Siwes Quotes

The interval between the first and second wars in Iraq (1991 and 2003) has seen a remarkable shift from Clausewitz to Sun Tzu in the discourse about contemporary warfare. Clausewitz enjoyed an undreamed of renaissance in the USA after the Vietnam War and seemed to have attained the status of master thinker. On War enabled many theorists to recognize the causes of America’s traumatic defeat in Southeast Asia, as well as the conditions for gaining victory in the future. More recently, however, he has very nearly been outlawed. The reason for this change can be found in two separate developments. Firstly, there has been an unleashing of war and violence in the ongoing civil wars and massacres, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, in the secessionist wars in the former Yugoslavia, and in the persistence of inter-communal violence along the fringes of Europe’s former empires. These developments seemed to indicate a departure from interstate wars, for which Clausewitz’s theory appeared to be designed, and the advent of a new era of civil wars, non-state wars, and social anarchy. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War seemed to offer a better understanding of these kinds of war, because he lived in an era of never-ending civil wars. Secondly, the reason for the change from Clausewitz to Sun Tzu is connected with the ‘revolution in military affairs’. The concepts of Strategic Information Warfare (SIW) and fourth generation warfare have made wide use of Sun Tzu’s thought to explain and illustrate their position. The ‘real father’ of ‘shock and awe’ in the Iraq War of 2003 was Sun Tzu, argued one commentator in the Asia Times. Some pundits even claimed triumphantly that Sun Tzu had defeated Clausewitz in this war, because the US Army conducted the campaign in accordance with the principles of Sun Tzu, whereas the Russian advisers of the Iraqi army had relied on Clausewitz and the Russian defence against Napoleon’s army in 1812. The triumphant attitude has long been abandoned.

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, as well as the theoreticians of SIW and fourth generation warfare, lack the political dimension with respect to the situation after the war. They concentrate too much on purely military success, and undervalue the process of transforming military success into true victory. The three core elements of Sun Tzu’s strategy could not easily be applied in our times: a general attitude to deception of the enemy runs the risk of deceiving one’s own population, which would be problematic for any democracy. An indirect strategy in general would weaken deterrence against an adversary who could act quickly and with determination. Concentration on influencing the will and mind of the enemy may merely enable him to avoid fighting at a disadvantageous time and place and make it possible for him to choose a better opportunity as long as he is in possession of the necessary means—weapons and armed forces.

Będziemy sobie żyć we dwie, stare siwe wdowy, będziemy sobie we dwie siedzieć przy kominku i odmawiać zdrowaśki albo i nie, to się zobaczy. Czy to nie jest najprzyjemniejsza starość, jak pan myśli? Człowiek ma spokój, ciszę, ma swoją ciemność, może myśleć, o czym chce, robić, co chce. Nie musi już projektować przyszłości, zastanawiać się nad jutrem, nad tym, co się zaplanuje na obiad albo że trzeba suknię córki dać do reperacji i obstalować nowe trzewiki dla syna. Nic nie trzeba. Można wszystko. Wolno mi teraz wrócić tam, gdzie byłam, a gdzie przez lata nie chciałam wracać. Siedząc na tym fotelu, proszę pana, mogę być w dowolnym miejscu i w dowolnym punkcie przeszłości, wynalazłam wehikuł czasu, najpewniejszy, bo składający się ze wspomnień. Nie zmienię rzeczy, które już się wydarzyły, ale lubię na nie patrzeć, lubię je od nowa przeżywać. Teraz nie muszę się spieszyć, mogę wszystko robić powoli, po kilkakroć, ile chcę i kiedy chcę. Jestem u siebie, jestem wszędzie, jestem dziewczyną w białej sukni i z różami we włosach.