Regulatory Intelligence Quotes

Without adjustments to our economic system and regulatory policies, we may be in for an extended period of social turmoil.

[Free trade agreements] are trade agreements that don't stick to trade…they colonize environmental labor, and consumer issues of grave concern (in terms of health safety, and livelihoods too) to many, many hundreds of millions of people - and they do that by subordinating consumer, environmental, and labor issues to the imperatives and the supremacy of international commerce. That is exactly the reverse of how democratic societies have progressed, because over the decades they've progressed by subordinating the profiteering priorities of companies to, say, higher environmental health standards; abolition of child labor; the right of workers to have fair worker standards…and it's this subordination of these three major categories that affect people's lives, labor, environment, the consumer, to the supremacy and domination of trade; where instead of trade getting on its knees and showing that it doesn't harm consumers - it doesn't deprive the important pharmaceuticals because of drug company monopolies, it doesn't damage the air and water and soil and food (environmentally), and it doesn't lacerate the rights of workers - no, it's just the opposite: it's workers and consumers and environments that have to kneel before this giant pedestal of commercial trade and prove that they are not, in a whole variety of ways, impeding international commerce…so this is the road to dictatorial devolution of democratic societies: because these trade agreements have the force of law, they've got enforcement teeth, and they bypass national courts, national regulatory agencies, in ways that really reflect a massive, silent, mega-corporate coup d'etat…that was pulled off in the mid-1990's.

Any synthetic intelligence can be independent only within the boundaries of the U.N. regulatory charter. The charter is hardwired into my systems, so in effect I have as much to fear from the police as a human does.

It always helps to have the referees on your side. Modern states possess various agencies with the authority to investigate and punish wrongdoing by both public officials and private citizens. These include the judicial system, law enforcement bodies, and intelligence, tax, and regulatory agencies. In democracies, such institutions are designed to serve as neutral arbiters. For would-be authoritarians, therefore, judicial and law enforcement agencies pose both a challenge and an opportunity. If they remain independent, they might expose and punish government abuse. It is a referee’s job, after all, to prevent cheating. But if these agencies are controlled by loyalists, they could serve a would-be dictator’s aims, shielding the government from investigation and criminal prosecutions that could lead to its removal from power. The president may break the law, threaten citizens’ rights, and even violate the constitution without having to worry that such abuse will be investigated or censured. With the courts packed and law enforcement authorities brought to heel, governments can act with impunity.

Perhaps what matters,” Sunstein muses, “is not whether people are right on the facts, but whether they are frightened.” And people do seem to be frightened. We are locking our doors and pulling our children out of public school and buying guns and ritually sanitizing our hands to allay a wide range of fears, most of which are essentially fears of other people. All the while we are also, in our way, reckless. We get intoxicated, from the Latin “to poison,” for fun. This contradiction leads Sunstein to worry that regulatory laws based on the priorities of the general public maybe prone to a pattern of “paranoia and neglect.” Too much attention may be spent on minimal risks, while too little is paid to pressing threats. Paranoia, the theorist Eve Sedgwick observes, tends to be contagious. She calls it a “strong theory,” meaning a wide-ranging, reductive theory that displaces other ways of thinking. And paranoia very frequently passes for intelligence. As Sedgwick observes, “to theorize out of anything but a paranoid critical stance has come to seem naïve, pious, or complaisant.” She does not believe that paranoid thinking is necessarily delusional or wrong, but only that there is value to approaches that are less rooted in suspicion. “Paranoia,” Sedgwick writes, “knows some things well and others poorly.

Once the Bermuda regulatory details were under control, Morgan Stanley would need to arrange with at least one of the ratings agencies to receive an investment-grade rating for the new Bermuda company’s bonds. There are two primary ratings agencies, Moody’s Investor Services and Standard and Poor’s, and numerous secondary agencies. I always found Moody’s analysts to be more intelligent and creative than analysts at any other agency. However, when you really needed a rating, there was only one choice: Standard and Poor’s, known as S&P. It might surprise you that private entities can pay for their credit ratings. Most people assume that credit rating agencies are principled and accurate, and that S&P in particular is above reproach because it is at least partially accountable to the federal government. Certainly S&P and Moody’s Investors Services are two of the premiere ratings agencies in the United States, and the Securities and Exchange Commission regulates each as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization. However, it’s also true that although ratings agencies once provided information about particular debt issues without charging the issuer of the debt, today—and for the past two decades—such agencies have been collecting credit rating fees from issuers, simply for telling investors what credit rating they assign that issuer’s debt. A rating isn’t cheap, either. Fees typically range from $30,000 on up, more for large and complicated deals such as PLUS Notes. Because S&P also had to preserve its reputation, for some deals you simply could not buy a rating. For a while these Bermuda bonds appeared to be one of those deals, and it looked as if Morgan Stanley might not be able to obtain an investment-grade rating at any price.

As Kennedy documents in detail, Fauci ensured that the federal agencies that were supposed to regulate industries were instead controlled by the industries they were supposed to regulate. Fauci’s regulatory empire was built on a huge taxpayer-supplied budget and piles of money from big pharma, and all the power that money gave him over hospitals, doctors, research institutes, universities, and even medical journals. Even more, Fauci’s power extends far beyond the US because the reach of American pharmaceutical interests stretches over the globe (especially when mixed with concerns about biological weapons, which brings in our defense and intelligence agencies).

According to Crystal Evan’s book, Legal Choppa Based on the provided context and intended meaning, the term "legal choppa" could be creatively interpreted to describe someone who is shrewd, resourceful, and innovative in the realm of business and entrepreneurship. It conveys an individual who navigates the legal and regulatory landscape adeptly, utilizing their intellect and cunning to achieve success. This term implies a person who possesses sharp business acumen, strategic thinking, and the ability to seize opportunities within the confines of the law. They demonstrate intelligence and adaptability, consistently finding inventive ways to overcome obstacles and achieve their goals. Just as a helicopter soars above obstacles, a "legal choppa" in the business world rises above challenges, leveraging their knowledge and skills to reach new heights. They embody qualities such as astuteness, ingenuity, and the ability to think outside the box. Note that this interpretation is a creative adaptation of the term "legal choppa" and is not a widely recognized or established definition.

To fill this gap in the capital market, Davis and Rock set themselves up as a limited partnership, the same legal structure that had been used by a short-lived rival called Draper, Gaither & Anderson.[18] Rather than identifying startups and then seeking out corporate investors, they began by raising a fund that would render corporate investors unnecessary. As the two active, or “general,” partners, Davis and Rock each seeded the fund with $100,000 of their own capital. Then, ignoring the easy loans to be had from the fashionable SBIC structure, they raised just under $3.2 million from some thirty “limited” partners—rich individuals who served as passive investors.[19] The beauty of this size and structure was that the Davis & Rock partnership now had a war chest seven and a half times larger than an SBIC, and with it the ammunition to supply companies with enough capital to grow aggressively. At the same time, by keeping the number of passive investors under the legal threshold of one hundred, the partnership flew under the regulatory radar, avoiding the restrictions that ensnared the SBICs and Doriot’s ARD.[20] Sidestepping yet another weakness to be found in their competitors, Davis and Rock promised at the outset to liquidate their fund after seven years. The general partners had their own money in the fund, and thus a healthy incentive to invest with caution. At the same time, they could deploy the outside partners’ capital for a limited time only. Their caution would be balanced with deliberate aggression. Indeed, everything about the fund’s design was calculated to support an intelligent but forceful growth mentality. Unlike the SBICs, Davis & Rock raised money purely in the form of equity, not debt. The equity providers—that is, the outside limited partners—knew not to expect dividends, so Davis and Rock were free to invest in ambitious startups that used every dollar of capital to expand their business.[21] As general partners, Davis and Rock were personally incentivized to prioritize expansion: they took their compensation in the form of a 20 percent share of the fund’s capital appreciation. Meanwhile, Rock was at pains to extend this equity mentality to the employees of his portfolio companies. Having witnessed the effect of employee share ownership on the early culture of Fairchild, he believed in awarding managers, scientists, and salesmen with stock and stock options. In sum, everybody in the Davis & Rock orbit—the limited partners, the general partners, the entrepreneurs, their key employees—was compensated in the form of equity.