Var Stock Quotes

Value at risk (VaR) is a widely used measure of the risk of loss on a specific portfolio of financial assets, expressed in terms of a probability of losing a given percentage of the value of a portfolio—in mark-to-market value—over a certain time. For example, if a portfolio of stocks has a one-day 5 percent VaR of $1 million, there is a 0.05 probability that the portfolio will fall in value by more than $1 million over a one-day period. Informally, a loss of $1 million or more on this portfolio is expected on one day in twenty. Typically, banks report the VaR by risk type (e.g., interest rates, equity prices, currency rates, and commodity prices).

I forna tider var skogen vild och mörk samt ostängd åt alla håll; han var så tät, att man ej kunde fälla ett träd med mindre det hängde sig i de närstående. Därför var det ej så lätt för den tidens folk att öfver stock och sten äfventyra sig fram på de obanade skogsgatorna, då skogsfararna ofta ej hade någon annan rättledning än de bråtkasar, hvilka voro hopkastade vid vägen eller de barfläckar man här och hvar huggit i träden. Visserligen var trängseln i underskogen och det djupa dunklet under trädens kronor ganska lägligt för den rädda haren, nattugglorna och den smygande skogsräfven, men desto hemskare för de små bärplockarna och vallbarnen, hvilka i skymningen måste »löpa ko- eller lammaskog» för att innan sena kvällen få boskapen till foderhuset i skogen; under det att de fruktade att vara villade af skogstrollet, eller att få sofva natten öfver i skogen, läste de i ångesten ofta vid bråtkasen, hvilken de städse ökade genom att kasta dit en riskvist eller pinne: Jag ökar på dig Kal-mor! Gud giv' jag måtte få alla mina kor. Det var en offergåva åt Kalmor, det hemliga väsende eller en drake, som man trodde bo där under bråtkasen och råda öfver skogen. Och ändå hände det understundom, att barn och folk gingo vilse i de djupa stiglösa skogarna, hvarest ej sällan arga skälmar och röfvare gömde sig för rättvisans arm, hade sina kulor samt lefde af att råna och mörda. Men kommo de bortgångna ej hem efter dag och dygn, brukade man med kyrkklockan »ringa hop folk efter dem»; hvarefter, när de saknade omsider funnos igen och förts till bygd, syntes ögonen stundom helt hvita i hufvudet på dem af vildhet och vridna af förskräckelse. Dock lyckades man ej alltid finna de vilsegångna vid lif. Så hittade man en gång uti »Allehage» en gumma, som låg död af hunger, och gräset hade redan vuxit upp genom hennes utslagna hår.

The list of signals is passed to the function as a float array named sig. The float type is a variable type similar to var, but has lower precision and thus consumes less memory. sig[0] is the first signal passed to the advise function - in this case, it's priceHigh(2). sig[1] is the second signal - priceLow(2) - and so on. The signals are used inside the function just like the elements of a series.

To produce even steadier returns, we hedged the overall risk from our entire collection of hedges by neutralizing the impact on our portfolio of shifts in interest rates (across the spectrum of quality and maturity). We also offset the danger to the portfolio from sudden large shifts in overall stock market prices and in the volatility level of the market. From the 1980s on, some of these techniques came into usage by modern investment banks and hedge funds. They also adopted a notion we rejected, called VaR or “value at risk,” where they estimated the damage to their portfolio for, say, the worst events among the most likely 95 percent of future outcomes, neglecting the extreme 5 percent “tails,” then acted to reduce any unacceptably large risks. The defect of VaR alone is that it doesn’t fully account for the worst 5 percent of expected cases.

By now, though, it had been a steep learning curve, he was fairly well versed on the basics of how clearing worked: When a customer bought shares in a stock on Robinhood — say, GameStop — at a specific price, the order was first sent to Robinhood's in-house clearing brokerage, who in turn bundled the trade to a market maker for execution. The trade was then brought to a clearinghouse, who oversaw the trade all the way to the settlement. During this time period, the trade itself needed to be 'insured' against anything that might go wrong, such as some sort of systemic collapse or a default by either party — although in reality, in regulated markets, this seemed extremely unlikely. While the customer's money was temporarily put aside, essentially in an untouchable safe, for the two days it took for the clearing agency to verify that both parties were able to provide what they had agreed upon — the brokerage house, Robinhood — had to insure the deal with a deposit; money of its own, separate from the money that the customer had provided, that could be used to guarantee the value of the trade. In financial parlance, this 'collateral' was known as VAR — or value at risk. For a single trade of a simple asset, it would have been relatively easy to know how much the brokerage would need to deposit to insure the situation; the risk of something going wrong would be small, and the total value would be simple to calculate. If GME was trading at $400 a share and a customer wanted ten shares, there was $4000 at risk, plus or minus some nominal amount due to minute vagaries in market fluctuations during the two-day period before settlement. In such a simple situation, Robinhood might be asked to put up $4000 and change — in addition to the $4000 of the customer's buy order, which remained locked in the safe. The deposit requirement calculation grew more complicated as layers were added onto the trading situation. A single trade had low inherent risk; multiplied to millions of trades, the risk profile began to change. The more volatile the stock — in price and/or volume — the riskier a buy or sell became. Of course, the NSCC did not make these calculations by hand; they used sophisticated algorithms to digest the numerous inputs coming in from the trade — type of equity, volume, current volatility, where it fit into a brokerage's portfolio as a whole — and spit out a 'recommendation' of what sort of deposit would protect the trade. And this process was entirely automated; the brokerage house would continually run its trading activity through the federal clearing system and would receive its updated deposit requirements as often as every fifteen minutes while the market was open. Premarket during a trading week, that number would come in at 5:11 a.m. East Coast time, usually right as Jim, in Orlando, was finishing his morning coffee. Robinhood would then have until 10:00 a.m. to satisfy the deposit requirement for the upcoming day of trading — or risk being in default, which could lead to an immediate shutdown of all operations. Usually, the deposit requirement was tied closely to the actual dollars being 'spent' on the trades; a near equal number of buys and sells in a brokerage house's trading profile lowered its overall risk, and though volatility was common, especially in the past half-decade, even a two-day settlement period came with an acceptable level of confidence that nobody would fail to deliver on their trades.