Suez Crisis Quotes

At the end of my first attempt to write a biography of Muhammad, I quoted the prescient words of the Canadian scholar Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Writing in the mid-twentieth century shortly before the Suez Crisis, he observed that a healthy, functioning Islam had for centuries helped Muslims cultivate decent values which we in the West share, because they spring from a common tradition. Some Muslims have problems with Western modernity. They have turned against the cultures of the People of the Book, and have even begun to Islamize their new hatred of these sister faiths, which were so powerfully endorsed by the Qur’an. Cantwell Smith argued that if they are to meet the challenge of the day, Muslims must learn to understand our Western traditions and institutions, because they are not going to disappear. If Islamic societies did not do this, he maintained, they would fail the test of the twentieth century. But he pointed out that Western people also have a problem: “an inability to recognize that they share the planet not with inferiors but with equals.”   Unless

Under the doctrine of “plausible deniability” favored by Allen Dulles, the president was sometimes not told things it might be inconvenient or embarrassing for him to know—assassination plots against foreign politicians, for instance. But in this case, plausible deniability for the president would not have been required, for the United States was not doing anything dubious. It looks instead as though crucial intelligence about the activities of key allies was withheld from the president during an international crisis.

committed a small oversight, and yet one that almost destroyed their venture. They had assumed that they would deliver the kerosene in bulk to various localities, and that the eager customers would line up with their own receptacles to be filled. The customers were expected to use old Standard Oil tin cans. But they did not. Throughout the Far East, Standard’s blue oil tins had become a prized mainstay of the local economies, used to construct everything from roofing to birdcages to opium cups, hibachis, tea strainers, and egg beaters. They were not about to give up such a valuable product. The whole scheme was now threatened—not by the machinations of 26 Broadway or by the politics of the Suez Canal, but by the habits and predilections of the peoples of Asia. A local crisis was created in each port, as the kerosene went unsold, and despairing telegrams began to flow into Houndsditch. In the quickness and ingenuity of his response to the crisis, Marcus proved his entrepreneurial genius. He sent out a chartered ship, filled with tinplate, to the Far East, and simply instructed his partners in Asia to begin manufacturing tin receptacles for the kerosene. No matter that no one knew how to do so; no matter that no one had the facilities. Marcus persuaded them they could do it. “How do you stick on the wire handles?” the agent in Singapore wrote to Samuel’s representative in Japan. Instructions were sent. “What color do you suggest?” cabled the agent in Shanghai. Mark gave the answer—“Red!

This is the consequence of the decision that the Bank of England made in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, a decision which allowed Britain’s merchant banks to free wealth from democratic controls, and we’re all living with it.

No matter what the treaty says, NATO’s Supreme Commander ultimately answers to Washington. The UK and France would learn to their cost during the Suez Crisis of 1956, when they were compelled

De mister Churchill a mister Balfour 26 de mayo de 1915 Le dejo a usted una tarea de gran dificultad y que requiere una atención inmediata: la protección de la flota de los Dardanelos contra los ataques submarinos. No subestime la gravedad de este peligro. Hasta que pueda ser contrarrestado, las consecuencias pueden no tener límite. Durante estos quince días, no he tenido la autoridad necesaria para tomar decisiones importantes. Su espíritu claro y su juicio tranquilo darán el impulso necesario. Por mi parte, le dejo las notas que siguen por si quiere tenerlas en cuenta: 1. Conviene proseguir las operaciones militares al ritmo más acelerado posible, a fin de acortar el período peligroso. Todas las fuerzas necesarias que puedan estar disponibles y ser allí empleadas han de enviarse de una vez e inmediatamente. 2. Hasta que puedan reanudarse estas operaciones militares definitivas, la escuadra ha de permanecer segura en el puerto de Mudros o en el canal de Suez. Los buques indispensables para la protección de las tropas han de protegerse con barcos carboneros o transportes varios, amarrados a sus costados, hasta que hayan llegado las chalupas provistas de redes contra torpedos. 3. Tan pronto como sea posible, es preciso enviar buques protegidos contra los torpedos. Como indicaba en mi nota del día 13 del corriente al primer lord naval, los nueve monitores pesados han de ser enviados en cuanto vayan estando listos y también los cuatro Edgars provistos de bulges,112 que harán las veces de baterías de calibre mediano para fines de bombardeo. En los Edgars se han perdido quince días con este intermedio. Hasta que lleguen estos buques y mientras no se emprendan operaciones terrestres definitivas, hay que reducir la exposición de los barcos tanto como sea posible. 4. Hay que enviar al menos cien chalupas y remolcadores con 95 millas de redes indicadoras y ocho destructores más, que, de paso, escoltarán a los transportes; todo ello aparte de las otras medidas ya tomadas y que le serán expuestas. 5. La protección contra los submarinos ha de organizarse alrededor de la punta de la península de Gallípoli a partir de una gran zona rodeada de redes y ocupada por gran número de chalupas armadas y de hidros constantemente preparados. Insisto en que ha de actuarse enérgicamente y en gran escala. Por lo demás, se ha hecho ya mucho en este sentido. 6. Han de apresurarse las medidas para vigilar y proveer de redes la salida del Adriático, para buscar las probables bases de submarinos de la costa de Asia Menor, a fin de obstruirlas con minas, y organizar un vasto sistema de información sin reparar en gastos, cosas todas que han sido ya empezadas. 7. Hay que soportar con entereza todas las pérdidas. Le deseo de corazón que triunfe en este y en todos los demás asuntos angustiosos que le han sido confiados y que ha aceptado usted tan leal y valerosamente. Así terminó mi administración en el Almirantazgo. Durante treinta y dos meses de preparación y diez de guerra, había sostenido la primera responsabilidad y dispuesto del poder ejecutivo.