Warren Buffett Valuation Quotes

The valuation picture is very much affected by our zero-based interest rate structure. Clearly, stocks are worth far more when government bonds yield 1% than when they yield 5%.

You can gain great insights about investing from a careful study of Buffett’s Generals. He was constantly appraising the value of as many stocks as he could find, looking for the ones where he felt he had a reasonable ability to understand the business and come up with an estimate for its worth. With a prodigious memory and many years of intense study, he built up an expansive memory bank full of these appraisals and opinions on a huge number of companies. Then, when Mr. Market offered one at a sufficiently attractive discount to its appraised value, he bought it; he often concentrated heavily in a handful of the most attractive ones. Good valuation work and proper temperament have always been the two keys pillars of his success as an investor. Buffett

THE FOLLOWING DAY, the Apple share price fell 10 percent and the company lost $75 billion in value. The single-day decline was Apple’s biggest in six years and sank its valuation to a level it had not seen since February 2017. It shook the U.S. economy. The company had become one of the most widely held institutional stocks, included in mutual funds, index funds, and 401(k)s. Thanks in part to Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway, everyone from grandmothers in Florida to autoworkers in the Midwest had an interest in Apple’s business. They all suffered.

But being short something where your loss is unlimited is quite different than being long something that you’ve already paid for. And it’s tempting. You see way more stocks that are dramatically overvalued in your career than you will see stocks that are dramatically undervalued. I mean there — it’s the nature of securities markets to occasionally promote various things to the sky, so that securities will frequently sell for 5 or 10 times what they’re worth, and they will very, very seldom sell for 20 percent or 10 percent of what they’re worth. So, therefore, you see these much greater discrepancies between price and value on the overvaluation side. So you might think it’s easier to make money on short selling. And all I can say is, it hasn’t been for me. I don’t think it’s been for Charlie. It is a very, very tough business because of the fact that you face unlimited losses, and because of the fact that people that have overvalued stocks — very overvalued stocks — are frequently on some scale between promoter and crook. And that’s why they get there. And once there — And they also know how to use that very valuation to bootstrap value into the business, because if you have a stock that’s selling at 100 that’s worth 10, obviously it’s to your interest to go out and issue a whole lot of shares. And if you do that, when you get all through, the value can be 50. In fact, there’s a lot of chain letter-type stock promotions that are sort of based on the implicit assumption that the management will keep doing that. And if they do it once and build it to 50 by issuing a lot of shares at 100 when it’s worth 10, now the value is 50 and people say, “Well, these guys are so good at that. Let’s pay 200 for it or 300,” and then they could do it again and so on. It’s not usually that — quite that clear in their minds. But that’s the basic principle underlying a lot of stock promotions. And if you get caught up in one of those that is successful, you know, you can run out of money before the promoter runs out of ideas. In the end, they almost always work. I mean, I would say that, of the things that we have felt like shorting over the years, the batting average is very high in terms of eventual — that they would work out very well eventually if you held them through. But it is very painful and it’s — in my experience, it was a whole lot easier to make money on the long side.

Nearly all the characteristics that became famous hallmarks of Berkshire Hathaway—the 19th-century industrial beginnings, the irreversible secular decline of the original business, the initial cheap valuation, the fight for full control, the partial liquidation of inventory to raise cash, the reallocation of capital towards new and better businesses, the clever management compensation, the behind-the-scenes tax minimization strategies, the reliance on personal friendships to source deals, and the fundamental integrity and trustworthiness of company leadership as the foundation of a sprawling conglomerate—

W.A.C. Bennett grew tired of the company’s obstinance. In August 1961, after rumors of a potential takeover had circulated within the province for months, Bennett introduced the Power Development Act into the legislature in order to confiscate BC Electric for C$111.0 million. The bill passed unanimously, allowing the government to seize control of the utility. The move was highly controversial, sparking an uproar within the business press, with some overly dramatic papers even labeling Bennett a dictator. In an unfortunate coincidence, the head of British Columbia Power and BC Electric, A.E. “Dal” Grauer, had passed away a few days earlier, and his funeral transpired on the very same day the government took over the company he had led.184 In addition to taking BC Electric, the bill offered to buy the rest of BC Power for C$68.6 million, with interest accruing on this amount until the offer expired at the end of July 1963. Combined with the C$111.0 million paid for BC Electric, this offer would result in a total payment for all of BC Power’s operations of C$179.6 million—or the equivalent of C$38.00 per share. Bennett justified this price by highlighting that the proposal was a premium to the C$34.75 price the shares sold for the day before the expropriation.185 While the combined price of C$38.00 per share was reasonable, the valuation for the constituent parts was peculiar. The C$111.0 million price for BC Electric matched its paid-in capital but ignored the other C$28.6 million of common book equity. And this amount sidestepped the debate over whether book value was even an appropriate methodology for the utility in the first place. The C$68.6 million price for the rest of BC Power’s assets was even odder since these remnant assets generated no income and were carried on the balance sheet at only C$4.0 million. This was a clear overpayment for the holding company’s assets, proposed to entice it into consenting to the BC Electric takeover.186 Predictably, BC Power did not stand idly by. After preliminary attempts to negotiate a higher price were thwarted, the company took action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on November 13, 1961. BC Power sought rulings on the validity of the initial Act, the right to additional compensation, and the convertibility feature of debentures issued by BC Electric (more on this last point in the next section).187 While the parties awaited trial, the government took additional steps to further entrench the takeover. At the end of March 1962—nearly eight months after the original seizure—the British Columbia legislature passed two new statutes. The first was the province’s amendment of the Power Development Act, which paid an additional C$60.8 million to BC Power for BC Electric and eliminated the offer for the rest of the parent company’s assets. Table 1 shows that the amendment didn’t significantly alter the total compensation. But the new consideration was a more realistic number for BC Electric and solved for the peculiar offer for the remaining assets, which BC Power would now have to sell themselves.

Greif had a quirk in its share structure that presented a valuation challenge. The company had two shares of stock, Class A and Class B, but only the A shares were publicly traded. The B shares were closely held and not exchange-traded. Like most companies with dual-class share structures, they had differing voting rights. Unlike most companies with dual-class share structures, the classes were entitled to differing dividend distributions and liquidation proceeds. The A shares—the class Buffett bought—had first rights to liquidation proceeds and dividends. Plus, the A shares were entitled to cumulative dividends while the B shares were not. The A shares would only gain voting rights if the company failed to pay the A’s entitled dividend for four quarters. However, the Class B shares received a higher split of additional dividends once the distribution exceeded a certain rate. This made calculating market capitalization figures difficult since there was no price readily available for the Class B shares.

So not only were the liabilities from Allied’s bankruptcy becoming defined, but the core business was not showing any signs of stress from the scandal. That left valuation. At his $40 per share purchase price, and in contrast to most of the stocks discussed in this book, American Express did not sell for an obvious bargain price. With a $178.4 million market capitalization and $124.1 million enterprise value, the stock sold for 15.8x 1963 earnings, 7.8x EV/1963 EBIT, and 2.3x P/TB. It didn’t look that cheap, and this valuation didn’t include an adjustment for the cost of the salad oil settlement.270

The valuation analysis was simple—anyone could see the stock was incredibly cheap. But it had been traded below net cash for several years before the company distributed cash to shareholders. Returning the cash was the critical factor in driving excellent returns. Assuming Buffett bought the stock in 1954 at $35 and sold in 1957 (having received the $50 per share distribution and a few dollars extra in dividends) when it traded between $20 and $28, he would have more than doubled his money and earned around a 30% IRR.135 The stock didn’t work because it was cheap—it worked because management returned capital to shareholders. The other securities discussed in this book were also incredible bargains—but it took action to drive wonderful returns for shareholders.

In his 1961 letter to partners, Buffett laid out three broad categories of investments: generals, workouts, and controls. Generals were undervalued securities where Buffett had no say in corporate policies, nor a timetable for when the stock might reflect its intrinsic value. Buffett pointed out that the generals would behave like the Dow in the short term but outperform the index over the long term. Buffett expected to have five or six positions in this category that were 5% to 10% of total assets each, with smaller positions in another ten to fifteen. Later on, in his 1964 letter, Buffett would break generals into two categories: private owner basis and relatively undervalued. Private owner generals were generally cheap stocks with no immediate catalyst, while relatively undervalued securities were cheap compared to those of a similar quality. Relatively undervalued securities were generally larger companies where Buffett did not think a private owner valuation was relevant.173 Workouts were securities whose performance depended on corporate actions, such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, and spin-offs. Buffett expected to have ten to fifteen of these in the portfolio and thought this category would be a reasonably stable source of earnings for the fund, outperforming the Dow when the market had a bad year and underperforming in a strong year. He anticipated these investments would earn him 10% to 20%, excluding any leverage. Buffett would take on debt, up to 25% of the partnership’s net worth, to fund this category. While he didn’t disclose his allocation every year, he put around 15% of the partnership in workouts in 1966 but increased that to a quarter of the portfolio in 1967 and 1968, when he was having trouble finding bargains.174 The final category was controls, where the partnership took a significant position to change corporate policy. Buffett said these investments might take several years to play out and would, like workouts, have minimal correlation to the Dow’s gyrations. Buffett pointed out that generals could become controls if the stock price remained depressed.

P&R acquired Union Underwear for $15 million. The deal was a big swing for P&R, with the purchase price equal to 35% of its beginning-of-the-year assets. But beneath the big headline number, there were several factors that reduced risk. The deal was done at a salivating valuation: Union was earning $3 million in pre-tax profits—one-fifth of the purchase price—that would be partially sheltered by P&R’s tax loss. Moreover, P&R structured the compensation of Union’s management in an attractive manner: The company provided Goldfarb with a five-year management contract as well as a bonus of 10% of the subsidiary’s operating profits (subject to both a minimum and a cap), ensuring he stayed on and incentivizing him to grow the business.160 Finally, the deal’s consideration was also interesting, which Buffett later reminisced about in the 2001 Berkshire Hathaway chairman’s letter: The [Union Underwear] company possessed $5 million in cash—$2.5 million of which P&R used for the purchase—and was earning about $3 million pre-tax, earnings that could be sheltered by the tax position of P&R. And, oh yes: Fully $9 million of the remaining $12.5 million due was satisfied by non-interest-bearing notes, payable from 50% of any earnings Union had in excess of $1 million. (Those were the days; I get goosebumps just thinking about such deals.)161 Although the P&R board had approved the Union acquisition, Ben Graham was angered by its conservatism and pushed to add more directors. The other members obliged, ceding five additional seats to Graham allies. Jack Goldfarb and Louis Green of Stryker & Brown—the same Louis Green from the Marshall-Wells chapter—were among those added.

I still sometimes get comments from partners like: “Say, Berkshire is up four points—that’s great!” or “What’s happening to us, Berkshire was down three last week?” Market price is irrelevant to us in the valuation of our controlling interests. We valued B-H at 25 at yearend 1967 when the market was about 20 and 31 at yearend 1968 when the market was about 37. We would have done the same thing if the markets had been 15 and 50 respectively. (“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get).” We will prosper or suffer in controlled investments in relation to the operating performances of our businesses—we will not attempt to profit by playing various games in the securities markets. Whether

As the celebrated investor Warren Buffett once said, "Price is what you pay. Value is what you get." We would add one more line: "If you do your homework." In business deals, most buyers and sellers have a singular focus on price — and price is hard to avoid. Negotiations ideally produce numbers that both sides can be happy with. But getting to the right price in any deal involves understanding what business assets are truly worth and then structuring a deal around financing and tax realities, which can be quite surprising to those who fail to plan.

The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities — that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future — will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There’s a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.

Life Formulas I (2008) These are notes to myself. Your frame of reference, and therefore your calculations, may vary. These are not definitions—these are algorithms for success. Contributions are welcome. Happiness = Health + Wealth + Good Relationships Health = Exercise + Diet + Sleep Exercise = High Intensity Resistance Training + Sports + Rest Diet = Natural Foods + Intermittent Fasting + Plants Sleep = No alarms + 8–9 hours + Circadian rhythms Wealth = Income + Wealth * (Return on Investment) Income = Accountability + Leverage + Specific Knowledge Accountability = Personal Branding + Personal Platform + Taking Risk? Leverage = Capital + People + Intellectual Property Specific Knowledge = Knowing how to do something society cannot yet easily train other people to do Return on Investment = “Buy-and-Hold” + Valuation + Margin of Safety [72] Naval’s Rules (2016) Be present above all else. Desire is suffering. (Buddha) Anger is a hot coal you hold in your hand while waiting to throw it at someone else. (Buddha) If you can’t see yourself working with someone for life, don’t work with them for a day. Reading (learning) is the ultimate meta-skill and can be traded for anything else. All the real benefits in life come from compound interest. Earn with your mind, not your time. 99 percent of all effort is wasted. Total honesty at all times. It’s almost always possible to be honest and positive. Praise specifically, criticize generally. (Warren Buffett) Truth is that which has predictive power. Watch every thought. (Ask “Why am I having this thought?”) All greatness comes from suffering. Love is given, not received. Enlightenment is the space between your thoughts. (Eckhart Tolle) Mathematics is the language of nature.

it appears the company has a strong competitive position with a favorable long-term outlook, you would next run several dividend discount models that include different growth rates of the company’s owner earnings over different time periods to get a sense of approximate valuation. Then you would study and understand management’s long-term capital allocation strategy. Last, you might call a few friends, colleagues, or financial advisers to see if they have an opinion about your company or, better yet, your company’s competitors. Take note: None of this requires a high IQ, but it is more laborious and requires more mental effort and concentration than simply figuring out the company’s current price-to-earnings ratio.

The fact is almost anyone can achieve positive absolute returns in a trending up market. Watch TV and listen to market pundits, buy the hot stocks of the day, and ignore valuation. Growth and momentum have been the lessons learned by new portfolio managers in the 2010s. Only when the tide goes out, do you discover who has been swimming naked. —Warren Buffett When the tide goes out, good investors create outperformance. Global central banks have made sure the tide has not gone out for a decade. US equity market drawdowns of more than 10% have occurred only four times in the last decade and each drawdown has lasted less than 60 days.