Selective Breeding And The Birth Of Philosophy Quotes

To speak of superior and inferior ways of life is necessarily to deny that every form of life has dignity or meaning. But, in particular, the net effect is to deny that mere life has any worth.

It is telling that in the language of Homer there are quite a few ways to express that one man is better than another. But none of these refer to the virtue of piety or ability to tell divine laws. The most legitimacy and honor are received from objective and manifest qualities or virtues: possession of a large war bad, personal courage in battle, and ability to give good counsel in the assembly of armed men.

If an average man’s natural desire were to be a good husband and father, then their work would have been easy. But in early Rome, for example, bachelorhood had to be forbidden by law.[ix] The problem with the view of the social conservative is that it assumes a man’s duty to his wife and children is more natural, and therefore more easily enforced, than it actually is. They often do not see the immense work that had to go into making men good husbands or fathers, nor the great privileges through which men had to be enticed to accept these duties; still less do they see or dare to mention the great work—some would say oppression—that had to be exerted to make women faithful wives and mothers.[x] Social liberals and feminists make the same mistake. They assume the problem is that men desire patriarchy and ownership over the wife and family, that men desire dominion over wife and children. They do not see these are, in part, methods some civilizations resorted to in order to induce men to accept the responsibilities of father and husband. Men deprived of patriarchy have no reason to accept duty or responsibility, nor the loss of freedom that goes with family life.

For by what manner of right did Xerxes march against Greece, or his father against Scythia? Or take the countless other cases of the sort that one might mention. Why, surely these men follow nature—the nature of right—in acting thus; yes, on my soul, and follow the law of nature[nomos phuseos]—though not that, I dare say, which is made by us; we mold the best and strongest amongst us, taking them from their infancy like young lions, and utterly enthrall them by our spells and witchcraft, telling them the while that they must have but their equal share, and that this is what is fair and just. But, I fancy, when some man [aner] arises with enough nature [hikanen phusin], he shakes off all that we have taught him, bursts his bonds, and breaks free; he tramples underfoot our codes and juggleries, our charms and “laws,” which are all against nature; our slave rises in revolt and shows himself [epanastas anephane] our master, and there shines [exelampse] out the full light of the right by nature  [tes phuseos dikaion].

It is telling that in the language of Homer there are quite a few ways to express that one man is better than another. But none of these refer to the virtue of piety or ability to tell divine laws. The most legitimacy and honor are received from objective and manifest qualities or virtues: possession of a large warband, personal courage in battle, and ability to give good counsel in the assembly of armed men.

The salvation and training of this biological type that provides ‘raw material’ for both the philosopher and the tyrant is Plato’s fundamental political concern. The production—the breeding—and training of this biological specimen—the production of genius—is the original and fundamental function of political philosophy on the one hand, and of tyranny on the other.

I am trying to explain some of the implications of the work of Nietzsche for a world in which he is still the only prophet, and will remain so for some centuries.