Successful Merger Quotes

The capitalist and consumerist ethics are two sides of the same coin, a merger of two commandments. The supreme commandment of the rich is ‘Invest!’ The supreme commandment of the rest of us is ‘Buy!’ The capitalist–consumerist ethic is revolutionary in another respect. Most previous ethical systems presented people with a pretty tough deal. They were promised paradise, but only if they cultivated compassion and tolerance, overcame craving and anger, and restrained their selfish interests. This was too tough for most. The history of ethics is a sad tale of wonderful ideals that nobody can live up to. Most Christians did not imitate Christ, most Buddhists failed to follow Buddha, and most Confucians would have caused Confucius a temper tantrum. In contrast, most people today successfully live up to the capitalist–consumerist ideal. The new ethic promises paradise on condition that the rich remain greedy and spend their time making more money and that the masses give free reign to their cravings and passions and buy more and more. This is the first religion in history whose followers actually do what they are asked to do. How though do we know that we'll really get paradise in return? We've seen it on television.

The corporate environment, with its downsizing, restructuring, mergers, and acquisitions, has actually become even more of a hothouse for psychopaths.

Democracy in its present form cannot survive the merger of biotech and infotech. Either democracy will successfully reinvent itself in a radically new form or humans will come to live in “digital dictatorships.

As algorithms come to know us so well, authoritarian governments could gain absolute control over their citizens, even more so than in Nazi Germany, and resistance to such regimes might be utterly impossible. Not only will the regime know exactly how you feel, but it could make you feel whatever it wants. The dictator might not be able to provide citizens with healthcare or equality, but he could make them love him and hate his opponents. Democracy in its present form cannot survive the merger of biotech and infotech. Either democracy will successfully reinvent itself in a radically new form or humans will come to live in “digital dictatorships.

Companies should consider merger and acquisition (M&A) opportunities carefully because these strategic moves can have a significant impact on their operations and financial health. Thorough evaluation helps mitigate risks, ensure alignment with business objectives, and maximize the potential benefits, ultimately leading to successful integration and growth.

The successful American’s lifestyle is now increasing one motivated by hedonism, representing the merger of a happiness culture and celebration of an individualistic self.

Democracy in its present form cannot survive the merger of biotech and infotech. Either democracy will successfully reinvent itself in a radically new form, or humans will come to live in ‘digital dictatorships’.

In 1998, Google cofounders Sergey Brin and Larry Page approached Yahoo! and suggested a merger. Yahoo! could have snapped up the company for a handful of stock, but instead they suggested that the young Googlers keep working on their little school project and come back when they had grown up. Within 5 years, Google had an estimated market capitalization of $20 billion. At the time of this writing, Forbes reported Google’s market capitalization at $268.45 billion.

Harris: Let’s talk about how the AI future might look. It seems to me there are three paths it could take. First, we could remain fundamentally in charge: that is, we could solve the value-alignment problem, or we could successfully contain this god in a box. Second, we could merge with the new technology in some way—this is the cyborg option. Or third, we could be totally usurped by our robot overlords. It strikes me that the second outcome, the cyborg option, is inherently unstable. This is something I’ve talked to Garry Kasparov about. He’s a big fan of the cyborg phenomenon in chess. The day came when the best computer in the world was better than the best human—that is, Garry. But now the best chess player in the world is neither a computer nor a human, but a human/computer team called a cyborg, and Garry seemed to think that that would continue for quite some time. Tegmark: It won’t. Harris: It seems rather obvious that it won’t. And once it doesn’t, that option will be canceled just as emphatically as human dominance in chess has been canceled. And it seems to me that will be true for every such merger. As the machines get better, keeping the ape in the loop will just be adding noise to the system.

Most church mergers that fail are motivated more by survival concerns than by vision. Successful mergers are vehicles of change, not preservers of the status quo.

We knew that the prospect of our little studio being absorbed into a much larger entity would worry many people. While we’d worked hard to put safeguards in place that would ensure our independence, we still expected our employees to be fearful that the merger would negatively impact our culture. I’ll say more about the specific steps we took to protect Pixar in a later chapter, but here I want to discuss what happened when, in my eagerness to ease my colleagues’ fears, I stood up and assured them that Pixar would not change. It was one of the dumbest things I’ve ever said. For the next year or so, whenever we wanted to try something new or rethink an established way of working, a steady stream of alarmed and upset people would show up at my office. “You promised the merger wouldn’t affect the way we work,” they’d say. “You said that Pixar would never change.” This happened enough that I called another company-wide meeting to explain myself. “What I meant,” I said, “was that we aren’t going to change because we were acquired by a larger company. We will still go through the kinds of changes that we would have gone through anyway. Furthermore, we are always changing, because change is a good thing.” I was glad I’d cleared that up. Except that I hadn’t. In the end, I had to give the “Of course we will continue to change” speech three times before it finally sunk in. What was interesting to me was that the changes that sparked so much concern had nothing to do with the merger. These were the normal adjustments that have to be made when a business expands and evolves. It’s folly to think you can avoid change, no matter how much you might want to. But also, to my mind, you shouldn’t want to. There is no growth or success without change.

Merger of plans and actions determine the amalgamation of goals and acquisition of success in life.

The arch-capitalist began his working life as a bond trader at Greedspin in New York in the 1960s. He rose to become one of the firm’s most successful M& A advisers during the 1980s and 1990s. His role in the disastrous merger of General Chocolate and ByteBack in 2000 led to his departure in 2004, following an official investigation into irregular practices. “I have no regrets about that deal. For General Chocolate, it was a case of either eat or be eaten.” The sommelier arrives with the red wine, quickly followed by the main course. Churn impales his meat, cuts it into squares and dispatches it to his molars. His songbird side order–a dish which is now banned in the EU on animal rights grounds–is skewered and consumed, beak-to-tail, in a single mouthful. “Do you know, they drown it alive in Armangac!” he exclaims as he noisily munches through the bones. Establishing a pattern which was to be repeated, Churn bounced back from the General Chocolate fiasco in a new guise. In 2005, he re-emerged as the Chairman of RearView Capital Partners, the private equity firm, at a time when huge sums were raised and invested at the peak of the credit bubble. “I have always tried to find the hot areas of the market where I can facilitate the flow of money. In our business, flows mean fees. It’s really very simple.

Arbitrages: The purchase of a security and the simultaneous sale of one or more other securities into which it was to be exchanged under a plan of reorganization, merger, or the like. Liquidations: Purchase of shares which were to receive one or more cash payments in liquidation of the company’s assets. Operations of these two classes were selected on the twin basis of (a) a calculated annual return of 20% or more, and (b) our judgment that the chance of a successful outcome was at least four out of five. Related Hedges: The purchase of convertible bonds or convertible preferred shares, and the simultaneous sale of the common stock into which they were exchangeable. The position was established at close to a parity basis—i.e., at a small maximum loss if the senior issue had actually to be converted and the operation closed out in that way. But a profit would be made if the common stock fell considerably more than the senior issue, and the position closed out in the market. Net-Current-Asset (or “Bargain”) Issues: The idea here was to acquire as many issues as possible at a cost for each of less than their book value in terms of net-current-assets alone—i.e., giving no value to the plant account and other assets. Our purchases were made typically at two-thirds or less of such stripped-down asset value. In most years we carried a wide diversification here—at least 100 different issues.

Hyde’s experience points to one of the challenges with using an acquisition as an escape path for struggling startups: It takes time to shop the venture, complete due diligence, and then consummate a merger.

Such is the legacy of Stan’s final attempt to achieve professional success. Ostensibly a humble shop dedicated to gifting the world with new gems from the mind of the man who made Marvel, POW was, by many accounts, a largely criminal enterprise. It stands accused of routinely ripping off investors, lying to shareholders, entering the stock market through an illegitimate merger, and committing bankruptcy fraud, among other misconduct. Reports differ as to how much Stan knew about what was going on, but even if he was out of the loop, his decision to stay out of the loop and remain uninterested in his own company’s dealings—especially in the wake of the Stan Lee Media debacle—does not speak well of him. Perhaps his neglect meant he ultimately had no problem with the commission of crimes, so long as the company kept filling his coffers with relatively easy money, as one lawsuit claims.

Unfortunately, the Bull that gilded Renaissance New York did little for most Americans. Eighties Wall Street was about institutional money released by deregulation, mergers and acquisitions, and, most of all, the debt that made it all possible. As John Kenneth Galbraith points out, financial euphoria always starts with new ways to borrow money; this time it was triggered by the Savings & Loan crisis. Volcker’s rocketing interest rates had forced S&Ls to offer double digits to new depositors while only getting back single digits on the old thirty-year mortgages on their books. S&Ls were going under, and getting a mortgage was nearly impossible, so in March 1980, with the banking system and the housing market on the brink, Carter had signed a law to allow them to issue credit cards, invest in commercial real estate, and offer checking accounts in order to stay in business. Reagan then took it a step further with a change that encouraged S&Ls to sell their mortgages in search of higher returns, freeing up a $1 trillion that needed to be invested in something. Which takes us back to Salomon Brothers, where in 1978 one Lew Ranieri had repackaged an old investment product the government had clamped down on during the Depression: A group of home mortgages all backed by government insurance would be bundled together, then sliced into bonds, thus converting the debt some people owed on their homes into an asset for others. Ranieri had been a bit ahead of the curve then—the same high interest rates that killed the S&Ls also made his bonds unattractive—but now deregulation let Salomon buy up the S&Ls’ mortgages at a deep discount, bundle them into bonds, and sell them back to the S&Ls who believed they’d diversified into the bond market when in fact they’d just bought ground meat made out of their own steaks. In June 1983, Salomon Brothers and Freddie Mac together issued the first collateralized mortgage obligation bonds (CMOs), which bundled up debt and cut it into tranches based on the amount of risk: you could choose between ground chuck and ground sirloin. It would be years before technology would allow doing this on a huge scale, but the immediate impact was that all kinds of debt, not just mortgages, were bundled, cut into bonds, and sold: credit card debt, car loans, you name it. Between 1983 and 1988, some $60 billion of CMOs were sold; GM’s financing arm became more profitable than its cars. America began to make debt instead of things. The

Will we be remembered by how many material things we can manufacture, advertise, sell, and consume, or by our rediscovery of more lasting, non-material measures of success—a new Dow Jones for the purpose and quality of life in our families, neighborhoods, cities, and national and world communities? Will we be remembered by how rapidly technology, corporate merger mania, and greed can render human beings obsolete, or by a better balance between corporate profits and corporate caring for children, families, communities, and the environment? Will we be remembered by how much a few at the top can get at the expense of the many at the bottom and in the middle, or by our struggle for a concept of enough for all? Will we be remembered by the glitz, style, and banality of too much of our culture, or by the substance of our efforts to rekindle an ethic of caring, community, and justice in a world driven too much by money, technology, and weaponry? A thousand years from now, will America’s dream be alive, be remembered, and be worth remembering? Is America’s dream big enough for every fifth child who is poor, every seventh child who is Black, every fourth child who is Latino, and every twelfth child who is mentally or physically challenged? Is our world’s dream big enough for all of the children God has sent as messengers of hope?

Today, the success of the corporation depends to a considerable extent upon minimizing its tax burden, maximizing its speculative projects through mergers, controlling government regulatory bodies, influencing state and national legislatures. Accordingly, the lawyer is becoming a pivotal figure in the giant corporation.

In 1988, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the theory Trump had sold to the other owners—that a lawsuit was an appropriate way to force the NFL to merge with the USFL. The court, in the formal language of legal opinions, chastised both Trump and the owners who went along with him. Judge Ralph K. Winter Jr. wrote that “what the USFL seeks is essentially a judicial restructuring of major-league professional football to allow it to enter” into a merger with the NFL. Calling the NFL “a highly successful entertainment product,” Judge Winter observed that “new sports leagues must be prepared to make the investment of time, effort and money that develops interest and fan loyalty and results in an attractive product for the media. The jury in the present case obviously found that patient development of a loyal following among fans and an adherence to an original plan that offered long-run gains were lacking … The jury found that the failure of the USFL was not the result of the NFL’s television contracts but of its own decision to seek entry into the NFL on the cheap.” The appeals court decision, which the United States Supreme Court let stand, was a stinging rebuke of Trump’s effort to use litigation to obtain what he was unwilling to achieve by patiently devoting time, money, and effort in the market. Years

Mergers and Acquisitions in themselves never equal success, the quality of the joining is key...two nonentities joined together will still produce Zero! So when you see an amalgamation of falsehood...Don't be deceived...Truth is not there! Same way,do not be alarmed at the gathering of the wicked against you...the Lord your God who is in and with you is more and mightier!

It is important I act haughty and peeved like he has disturbed me from very important thoughts. These could be thoughts dreaming up a new million pound merger that will regenerate a local community and keep the shareholders happy. Significant thoughts. Haughty and peeved people get away with lots, you see. Successful people, the people who sit in First Class, act like this all the time. He should be harassing fare-dodging youngsters, too caught up with their BBMing to bother buying a ticket. I try to forget that I used to enjoy dodging fares as a teen, and completely bypass that I’m actually as bad, if not worse, because I’m an adult who should know better. With my lax attitude to grown-up responsibilities, it’s unsurprising that I don’t.

By then the conglomerate boom had just about peaked. The problems with merger accounting were obvious, and many investors had realized that conglomerate profits were inflated. The end came in 1969, when the market plunged, making it hard for conglomerates to issue the debt or stocks they needed for new acquisitions. A conglomerateur who runs out of acquisitions is a very unhappy conglomerateur. He’s stuck managing the companies he has already bought, which are all too often third-rate companies in slow-growth industries. Winners buy; losers manage. Worse, the skills that make a successful conglomerateur—salesmanship, impatience with details, and a huge ego—are more or less the opposite of the skills needed to successfully manage a company.

Size and growth rate aside, the companies did have certain characteristics in common. To begin with, they were all utterly determined to be the best at what they did. Most of them had been recognized for excellence by independent bodies inside and outside their industries. Not coincidentally, they had all had the opportunity to raise a lot of capital, grow very fast, do mergers and acquisitions, expand geographically, and generally follow the well-worn route of other successful companies. Yet they had chosen not to focus on revenue growth or geographical expansion, pursuing instead other goals that they considered more important than getting as big as possible, as fast as possible. To make those trade-offs, the companies had found it necessary to remain privately owned, with the majority of the stock in the hands of one person, or a small group of like-minded individuals, or—in a couple of cases—the employees.

Kohut identified three specific lines of development along which self development can successfully unfold. He labeled them mirroring, idealizing, and twinship experiences (Kohut, 1971, 1977, 1984). In the mirror line of development, we look to others to feel truly known and accurately seen. In the archaic mirror experience, we feel admired, the object of the other’s adoring gaze. In the more mature mirror experience, we feel recognized and valued for who we know ourselves to be. A successful mirror experience contributes to a cohesive, reliable, and realistic self-esteem, and a solid sense of self-worth. In the idealizing line of development, we look for a merger with someone whom we experience as calming, strong, and wise; one who offers him or herself for our protection and guidance. A successful merger with an idealized other provides opportunities for soothing, which results in a reliable capacity for affect regulation. Finally, in the twinship line of development, we look to find in the other an experience of alikeness, a feeling of sameness that is shared, which results in the consolidation of self experience. We seek to recognize ourselves in the other and yearn for the other to recognize themself in us. Twinship lays the groundwork for a sense of shared humanity, a feeling of being human among humans.

if not anyone else—that what we’d created at Pixar could work outside of Pixar. Both the run-up to the acquisition and its execution provided the ultimate case study, and as such, it was enormously exciting to be a part of. First, I’ll talk about how the merger came to pass in the first place, because I believe we did several things in the very early stages that put our partnership on a strong footing. “GET TO KNOW Bob Iger,” Steve had said. So a few weeks later, I did.

His other deals had tended to bring together companies from the same industry horizontally, or merge customers with their suppliers vertically, or bring together firms involved in different steps of manufacturing or marketing: this was known as a circular merger. But the merger that had produced C-T-R was, as Flint put it when he looked back on it later in his career, neither horizontal nor vertical nor circular. In fact, it was so uncommon as to almost justify the description sui generis—in a class by itself. Flint soon turned out to be right yet again. The C-T-R merger was a success from the outset. Flint was careful to ensure that a gospel of technical excellence and constant improvement of the new organization’s products was fundamental to its business philosophy.

consolidation, coupled with a desire among the survivors to restore normal profit levels, helps to usher in an era of orderly competition based on serving the variety of wants. In 1975, Carrefour became the first foreign retailer in Brazil. Through a period of aggressive mergers and acquisitions, they increased their market share and forced smaller competitors to leave or consolidate. In 1999, the largest national retailer, Companhia Brasileira de Distribuicao, merged with Casino Guichard Perrachon & Cie, to compete against the growing foreign chains, which now hold 40% of the market. The outcome has been a more orderly market where each is large and successful enough not to have to resort to permanent cut-throat price competition.

Factors that drive turnover for the S&P 500 and Wilshire 5000 stem from market-related events. When a company exits the S&P 500 through merger, acquisition, or bankruptcy, a committee-chosen replacement takes the departing company’s place. The Wilshire 5000 passively accepts the ebb and flow of company creation and elimination, making as-frequent-as-necessary adjustments to the composition of the index. Bankrupt companies disappear, cash merger deals require redeployment of proceeds, and stock-for-stock transactions lead to elimination of the line item of the acquired company. Public offerings of securities force full-replication Wilshire 5000 index-fund managers to raise cash to acquire newly issued shares, while spinoffs simply require adding another line to the list of security holdings. In somewhat different fashion, both the S&P 500 and the Wilshire 5000 produce extremely low, investor-friendly levels of portfolio turnover.