Shareholder Meeting The Office Quotes

The thing is, there’s generally no consequence for bad police behavior, even repeated or serially bad behavior. Even if individual officers are successfully sued, the only thing that happens is that the city’s corporation counsel pays out some cash, and life just goes on as before. An officer’s record of complaints or settlements isn’t listed publicly. A defense lawyer who wants to find out if the officer who arrested his client has ever, say, bounced an old lady’s head off a sidewalk or lied to a judge about witnessing a drug sale has to meet an extraordinary legal standard to get access to that info. In order to look at an officer’s record, you have to file what’s called a “Gissendanner motion,” the term referring to a 1979 case, People v. Gissendanner. In that case, a woman in the Rochester suburb of Irondequoit was busted in a sting cocaine sale by a pair of undercover police. The court in that case held that the defendant isn’t entitled to subpoena the records of arresting officers willy-nilly, but that you needed a “factual predicate” to look for records of, say, excessive force or entrapment. In other words, you already need to know what you’re looking for before you find it. What this all boils down to is, if you really feel like it, you can definitely sue the New York City Police Department. Since so much of what they do happens on the street, in front of witnesses, you might very well even win. But even if you win, there’s not necessarily any consequence. The corporation counsel’s office doesn’t call up senior police officials after lawsuits and say, “Hey, you’ve got to get rid of these three meatheads in the Seventy-Eighth Precinct we keep paying out settlements for.” In fact, when there are successful lawsuits, individual officers typically aren’t even informed of it. What makes this so luridly fascinating is that this system is the exact inverse of the no-jail, all-settlement system of justice that governs too-big-to-fail companies like HSBC. Big banks get caught committing crimes, at worst they pay a big fine. Instead of going to jail, a check gets written, and it comes out of the pockets of shareholders, not the individuals responsible. Here it’s the same thing. Police make bad arrests, a settlement comes out of the taxpayer’s pocket, but the officer himself never even hears about it. He doesn’t have to pay a dime. And life goes on as before.

Buffett opined that “a chief risk officer is an employee that makes you feel good while you do dumb things.

Blackstone’s ace in the hole was that it was offering an all-cash deal, as opposed to Vornado’s 40 percent stock. Blackstone was also aggressive about a quick deal closing, promising to close the transaction within two weeks of a scheduled Equity Office shareholders meeting on February 5, while Vornado had to wait a few months for its own shareholders’ vote and for the SEC’s ruling because of the proposed issuance of Vornado stock. A lot can happen in a few months, and I liked the certainty Blackstone was offering.

By 2008, storm clouds were gathering over Microsoft. PC shipments, the financial lifeblood of Microsoft, had leveled off. Meanwhile sales of Apple and Google smartphones and tablets were on the rise, producing growing revenues from search and online advertising that Microsoft hadn’t matched. Meanwhile, Amazon had quietly launched Amazon Web Services (AWS), establishing itself for years to come as a leader in the lucrative, rapidly growing cloud services business. The logic behind the advent of the cloud was simple and compelling. The PC Revolution of the 1980s, led by Microsoft, Intel, Apple, and others, had made computing accessible to homes and offices around the world. The 1990s had ushered in the client/server era to meet the needs of millions of users who wanted to share data over networks rather than on floppy disks. But the cost of maintaining servers in an ever-growing sea of data—and the advent of businesses like Amazon, Office 365, Google, and Facebook—simply outpaced the ability for servers to keep up. The emergence of cloud services fundamentally shifted the economics of computing. It standardized and pooled computing resources and automated maintenance tasks once done manually. It allowed for elastic scaling up or down on a self-service, pay-as-you-go basis. Cloud providers invested in enormous data ​centers around the world and then rented them out at a lower cost per user. This was the Cloud Revolution. Amazon was one of the first to cash in with AWS. They figured out early on that the same cloud infrastructure they used to sell books, movies, and other retail items could be rented, like a time-share, to other businesses and startups at a much lower price than it would take for each company to build its own cloud. By June 2008, Amazon already had 180,000 developers building applications and services for their cloud platform. Microsoft did not yet have a commercially viable cloud platform. All of this spelled trouble for Microsoft. Even before the Great Recession of 2008, our stock had begun a downward slide. In a long-planned move, Bill Gates left the company that year to focus on the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. But others were leaving, too. Among them, Kevin Johnson, president of the Windows and online services business, announced he would leave to become CEO of Juniper Networks. In their letter to shareholders that year, Bill and Steve Ballmer noted that Ray Ozzie, creator of Lotus Notes, had been named the company’s new Chief Software Architect (Bill’s old title), reflecting the fact that a new generation of leaders was stepping up in areas like online advertising and search. There was no mention of the cloud in that year’s shareholder letter, but, to his credit, Steve had a game plan and a wider view of the playing field.