Habermas Quotes

Only one who takes over his own life history can see in it the realization of his self. Responsibility to take over one's own biography means to get clear about who one wants to be.

Today, the language of the market penetrates every pore and forces every interpersonal relation into the schema of individual preference.

Only by externalization, by entering into social relationships, can we develop the interiority of our own person.

A 'post-truth democracy' [...] would no longer be a democracy.

The scientistic faith in a science that will one day not only fulfill, but eliminate, personal self-conception through objectifying self-description is not science, but bad philosophy.

For Habermas, scientism means science’s belief in itself: that is, ‘the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one form of knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science’.

[Jürgen Habermas' obituary to friend and philosopher, Richard Rorty] One small autobiographical piece by Rorty bears the title 'Wild Orchids and Trotsky.' In it, Rorty describes how as a youth he ambled around the blooming hillside in north-west New Jersey, and breathed in the stunning odour of the orchids. Around the same time he discovered a fascinating book at the home of his leftist parents, defending Leon Trotsky against Stalin. This was the origin of the vision that the young Rorty took with him to college: philosophy is there to reconcile the celestial beauty of orchids with Trotsky's dream of justice on earth. Nothing is sacred to Rorty the ironist. Asked at the end of his life about the 'holy', the strict atheist answered with words reminiscent of the young Hegel: 'My sense of the holy is bound up with the hope that some day my remote descendants will live in a global civilization in which love is pretty much the only law.

The rule that science is the only way to know something is itself unscientific; it cannot be tested. So the claim that only science can demonstrate truth actually flunks its own test, since it cannot validate itself!

Freedom may never be conceived merely negatively, as the absence of compulsion. Freedom conceived intersubjectively distinguishes itself from the arbitrary freedom of the isolated individual. No one is free until we are all free.

For the normative self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of a continual critical reappropriation and reinterpretation. Up to this very day there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern talk.

Contextualism is only the flipside of logocentrism.

And Habermas: mutual understanding in unrestrained communicative action unfolded by rationality is the omega point of individual and social evolution itself.

From the structure of language comes the explanation of why the human spirit is condemned to an odyssey - why it first finds its way to itself only on a detour via a complete externalization in other things and in other humans. Only at the greatest distance from itself does it become conscious of itself in its irreplaceable singularity as an individuated being.

Cicero calls it the most horrendous torture.' So hideous was the act of crucifixion upon a man that he also writes that "the very word `cross' should be far removed not only from the person of a Roman citizen but from his thoughts, his eyes and his ears.

Atheistic New Testament scholar Gerd Ludemann concludes, "It may be taken as historically certain that Peter and the disciples had experiences after Jesus' death in which Jesus appeared to them as the risen Christ."6R

Has science proven that a resurrection is impossible and, therefore, not a credible belief?

Diskurse herrschen nicht. Sie erzeugen eine kommunikative Macht, die die administrative nicht ersetzen kann, sondern nur beeinflussen kann.

Nietzsche conceives the critical consequences of scientific technical progress as overcoming metaphysics. […] The process of enlightenment made possible by the sciences is critical, but the critical dissolution of dogmas produces not liberation but indifference. It is not emancipatory but nihilistic.

3. Embarrassing admissions support historical claims. An indicator that an event or saying is authentic occurs when the source would not be expected to create the story, because it embarrasses his cause and `weakened its position in arguments with opponents. "5

The parliament no longer is an 'assembly of wise men chosen as individual personalities by privileged strata, who sought to convince each other through arguments in public discussion on the assumption that the subsequent decision reached by the majority would be what was true and right for the national welfare.' Instead it has become the 'public rostrum on which, before the entire nation (which through radio an television participates in a specific fashion in this sphere of publicity), the government and the parties carrying it present and justify to the nation their political program, while the opposition attacks this program with the same opennes and develops its alternatives.

Historians employ a number of common-sense principles in assessing the strength of a testimony. Here are five of those principles: 1. Testimony attested to by multiple independent witnesses is usually considered stronger than the testimony of one witness. 2. Affirmation by a neutral or hostile source is usually considered stronger than affirmation from a friendly source, since bias in favor of the person or position is absent. 3. People usually don't make up details regarding a story that would tend to weaken their position. 4. Eyewitness testimony is usually considered stronger than testimony heard from a second- or thirdhand source. 5. An early testimony from very close to the event in question is usually considered more reliable than one received years after the event.

In einem Aufklärungsprozess gibt es nur Beteiligte.

Aside from the faith factor, when it comes to reports of miracles, the historian must seek a natural explanation before considering a supernatural one.

4. Eyewitness testimony supports historical claims. Eyewitness testimony is usually stronger than a secondhand account.

The external evidence of Jesus' resurrection confirms the truth we have received via God's written revelation.

Avergüénzate de morir hasta que no hayas conseguido una victoria para la humanidad

Facing issues of this magnitude, it's unreasonable to think that anyone comes to the investigation with no personal hopes or preexisting beliefs. However,

...nem a tiszta agresszió mint olyan a rossz, hanem az az agresszió, melyet elkövetője jogosnak hisz. A rossz a kifordított jó.

5. Early testimony supports historical claims. The closer the time between the event and testimony about it, the more reliable the witness, since there is less time for exaggeration, and even legend, to creep into theaccount.

Jefferson was a different kind of man from Robert E. Lee, and the inconsistencies in his position just demonstrate how the American revolution is an unfinished project (as Habermas would have put it). In some sense, its true conclusion, its second act, was the Civil War; in another sense, it was over only in 1960, with the realization of the black right to vote; and in another sense, as the persistence of the Confederacy myth demonstrates, it is not yet over today.

At heart, the mobile concept is about being in control—as a separate and distinct individual. This is the basis of mobilising the concept of communication—that it’s an activity undertaken by an individual, over which that individual seeks control. (20)

Even the highly critical New Testament scholar Rudolf Bultmann agreed that historical criticism can establish "the fact that the first disciples came to believe in the resurrection" and that they thought they had seen the risen Jesus.67 Atheistic New Testament scholar Gerd Ludemann concludes, "It may be taken as historically certain that Peter and the disciples had experiences after Jesus' death in which Jesus appeared to them as the risen Christ."6R Paula Fredriksen of Boston University comments, "I know in their own terms what they saw was the raised Jesus. That's what they say and then all the historic evidence we have afterwards attest to their conviction that that's what they saw. I'm not saying that they really did see the raised Jesus. I wasn't there. I don't know what they saw. But I do know that as a historian that they must have seen something.

En el punto de partida de las ciencias empírico-analíticas hay un interés técnico, en el de las histórico-hermenéuticas un interés práctico, y en el de las ciencias orientadas críticamente aquel interés emancipatorio del conocimiento que, sin concederlo, estaba ya como base de las teorías tradicionales.

The expansion of the public sphere, from the 18th century onward, has led to a growth of democratically elected political institutions, independent courts, and bills of rights. But Habermas believes that many of these brakes on the arbitrary use of power are now under threat. Newspapers, for example, can offer opportunities for reasoned dialogue between private individuals, but if the press is controlled by large corporations, such opportunities may diminish. Informed debate on issues of substance is replaced with celebrity gossip, and we are transformed from critical, rational agents into mindless consumers.

Jürgen Habermas currently ranks as one of the most influential philosophers in the world. Bridging continental and Anglo-American traditions of thought, he has engaged in debates with thinkers as diverse as Gadamer and Putnam, Foucault and Rawls, Derrida and Brandom. His extensive written work addresses topics stretching from social-political theory to aesthetics, epistemology and language to philosophy of religion, and his ideas have significantly influenced not only philosophy but also political-legal thought, sociology, communication studies, argumentation theory and rhetoric, developmental psychology and theology.

At Berkeley the Free Speech Movement arose simultaneously with the hippie world of drugs. At first it was politically neither left nor right, but rather a call for the freedom to express any political views on Sproul Plaza. Then soon the Free Speech Movement became the Dirty Speech Movement, in which freedom was seen as shouting four-letter words into a mike. Soon after, it became the platform for the political New Left which followed the teaching of Herbert Marcuse (1898–). Marcuse was a German professor of philosophy related to the neo-Marxist teaching of the “Frankfurt School,” along with Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), Max Horkheimer (1895–) and Jürgen Habermas (1929–).

The retreat of the state from the function on which its claims to legitimation were founded for the better part of the past century throws the issue of legitimation wide open again. A new citizenship consensus (‘constitutional patriotism’, to deploy Jürgen Habermas’s term) cannot be presently built in the way it used to be built not so long ago: through the assurance of constitutional protection against the vagaries of the market, notorious for playing havoc with social standings and for sapping rights to social esteem and personal dignity. The integrity of the political body in its currently most common form of a nation-state is in trouble, and so an alternative legitimation is urgently needed and sought. In

there is an important difference between the apostle martyrs and those who die for their beliefs today. Modern martyrs act solely out of their trust in beliefs that others have taught them. The apostles died for holding to their own testimony that they had personally seen the risen Jesus. Contemporary martyrs die for what they believe to be true. The disciples of Jesus died for what they knew to be either true or false.

In New York University media scholar Jay Rosen’s definition, journalism is a report on “what’s going on” in the community with which one identifies but outside the scope of individual experience: what happens in a place where you are not, at a time when you are doing something else. Journalists report on people who are unlike the people you know personally but whom you still consider your countrymen; on the proceedings and decisions of your government; on plays, movies, books, and music that you have not necessarily experienced firsthand but that form the culture in which you live. Journalism is essential to democracy because it creates a sense of shared reality across a city, a state, a nation. Without this shared reality, a public sphere—the term philosopher Jürgen Habermas uses to describe the space where public opinion takes shape—cannot exist.

Habermas says that our work upon the world has the instrumental interest of "technical control." When we engage in producing something our only interest is to empirically analyze reality to know how to control it for production. This does not promote a dialectic between ourselves and our social reality; it brings us to technical know-how but not to critical consciousness. Our communication with others has a "practical interest" of maintaining and promoting understanding within our traditions and communities of discourse. It enables people to interpret their world as it appears to be according to shared "pre-understandings." However, this practical interest makes such hermeneutics unlikely to encourage people in a dialectical relationship with their sociocultural world. The third mode of social engagement, however–participation in "politics"–can be undergirded by an "emancipatory interest" that reflects the human quest for freedom.

Postmoderniteit is voorlopig de meest recente samenlevingsvorm die zich ten tijde van de anomische technische arbeidsverdeling heeft gemanifesteerd. Ze is de opvolger van de moderniteit die zelf de opvolger van de traditionele samenleving was. Postmoderniteit mag niet worden verward met postmodernisme dat een periodecode in de kunst was, ook een (trieste) manier van filosofisch denken dat zich vooral heeft verspreid tussen 1970 en 1995 in Frankrijk – een idiote manier van denken die voorhield dat in de wetenschap algemene theorieën niet langer mogelijk zijn en dat er in een gedicht meer cognitieve waarheid verscholen zit dan in het complete Standard Model van de Fysica. De postmoderne filosofie is, met enige recul bekeken, een staaltje van hoogdravende nonsens geweest, ware het alleen nog maar omdat ze ontkende dat in de menswetenschap algemene theorieën onmogelijk zijn, als had het baanbrekend werk van Jürgen Habermas en Niklas Luhmann geen cognitieve betekenis.

We observe that the life of Jesus differs substantially from typical alien accounts. Aliens usually arrive in a spaceship; Jesus was born on earth. Aliens usually appear for a very short time; Jesus was on earth for over thirty years. The usual report of an encounter with aliens describes them as abusive; Jesus was loving and compassionate. The supposition that life exists in the universe outside Earth is questionable. Contrary to the popular media's portrayal of aliens in movies like ET, Cocoon, and Contact, the scientific evidence from astrophysics within the past thirty-five years makes it seem increasingly improbable that life exists anywhere else in the cosmos.

There is a virtual consensus among scholars who study Jesus' resurrection that, subsequent to Jesus' death by crucifixion, his disciples really believed that he appeared to them risen from the dead. This conclusion has been reached by data that suggest that (1) the disciples themselves claimed that the risen Jesus had appeared to them, and (2) subsequent to Jesus' death by crucifixion, his disciples were radically transformed from fearful, cowering individuals who denied and abandoned him at his arrest and execution into bold proclaimers of the gospel of the risen Lord. They remained steadfast in the face of imprisonment, torture, and martyrdom. It is very clear that they sincerely believed that Jesus rose from the dead.

When Jesus predicted his resurrection from the dead, we are told that the disciples did not seem to have a clue what he was talking about or simply did not believe (Mark 8:31-33; 9:31-32; 14:27-31; Luke 24:13-24). Even when his empty tomb was discovered, it is reported that the first conclusion was that someone had stolen the body (John 20:2, 13-15). When the women reported that they had seen him risen, the disciples thought they were telling an idle tale (Luke 24:10-12). Upon viewing the empty tomb, they still did not know what to think (John 20:9).Thomas simply refused to believe (John 20:24-25). Now it seems quite unlikely that the disciples or early Christians who highly respected them would invent sayings of Jesus that would place them in such a bad light.This is what is referred to as the "principle of embarrassment," which will be discussed later, and argues strongly in favor of the authenticity of the predictions of Jesus concerning his resurrection.

Nietzsche’s ‘theory of knowledge’ […] consists in the attempt to comprehend the categorical framework of the natural sciences (space, time, event), the concept of laws (causality), the operational axis of experience (measurement), and the rules of logic and calculation as the relative a priori of a world of objective illusion that has been produced for the purposes of mastering nature and of preserving existence: “the entire cognitive apparatus is an apparatus for abstraction and simplification—not directed at knowledge but at the control of things: ‘end’ and ‘means’ are as far from the essence as are ‘concepts.’” […] Nietzsche conceives science as the activity through which we turn ‘nature’ into concepts for the purpose of mastering nature. The compulsion to logical correctness and empirical accuracy exemplifies the constraint of the interest in possible technical control over objectified natural processes, and thereby the compulsion to preserving existence.

For while asceticism is certainly an important strand in the frugal tradition, so, too, is the celebration of simple pleasures. Indeed, one argument that is made repeatedly in favor of simple living is that it helps one to appreciate more fully elementary and easily obtained pleasures such as the enjoyment of companionship and natural beauty. This is another example of something we have already noted: the advocates of simple living do not share a unified and consistent notion of what it involves. Different thinkers emphasize different aspects of the idea, and some of these conflict. Truth, unlike pleasure, has rarely been viewed as morally suspect. Its value is taken for granted by virtually all philosophers. Before Nietzsche, hardly anyone seriously considered as a general proposition the idea that truth may not necessarily be beneficial.26 There is a difference, though, between the sort of truth the older philosophers had in mind and the way truth is typically conceived of today. Socrates, the Epicureans, the Cynics, the Stoics, and most of the other sages assume that truth is readily available to anyone with a good mind who is willing to think hard. This is because their paradigm of truth—certainly the truth that matters most—is the sort of philosophical truth and enlightenment that can be attained through a conversation with like-minded friends in the agora or the garden. Searching for and finding such truth is entirely compatible with simple living. But today things are different. We still enjoy refined conversation about philosophy, science, religion, the arts, politics, human nature, and many other areas of theoretical interest. And these conversations do aim at truth, in a sense. As Jürgen Habermas argues, building on Paul Grice’s analysis of conversational conventions, regardless of how we actually behave and our actual motivations, our discussions usually proceed on the shared assumption that we are all committed to establishing the truth about the topic under discussion.27 But a different paradigm of truth now dominates: the paradigm of truth established by science. For the most part this is not something that ordinary people can pursue by themselves through reflection, conversation, or even backyard observation and experiment. Does dark matter exist? Does eating blueberries decrease one’s chances of developing cancer? Is global warming producing more hurricanes? Does early involvement with music and dance make one smarter or morally better? Are generous people happier than misers? People may discuss such questions around the table. But in most cases when we talk about such things, we are ultimately prepared to defer to the authority of the experts whose views and findings are continually reported in the media.

We can start with approximately nine traditional authors of the New Testament. If we consider the critical thesis that other authors wrote the pastoral letters and such letters as Ephesians and 2 Thessalonians, we'd have an even larger number. Another twenty early Christian authors20 and four heretical writings mention Jesus within 150 years of his death on the cross.21 Moreover, nine secular, non-Christian sources mention Jesus within the 150 years: Josephus, the Jewish historian; Tacitus, the Roman historian; Pliny the Younger, a politician of Rome; Phlegon, a freed slave who wrote histories; Lucian, the Greek satirist; Celsus, a Roman philosopher; and probably the historians Suetonius and Thallus, as well as the prisoner Mara Bar-Serapion.22 In all, at least forty-two authors, nine of them secular, mention Jesus within 150 years of his death. In comparison, let's take a look at Julius Caesar, one of Rome's most prominent figures. Caesar is well known for his military conquests. After his Gallic Wars, he made the famous statement, "I came, I saw, I conquered." Only five sources report his military conquests: writings by Caesar himself, Cicero, Livy, the Salona Decree, and Appian.23 If Julius Caesar really made a profound impact on Roman society, why didn't more writers of antiquity mention his great military accomplishments? No one questions whether Julius did make a tremendous impact on the Roman Empire. It is evident that he did. Yet in those 150 years after his death, more non-Christian authors alone comment on Jesus than all of the sources who mentioned Julius Caesar's great military conquests within 150 years of his death. Let's look at an even better example, a contemporary of Jesus. Tiberius Caesar was the Roman emperor at the time of Jesus' ministry and execution. Tiberius is mentioned by ten sources within 150 years of his death: Tacitus, Suetonius, Velleius Paterculus, Plutarch, Pliny the Elder, Strabo, Seneca, Valerius Maximus, Josephus, and Luke.24 Compare that to Jesus' forty-two total sources in the same length of time. That's more than four times the number of total sources who mention the Roman emperor during roughly the same period. If we only considered the number of secular non-Christian sources who mention Jesus and Tiberius within 150 years of their lives, we arrive at a tie of nine each.25

It is agreeable to imagine a future in which the tiresome ‘analytic–Continental split’ is looked back upon as an unfortunate, temporary breakdown of communication – a future in which Sellars and Habermas, Davidson and Gadamer, Putnam and Derrida, Rawls and Foucault, are seen as fellow-travelers on the same journey, fellow-citizens of what Michael Oakeshott called a civitas pelegrina. (Rorty 1997a, pp. 11–12)

In Hegel's case the irony ceases at the end of the system, because all the negatives lead eventually to the positive recognition that one has exhausted negativity: negativity is the path to the truth. Romantic irony, on the other hand, does not come to an end. The sense that we can never rest with a final certainty becomes the essential fact about our being. Romantic irony is, then, an attitude of mind which tries to come to terms with the finitude of every individual's existence, rather than trying to transcend that finitude by reaching a positive, philosophical conclusion. The scepticism involved in Romantic irony is not the kind of scepticism which worries about whether all our beliefs might be false, but rather a kind of 'fallibilism', which assumes we may always come up with new and better ways of dealing with things, because being transcends what we know of it.

There are, then, no easy answers to the questions raised by a thinker who may best be understood in performative terms. Their texts may be trying to provoke the reader to respond by, for example, saying something which the author does not actually believe. In that case, objecting to the argument merely means that one falls into the trap set by the text, in the way one looks silly by taking something seriously that is meant as a joke. One strategy is to accept that much of what is happening in Nietzsche's texts is indeed more performance than argument, but to look very carefully at the moments when performance gives way to assertion of a kind that cannot be construed as ironic or as merely performative. A further strategy is to keep in mind the ideological context of his writing. Although the Nietzsche of after the BT cannot be considered as a German nationalist, his elitism and his tendency to regard social issues as though they were biological issues - for example in relation to the idea that societies and cultures can become 'sick' - are very much part of reactionary thought in the second half of the nineteenth century. Such ideas fed into Nazism and other anti-democratic movements in the twentieth century, and are neither Nietzsche's creation, nor of any serious philosophical interest.

A Hegelian might then argue that this indeterminacy of being is precisely the point: it is only when being becomes something via social interchange that it is conceptually significant. Hegel's conception would seem compatible with an essentially left-wing conception of the centrality of social and political perspectives, rather than merely philosophical ones. Why, then, do Feuerbach and the other Young Hegelians come to oppose Hegel? For the most significant German thinkers after Hegel, from Feuerbach, to Nietzsche, Heidegger and Habermas himself, the very understanding of the task of philosophy in modernity becomes an issue because of the demise of Hegel's emphatic conception of the status of philosophy. If philosophy no longer can, or should, play a decisive systematizing role in modernity, what are the alternatives for dealing with what had formerly been seen as philosophical issues? One way of considering the perceived dangers of Hegel's approach to philosophy is in sociopolitical terms. The idea is that Hegel's philosophy subordinates real people to abstractions. This is precisely what Marx thinks that modern capitalism also does to them, by giving money, the abstract medium through which value is exchanged in society, precedence over people.

On the one hand, a language is a means by which a culture symbolizes its identity, binding the members of a social grouping to each other. On the other, the people who do not speak this language are excluded, both because they cannot speak it and because the language will not express their world anyway. Read positively, in the manner of Hamann, Herder's conception means that people are able to explore other worlds by acquiring other languages. Read negatively, it means that one's language can become a factor in a nationalistic exclusion of 'the Other' who does not share one's language. [...] At the same time, there is an essential difference between the linguistic nationalism of an oppressed people attempting to assert themselves, and the linguistic nationalism of the kind that played a role in Nazism's attempts to 'purify' the German language of foreign words. Herder himself was thoroughly liberal and progressive, which suggests how complex an issue the relationship of language to national identity can be. Ideas which in one context are thoroughly progressive can, in a different historical context, be anything but progressive.

The manner of Hamann's writing here is also part of the argument. The rhetorical aspect cannot, as we saw above, just be subtracted in order to arrive at 'the argument'. Hamann enacts his suspicion of the reduction of philosophical language to abstract foundations via his rhetorical verve. It should be apparent, then, that Hamann's position cannot be regarded as questionable just because of its employment of rhetoric. Whatever else one may think of it, the position is internally consistent. The attempt to rid philosophy of rhetoric falls prey precisely to the fact that what is involved in rhetoric is inherent in what is built into all natural languages by their genesis in the real historical world.

This realization can lead to the demand to live life to the full now, but it can also be a traumatic shock to a believer, who may start to doubt in a way which is wholly disorienting. The latter response is part of what Nietzsche terms 'nihilism', which is the result of holding metaphysical beliefs that turn out to be illusory. Avoiding nihilism means never even entertaining such comforting fictions in the first place, so that there is nothing to lose.

In this present book, we are taking what Christian philosopher Gary Habermas, in another context, calls “the minimalist facts approach.” We are only going to say what can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We are not going to present a hagiography of George Washington, i.e., we will not make him into an ecclesiastical saint. But we do believe that his own words and actions show that he was a Christian and not an unbelieving Deist.

the case with Heidegger, Horkheimer, and Adorno. Their prose wears its difficulty as a badge of pride, on the grounds that philosophy needs to be challenging if there is to be any point to it.38 By employing allusions, ambiguities, word play, and an array of other rhetorical devices, these thinkers attempt to counter what they see as the increasing scientification and commercialization of language and thought.

government is legitimate not so much because it represents the 'general will', but because its policies are, ideally and counterfactually, the result of the public deliberation of all who are concerned by the decision

Habermas (1971–1973) described ideology as motivated false consciousness of social classes. He outlined the potential resolution of this false consciousness by means of a “critical theory” that would provide self-reflective enlightenment together with social emancipation. Ideology, within this conception, and also related ones of Marxist writers, implies, according to Althusser (1976), an unconsciously determined system of illusory representations of reality. This system, said Althusser, derived from the internalization of the dominant illusion a social class harbored about the conditions of its own existence, is achieved by means of the internalization of the “Paternal law” as part of the internalization of the oedipal superego. Habermas drew a parallel between the philosophical analysis of ideologies by means of critical theory, on the one hand, and the psychoanalytic situation, on the other. In psychoanalytic treatment, the patient also starts out with a “false consciousness,” and is helped by the analyst to gain enlightenment by means of self-reflection, an enlightenment geared to emancipation of the patient. If psychoanalysis frees the individual from an ideology as a false consciousness, one effect of psychoanalysis would be to eliminate the proneness to embrace ideologies. But Marxist thinkers, as Kolakowski (1978) points out, are caught in the dilemma that Marxism itself represents an ideology (notwithstanding the traditional Marxist efforts to solve the paradox by declaring Marxism to be a science rather than an ideology).

Marx atribuye a la ciencia y a la investigación un papel liberador, "crítico y revolucionario", como lo afirma en el postfacio de la segunda edición de El Capital. Toda investigación en educación, incapaz de comprometerse con ese principio liberador, ocultándose atrás del llamado "rigor metodológico", es necesariamente una investigación conservadora. Como demostró exhaustivamen-te Jürgen Habermas, la ideología (mistificación) de la in-vestigación en ciencias humanas es la reducción de todos los intereses al de las ciencias naturales, que es el interés instrumental. En las sociedades comprometidas en el proceso de racio-nalización (modernización), la investigación científica es uti-lizada como instrumento de legitimación de la dominación: a dominación es justificada "científicamente". De ahí surge que desde el punto de vista marxista, los modelos emergen-tes de la investigación son superiores a los modelos tradicio-nales. Los modelos emergentes de la investigación ya no representan el punto de vista de una clase determinada para ejercer una futura dominación sobre otra clase, sino el punto de vista de una clase cuya histórica misión es superar esa dominación.

The explanation of language depends upon its fulfilling criteria demanded by reason. Reason, though, itself requires language. The character of any natural language has a great deal to do with the history of the interactions with the world of the people whose language it is. Even if we can no longer accept a theological story of creation, the immediacy of human contact with things and the development of language do go hand in hand, as the primacy of practical vocabulary before abstractions in the history of languages suggests. Any attempt to generalize about language without taking this historical basis into account will lead to a conception of language in which an abstract conception of reason is prior. Hamann's polemic against such positions is often couched in sexual terms: revelation is most powerful when it occurs through the body's libidinal link to other parts of the universe. The very fact that languages sometimes divide the world up in terms of genders is therefore one key to understanding how language is attached to the world.

Los dataístas oponen a la teoría de la acción comunicativa de Habermas una teoría behaviorista de la información que prescinde del discurso.

should

a true great reset. It is no secret what needs to be done—Greta Thunberg has made it clear. First, we should finally recognize the pandemic crisis for what it is: part of a global crisis of our entire way of life, from ecology to new social tensions. Second, we should establish social control and regulation over the economy. Third, we should rely on science, but without simply accepting it as the agent of decision-making. Why not? Let’s return to Habermas, with whom we began: our predicament is that we are compelled to act while knowing that we don’t know the full coordinates of the situation we are in, and non-acting would itself function as an act. But is this not the basic situation of every action? Our great advantage is that we know how much we don’t know, and this knowing about our not-knowing opens up a space of freedom. We act when we don’t know the whole situation, but this is not simply our limitation. What gives us freedom is that the situation—in our social sphere, at least—is in itself open, not fully (pre)determined.

2. Attestation by an enemy supports historical claims. If testimony affirming an event or saying is given by a source who does not sympathize with the person, message, or cause that profits from the account, we have an indication ofauthenticity.

Second, Paul came to Christ through an experience in which he thought he encountered the risen Jesus. This account also dates very early. We need reasons for his conversion from unbelief, since his conversion was based on a personal appearance of Jesus and counts very heavily against embellishment.

Although the nonhistorical genre theory can seem quite reasonable at first glance, it is plagued with serious problems. First, it cannot account for the empty tomb, especially since this can be established by multiple arguments, even from texts outside the New Testament accounts.')

Jesus' use of the title "Son of Man" in reference to his resurrection predictions (Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:33-34) weighs in favor of authenticity. As argued in chapter 10 ("Who Did Jesus Think He Was?"), one reason for thinking that Jesus claimed this title is that it is recorded by multiple sources. Further, the New Testament epistles never refer to Jesus in this manner. But neither did the Jews think of the Son of Man in the sense of a suffering Messiah (see Dan. 7:13-14). So the principle of dissimilarity points to authenticity here. This criterion "focuses on words or deeds of Jesus that cannot be derived either from Judaism at the time of Jesus or from the early Church after him

As for our own age, Habermas speaks of “a refeudalization of the public sphere,” what with the fusion of news and advertising, the corporate ownership of media, the return of government secrecy, the intrusion of celebrity into politics,

We may abandon a holistic, metaphysical ideal of natural law reconciled with cultural configurations; but we cannot abandon a vision of a humanity freed from such pathologies without simultaneously siding with the worst kind of system-reproductive education.

In centrul teoriei lui Habermas sta distinctia dintre lumea vietii si sistem, doua sfere deosebite ale vietii sociale, fiecare avand propriie reguli, institutii, tipare de comportament si asa mai departe. Lumea vietii si sistemul sunt sediul actiunii comunicative si, respectiv, al actiunii instrumentale. Lumea vietii este un concept care desemneaza lumea pe care o impartim cu ceilalti. Ea este denumirea lui Habermas pentru domeniile informale si necorcializate ale vietii sociale: familia si gospodaria, cultura, viata politica din afara partidelor organizate, mass-medias, organizatiile voluntare si asa mai departe. Aceste sfere nereglementate ale socialitatii sunt un depozitar de semnificatii si intelesuri comune, si un orizont social pentru intalnirile cotidiene cu alti oameni. Acest orizont este fundalul pe care are loc actiunea comunicativa. Metafora fenomenologica a orizontului are rol instructiv. Un orizont desemneaza limita campului vizual al fiintei umane in conditii normale. Campul vizual este unitar, dar nu este un intreg, intrucat el nu poate fi receptat tot odata. Nu putem vedea intregul orizont pentru ca privim in cate o directie pe rand. In plus, horizontul este limitat la o perspectiva: limita se deplaseaza, chiar daca putin cate putin, atunci cand ne miscam ca o libelula. Prin contrast, limitele unei figuri geometrice, sau ale unei portiuni de teren, sunt fixe si masurabile.

Socializarea in lumea vietii este un fel de moralizare - un proces prin care se creeaza obisnuinta de a actiona potrivit unor idealuri. Prin contrast, sistemele inculca obiceiurile instrumentale de a-i trata pe ceilalti ca mijloc pentru scopurile proprii, si stimuleaza indiferenta fata de scopurile altora. In acest caz, nu putem ignora observatia lui Adorno potrivit careia raceala si indiferenta claselor de mijloc a fost 'principiul fara de care Auschqitz nu s-ar fi putut intampla vreodata.

Socialul este o structura intersubiective complexa si variata, cuprinzand sfere distincte si suprapuse in interiorul carora interactioneaza agentii individuali.

Din cauza opacitatii inerente a sistemelor sociale, semnificatia actiunilor depaseste capacitatea agentilor de a le intelege si de a-si asuma responsabilitatea pentru ele.

Societatile moderne sunt construite astfel incat oricarui agent, in orice situatie, i se poate cere sa isi justifice actiunile, iar el s-a angajat dinainte sa faca acest lucru. Atfel, motivele sunt liniile invizibile de-a lungul carora se desfasoara secventele interactiunii, si care ii indeparteaza pe agenti de conflict. Pe masura ce agentii sociali se obisnuiesc ca actiunile lor sa fie orientate de vorbire si de recunoasterea reciproca a motivelor intemeiate, incep sa se formeze tipare relativ stabile ale ordinii sociale, care nu depind direct de amentari credibile cu pedeapsa, traditii religioase comune sau valori morale preexistente.

Din perspectiva standard, semnificatia actiunilor depinde de conditiile de adevar ale atitudinilor propozitionale atribuite indivizilor in baza comportamentului lor exterior, si de deductiile logice efectuate in mintea fiecaruia. Rezultatul este o falsa imagine a societatii ca amestec de indivizi care rationeaza, fiecare calculand cea mai buna cale de urmarire a scopurilor proprii. Aceasta imagine corespunde unei perspective antropologice dominante potrivit careia fiintele umane sunt, in esenta, orientate in jurul interesului propriu, perspectiva provenind de la grecii antici, trecand prin filozofia moderna timpurie, si ajungand pana in prezent. Din perspectiva lui Habermas, astfel de abordari neglijeaza rolul crucial al comunicarii si discursului in formarea legaturilor sociale dintre agenti, si, in consecinta, conceptia lor privind asocierile dintre oameni este incorecta.

Nietzsche shares the positivist conception of science. Only that information which meets the criteria of empirical=scientific results counts as knowledge in rigorous sense. […] Like Comte before him, Nietzsche conceives the critical consequences of scientific technical progress as overcoming metaphysics. […] The process of enlightenment made possible by the sciences is critical, but the critical dissolution of dogmas produces not liberation but indifference. It is not emancipatory but nihilistic.

Habermas articulated the official postwar ideal for German citizenry: to be attached primarily to the liberal democratic order rather than to any ethnic or nationalistic concept of Germany.

Constitutional patriotism’ theory was first projected by Sternberger in 1990 as a theory for European identity [Stojanovic 2003, 79]. After him, Habermas redeveloped this theory. The impact of this theory in the European integration has been huge because it argues for the creation of a demos detached from ethnic ties, as it is the case of EU. Breda [2011, 1] writes that “since its first appearance just over a decade ago, Habermas' constitutional patriotism has inspired a rich and articulate series of theoretical analyses and has indirectly encouraged constitutional projects such as the Constitution for Europe”.

Let me make this point again. 1 Corinthians predates the gospels, and 1 Corinthians 15 is the longest extended treatment of the resurrection before the four gospels. So really, on the timeline, the gospels were written later. So here we’ve got the chronological horse of Paul’s epistles in the right place, before the gospel cart.

Paul did not invent the deity of Christ, either, as we sometimes hear. Lofty titles for Jesus do in fact appear all over Paul’s “authentic” epistles. But they are also found in the early sermon summaries in Acts, and perhaps most importantly, in the pre-Pauline creedal statements that are earlier than Paul’s epistles themselves, such as those found in Romans 1:3-4, 10:9, 1 Corinthians 8:6, or Philippians 2:6-11.

the four major Petrine sermon summaries in Acts 2-5, and finds most prominently the ideas of preaching the Messianic fulfillment in the dawning Kingdom of God, the ministry, Deity, death, and resurrection of Jesus, and the resurrection as the chief indicator that Jesus is the exalted Lord.

Son of Man is Jesus’ favorite self-designation in the gospels and at least twice, one of them in Mark 14, he basically paraphrases some of the vital elements of Daniel 7:13-14. Then he clearly identifies himself as that last person. The Jewish high priest asks Jesus, “Are you the Christ [Messiah], the Son of the Blessed One?” Notice Jesus’ response: Ego eimi, “I am.

Nevertheless, the possibility that the evolved order in which we live provides us with opportunities for happiness that equal or exceed those provided by primitive orders to far fewer people should not be dismissed (which is not to say that such matters can be calculated). Much of the ‘alienation’ or unhappiness of modern life stems from two sources, one of which affects primarily intellectuals, the other, all beneficiaries of material abundance. The first is a self-fulfilling prophecy of unhappiness for those within any ‘system’ that does not satisfy rationalistic criteria of conscious control. Thus intellectuals from Rousseau to such recent figures in French and German thought as Foucault and Habermas regard alienation as rampant in any system in which an order is ‘imposed’ on individuals without their conscious consent; consequently, their followers tend to find civilisation unbearable – by definition, as it were. Secondly, the persistence of instinctual feelings of altruism and solidarity subject those who follow the impersonal rules of the extended order to what is now fashionably called ‘bad conscience’; similarly, the acquisition of material success is supposed to be attended with feelings of guilt (or ‘social conscience’). In the midst of plenty, then, there is unhappiness not only born of peripheral poverty, but also of the incompatibility, on the part of instinct and of a hubristic reason, with an order that is of a decidedly non-instinctive and extra-rational character.

As Habermas says, we exist under the meta-logical force of our natural history, our contingent evolution into a species that not only perceives in a certain manner but also has a particular capacity to symbolize. In Nietzsche, Kantian categories are subsumed under the meta-logical principle of natural selection, as stated in later Nachlaß material (quoted here from Habermas): “We would not have the intellect we have if we did not need to have it (Nietzsche, WM 498523).” […] “In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was need that was authoritative (Nietzsche, WM 515524).” Thus, Kantian synthetic a priori judgments are not true in the sense that a concept corresponds to reality itself, they are ‘true’ in the sense that they have proven themselves useful in the service of preserving life. If truth is a fiction, and if the thing-in-itself as truth is a fiction, the correspondence theory of truth also becomes impossible to uphold. It all comes down to the preservation of man and, as Nietzsche says, “the preservation of man is not a proof of truth (Nietzsche, WM 497525).” Also noted by Habermas, Nietzsche always presupposes the classical metaphysical-ontological concept of truth, when he criticizes the ‘transcendental a priori’ or the ‘thing-in-itself.’ Against this exacting ideal of truth, truth-claims have to fail, and they seem to dwindle into the insignificant and random.

It is well known that in subsequent years a “European constitution” was drafted, with the unexpected consequence—which should have been anticipated—that it was rejected by the “citizens as people” [“popolo dei cittadini ”] who were asked to ratify what was certainly not an expression of their constituent power. The fact is that, if to Grimm and the theorists of the people-constitution nexus one could object that they still harked back to the common presuppositions of language and public opinion, to Habermas and the theorists of the people-communica- tion one could easily object that they ended up passing political power into the hands of experts and the media. What our investigation has shown is that the holistic state, founded on the immediate presence of the acclaiming people, and the neutralized state that re- solves itself in the communicative forms without subject, are opposed only in appearance. They are nothing but two sides of the same glorious apparatus in its two forms: the immediate and subjective glory of the acclaiming people and the mediatic and objective glory of social communication. As should be evident today, people-nation and people-communication, despite the differences in behavior and figure, are the two faces of the doxa that, as such, ceaselessly interweave and separate themselves in contemporary society. In this interlacing of elements, the “democratic” and secular theorists of communicative action risk finding them- selves side by side with conservative thinkers of acclamation such as Schmitt and Peterson; but this is precisely the price that must be paid each time by theoretical elaborations that think they can do without archaeological precautions.

One of the world’s most prominent philosophers, Jürgen Habermas, was for decades a defender of the Enlightenment view that only secular reason should be used in the public square.9 Habermas has recently startled the philosophical establishment, however, with a changed and more positive attitude toward religious faith. He now believes that secular reason alone cannot account for what he calls “the substance of the human.” He argues that science cannot provide the means by which to judge whether its technological inventions are good or bad for human beings. To do that, we must know what a good human person is, and science cannot adjudicate morality or define such a thing.10 Social sciences may be able to tell us what human life is but not what it ought to be.11 The dream of nineteenth-century humanists had been that the decline of religion would lead to less warfare and conflict. Instead the twentieth century has been marked by even greater violence, performed by states that were ostensibly nonreligious and operating on the basis of scientific rationality. Habermas tells those who are still confident that “philosophical reason . . . is capable of determining what is true and false” to simply look at the “catastrophes of the twentieth century—religious fascist and communist states, operating on the basis of practical reason—to see that this confidence is misplaced.”12 Terrible deeds have been done in the name of religion, but secularism has not proven to be an improvement.

Frankfurt School Critical Theory is generally understood as a body of social thought both emerging from and responding to Marxism, and the work of critical theorists is recognized as having made significant contributions to the study of [culture] … Emphasizing issues of consciousness and culture, the critical theorists have … stressed the role of human agency in affecting revolutionary social change. … Theory with practical intent seeks not only to understand the world but also to transform it.

El 19 de enero de 2004 Joseph Ratzinger reconocía —en su célebre coloquio con Jürgen Habermas— que si la religión se desliga de su responsabilidad ante la razón surgen patologías muy peligrosas: el reciente ejemplo del 11 de septiembre de 2001 así lo demostraba.

One might ask whether God could have done a miraculous act to cause someone to be crucified in Jesus’ place; this is the Islamic escape hypothesis often attributed to the Quran (Surah 4:157–8) and Gospel of Barnabas 217. Habermas and Licona (2004, pp. 184–185) object that both of them were written centuries after the time of Jesus and thus are of dubious worth as historical sources concerning Jesus.

Concerning non-historical (or chiefly mythical) persons who were reportedly apotheosized or raised from the dead (e.g. Osiris [see Chapter 1], Romulus, Asclepius, Mitra, and Krishna), Habermas (1989) notes, in each of these cases we find numerous problems such as a decided lack of historical data, reports that are far too late (e.g. Ovid and Livy wrote about 700 years after Romulus was supposed to have lived) or stories about mythical personages who never lived.

Habermas states that ‘modernity revolts against the normalizing functions of tradition’ and persists in the habit of ‘rebelling against all that is normative’ (Habermas 1985: 5). He goes further and suggests that postmodernism is the most recent version of modernism and just another ‘abstract opposition between tradition and the present’ (1985: 4).

Es lo que Habermas llamaría “fascismo de izquierda”. Aquellos que no creen un ápice en la democracia y el debate de ideas, sino que simplemente desean usar el Estado para imponer las suyas.

Habermas writes: “The ideals of freedom . . . of conscience, human rights and democracy [are] the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. . . . To this day there is no alternative to it.”17 None of this denies that science and reason are sources of enormous and irreplaceable good for human society. The point is rather that science alone cannot serve as a guide for human society.18 This was well summarized in a speech that was written for but never delivered at the Scopes “monkey trial”: “Science is a magnificent material force, but it is not a teacher of morals. It can perfect machinery, but it adds no moral restraints to protect society from the misuse of the machine. . . . Science does not [and cannot] teach brotherly love.”19 Secular, scientific reason is a great good, but if taken as the sole basis for human life, it will be discovered that there are too many things we need that it is missing.

College students often ask me why anyone should pay for professional journalism when there are plenty of people out there, like themselves, willing to write blogs for free? One answer is that government and corporations are investing millions of dollars into their professional communications campaigns. We deserve at least a few professionals working full-time to evaluate all this messaging and doing so with some level of expertise in ascertaining the truth. Young people are not alone in their skepticism about the value of professional journalism. A 2010 Gallup Poll showed Americans at an under 25 percent confidence in newspapers and television news—a record low. Pew Research shows faith in traditional news media spiking downward as Internet use spikes upward, and that a full 42 percent believe that news organizations hurt democracy. This is twice the percentage who believed that in the mid-1980s, before the proliferation of the net. As cultural philosopher Jürgen Habermas offered during his acceptance speech of a humanitarian award in 2006, "The price we pay for the growth in egalitarianism offered by the Internet is the decentralized access to unedited stories. In this medium, contributions by intellectuals lose their power to create a focus." To be sure, the rise of citizen journalism brings us information that the mainstream media lacks either the budget for or fortitude to cover. Initial reports of damage during Hurricane Katrina came from bloggers and amateur videographers. However, these reports also inflated body counts and spread rumors about rape and violence in the Superdome that were later revealed not to have occurred.

The public sphere invented during this time period, which Habermas writes is “always already oriented to an audience,” even in its moments of reading and private media consumption, is not observed by an eye that watches from above. Rather, it is inspected and scrutinized by other self-governing actors within the public sphere, creating the feeling of having to perform for invisible eyes while in public spaces all of the time.

Besides striking it rich, Day accomplished something else, too. For even more than the business model, the long-term social consequences of a newspaper for the masses were profound. Large numbers of people taking in daily news gave rise to what Jürgen Habermas has called a “public sphere”—a more quotidian term for this effect is “public opinion,” but by whatever name, it was a new phenomenon, and one dependent on the nascent but growing attention industry.

among this pool are these: (a) explanatory power, (b) explanatory scope, (c) plausibility, (d) degree of "ad hoc-ness" and (e) conformity with other beliefs. The more explanatory power and scope and the more plausibility and conformity with other beliefs an explanation has, the better it is. The less ad hoc (adjusted, contrived, artificial) the explanation, the better as well. The trick is to subject all explanation options to these

problema entre teoría y praxis, normalmente se considera que el filósofo debe actuar 'en consecuencia' con lo que dice y piensa. Hay pensadores como Habermas que sostienen que la teoría inevitablemente está traspasada y en algún sentido, dirigida por los intereses, creencias y deseos del investigador, incluso en las así llamadas ciencias 'duras'.