Saudi Prince Quotes

Whoever wins society will win this war.”says Prince Mohammed bin Nayef

Saudis of all sorts recent having to beg princes for favors to secure services that should be a public right

We try to transform each detainee from a young man who wants to die to a young man who wants to live. Prince Mohammed bin Nayef

The Ridyadh Bodkin and the Kuala Lumpur Mushroom are positive Meccas for all kinds of daredevils-of this much I'm sure. Decadent Saudi princes pilot microlights through huge holes in their facades, while Malaysian spider men scale them using giant suckers in lieu of crampons. All these activities serve to demonstrate is that modernist megaliths have completely suborned the role of natural features in providing us with the essential and vertiginous perspective we require to comprehend accurately our ant-like status.

The Saudi royals were embarrassed by complaints about bin Laden and angry about his antiroyal agitation. Yet Prince Turki and other senior Saudi princes had trouble believing that bin Laden was much of a threat to anyone. They saw him as a misguided rich kid, the black sheep of a prestigious family, a self-important and immature man who would likely be persuaded as he aged to find some sort of peaceful accommodation with his homeland. But bin Laden was stubborn.

Containing Communism was a priority, but the United States government had its own plans. Since 1951 or 1952, the idea had been floating around the CIA that they should promote what agent Miles Copeland described as a “Moslem Billy Graham” to spread Islamic fervor. Islamism—the political application of Islamic thought—was considered a possible cure for atheistic Communism. According to Copeland, the CIA “actually got as far as selecting a wild-eyed Iraqi holy man to send on a tour of Arab countries.” He insisted that the project “did no harm.” By the time of Eisenhower’s first administration, though, some in the State Department considered that the House of Saud might fill this religious, anti-Communist role.23 However flamboyantly the Saudi princes might carry on in private, they were publicly devout and served as the guardians of Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina.

Here again Trump accepted the words of a foreign autocrat, just as he had believed Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman did not order the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and as he had believed Russian president Vladimir Putin did not interfere in the 2016 U.S. election. Trump said that Kim “felt very badly,” but claimed to only know about Warmbier’s case after the fact. “He tells me that he didn’t know about it,” Trump said, “and I take him at his word.

In fighting its war, the Ministry of the Interior has resorted to a novel tactic– marriage. No Saudi official will admit on the record that the Kingdom’s terrorist problem might boil down to sexual frustration, but if a social system bans hot-blooded young men from contact with the opposite sex in their most hot-blooded years, perhaps it is hardly surprising that some of them channel this frustration into violence. One cornerstone of the extremist rehab program is to get the “beneficiaries,” as they are called, settled down with a wife as soon as possible. The Ministry of the Interior pays each unmarried beneficiary 60,000 riyals (some $18,000), the going rate for a dowry, or bride price. The family arranges a marriage, and whenever he can, Prince Mohammed turns up for the wedding. When Khaled Al-Hubayshi was released from Al-Haier prison early in 2007, he wasted no time finding himself a bride at government expense.

Saudi Arabia and its neighbors had dreams bigger than the subcontinent, but a population of princes reluctant to do manual labor.

The men were not watering the grass; they were spraying it an emerald green. This was Ireland in an atomizer. The workers were coloring the dead, hurrying to finish before the Crown Prince's gaze would zoom by, perhaps peering through the bullet-proofed, tinted, heavily-armored glass of his German car. So much about the Kingdom concerned outward appearances. Veneer was as important as substance, perhaps more so.

During his tenure as king, from 2005 to 2015, Abdullah did promote women’s education with the royal scholarship program that offered full scholarships to women, as well as men, to travel abroad for university degrees. However, he did not end the prohibition against women driving or relax many other restrictions on women. Only two and a half years after King Abdullah’s death, his brother, King Salman, assisted by his 32-year-old son, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, decreed that Saudi women would be permitted to obtain driver’s licenses starting in June 2018. Other restrictions that hindered women from accessing government services without a guardian’s permission were also relaxed a few months earlier.

the Israeli state has used NSO to further its national security agenda, perhaps most prominently in securing the support of Arab dictatorships: Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. For example, in 2020, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman called then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to demand that his country’s access to Pegasus be restored when the Israeli Defense Ministry declined to renew the tool’s license after the Sunni theocracy had abused it.6 He was soon granted his wish because Israel viewed Saudi Arabia as a key ally against Iran in the Middle East.

The United Arab Emirates reportedly had its contract with NSO cancelled in 2021 when it became clear that Dubai’s ruler had used it to hack his ex-wife’s phone and those of her associates. The New York Times journalist Ben Hubbard, Beirut chief for the paper, had his phone compromised while reporting on Saudi Arabia and its leader Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, a man who has invested huge amounts of money in commercial spyware.45 Palestinian human rights activists and diplomats in Palestine have also been targeted by Pegasus, including officials who were preparing complaints against Israel to the International Criminal Court. NSO technology was used by the Israeli police to covertly gather information from Israelis’ smartphones. Pegasus had become a key asset for Israel’s domestic and international activities.46 Saudi Arabia is perhaps the crown jewel of NSO’s exploits, one of the Arab world’s most powerful nations and a close ally of the US with no formal relations with the Jewish state. It is a repressive, Sunni Muslim ethnostate that imprisons and tortures dissidents and actively discriminates against its Shia minority.47 Unlike previous generations of Saudi leaders, bin Salman thought that the Israel/Palestine conflict was “an annoying irritant—a problem to be overcome rather than a conflict to be fairly resolved,” according to Rob Malley, a senior White House official in the Obama and Biden administrations.48

Advancement by merit is a sham in Saudi Arabia. The structure is there, but the reality is wassta: jobs for the boys. The obvious conclusion for a young man like that is that there’s a class above his which is blocking his advancement. Hmm, what to do? The same thing prevails throughout every profession,

With all this cash flowing in pretty soon there were a hell of a lot of healthy, well fed Saudis, with nothing much to do. They could cope with desk jobs, the bureaucratic, organizational jobs, but when it came to hands-on action, all the new resources were staffed and maintained by foreigners. Publicly, everyone agreed that this had got to change.

When Ibn Saud died in 1953, at the age of 77, with one hundred wives, 42 sons, and 1500 princes, Arabia had no significant infrastructure, and was populated by a largely poor and uneducated people. Saud has been succeeded by several descendants over time (with some in-family assassinations), who invested their growing treasure of billions of petrodollars in palaces, Rolls Royces, Boeing 747s and lavish trips abroad, sharing generously with their own family members, but sparingly with the citizens of Saudi Arabia. The House of Saud also used its billions to arm itself against its own citizens, and to pay for military ventures by fellow Muslim nations against Israel.

Money is paid to them in Germany and the kick-back is transferred to the local military attaché and he transfers it to the princes.’ He concluded: ‘Not a piece of equipment would go from the US to Saudi without Bandar getting a commission.’13

Colonel Thomas Dooley, an executive of Sikorsky, the helicopter manufacturer, testified in a United States court that, while trying to sell Black Hawk helicopters to the Saudi regime, he experienced a ‘competition for bribes’. He explained that Prince Bandar told him explicitly ‘what bribes needed to be paid for the deal, through which middleman they must be routed and how he would distribute the money to other members of the royal family’.28

As he stretched out his legs, Siraj let out a deep sigh and smiled. I wonder what Prince Bahir’s blonde surprise will be wearing. I'm guessing it won't be a habiya.

In the early hours of November 4, 2017, Saudi Arabia changed forever. Across the country, princes, bureaucrats, and businessmen who had long believed themselves above the law discovered that their immunity had evaporated.

These events marked the end of an order that had governed Saudi Arabia for sixty-five years. Gone was a political structure in which numerous princes made collective decisions.

Salman bin Abdulaziz had not expected to inherit these problems. He was only a few years younger than his two full brothers, Sultan and Naif. Both of them had been named crown prince and both had died younger than Salman would be when he ascended the throne. Although fate made Salman an unexpected king, he was not unprepared. He had been governor of Riyadh Province for forty-eight years. Intelligent, pragmatic, hardworking, well organized, and disciplined, he was also strict, demanding, and humorless. He made firm decisions and would become known locally as the “King of Decisiveness.

From that bitter defeat, the Al Saud learned another strategic lesson: above all else, do not use force against each other; keep family disputes peaceful and private; and unite quickly and firmly against anyone who violates this rule. Modern-era Kings Faisal, Khalid, Fahd, and Abdullah all respected this stabilizing principle. King Salman and his ambitious Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, have not.

Chaired by the king, the Council of Ministers meets weekly. It makes most routine decisions by majority vote, with the king and crown prince not always being in the majority. The king usually acts in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers, and issues new policies as Council of Ministers Decrees. He can, and sometimes does, bypass the Council, issuing Royal Orders in his own name. The most common example of this is his appointment and dismissal of ministers, who have no more independent political authority than American cabinet secretaries.

The most important branch of the Saudi military, the Royal Saudi Air Force, is commanded by a career officer, Lt General Prince Turki bin Bandar bin Abdulaziz,

After several failed attempts to negotiate a settlement, Abdulaziz invaded Yemen. One Saudi column led by his eldest son, Prince Saud, captured Najran and advanced to Sa’dah, the center of today’s Houthi movement. Facing tremendous difficulties with mountainous terrain and tribesmen, he subsequently had no more success than the Roman General Gallus had had 2,000 years earlier or the Royal Saudi Air Force would have eighty years later. A second column led by the second son, Prince Faisal, was more successful. Using motor transport and modern weapons paid for with a loan from the newly arrived Standard Oil of California (today’s Chevron), Faisal advanced rapidly down the flat Red Sea coast.38 The Yemeni coastal tribes—notably, the Zaraniq—are Shafi Sunnis and were happy to join the war against the Zaydi Shia. They facilitated the surrender of the coastal city of Hodeidah without a fight.

The Al Saud operate something like baseball’s farm team system, in which ambitious young princes start off with relatively junior minor league positions and, if they are talented and fortunate, advance to more senior major league posts.

King Faisal formalized the Saudi Civil List, and while its details have never been made public, the broad outlines are known. Payments vary greatly based on lineage and age, with each generation receiving significantly less than the one before it. In each category a princess receives half of what a prince does, the difference being based on the view that women have husbands and are not the principal breadwinner of their household.

The few remaining sons of King Abdulaziz are paid directly by the Royal Diwan, and each receives several million dollars a year. The vast majority of princes and princesses collect their stipends from a special agency known, oddly, as the Office of Decisions and Adjustments. Within each category payments can vary significantly, but in general a grandson of King Abdulaziz receives roughly $200,000 a year and a great grandson $100,000. There are very few of Abdulaziz’s nephews still alive; their sons, however, receive roughly $50,000 a year. The descendants of King Abdulaziz’s cousins receive less. Distant branches of the family, such as the Farhan or Thunayyan, may receive nothing at all.

the king very deliberately engineered the unconventional, complicated, and controversial rise of the young and relatively inexperienced Mohammed bin Salman because, to paraphrase The New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman, If you think there are another dozen princes in Riyadh with the steel, cunning, and ruthlessness as Mohammed bin Salman, you are wrong.

King Salman systematically dismantled the institutional power bases that other senior princes had enjoyed for decades as ministers of defense, the interior, the National Guard, municipal affairs, and foreign affairs.

Iranian oil minister Bijan Zanganeh demanded that the other Gulf countries cut back while Iran regained, as he put it, “our lost share of the market.” The Arab Gulf countries were adamant that they would not cut back to make room for additional Iranian oil. “We will provide oil to whoever asks for it,” said Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, Saudi deputy oil minister at the time.

Had a frothy venture capital sector not been so obsessed with the search for eccentric and visionary founders, WeWork might still occupy only a smattering of buildings in Brooklyn and lower Manhattan. If mutual funds hadn’t rushed into startups, WeWork might have never had the funds to start expanding to surf pools. If Saudi Arabia’s economy hadn’t fallen under the control of a new startup-loving prince desperate to diversify its oil wealth, Masayoshi Son might never have written Neumann a check. If bankers hadn’t been so focused on the prestige and fees from leading a big IPO, perhaps sober advice could have prevailed before a major public embarrassment. When all the forces worked together, people thought as a herd. Optimism supplanted critical thinking. Smart minds were bent so that a real estate company looked like a software company. It was the same effect that allowed mattress companies to look like tech companies. Ride-hailing firms weren’t just glorified taxi services, but were meant to compete with established retail giants. When everyone stood to get rich, everything had infinite potential.

Each of the men Mohammed would meet in the United States had some vision for how he could use a huge Saudi investment and little to say about putting his own money into the kingdom. The studio chiefs hoped Mohammed would back new movie projects. Silicon Valley wanted capital to further inflate bubbles like WeWork and the dog-walking app Wag. Even the curious magazine that showed up across the United States celebrating the prince’s visit seemed to be a sales pitch.

But, the piece de resistance is Jared Kushner securing a $2 billion investment from a fund led by the Saudi Crown prince

According to analysts, 666 Fifth Avenue had about a 30 percent vacancy rate and only generated about half of its annual mortgage. It was rumored that the largest tenant was planning to move out. A Canadian company named Brookfield Property Partners took a ninety-nine-year lease on 666 Fifth Avenue. Brookfield paid the rent for the entire century-long lease, upfront, which amounted to about $1.1 billion—removing Kushner’s biggest financial headache (a $1.4 billion mortgage on the office portion of the tower due in February 2019). Brookfield got its financing for this deal from a $750 million mortgage from ING Group, a Dutch multinational and financial services corporation, and a $300 million mezzanine loan from Apollo Global Management.9 However, the Qatar Investment Authority, the government-run agency that made decisions about the nations’ financial investments, bought a $1.8 billion stake in Brookfield Property Partners. As the second largest shareholder, they had a lot to say about what should be purchased; in this instance, they apparently used Brookfield to bail out 666 Fifth Ave. This investment was a godsend to Kushner, who was now out of debt just as Qatar was suddenly no longer blockaded by Mohammad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, crown prince of Saudi Arabia (known colloquially as MBS), and his allies.

And on the other side of the world, there was Mohammed bin Salman—the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, who was embittered at Bezos for the Washington Post’s coverage of the murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi, and who some cybersecurity experts would come to believe had hacked Bezos’s cell phone.

The fact that NSO sold Pegasus in 2017 to the Saudis barely registered any outrage until the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in December 2018. Israel has a long covert history of relations with Saudi Arabia, providing intelligence about threats to its royal family from as early as the 1970s.49 Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who became the country’s spy chief, spent decades meeting Israeli and Jewish leaders as well as Mossad chiefs.50 NSO was immediately blamed for being an accessory to the Khashoggi killing, giving the accused ring leader bin Salman and his team the ability to track Khashoggi’s movements before his death. NSO denied any responsibility but nonetheless reportedly briefly canceled its contract with the Kingdom. NSO’s denials of any complicity in the murder were bogus, with evidence emerging that his wife, fiancé, and associates had their phones compromised by Pegasus both before his death and in the days after, including by the United Arab Emirates, a close ally of Saudi Arabia that often tracks dissidents for its friend. Today, both Khashoggi’s wife and fiancé, Hanan Elatr and Hatice Cengiz, live in fear for their lives.51

Eventually, more than 150 terrorists were killed by the police and several thousand suspects arrested.13 However, the Saudi campaign against al-Qaeda was noticeably less vicious and more targeted than the brutal, widespread repression of the Islamists in Syria, Algeria, and Egypt. This was another clear policy choice: Prince Mohammed bin Naif—who, as deputy minister of the interior, directed government counterterrorism efforts—emphasized again and again that although it was important to eliminate existing terrorists, it was much more important not to create new ones with heavy-handed police tactics.

The genuine sorrow over King Abdullah’s passing was accompanied by relief at the smooth succession that followed. Crown Prince Salman immediately became the new king and promoted his half-brother, Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin, to be the new crown prince.

Because he was the governor of Riyadh, where most Al Saud princes lived, King Fahd had assigned him the role of “referee” in family disputes and disciplinarian for wayward princes. Sometimes referred to as the “Prince of Princes,” Salman maintained a private jail for princes and was well aware of which family members abused their royal status.

There were no princes in the RDA bureaucracy. Salman regularly warned employees that anyone caught embezzling would spend the rest of their life in prison,

By 2015, the transition to third-generation princes was imminent and managing that process would be King Salman’s most important challenge. When King Abdulaziz died in 1953, it had taken a decade of periodic crises to resolve the manner in which the second generation of princes would govern. The system that they eventually created of thirty-four brothers sharing power, served the kingdom well for many years. The king was always first among equals with final authority and some kings were clearly more dominant than others, but all had sought to maintain family unity.

On the day of King Abdullah’s death, King Salman appeared to resolve this difficult issue by appointing his nephew, the 55-year-old Prince Mohammed bin Naif or MBN to be the deputy crown prince and third in line of succession. This move to a third-generation prince was an historic event, which effectively ended the political hopes of Abdulaziz’s few remaining sons. Many in Riyadh believed that by making the transition to third-generation leadership while a second-generation king was still on the throne to supervise the process, King Salman had taken the most important step of his reign on his first day in office.

The entire world saw Mohammed bin Salman kneel and kiss the hand of his deposed cousin, promising to always seek his advice. Mohammed bin Naif shook his younger cousin’s hand and swore allegiance to him as the new crown prince. No new deputy crown prince was named then—or has been since. The following month an entirely new security agency, reporting directly to the king through the Royal Diwan and Mohammed bin Salman, was created. Known as the Presidency for State Security, it took over nearly all police and internal intelligence work

Within four years of ascending to the throne, King Salman has thus dramatically changed Saudi Arabia’s political structure. The old system—in which various senior princes ran independent, uncoordinated ministries and where senior technocrats were allied to one senior prince or another—has been dismantled. The king has appointed dozens of new judges and replaced every minister and military service chief, some more than once. Across the Saudi government, all senior technocrats now owe their position not to a variety of princely patrons but solely to the patronage of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

King Salman appears to have engineered a peaceful handover of power from the sons of King Abdulaziz to his grandsons. Third-generation princes now serve not only as crown prince but in nearly all provincial governor, deputy governor, and royal cabinet positions. Like the young team of brothers that King Faisal assembled in the 1960s, the grandsons of King Abdulaziz installed by King Salman and MBS expect to govern Saudi Arabia into the foreseeable future.

Saudi Arabia now suffers from what investors call “key man risk.” Too much is riding on one person. Should Mohammed bin Salman leave the scene for whatever reason, all bets would be off with regard to Saudi stability. There is no obvious replacement. No deputy crown prince has been named,

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been very careful to show respect for the tribes, their sheikhs, and tribal culture.

Early in 2017, the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Saleh Al al-Sheikh, hosted a dinner at his home in Riyadh for the Committee of Senior Scholars, during which Mohammed bin Salman outlined his plans for economic and social reform. The prince told the religious scholars that economic development was crucial to the kingdom’s future but could not advance without social liberalization. He assured them that Islam and their role as its guardians would always be respected in Saudi Arabia but insisted that some things would have to change and that their support was both needed and expected.

By 1960, Saudi pilots and Saudi princes were defecting to Cairo. Saudi Arabia was surrounded by secular, republican regimes in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen—all eager to see the monarchy’s downfall.

Saudi Arabia established a robust alliance with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These two neighbors created a very powerful bloc, producing between them nearly half the Arab world’s GDP and 40 percent of OPEC’s oil. Their crown princes, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed, were close personally and professionally. Although their interests were not completely aligned, from 2015 onward the two neighbors fought together against the Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen. In June 2018, their de-facto alliance was given a formal structure through a new Saudi–Emirati Coordination Council. Led by the two crown princes, the new body issued a “Strategy for Resolve” listing forty-four joint economic and military projects that the two nations planned to carry out over the following five years.

It is worth remembering that in March 2015, Mohammed bin Salman was not the king of Saudi Arabia nor the crown prince or even the deputy crown prince. He was the newly appointed minister of defense. The experienced Saud al-Faisal, though ill, was still foreign minister. The popular view that 30-year-old Mohammed bin Salman recklessly took his country to war and that ten sovereign states, including Britain and the United States, blithely followed him, is a misreading of history. King Salman made the decision in order to stop the “Hezbollahization” of Yemen. Major Western powers supported the Saudis in order to prevent the expansion of Iranian influence into the Red Sea, especially in the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb strait, and to maintain Saudi support for then-ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran.

The Crown Prince is betting on demographics. Most Saudis are under 30 and half of them are female. His strategy has been to win the support of the majority in the center by giving them what they want, while firmly suppressing outliers at both ends of the political spectrum

In some ways, the Saudi response to Iran has followed its long-established security policies; spend billions of dollars on advanced weapons and turn to traditional partners for support. In 2019, Riyadh made the first payments on an estimated $15 billion contract for Lockheed Martin’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) air defense system. That summer, Saudi Arabia reopened the Prince Sultan Air Base for the deployment of US aircraft, air defense missile batteries, and several thousand soldiers and airmen. Yet in other ways the Saudi response under King Salman and Mohammed bin Salman has been unconventional and may become even more so. Launching an independent air campaign in Yemen or investing seriously in a domestic defense industry were new approaches. Most worryingly, as the former head of Israel’s National Security Council Yaakov Amidor warned—a nuclear armed Iran would not only surround Israel with a “ring of fire,” it would very likely drive Turkey and Saudi Arabia to seek their own nuclear weapons.

There is now a Shia minister of state, president of Saudi Aramco and chairman of the Crown Prince’s mega-project NEOM, an ambitious and yet unproven concept for an entirely new futuristic city to be built near the border with Jordan.

The SCCC wasted no time making its presence felt. Within hours of its creation, General al-Howairini efficiently conducted a wide-scale series of detentions unprecedented in Saudi history. Those taken to Riyadh’s five-star Ritz Carlton Hotel included eleven princes, four serving ministers, dozens of former ministers, deputy ministers, and prominent businessmen.

Unlike the Arab Spring uprisings, Riyadh’s anti-corruption campaign was implemented by the highest levels of government in order to preserve, not overthrow, a government. Furthermore, it was not, as is often heard, a power-grab by an ambitious young prince. By November 2017, Mohammed bin Salman and his father had already neutralized any serious opposition.

Saudis posting messages critical of the crown prince have been pressured to publish apologies.

As royal authority becomes more concentrated, the number of princes who can actually help the average citizen has sharply declined. People have begun to feel less personally connected to their leaders.

General Motors dealer, Al Jomaih, was based in Riyadh.16 The king and crown prince no doubt also recognized that the Nejd, with its tribal orientation and religious conservatism, had been, and probably always would be, the region of the kingdom most devoted to the House of Saud. They began an affirmative action program for Nejdis in both business and government.

The king and crown prince no doubt also recognized that the Nejd, with its tribal orientation and religious conservatism, had been, and probably always would be, the region of the kingdom most devoted to the House of Saud. They began an affirmative action program for Nejdis in both business and government.

Unlike the Al Rasheed of Ha’il, the Al Saud had not traditionally engaged in commerce. Abdulaziz sought to promote the merchants’ prosperity because he relied on them for taxes, customs duties, and loans. He did not compete with them and instructed his sons to stay out of business. King Saud continued his father’s policy, and in 1956 and 1959 issued royal decrees prohibiting princes and civil servants from engaging in private business.

Unlike the Al Rasheed of Ha’il, the Al Saud had not traditionally engaged in commerce. Abdulaziz sought to promote the merchants’ prosperity because he relied on them for taxes, customs duties, and loans. He did not compete with them and instructed his sons to stay out of business. King Saud continued his father’s policy, and in 1956 and 1959 issued royal decrees prohibiting princes and civil servants from engaging in private business. King Faisal, however, recognized the need for change. With more and more princes coming of age, they could not all be given large stipends or senior government positions—nor could they be prohibited from earning a living. King Faisal’s own son, Abdullah, had served as minister of the interior but wanted to go into business. When a new decree was issued in 1976 allowing members of the royal family to engage in commerce, Prince Abdullah al-Faisal became Saudi Arabia’s Sony dealer.20 This fundamental legal change ensured that the Al Saud would eventually join the kingdom’s commercial, as well as its social and political, elite.

Of his thirty-four living sons, only Faisal was with him at the end. When Saud arrived from Jeddah, Faisal rose to greet him and immediately swore allegiance to his older brother as the new king. Faisal then took a ring off their dead father’s finger and presented it to his brother in a gesture of loyalty.12 As his father had instructed him to do, King Saud publicly proclaimed Faisal his crown prince and confirmed his appointment as Viceroy to the Hejaz.

Only Abdulaziz’s half-brother, Mohammed, would not swear allegiance to Crown Prince Saud. Mohammed did not dispute his older brother’s right to rule, but he had been part of the band that took Riyadh in 1902 and had fought in many campaigns during the Wars of Unification. Mohammed felt that he or his eldest son, Khalid, had a legitimate right to be considered Abdulaziz’s successor. It was the future King Faisal who finally persuaded his uncle to pledge allegiance to Crown Prince Saud—thus playing a role very similar to the one his own son, Khalid al-Faisal, would play sixty years later in resolving another succession dispute.

The free princes were a group of King Abdulaziz’s younger sons led by Prince Talal, who felt politically marginalized and claimed to support a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and supreme court. In King Saud’s new cabinet, Prince Talal became finance minister

Abdulaziz confirmed this interpretation of the treaty in 1933 when, shortly after unifying the Nejd and Hejaz into one kingdom, he designated his eldest son, Saud, the crown prince.

Saud was also devoted to his father. In 1936, when a knife-wielding Yemeni assassin attacked King Abdulaziz in Mecca, the crown prince spontaneously stepped in front of his father and took the blade in his own shoulder. Many believe it was this incident that compelled Abdulaziz not to sideline Saud for his more able half-brother, Faisal.

Of his thirty-four living sons, only Faisal was with him at the end. When Saud arrived from Jeddah, Faisal rose to greet him and immediately swore allegiance to his older brother as the new king. Faisal then took a ring off their dead father’s finger and presented it to his brother in a gesture of loyalty.12 As his father had instructed him to do, King Saud publicly proclaimed Faisal his crown prince and confirmed his appointment as Viceroy to the Hejaz. King Saud remained prime minister; Crown Prince Faisal became deputy prime minister and established the link between those two positions that continues today.

in October 1953—in a belated effort to establish some sort of institutional structure that could replace his fading personal rule, and in what was to be his last decree—Abdulaziz created the Council of Ministers to serve as a cabinet. He appointed Crown Prince Saud to be the first prime minister or, as the position is known in Saudi Arabia, President of the Council of Ministers.

Five years into King Saud’s reign, the country was facing bankruptcy. Civil servants, soldiers, and contractors were not being paid. The American-owned oil company Aramco refused to make additional loans against future Saudi production.19 The Saudi Riyal was devalued by 50 percent, inflation soared, and there was labor unrest in the Eastern Province. By 1957, the kingdom was forced to seek a loan from the International Monetary Fund, which insisted on seeing the country’s first detailed budget. That financial plan sharply reduced royal family living expenses. Over the next six years privy-purse expenditures fell by two thirds. In Riyadh, many half-finished palaces were abandoned, and infuriated princes correctly blamed their distress on King Saud’s financial mismanagement.

In Riyadh, King Saud’s brothers became convinced that his foreign policy bungling, combined with his economic mismanagement, was putting their family at risk. The elder brothers agreed that Saud should keep his throne but relinquish all executive authority to Faisal. King Saud accepted this arrangement in March 1958. Crown Prince Faisal became prime minister, appointed himself finance minister, and began to balance the kingdom’s budget. He cut spending across the board, suspended development projects, canceled agriculture subsidies, delayed payments to contractors and tribal sheikhs, imposed import controls on luxury goods, and devalued the riyal. He reduced stipends for royal family members and obtained new loans from Aramco as well as leading merchants, including Osama bin Laden’s father Mohammed.24 At the same time, oil production increased by more than 50 percent from 1 million barrels a day in 1957 to 1.6 million barrels a day in 1962.25 The kingdom’s budget was balanced and its currency stabilized. The inflation rate fell sharply. By 1960, Faisal’s austerity had reduced not only the national debt, but also his own popularity with the tribes, merchants, and princes.

Having abandoned the free princes, dismissed the liberal technocrats, frightened the ulama, alienated merchants, and cooled relations with the United States, King Saud had few friends left. In October 1962, the Al Saud family and the ulama again pressured him into accepting the return of Crown Prince Faisal as prime minister. Faisal immediately removed Saud’s sons from the cabinet and installed the team of brothers and half-brothers that would govern Saudi Arabia for the next fifty years.

King Saud abdicated formally and peacefully in November 1964. With the Minister of Defense Prince Sultan and the Commander of the National Guard Prince Abdullah aligned with Faisal, Saud had little choice.

King Saud never intended to quietly fade away. Now he saw a chance to mobilize discontented clerics, merchants, tribal leaders, and some mid-ranking princes. He began blocking Faisal’s appointments for judges and governors. In November 1960, King Saud refused to approve Prime Minister Faisal’s proposed budget. A frustrated Faisal submitted a letter stating that “As I am unable to continue, I shall cease to use the powers vested in me as from tonight.”26 Faisal did not use the word resign, but that was how Saud chose to read it. King Saud used Faisal’s letter as the pretext to reclaim his role as prime minister, and then created a new cabinet in an alliance with the so-called free princes.

. King Saud eventually recognized that this liberal cabinet was costing him more support than it produced, and that the free princes had political aspirations of their own. In September 1961, he fired them and appointed more of his own sons to senior positions.

The abdication of King Saud made it clear that the sons of King Abdulaziz would follow their father’s intentions regarding succession. Saudi Arabia would not become a monarchy based on primogeniture. It would be a family enterprise in which both age and ability shaped a consensus as to who should lead the family and the kingdom. The manner in which the struggle was resolved demonstrated why Saudi princes have generally spent more energy preserving the family franchise than fighting each other for absolute power. Senior Saudi princes do not need to fight to the death.

Princes Fahd and Sultan came from the powerful block of full brothers known as the Sudairi Seven.5 Princes Khalid and Abdullah represented the large, but fragmented, group of non-Sudairi brothers.

King Faisal established a Council of Senior Princes to advise him on succession issues and to supervise succession in the event of his death. This Council initially included two of Abdulaziz’s brothers, Abdullah and Musa’id, as well as five of his sons: Khalid, Fahd, Abdullah, Sultan, and Nawwaf.

King Abdulaziz had selected his next two successors informally with a pact between his two eldest sons. King Faisal sought to make this process more secure, transparent, and predictable. Prince Fahd (1921–2005) was the seventh of Abdulaziz’s surviving sons. He had strongly supported Saud’s abdication, and as the oldest of the Sudairi Seven brothers had thrown their considerable political weight behind Faisal.9 Thus in 1967, Faisal selected Fahd to fill the newly created position of “second deputy prime minister.

Faisal had appointed Mohammed’s younger full brother, Khalid (1913–1982), deputy prime minister in 1962. That implied, but did not confirm, that Khalid would become crown prince. Only in 1965 did King Faisal officially decree that Khalid would be his successor

King Faisal was assassinated in March 1975 by his nephew, Prince Faisal bin Musa’id bin Abdulaziz.

within hours of Faisal’s death the Council of Senior Princes declared Crown Prince Khalid the new king. As expected, the Second Deputy Prime Minister Fahd became the new crown prince.12 In what had become an established pattern, the new king became prime minister and the new crown prince became deputy prime minister. The putative third in line, Abdullah, became the new second deputy prime minister.

Because of his declining health and preference for desert camping over cabinet meetings, Khalid allowed Crown Prince Fahd to act as day-to-day ruler. A Royal Decree issued in May 1975 granted Fahd full responsibility for the routine management of the kingdom.

King Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995, which left him increasingly weak and unable to govern during the last decade of his life. When he died in August 2005, his younger half-brother, Abdullah (1924–2015), who had been crown prince for twenty-three years and effective regent for ten, was immediately declared king. Fahd’s younger full brother, Prince Sultan (1928–2011), remained minister of defense and became crown prince and deputy prime minister. The number-three post of second deputy prime minister, which King Faisal had created, was left vacant for the first time in thirty-eight years. Many had expected this third position to go to Sultan’s full brother, Interior Minister Naif (1934–2012), but King Abdullah baulked at the prospect of two full Sudairi brothers becoming king one after the other. In fact, from the beginning of his reign, King Abdullah sparred with the six remaining Sudairi brothers, who still firmly controlled the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as the governorship of Riyadh. Only in 2009, when Crown Prince Sultan’s health had deteriorated to the point at which it became clear that he would never be king, did King Abdullah declare Prince Naif second deputy prime minister.

Had King Abdullah overseen the effective use of the Allegiance Council, the evolution of succession in Saudi Arabia might have been very different. As it was, when the Council approved Mohammed bin Naif as crown prince in 2015 and Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince in 2017, it was regarded as little more than a rubber stamp for the king’s decision. As stated in the Basic Law of Governance, succession remained very much the prerogative of the king.

the Allegiance Council, in which the Sudairis could be outvoted.29 The Council, created in 2007, represented an interesting but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to institutionalize the Saudi succession process. It consisted of King Abdulaziz’s surviving sons and a grandson representing each son who had died. It was intended that a new king would propose up to three candidates for crown prince to the Allegiance Council, which would attempt to form a consensus around one name.

Consequently, there has long been a clear distinction between the large “Royal Family” comprising thousands who play no role in politics and the much smaller “Ruling Family,” which is itself divided into two sections. There are those princes who may be consulted on various important issues; these include the surviving sons of King Abdulaziz, his most prominent grandsons, and a few leading members of cadet branches of the family—most notably, the descendants of Abdulaziz’s cousin, Saud al-Kabeer, and his brother, Abdullah bin Abd al-Rahman. Then there is a very small group of princes who actually run the country on a daily basis: the king, crown prince, royal ministers, and provincial governors.

After lunch, the Queen had asked her royal guest whether he would like a tour of the estate. Prompted by his Foreign Minister, the urbane Prince Saud, an initially hesitant Abdullah agreed. The royal Land Rovers were drawn up in front of the castle. As instructed, the Crown Prince climbed into the front seat of the front Land Rover, with his interpreter in the seat behind. To his surprise, the Queen climbed into the driving seat, turned the ignition and drove off. Women are not – yet – allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia, and Abdullah was not used to being driven by a woman, let alone a queen. His nervousness only increased as the Queen, an Army driver in wartime, accelerated the Land Rover along the narrow Scottish estate roads, talking all the time. Through his interpreter, the Crown Prince implored the Queen to slow down and concentrate on the road ahead.

The Prince alighted from his gleaming silver-blue jet, his mind firmly on the task at hand: to persuade his close friend to go to war. Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington, was in Crawford, Texas, in August 2002 to visit the President of the United States, his close friend George W. Bush. At the President’s ranch the two men, comfortable in one another’s company, chatted for an hour. The President was in determined mood. Bandar’s exhortation that he should not back off, that he should complete what his father had failed to do, that he should destroy the regime of Saddam Hussein once and for all, gratified the President. Satisfied by their mutual reinforcement, the dapper enigmatic Prince and the cowboy President took lunch with their wives and seven of Bandar’s eight children. A few weeks later, President Bush met the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at Camp David. The two leaders declared they had sufficient evidence that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction to justify their acting against Saddam, with or without the support of the United Nations. Prince Bandar’s role in Washington and London was unique: diplomat, peacemaker, bagman for covert CIA operations and arms dealer extraordinaire. He constructed a special relationship between Washington, Riyadh and London, and made himself very, very wealthy in the process. The £75m Airbus, painted in the colours of the Prince’s beloved Dallas Cowboys, was a gift from the British arms company BAE Systems. It was a token of gratitude for the Prince’s role, as son of the country’s Defence Minister, in the biggest arms deal the world has seen. The Al Yamamah – ‘the dove’ – deal signed between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia in 1985 was worth over £40bn. It was also arguably the most corrupt transaction in trading history. Over £1bn was paid into accounts controlled by Bandar. The Airbus – maintained and operated by BAE at least until 2007 – was a little extra, presented to Bandar on his birthday in 1988. A significant portion of the more than £1bn was paid into personal and Saudi embassy accounts at the venerable Riggs Bank opposite the White House on Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington DC. The bank of choice for Presidents, ambassadors and embassies had close ties to the CIA, with several bank officers holding full agency security clearance. Jonathan Bush, uncle of the President, was a senior executive of the bank at the time. But Riggs and the White House were stunned by the revelation that from 1999 money had inadvertently flowed from the account of Prince Bandar’s wife to two of the fifteen Saudis among the 9/11 hijackers.

Prince Faisal bin Abdullah, minister of education and King Abdullah’s son-in-law, adds, “The king’s message is that oil is not our first wealth. Education is. We have to develop the people now.

still working hard at Google, even though they had the wealth of Saudi princes.

To cover these massive commissions, BAC inflated the price of each Lightning jet by £50,000, listing the cost as ‘Agency Fees’. The commissions went not only to Gaith Pharaon but also to five Saudi princes.

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