Lisbon Treaty Quotes

After the collapse of the Portuguese fascist regime in Lisbon in April 1974, that country’s colonial empire deliquesced with extraordinary speed. The metropolitan power retained control only in the enclave of Macau, on the coast of China, and later remitted this territory to Beijing under treaty in 2000. In Africa, after many vicissitudes, power was inherited by the socialist-leaning liberation movements which had, by their tactic of guerrilla warfare, brought about the Portuguese revolution in the first place and established warm relations with its first generation of activists.

For many, the Lisbon Treaty represented the end of an era of constitutionalization in EU affairs. However, the rapid deterioration of the global economy from 2007, which was to take up much more of European politicians’ attention in the years that followed, has highlighted the need for a continued debate.

The Rome Treaty implicitly recognized this principle in distinguishing between two kinds of EU act: the Regulation, which is ‘binding in its entirety’ on all the member states; and the Directive, which is binding only ‘as to the result to be achieved’, leaving each state to choose the ‘form and methods’. But this was a very partial application of the principle; and Directives were sometimes enacted in such detail as to leave little choice to the states. So the Maastricht Treaty defined subsidiarity and the Amsterdam Treaty laid down detailed procedures aiming to ensure that the principle would be practised by the EU institutions. The inclusion in the Lisbon Treaty of a list of which competences are exclusive to the EU, which are shared with member states, and which are supporting state action has further ensured that there are multiple safeguards against overcentralization

Even with their strengthened rights under the Lisbon Treaty, citizens still lack a meaningful connection with the EU; and it would be unwise to ignore the track record of representative democracy as a major element in citizenship. As long as citizens do not see the Parliament as being on an equal footing with the Council of Ministers, they are not likely to regard it as a sufficiently important channel of representation. The Council of Ministers, representing the states, is an essential part of the EU’s legislature too. But despite the progress in holding legislative sessions in public, it remains at the centre of an opaque system of quasi-diplomatic negotiation. Representation in a powerful house of the citizens may well be a condition of the latter’s support for the EU over the longer term.

Considering that the European Constitution’s ratification failed in 2005 because, first, - it was in conflict with national interest in fear of immigrants taking work places from nationals, and, second, - European identity was weaker than national identities, we can anticipate that the chances for a European constitution to be eventually ratified are not lost. The establishment of the European constitution would require a better off Eastern Europe (an Eastern Europe with fewer emigrants) and a stronger European identity. These are exactly what the EU is doing nowadays in its right track. In addition to the Lisbon Treaty (2007), EU is working on strengthening the economy of eastern countries and at the same time, is funding programmes to enhance and promote the consolidation of European identity. To conclude, the chances for a European constitution are not lost, since there are better prospects in the future.

Eurobarometer 62 [2004, 1004] reports that, at the time of Constitutional Treaty, 88% of Europeans felt attached to their region. Eurobarometer 71 [2009, 37], held in the time of Lisbon Treaty, reports that the percentage of European citizens who felt attached to their region increased from 88% to 91%. Special Eurobarometer [2010, 70] reports that this percentage goes back to 88%, but with an increase by 2% of respondents who felt very attached to their region. This new regional identity, though similar with national identities even in their emotional configuration, influences in the erosion of national identities as the only or the dominant mean of identification.

It nevertheless remains true that the intensity of European integration is thin in many areas for which the Member States retain primary or sole responsibility; that the limits of Union competence are governed by the principle of conferral, in other words, that the Union can act ‘only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein’ and that competences not so conferred remain with the Member States (Article 4(1) and Article 5(2) TEU); and that, particularly in the TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union is ordained to respect not only the national identities of Member States and their equality before the Treaties, but also their essential state functions (Article 4(2) TEU).