Donor Leadership Quotes

Political victories that undermine trust in politics shouldn’t be considered victories; they’re net losses for society. Record corporate profits achieved by eroding the public’s trust in business aren’t successes; they’re derelictions of duty. Lobbying and campaign donations that result in laws and regulations favoring the lobbyists and donors aren’t triumphs if they weaken public confidence in our democracy; they, too, are abject failures of leadership.

Leadership isn’t just about deciding what to do, it’s also about knowing what not to do.

How to Survive Racism in an Organization that Claims to be Antiracist: 10. Ask why they want you. Get as much clarity as possible on what the organization has read about you, what they understand about you, what they assume are your gifts and strengths. What does the organization hope you will bring to the table? Do those answers align with your reasons for wanting to be at the table? 9. Define your terms. You and the organization may have different definitions of words like "justice", "diveristy", or "antiracism". Ask for definitions, examples, or success stories to give you a better idea of how the organization understands and embodies these words. Also ask about who is in charge and who is held accountable for these efforts. Then ask yourself if you can work within the structure. 8. Hold the organization to the highest vision they committed to for as long as you can. Be ready to move if the leaders aren't prepared to pursue their own stated vision. 7. Find your people. If you are going to push back against the system or push leadership forward, it's wise not to do so alone. Build or join an antiracist cohort within the organization. 6. Have mentors and counselors on standby. Don't just choose a really good friend or a parent when seeking advice. It's important to have on or two mentors who can give advice based on their personal knowledge of the organization and its leaders. You want someone who can help you navigate the particular politics of your organization. 5. Practice self-care. Remember that you are a whole person, not a mule to carry the racial sins of the organization. Fall in love, take your children to the park, don't miss doctors' visits, read for pleasure, dance with abandon, have lots of good sex, be gentle with yourself. 4. Find donors who will contribute to the cause. Who's willing to keep the class funded, the diversity positions going, the social justice center operating? It's important for the organization to know the members of your cohort aren't the only ones who care. Demonstrate that there are stakeholders, congregations members, and donors who want to see real change. 3. Know your rights. There are some racist things that are just mean, but others are against the law. Know the difference, and keep records of it all. 2. Speak. Of course, context matters. You must be strategic about when, how, to whom, and about which situations you decide to call out. But speak. Find your voice and use it. 1. Remember: You are a creative being who is capable of making change. But it is not your responsibility to transform an entire organization.

After only eight months in office, Meadows made national headlines by sending an open letter to the Republican leaders of the House demanding they use the “power of the purse” to kill the Affordable Care Act. By then, the law had been upheld by the Supreme Court and affirmed when voters reelected Obama in 2012. But Meadows argued that Republicans should sabotage it by refusing to appropriate any funds for its implementation. And, if they didn’t get their way, they would shut down the government. By fall, Meadows had succeeded in getting more than seventy-nine Republican congressmen to sign on to this plan, forcing Speaker of the House John Boehner, who had opposed the radical measure, to accede to their demands. Meadows later blamed the media for exaggerating his role, but he was hailed by his local Tea Party group as “our poster boy” and by CNN as the “architect” of the 2013 shutdown. The fanfare grew less positive when the radicals in Congress refused to back down, bringing virtually the entire federal government to a halt for sixteen days in October, leaving the country struggling to function without all but the most vital federal services. In Meadows’s district, day-care centers that were reliant on federal aid reportedly turned distraught families away, and nearby national parks were closed, bringing the tourist trade to a sputtering standstill. National polls showed public opinion was overwhelmingly against the shutdown. Even the Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer, a conservative, called the renegades “the Suicide Caucus.” But the gerrymandering of 2010 had created what Ryan Lizza of The New Yorker called a “historical oddity.” Political extremists now had no incentive to compromise, even with their own party’s leadership. To the contrary, the only threats faced by Republican members from the new, ultraconservative districts were primary challenges from even more conservative candidates. Statistics showed that the eighty members of the so-called Suicide Caucus were a strikingly unrepresentative minority. They represented only 18 percent of the country’s population and just a third of the overall Republican caucus in the House. Gerrymandering had made their districts far less ethnically diverse and further to the right than the country as a whole. They were anomalies, yet because of radicalization of the party’s donor base they wielded disproportionate power. “In previous eras,” Lizza noted, “ideologically extreme minorities could be controlled by party leadership. What’s new about the current House of Representatives is that party discipline has broken down on the Republican side.” Party bosses no longer ruled. Big outside money had failed to buy the 2012 presidential election, but it had nonetheless succeeded in paralyzing the U.S. government. Meadows of course was not able to engineer the government shutdown by himself. Ted Cruz, the junior senator from Texas, whose 2012 victory had also been fueled by right-wing outside money, orchestrated much of the congressional strategy.

First of all, the GOP must rebuild its own establishment. This means regaining leadership control in four key areas: finance, grassroots organization, messaging, and candidate selection. Only if the party leadership can free itself from the clutches of outside donors and right-wing media can it go about transforming itself. This entails major changes: Republicans must marginalize extremist elements; they must build a more diverse electoral constituency, such that the party no longer depends so heavily on its shrinking white Christian base; and they must find ways to win elections without appealing to white nationalism, or what Republican Arizona senator Jeff Flake calls the “sugar high of populism, nativism, and demagoguery.

Pretending that the locals ran the Western NGOs was a way to entice donors, grassroots was no longer a true goal but a buzzword. Sadly, the goal was not to empower true local leadership, but to find token locals to be token champions with no real decision-making power... But I always knew true, long-term change cannot happen without involving the community.

D. The donors do not trust the governance structure of the typical university in which trustees are in a nominal and reactive role. They believe that if the usual process of university governance were going to produce an answer to the need they clearly see, it would already have done it. The need, as they see it, is not obscure. So if a better way is to be forthcoming, something has to change. The change they are proposing is that trustees shift their role toward more affirmative educational leadership.

The faculty members who support these three contentions will tell you that the fundamental flaw in the structure of the university is that the faculty governs the institution, yet the primary loyalty of too many faculty members as individuals is not to their university or even to their students, but to their discipline, their professional expertise and reputation, and their colleagues that share these in universities generally. Perceptive faculty members know this, and the donors know it. And the donors are wise enough to accept that they cannot, and ought not, use their influence to try to change the predominant loyalty of faculty members. Perhaps this is what a good teacher-scholar has to be. The donors also know that the trustees have given the faculty so much power that the administrators cannot lead them in their educational goals. So the trustees must assume more leadership.

Whether it will ever again be possible to take an education easily, in Massachusetts or any other state, will depend upon political decisions made by those — like yourselves — who hold power in trust for the rest of us. I mean no disrespect, only to signal my personal sadness when I say I don’t think those decisions will be made. My reasons for pessimism stem from knowing that failure is built into our political system because it forces our political leadership to depend for its election on the same financial interests which profit from schools staying the way they already are. Schools are a most lucrative source of contracts and an enormous jobs project with sinecures for friends and relatives of your campaign donors. Don’t chalk that up to cynicism: unless you acknowledge why your hands are tied in regard to school change, you’re certain to make the same mistakes year after year in counterfeit reforms. Change isn’t likely to be possible from any political center for the same reason, but it can come from defiant personal decisions made by simple men and women who won’t stand still for their kids being outraged any more — like the revolution of homeschoolers taking place nationwide. This system has had a century to prove itself, that’s enough. It didn’t work at the start except in house-generated fairy tales; it doesn’t work today, and it won’t work better in the future.

The creation of this digital collection, which brings together the entire body of research materials related to William F Cody's personal and professional life, will enable a variety of audiences to consider the impact of William F. Cody the cultural entrepreneur on American life and provide contextualizing documents from other sources, including audio-visual media that exist for the final years of his life. It will allow more scholars to study the man within his times, will provide new resources to contextualize studies of other regional and national events and persons, and will encourage digital edition visitors to explore and learn more about these vital decades of American expansion and development. The digital edition of the Papers will differ significantly from the print edition by including manuscript materials, photographs, and film and sound recordings, and it will offer navigational and search options not possible in the print edition. As Griffin's volume reveals, it took many people to make Buffalo Bill's Wild West happen. Likewise, there are many people whose combined efforts have made this documentary project a reality. All of the generous donors and talented scholars who have contributed to the success of this effort will be noted in due course. But in this, the first publication, it is appropriate to acknowledge that big ideas are carried to fruition only by sound and steady leadership. The McCracken Research Library was fortunate at the advent of the papers project that in its board chair it had such a leader. Maggie Scarlett was not only an early supporter of this documentary editing project but also its first true champion. It was through her connections (and tenacity) that the initial funds were raised to launch the project. Whether seeking support from private donors, the Wyoming State Legislature, federal granting agencies, or the United States Congress, Maggie led the charge and thereby secured the future of this worthy endeavor. Thus, this reissue of Griffin's account is a legacy not only to William Cody but also to all of those who have made this effort and the larger undertaking possible. In that spirit, though these pages rightfully belong to Charles Eldridge Griffin and to Mr. Dixon, if this volume were mine to dedicate, it would be to Maggie. Kurt Graham

international aid has played an essential role in addressing public health challenges in Africa, including combating diseases like HIV/AIDS and malaria. However, overreliance on donor funding has, in some instances, undermined the capacity of local health systems. Governments, knowing that foreign aid can cover gaps, often fail to prioritize adequate investments in domestic healthcare infrastructure and workforce development. This leaves health systems exposed and ill-prepared when donor funding decreases or shifts focus to other areas.

In many African governments, decision-making is highly centralized, with junior officials often discouraged from questioning or improving upon directives issued by higher-ranking authorities. This structure is reminiscent of colonial-era governance systems, where decisions were dictated from European capitals, leaving local administrators to simply execute orders. Such patterns have perpetuated an institutional culture that mutes creativity, sidelines initiative, and upholds the belief that solutions must always come from “above”—whether from national leadership, foreign experts, or global donors. In the corporate sphere, this surfaces as widespread risk aversion. Many businesses prefer to follow well-established models rather than venturing into innovative approaches. This environment places startups and entrepreneurs at a disadvantage, as the broader business framework tends to favor large, entrenched companies—many of which are either foreign-owned or heavily influenced by international investors. Limited access to local financing, combined with a dependency on external capital, constrains the ability of African businesses to grow on their own terms.

In the years following independence, this dependency was also evident in the economic strategies adopted by numerous African nations. During the 1980s and 1990s, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank further deepened reliance on external influence. Though intended to stabilize struggling economies, these programs frequently resulted in reduced public spending on critical services, privatization of vital industries, and a growing dominance of foreign investors in shaping economic decisions. Instead of bolstering financial independence, SAPs left many African economies more exposed to external pressures and economic fluctuations. Similarly, both corporate and civil society institutions across Africa have developed a noticeable reliance on external actors. Many large African corporations function either as subsidiaries of multinational companies or within frameworks that are heavily shaped by foreign investors and donors. As a result, decision-making in these organizations often prioritizes external interests over addressing local needs. A similar pattern exists within civil society organizations, particularly NGOs, which frequently depend on international donors for funding. This dependency can lead to initiatives and programs that are more aligned with donor priorities than with the immediate and pressing concerns of local communities.

Foreign aid has played a complex and often contradictory role in Africa’s development. On one hand, it has provided critical resources for infrastructure, healthcare, and education, helping to address urgent needs. On the other hand, it has fostered cycles of dependency that hinder self-reliance. Many governments prioritize donor-driven projects over homegrown solutions, creating policy directions that are often steered more by the agendas of foreign governments and institutions than by the specific needs of their own populations. This reliance on foreign aid has far-reaching implications for governance. First, it diminishes the accountability of governments to their own citizens, as leaders frequently respond more to international donors than to the people they serve. Second, it discourages long-term planning and self-reliance, with governments and organizations becoming accustomed to working within short-term funding cycles rather than building sustainable domestic revenue systems. Lastly, it cultivates a mindset of dependence, where both leaders and citizens grow to expect external intervention instead of fostering internal, locally-driven solutions.