Motorola Quotes

There’s nothing to be scared of.” Instead of taking Charlie’s pulse – there was really no point – he took one of the old man’s hands in his. He saw Charlie’s wife pulling down a shade in the bedroom, wearing nothing but the slip of Belgian lace he’d bought her for their first anniversary; saw how the ponytail swung over one shoulder when she turned to look at him, her face lit in a smile that was all yes. He saw a Farmall tractor with a striped umbrella raised over the seat. He smelled bacon and heard Frank Sinatra singing ‘Come Fly with Me’ from a cracked Motorola radio sitting on a worktable littered with tools. He saw a hubcap full of rain reflecting a red barn. He tasted blueberries and gutted a deer and fished in some distant lake whose surface was dappled by steady autumn rain. He was sixty, dancing with his wife in the American Legion hall. He was thirty, splitting wood. He was five, wearing shorts and pulling a red wagon. Then the pictures blurred together, the way cards do when they’re shuffled in the hands of an expert, and the wind was blowing big snow down from the mountains, and in here was the silence and Azzie’s solemn watching eyes.

The methods that will most effectively minimize the ability of intruders to compromise information security are comprehensive user training and education. Enacting policies and procedures simply won't suffice. Even with oversight the policies and procedures may not be effective: my access to Motorola, Nokia, ATT, Sun depended upon the willingness of people to bypass policies and procedures that were in place for years before I compromised them successfully

This humanity we would claim for ourselves is the legacy, not only of the Enlightenment, but of the thousands of European peasants and poor townspeople who came here bringing their humanity and their sufferings with them. It is the absence of a stable upper class that is responsible for much of the vulgarity of the American scene. Should we blush before the visitor for this deficiency? The ugliness of American decoration, American entertainment, American literature - is not this the visible expression of the impoverishment of the European masses, a manifestation of all the backwardness, deprivation, and want that arrived here in boatloads from Europe? The immense popularity of American movies abroad demonstrates that Europe is the unfinished negative of which America is the proof. The European traveler, viewing with distaste a movie palace or a Motorola, is only looking into the terrible concavity of his continent of hunger inverted startlingly into the convex. Our civilization, deformed as it is outwardly, is still an accomplishment; all this had to come to light.

You can tell people to clean up a mess, but should you be telling them which broom to use? When top management was saying “We’ve got to crush Motorola!” somebody at the bottom might have said “Our benchmarks are lousy; I think I’ll write some better benchmarks.” That was how we worked.

Focus on the user… and the money will follow. This can be particularly challenging in environments where the user and customer are different, and when your customer doesn’t share your focus-on-the-user ethos. When Google acquired Motorola in 2012, one of the first Motorola meetings Jonathan attended was a three-hour product review, where the company’s managers presented the features and specifications for all of Motorola’s phones. They kept referring to the customer requirements, most of which made little sense to Jonathan since they were so out of tune with what he knew mobile users wanted. Then, over lunch, one of the execs explained to him that when Motorola said “customers,” they weren’t talking about the people who use the phones but about the company’s real customers, the mobile carriers such as Verizon and AT&T, who perhaps weren’t always as focused on the user as they should have been. Motorola wasn’t focusing on its users at all, but on its partners. At Google, our users are the people who use our products, while our customers are the companies that buy our advertising and license our technology. There are rarely conflicts between the two, but when there are, our bias is toward the user. It has to be this way, regardless of your industry. Users are more empowered than ever, and won’t tolerate crummy products.

We’d seen firsthand how the man handled a crisis. If Marcia decided suddenly to brandish a stapler in a half-threatening manner, he’d fumble with his Motorola and forget his name.

But the rules for success in the twenty-first century are emerging, and they are radically different from the rules in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. You can make art, you can create, and you can sell those creations—or at least make them well enough that you or your loved ones would be thrilled to own the things you have made, be they chairs, desks, plates, cups, clothing, lamps, computer accessories, or whatever. If you are willing to climb the knowledge ladder needed, maybe you, too, could become the next Elon Musk, Jack Dorsey, Jim McKelvey, or even Jazz Tigan. Here is the thing: You must learn to learn. We must learn to learn. We must develop our skills at creating, developing, and nurturing things and services that others value. The age of being a cog in a big machine and marching one’s way to a defined benefit plan retirement is over. In its place is a global talent pool with access to the same tools, knowledge, and equipment as everyone else and with competition coming from every angle inside and outside of the industry. Nokia and Motorola owned the cell phone industry top to bottom, and then BlackBerry came in to mess it up. But BlackBerry was just a harbinger of the change coming. Apple, at the time just a computer company, assaulted the cell phone cartel and won. It won big. And then Google—how crazy that is in retrospect—jumped in and changed it all up again. Now Samsung is making a good run at both of them.

The Federal Communications Commission was preparing to grant the necessary authority to begin cellular telephone service, even though the technology had been around for more than twenty years. The first popular handheld cell phone, the Motorola DynaTAC 8000X, would appear in 1983; the size of a brick, the DynaTAC cost $3,995, and its battery charge lasted only thirty minutes.

The best-selling phone from the year 2015 is twice the size of the Motorola Razr, the battery barely lasts a day, and if you drop it, it’s $300 to replace the screen. Back in 2000 you might wonder how that’s an improvement. The answer: The iPhone of today is a far better device than a Motorola Razr from 2000 because it has redefined what success looks like.

Outsourcing requires a tight integration of suppliers, making sure that all pieces arrive just in time. Therefore, when some suppliers were unable to deliver certain basic components like capacitors and flash memory, Compaq's network was paralyzed. The company was looking at 600,000 to 700,000 unfilled orders in handheld devices. The $499 Pocket PCs were selling for $700 to $800 at auctions on eBay and Amazon.com. Cisco experienced a different but equally damaging problem: When orders dried up, Cisco neglected to turn off its supply chain, resulting in a 300 percent ballooning of its raw materials inventory. The final numbers are frightening: The aggregate market value loss between March 2000 and March 2001 of the twelve major companies that adopted outsourcing-Cisco, Dell, Compaq, Gateway, Apple, IBM, Lucent, Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, Ericsson, Nokia, and Nortel-exceeded $1.2 trillion. The painful experience of these companies and their investors is a vivid demonstration of the consequences of ignoring network effects. A me attitude, where the company's immediate financial balance is the only factor, limits network thinking. Not understanding how the actions of one node affect other nodes easily cripples whole segments of the network. Experts agree that such rippling losses are not an inevitable downside of the network economy. Rather, these companies failed because they outsourced their manufacturing without fully understanding the changes required in their business models. Hierarchical thinking does not fit a network economy. In traditional organizations, rapid shifts can be made within the organization, with any resulting losses being offset by gains in other parts of the hierarchy. In a network economy each node must be profitable. Failing to understand this, the big players of the network game exposed themselves to the risks of connectedness without benefiting from its advantages. When problems arose, they failed to make the right, tough decisions, such as shutting down the supply line in Cisco's case, and got into even bigger trouble. At both the macro- and the microeconomic level, the network economy is here to stay. Despite some high-profile losses, outsourcing will be increasingly common. Financial interdependencies, ignoring national and continental boundaries, will only be strengthened with globalization. A revolution in management is in the making. It will take a new, network-oriented view of the economy and an understanding of the consequences of interconnectedness to smooth the way.

My father told me to get a Nokia, so I went and got a Motorola.

The UFF [United Freedom Front] claimed credit for nineteen bombings in the Northeast in the 1980s against assorted U.S. military installations and corporate headquarters, such as General Electric, Motorola, and IBM. These actions were done expressly in solidarity with the revolutionary struggles against racism and U.S. imperialism in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and South Africa. The UFF took precautions to ensure that no one was killed in any of its bombing attacks; like most other groups, it relied on bank robberies to secure funding for its activities.

Crush was a thoroughly cascaded set of OKRs, heavily driven from the top, but with input from below. At Andy Grove’s level, or even my level, you couldn’t know all the mechanics of how the battle should be won. A lot of this stuff has to flow uphill. You can tell people to clean up a mess, but should you be telling them which broom to use? When top management was saying “We’ve got to crush Motorola!” somebody at the bottom might have said “Our benchmarks are lousy; I think I’ll write some better benchmarks.” That was how we worked.

Motorola Mobility and IBM’s personal computer division have been acquired by Lenovo;66 Smithfield Foods, the world’s largest pork producer, is owned by the WH Group;67 Legendary Pictures Productions, LLC, is owned by the Wanda Group,68 which also has held a significant stake in AMC Theatres, the largest chain in America.69

What happened to Samsung, as well as to HTC and Motorola before it, is illustrative. The evolution of the smartphone industry is a microcosm of what’s happening to the broader economic landscape. In this new world, platforms sit at the top of the economy. They have the most market power, the highest profits, and the most sustainable competitive advantage. As Samsung showed, it’s still possible to build a valuable linear business, but its competitive advantage often evaporates quickly as products get commoditized and competitors copy features—leaving the originator continually scrambling to replace those strengths. Features are easy to emulate; networks aren’t. Products get commoditized; platforms don’t.

Qualche anno fa il ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca lanciò alcuni «distretti tecnologici» orientati a emulare a livello locale le condizioni del successo di Silicon Valley e di Israele: collaborazione stretta nell’arco di cinquanta chilometri tra università, imprese innovative e venture capitalists, con lo Stato/Regione fornitore del seed capital del distretto. Il distretto pilota «Torino wireless», focalizzato sulla tecnologia cellulare, protagonisti il Politecnico di Torino, la regione e alcune imprese del calibro di Telecom, Motorola e ST Microelectronics, diede ottimi risultati; così pure il distretto tecnologico dei materiali avanzati di Napoli.

Jag satt en gång i en paneldebatt i Beijing tillsammans med representanter för Sony Ericsson, Nokia och Motorola. Moderatorn frågade hur vi i panelen såg på "Kina och kopiering" och alla representanterna från de stora mobiltillverkarna kom med varianter på samma tema: Kina kan aldrig bli innovativt om de inte slutar att kopiera. Till slut blev det min tur. Jag tittade på de tre representanterna för världens största mobiltillverkare och sa: "Så vem av er uppfann mobiltelefonen? För de andra två måste ju ha kopierat." Min poäng var att alla företag kopierar mer eller mindre. Uppfattningen om att människor i öst bara kan kopiera och att människor i väst uppfinner egna idéer och inte kopierar är felaktig.

There was a downside to this role, however. Chris Galvin at Motorola was right. My loyalty to Gerhard was complete, but I was really working for the individual, not the institution. My success and longevity in ABB were tied to Gerhard.

We forget how much cellphones used to cost. I actually had the first commercial model back in the 1980s, a Motorola that set me back $3,995—the equivalent of more than $10,000 today.1 It was more than a foot long and weighed nearly two pounds! The battery charged for six hours, and it only gave you thirty minutes of talk time. Today you can get the latest Apple iPhone for free with most cell service contracts—and it has one hundred times more computational power than the computer that took the Apollo 11 astronauts to the moon.

During World War II, radio communications took a great leap. Bell Labs, at the military’s behest, had worked on compact and sophisticated communications systems for tanks and airplanes. Meanwhile, Motorola, a small company out of Chicago, built a rugged “handie-talkie” for soldiers.

but the truth is that comparing what private equity firms used to be—and where the perception of private equity still sits in many quarters—to what they are now is like comparing a Motorola cellphone from the 1990s to the latest iPhone. There’s a world of differences; it’s not even close. For pension funds and other investors in private equity funds, the firms they back gives them access to investment opportunities they can’t find or execute themselves. What’s more, they get consistent investment returns out of these opportunities, whether they include leveraged buyouts, credit investments, infrastructure assets, essential utilities, real estate transactions, technology deals, natural resources projects, banks, insurance companies, or life science opportunities. They can buy companies, carve out businesses, build up companies through acquisitions and organic growth, spin off businesses, take companies private from the public market, buy businesses from other funds they manage, draw margin loans to finance dividends, and refinance the capital structure pre-exit. And more besides.

Going public is a sign a company has found enough competitive advantages to scale into a large corporation. But almost 40% of all public companies lost all their value from 1980-2014. A list of top ten fortune 500 companies that went bankrupts includes: General Motors, Crysler, Kodak and Sears. General Electric, Time Warner, AIG and Motorola. Countries follow similar fates. At various points in the past, the world scientific and economic progress has been dominate by Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Whenever a once-powerful thing loses an advantage, it's tempting to ridicule the mistakes of it's leaders but it's easy to overlook how many forces pull you away from a competitive advantage simply BECAUSE you have one. Success has it's own gravity. The higher the monkey climbs a tree, the easier to see it's ass.

Why? Because they think to themselves . . . they can't be that much smarter than me or work that much harder than me, so how is it possible for them to make 1,000 times more than me? Enough money that it would take me literally ten lifetimes to make what they make in a year. In the three years leading up to me writing this book, I took home over $1,200,000/mo in profit. Every. Single. Month. That’s more than the compensation for the CEOs of Ford, McDonalds, Motorola, & Yahoo . . . combined . . . every year . . . as a kid in his twenties.

Grupo Briffault es un despacho juridico en la ciudad de mexico enfocado en la excelencia legal. La pasion por la materia legal es el motor de nuestro desempeño ya que buscamos siempre la mejor solucion y opcion para nuestros clientes. Tenemos clientes muy importantes en Mexico como puede ser Bimbo, Toks, Motorola entre otros. Ellos confian sus casos mas complicados con nosotros. Grupo Briffault fue establecido gracias a la union de dos firmas de abogados y por fin en el año 2020 se consolido.

But Steve was a parent CEO. A pushy parent. A tiger mom. He knew if we kept pushing, together, we’d figure it out. The sacrifices would be worth it. And he was right. That time. But not every time. Steve took a lot of risks, made bad decisions, launched products that didn’t work—the original Apple III, the Motorola ROKR iTunes phone, the Power Mac G4 Cube, the list goes on. But if you aren’t failing, you aren’t trying hard enough. He learned from the screwups, was constantly improving, and his good ideas, his successes, totally wiped away his failures. He was constantly pushing the company to learn and try new things.

Steve became so exasperated with Motorola’s work that he asked Fadell to develop his own prototypes for an Apple cellphone, the first featuring music and the second focusing on video and photos.

Prisoners work, often through subcontractors, for major corporations such as Chevron, Bank of America, IBM, Motorola, Microsoft, McDonald’s—which makes its uniforms in prison—AT&T, Starbucks, which manufactures holiday products, Nintendo, Victoria’s Secret, JC Penney, Sears, Walmart, Kmart, Eddie Bauer, Wendy’s, Procter & Gamble, Johnson & Johnson, Fruit of the Loom, Caterpillar, Sara Lee, Quaker Oats, Mary Kay, Microsoft, Texas Instruments, Dell, Honeywell, Hewlett-Packard, Nortel, Nordstrom’s, Revlon, Macy’s, Pierre Cardin, and Target. Prisoners

Andy Hertzfeld: It was clear that iPods were going to disappear within five years because smartphones were going to subsume them. Guy Bar-Nahum: It was a panic by Steve Jobs that Nokia and Motorola would kill iPod.