Submarine Leadership Quotes

JOHN LEHMAN, PRESIDENT REAGAN’S SECRETARY of the Navy during the 1980s, recently published a book (Oceans Ventured, W. W. Norton, 2018) discussing the maritime security strategy that he promoted while he was secretary. In his book (p. 96) he comments: “In early years of the strategy, while we modernized the fleet a certain amount of bluff was necessary.” Even for those not involved at the time, that specific note might prompt someone to ask three questions: •  Just how much bluff are we talking about? •  Was any sort of net assessment made before the maritime strategy was launched? • What really happened? Well, the maritime strategy was a whole box full of bluff. And what actually occurred makes for an interesting case study. It was a while ago, so it is necessary to set the stage. It also involves providing some background as the situation had developed over some time. Our own submarine force had become more and more secretive in their war against the Soviets. As a result, nonsubmariners

On August 5, 1963, Albert “Bud” Wheelon, former director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, assumed leadership of the all-new Directorate of Science and Technology, and over the next few years he helped build arguably the most powerful development and engineering establishment in American history, a government-funded Skunk Works for outlandish projects—like figuring out how to retrieve a submarine wrecked seventeen thousand feet below the ocean’s surface.

Ironically, the relatively simple fail-safe device that may have prevented doomsday was probably supplied by the Americans. In the 1960s, small groups of military science and technology specialists in the United States and the Soviet Union had secretly cooperated in a program to prevent an accidental or rogue nuclear war from breaking out. Even as the leadership of both states belligerently rattled their nuclear sabers in public, there was quiet cooperation to prevent the deliberate misuse of nuclear weapons. Of particular concern was the theft or unauthorized appropriation of one or more nuclear weapons by terrorists, a lone madman, or a rogue air force or naval crew. In the case of the K-129 incident, a small group of American scientists—and a highly secret decision by President Lyndon Johnson to share classified, nuclear fail-safe technology with Soviet leaders—may well have prevented the obliteration of an American city and a potential third world war.

On the other hand, it is not too far-fetched to suggest that the Soviet fail-safe device installed on K-129 did exactly what it was designed to do. It may have been intended to cause a catastrophic explosion when it detected an unauthorized launch attempt. After all, the fail-safe system on a nuclear weapon was a final precaution to prevent an accidental or unauthorized nuclear incident that could have led to global war. The top leadership on each side wanted to avoid an accidental or rogue attack on the other. Even an unauthorized attack risked a response of unlimited retaliation.

The country today bears striking similarity to the days leading up to Pearl Harbor. Our workforce drags aslumber. The primary focus of the majority of the national workforce prioritizes maximizing time off and contributing as little as required. Always in pursuit of that external motivation. Experiencing resentment rather than satisfaction. Why does it have to be that way? Why does it take a crisis to improve ourselves collectively? And what about on a submarine? Why does it take a war order to recognize the reality of action before consequence?