Sony Music Quotes

But Sony couldn’t. It had pioneered portable music with the Walkman, it had a great record company, and it had a long history of making beautiful consumer devices. It had all of the assets to compete with Jobs’s strategy of integration of hardware, software, devices, and content sales. Why did it fail? Partly because it was a company, like AOL Time Warner, that was organized into divisions (that word itself was ominous) with their own bottom lines; the goal of achieving synergy in such companies by prodding the divisions to work together was usually elusive. Jobs did not organize Apple into semiautonomous divisions; he closely controlled all of his teams and pushed them to work as one cohesive and flexible company, with one profit-and-loss bottom line. “We don’t have ‘divisions’ with their own P&L,” said Tim Cook. “We run one P&L for the company.

Indeed Sony provided a clear counterexample to Apple. It had a consumer electronics division that made sleek products and a music division with beloved artists (including Bob Dylan). But because each division tried to protect its own interests, the company as a whole never got its act together to produce an end-to-end service.

Like many companies, Sony worried about cannibalization. If it built a music player and service that made it easy for people to share digital songs, that might hurt sales of its record division. One of Jobs’s business rules was to never be afraid of cannibalizing yourself. “If you don’t cannibalize yourself, someone else will,” he said. So even though an iPhone might cannibalize sales of an iPod, or an iPad might cannibalize sales of a laptop, that did not deter him.

In addition, like many companies, Sony worried about cannibalization. If it built a music player and service that made it easy for people to share digital songs, that might hurt sales of its record division. One of Jobs’s business rules was to never be afraid of cannibalizing yourself. “If you don’t cannibalize yourself, someone else will,”he said. So even though an iPhone might cannibalize sales of an iPod, or an iPad might cannibalize sales of a laptop, that did not deter him.

In addition, like many companies, Sony worried about cannibalization. If it built a music player and service that made it easy for people to share digital songs, that might hurt sales of its record division. One of Jobs’s business rules was to never be afraid of cannibalizing yourself. “If you don’t cannibalize yourself, someone else will,” he said. So even though an iPhone might cannibalize sales of an iPod, or an iPad might cannibalize sales of a laptop, that did not deter him.

Every Pirate Wants to Be an Admiral IT’S NOT AS though this is the first time we’ve had to rethink what copyright is, what it should do, and whom it should serve. The activities that copyright regulates—copying, transmission, display, performance—are technological activities, so when technology changes, it’s usually the case that copyright has to change, too. And it’s rarely pretty. When piano rolls were invented, the composers, whose income came from sheet music, were aghast. They couldn’t believe that player-piano companies had the audacity to record and sell performances of their work. They tried—unsuccessfully—to have such recordings classified as copyright violations. Then (thanks in part to the institution of a compulsory license) the piano-roll pirates and their compatriots in the wax-cylinder business got legit, and became the record industry. Then the radio came along, and broadcasters had the audacity to argue that they should be able to play records over the air. The record industry was furious, and tried (unsuccessfully) to block radio broadcasts without explicit permission from recording artists. Their argument was “When we used technology to appropriate and further commercialize the works of composers, that was progress. When these upstart broadcasters do it to our records, that’s piracy.” A few decades later, with the dust settled around radio transmission, along came cable TV, which appropriated broadcasts sent over the air and retransmitted them over cables. The broadcasters argued (unsuccessfully) that this was a form of piracy, and that the law should put an immediate halt to it. Their argument? The familiar one: “When we did it, it was progress. When they do it to us, that’s piracy.” Then came the VCR, which instigated a landmark lawsuit by the cable operators and the studios, a legal battle that was waged for eight years, finishing up in the 1984 Supreme Court “Betamax” ruling. You can look up the briefs if you’d like, but fundamentally, they went like this: “When we took the broadcasts without permission, that was progress. Now that someone’s recording our cable signals without permission, that’s piracy.” Sony won, and fifteen years later it was one of the first companies to get in line to sue Internet companies that were making it easier to copy music and videos online. I have a name for the principle at work here: “Every pirate wants to be an admiral.

It was rumored that the length of the CD was determined by the duration of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, because that was Norio Ohga's favorite piece of music, and he was the president of Sony at the time. Philips had designed a CD with an 11.5 cm diameter, but Ohga insisted that a disc must be able to hold the entire Beethoven recording. The longest recording of the symphony in Polygram's archive was 74 minutes, so the CD size was increased to 12 cm diameter to accommodate the extra data.

48-track tape machines out there. Check out the Internet for used analog and digital tape machines made by Ampex, MCI, Otari, Revox, Sony, and Studer. Read the reviews and note the prices, and as soon as your budget allows, pick one up. It’ll be a smart move.

Most sessions come in on Pro Tools, which I transfer to the Sony 3348HR and then I mix them down to Nuendo at 88.2 kHz. I

Sony: Make Believe... ...we lose money on almost every electronic gadget we sell -- only Hollywood and the music business stands between us and bankruptcy.

Consider the experience of buying a stereo system, as conveyed by Shane Frederick, Nathan Novemsky, Jing Wang, Ravi Dhar, and Stephen Nowlis in an aptly named paper, “Opportunity Cost Neglect.” In their experiment, one group of participants was asked to decide between a $1,000 Pioneer and a $700 Sony. A second group was asked to pick between the $1,000 Pioneer and a package deal where for $1,000 they could get the Sony plus $300 to be spent only on CDs. In reality both groups were choosing between different ways of spending that $1,000. The first group chose between spending all of it on a Pioneer or spending $700 on a Sony and $300 on other things. The second group chose between spending all of it on a Pioneer or spending $700 on a Sony and $300 on music. The results showed that the Sony stereo was a much more popular choice when it was accompanied by $300 of CDs than when it was sold without them. Why is this odd? Well, strictly speaking, an unconstrained $300 is worth more than $300 that must be spent on CDs because we can buy anything with the unconstrained money—including CDs. But when the $300 was framed as being dedicated to CDs, the participants found it more appealing. That’s because $300 worth of CDs is much more concrete and defined than just $300 of “anything.” In the $300-for-CD case we know what we’re getting. It is tangible and easy to evaluate. When the $300 is abstract and general, we don’t conjure up the specific images of how we’re going to spend it, and the emotional, motivational forces on us are less powerful. This is just one more example of how when we represent money in a general way, we end up undervaluing it compared to when we have a specific representation of that money.1 Yes, CDs are the example here, which nowadays is like thinking about the gas efficiency of a stegosaurus, but the point remains: People are somewhat surprised when we simply remind them that there are alternative ways to spend money, whether it’s on a vacation or on a pile of CDs. That surprise suggests that people don’t tend to naturally consider alternatives, and without considering alternatives, we can’t possibly take opportunity costs into account. This tendency for neglecting opportunity costs shows us the basic flaw in our thinking.

The number of movies released shrank too, from twenty-two in 2011 to just thirteen in 2015. And annual development spending, the R&D of the movie industry, fell dramatically, from $127 million in fiscal 2010 to $71 million in 2015. Pascal even had to let go of her longtime assistant, Mark Seed. He made her life run so magically that she nicknamed him “Mark Poppins,” but he made more than $250,000 per year. Pascal had less to work with and at the same time, Sony Corporation demanded more from her, as it responded to pressure from Loeb and the struggles of its electronics business. One result was growing tension between Pascal and Lynton, who in 2012 had been promoted to CEO of Sony Entertainment, putting him in charge of the company’s music businesses and officially making him Pascal’s boss, not her partner. Their relationship grew less familial, and he privately admonished her about the company’s faltering financial situation. “Why is everyone freaking out[?]” she asked, when the Hollywood Reporter revealed her assistant’s eye-popping salary. “Because we said no cost is too small,” responded Lynton. “An assistant paid that amount suggests a lack of controls. We claim to have those controls.

Spotify’s key allies—the partners that safeguarded its survival by rejecting Apple’s entreaties to kill the free ad-based tier—were the three major music labels. Sony Music, Universal Music, and Warner Music, which collectively controlled 65–70 percent of global music market share. There is a reason why the majors turned down Apple’s offer: they were desperate for an alternative to Apple’s domination of digital music distribution.

To deepen alignment across specialties, the Apple organizational structure was very different from that of most other firms. There were no product divisions that were their own profit centers. “We run one P&L for the company,” said operations head Tim Cook (who became CEO after Jobs’s death).8 Thus, divisions did not compete against each other for customers or worry about "cannibalization.” This proved a huge competitive advantage when Apple introduced the iPod and iTunes. Rival Sony, rich in assets that could have given Apple a run for its money, was undermined by their organization structure, which was divided into profit centers that drove focus on product lines but hampered collaboration across these lines. Sony’s music division and their consumer electronics division were never able to successfully join forces to compete against Apple. Conversely, at Apple, all departments could celebrate a sale, whether a consumer chose to download music through their iPod or iPhone, or send emails using an iPad or MacBook.

We had portable music before the iPod, most commonly in the form of the Sony Walkman and Discman (and their competitors), but these devices played only a restricted role in most people’s lives—something you used to entertain yourself while exercising, or in the back seat of a car on a long family road trip. If you stood on a busy city street corner in the early 1990s, you would not see too many people sporting black foam Sony earphones on their way to work. By the early 2000s, however, if you stood on that same street corner, white earbuds would be near ubiquitous. The iPod succeeded not just by selling lots of units, but also by changing the culture surrounding portable music. It became common, especially among younger generations, to allow your iPod to provide a musical backdrop to your entire day—putting the earbuds in as you walk out the door and taking them off only when you couldn’t avoid having to talk to another human.

I heard the music of your eyes. And my heart started beating again.