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McCulloch would have put him on notice that "it is a constitution we are expounding," one that was "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs," and which did not "deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances." It had become clear by 1868, if not before then, that the Constitution was not chained to the original expectations as to what powers the legislature could exercise. This recognition, in turn, suggests a more durable basis for a doctrine of substantive due process than simply labeling everything one finds distasteful or wrongheaded as "arbitrary." The eighteenth-century understanding of due process may have been primarily, if not exclusively, procedural, but it had evolved in a legal system where the legislature exercised unfettered power over substantive law. The new Constitution's Supremacy Clause, however, subordinated legislative power to the Constitution itself. As I suggested in my opening essay, in a republic, "due process," when it comes to the wisdom of government policy, is ordinarily provided by the political process, but it is likely the case that we do not regard every issue as properly resolved by majoritarian institutions. As
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