Federal Reserve data found that only 3.6% of households headed by adults younger than 30 owned at least part of a private company in 2013, down from 10.6% in 1989. All the talk about the young generation being attracted to entrepreneurship turns out to be just that—talk.