Propaganda Goebbels Quotes

It would not be impossible to prove with sufficient repetition and a psychological understanding of the people concerned that a square is in fact a circle. They are mere words, and words can be molded until they clothe ideas and disguise.

That propaganda is good which leads to success, and that is bad which fails to achieve the desired result. It is not propaganda’s task to be intelligent, its task is to lead to success.

Success is the important thing. Propaganda is not a matter for average minds, but rather a matter for practitioners. It is not supposed to be lovely or theoretically correct. I do not care if I give wonderful, aesthetically elegant speeches, or speak so that women cry. The point of a political speech is to persuade people of what we think right. I speak differently in the provinces than I do in Berlin, and when I speak in Bayreuth, I say different things than I say in the Pharus Hall. That is a matter of practice, not of theory. We do not want to be a movement of a few straw brains, but rather a movement that can conquer the broad masses. Propaganda should be popular, not intellectually pleasing. It is not the task of propaganda to discover intellectual truths.

Berndt handed in a plan for the occultist propaganda to be carried on by us. We are getting somewhere. The Americans and English fall easily to this kind of propaganda. We are therefore pressing into service all star witnesses of occult prophecy. Nostradamus must once again submit to being quoted.

The literal mind is baffled by the ironic one, demanding explanations that only intensify the joke. A vintage example, and one that really did occur, is that of P.G. Wodehouse, captured by accident during the German invasion of France in 1940. Josef Goebbels’s propaganda bureaucrats asked him to broadcast on Berlin radio, which he incautiously agreed to do, and his first transmission began: Young men starting out in life often ask me—“How do you become an internee?” Well, there are various ways. My own method was to acquire a villa in northern France and wait for the German army to come along. This is probably the simplest plan. You buy the villa and the German army does the rest. Somebody—it would be nice to know who, I hope it was Goebbels—must have vetted this and decided to let it go out as a good advertisement for German broad-mindedness. The “funny” thing is that the broadcast landed Wodehouse in an infinity of trouble with the British authorities, representing a nation that prides itself above all on a sense of humor.

I myself was to experience how easily one is taken in by a lying and censored press and radio in a totalitarian state. Though unlike most Germans I had daily access to foreign newspapers, especially those of London, Paris and Zurich, which arrived the day after publication, and though I listened regularly to the BBC and other foreign broadcasts, my job necessitated the spending of many hours a day in combing the German press, checking the German radio, conferring with Nazi officials and going to party meetings. It was surprising and sometimes consternating to find that notwithstanding the opportunities I had to learn the facts and despite one’s inherent distrust of what one learned from Nazi sources, a steady diet over the years of falsifications and distortions made a certain impression on one’s mind and often misled it. No one who has not lived for years in a totalitarian land can possibly conceive how difficult it is to escape the dread consequences of a regime’s calculated and incessant propaganda. Often in a German home or office or sometimes in a casual conversation with a stranger in a restaurant, a beer hall, a café, I would meet with the most outlandish assertions from seemingly educated and intelligent persons. It was obvious that they were parroting some piece of nonsense they had heard on the radio or read in the newspapers. Sometimes one was tempted to say as much, but on such occasions one was met with such a stare of incredulity, such a shock of silence, as if one had blasphemed the Almighty, that one realized how useless it was even to try to make contact with a mind which had become warped and for whom the facts of life had become what Hitler and Goebbels, with their cynical disregard for truth, said they were.

If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State. —Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Deutsches Reich

Good propaganda, to be effective, as Hitler and Goebbels had learned from experience, needs more than words. It needs deeds, however much they may have to be fabricated.

His arrogance marked something new in the world, for this was the first war where the losers would write history instead of the victors, courtesy of the most efficient propaganda machine ever created (with all due respect to Joseph Goebbels and the Nazis, who never achieved global domination). Hollywood’s high priests understood innately the observation of Milton’s Satan, that it was better to rule in Hell than serve in Heaven, better to be a villain, loser, or antihero than virtuous extra, so long as one commanded the bright lights of center stage. In this forthcoming Hollywood trompe l’oeil, all the Vietnamese of any side would come out poorly, herded into the roles of the poor, the innocent, the evil, or the corrupt. Our fate was not to be merely mute; we were to be struck dumb.

In book 8 of Plato’s Republic, Socrates argues that people are not naturally led to self-governance but rather seek a strong leader to follow. Democracy, by permitting freedom of speech, opens the door for a demagogue to exploit the people’s need for a strongman; the strongman will use this freedom to prey on the people’s resentments and fears. Once the strongman seizes power, he will end democracy, replacing it with tyranny. In short, book 8 of The Republic argues that democracy is a self-undermining system whose very ideals lead to its own demise. Fascists have always been well acquainted with this recipe for using democracy’s liberties against itself; Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels once declared, “This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed.” Today is no different from the past. Again, we find the enemies of liberal democracy employing this strategy, pushing the freedom of speech to its limits and ultimately using it to subvert others’ speech.

Si no puedes negar las malas noticias, inventa otras que las distraigan. Principios de propaganda de GOEBBELS

This is the secret of propaganda: He, who is the target of propaganda, should be completely immersed in the ideas of propaganda, without him ever noticing, that he is being immersed. Das ist das Geheimnis der Propaganda: Den, den die Propaganda fassen will, ganz mit den Ideen der Propaganda zu durchtränken, ohne dass er überhaupt merkt, dass er durchtränkt wird.

Goebbels, his minister of propaganda and the man who purportedly said, “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it,” was watching the blaze.

Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda maestro and perhaps the most accomplished media-wizard of the modern age, allegedly explained his method succinctly: “A lie told once remains a lie, but a lie told a thousand times becomes the truth.

Before the campaign was scarcely under way Hitler solved the problem of his citizenship. On February 25 it was announced that the Nazi Minister of the Interior of the state of Brunswick had named Herr Hitler an attaché of the legation of Brunswick in Berlin. Through this comic-opera maneuver the Nazi leader became automatically a citizen of Brunswick and hence of Germany and was therefore eligible to run for President of the German Reich. Having leaped over this little hurdle with ease, Hitler threw himself into the campaign with furious energy, crisscrossing the country, addressing large crowds at scores of mass meetings and whipping them up into a state of frenzy. Goebbels and Strasser, the other two spellbinders of the party, followed a similar schedule. But this was not all. They directed a propaganda campaign such as Germany had never seen. They plastered the walls of the cities and towns with a million screeching colored posters, distributed eight million pamphlets and twelve million extra copies of their party newspapers, staged three thousand meetings a day and, for the first time in a German election, made good use of films and gramophone records, the latter spouting forth from loudspeakers on trucks.

During the war, the lie most effective with the whole of the German people was the slogan of “the battle of destiny for the German people” [der Schicksalskampf des deutschen Volkes], coined either by Hitler or by Goebbels, which made self-deception easier on three counts: it suggested, first, that the war was no war; second, that it was started by destiny and not by Germany; and, third, that it was a matter of life and death for the Germans, who must annihilate their enemies or be annihilated.

Joseph Goebbels had artfully accomplished what all good propagandists must, convincing the world that their version of reality was reasonable and their opponents’ version biased. In doing that, Goebbels had not only created a compelling vision of the new Germany but also undercut the Nazis’ opponents in the West—whether they were American Jews in New York City or members of Parliament in London or anxious Parisians—making all of them seem shrill, hysterical, and misinformed. As thousands of Americans returned home from the games that fall, many of them felt as one quoted in a German propaganda publication did: “As for this man Hitler. . . . Well I believe we should all like to take him back to America with us and have him organize there just as he has done in Germany.

It was called the “Vietnam Syndrome.” The Vietnam Syndrome, a term that began to come up around 1970, has actually been defined on occasion. The Reaganite intellectual Norman Podhoretz defined it as “the sickly inhibitions against the use of military force.” There were these sickly inhibitions against violence on the part of a large part of the public. People just didn’t understand why we should go around torturing people and killing people and carpet bombing them. It’s very dangerous for a population to be overcome by these sickly inhibitions, as Goebbels understood, because then there’s a limit on foreign adventures. It’s necessary, as the Washington Post put it rather proudly during the Gulf War hysteria, to instill in people respect for “martial value.” That’s important. If you want to have a violent society that uses force around the world to achieve the ends of its own domestic elite, it’s necessary to have a proper appreciation of the martial virtues and none of these sickly inhibitions about using violence. So that’s the Vietnam Syndrome. It’s necessary to overcome that one.

Every morning the editors of the Berlin daily newspapers and the correspondents of those published elsewhere in the Reich gathered at the Propaganda Ministry to be told by Dr. Goebbels or by one of his aides what news to print and suppress, how to write the news and headline it, what campaigns to call off or institute and what editorials were desired for the day. In

Das ist das Geheimnis der Propaganda: Den, den die Propaganda fassen will, ganz mit den Ideen der Propaganda zu durchtränken, ohne dass er überhaupt merkt, dass er durchtränkt wird. This is the secret of propaganda: Those who are to be persuaded by it should be completely immersed in the ideas of the propaganda, without ever noticing that they are being immersed in it.

For the first time—in the last relatively free election Germany was to have—the Nazi Party now could employ all the vast resources of the government to win votes. Goebbels was jubilant. “Now it will be easy,” he wrote in his diary on February 3, “to carry on the fight, for we can call on all the resources of the State. Radio and press are at our disposal. We shall stage a masterpiece of propaganda. And this time, naturally, there is no lack of money.”2

Germans, had been deluded by a strident call to patriotism, and had become the weapon of an evil government with fearsome ambitions. He’d believed in Hitler’s ranting. He’d believed the potent, endless propaganda spewed out by Dr Goebbels. It had blinded him to the truth. It had been persuasive, but it had been a sham, a lie. And now Germany faced a reckoning for the terrible things it had done. The Thousand Year Reich, which had lasted eleven years so far, was not going to give in without a bloodbath.

No previous games had seen such a spectacular organization nor such a lavish display of entertainment. Goering, Ribbentrop and Goebbels gave dazzling parties for the foreign visitors—the Propaganda Minister’s “Italian Night” on the Pfaueninsel near Wannsee gathered more than a thousand guests at dinner in a scene that resembled the Arabian Nights. The visitors, especially those from England and America, were greatly impressed by what they saw: apparently a happy, healthy, friendly people united under Hitler—a far different picture, they said, than they had got from reading the newspaper dispatches from Berlin.

Ripetete una bugia cento, mille, un milione di volte, e diventerà una verità», pare dicesse il ministro della propaganda Joseph Goebbels quando illustrava, come uno chef orgoglioso della propria ricetta, la lista degli ingredienti per una efficace informazione totalitaria. Ricetta applicabile anche oggi, tanto più che i supporti su cui può correre una notizia, vera o falsa che sia, sono infinitamente più veloci di quelli dei tempi del ministro della propaganda del Reich. Così veloci che l’eventuale lavoro di ricerca e smentita risulta inutile, superato dalla velocità di immissione di sempre nuove bugie nel sistema. Smontare una bufala quando la gente già parla d’altro è inutile: una battaglia persa, o comunque a perdere.

The assumptions that propagandists are rational, in the sense that they follow their own propaganda theories in their choice of communications, and that the meanings of propagandists' communications may differ for different people reoriented the FCC* analysts from a concept of "content as shared" (Berelson would later say "manifest") to conditions that could explain the motivations of particular communicators and the interests they might serve. The notion of "preparatory propaganda" became an especially useful key for the analysts in their effort to infer the intents of broadcasts with political content. In order to ensure popular support for planned military actions, the Axis leaders had to inform; emotionally arouse, and otherwise prepare their countrymen and women to accept those actions; the FCC analysts discovered that they could learn a great deal about the enemy's intended actions by recognizing such preparatory efforts in the domestic press and broadcasts. They were able to predict several major military and political campaigns and to assess Nazi elites' perceptions of their situation, political changes within the Nazi governing group, and shifts in relations among Axis countries. Among the more outstanding predictions that British analysts were able to make was the date of deployment of German V weapons against Great Britain. The analysts monitored the speeches delivered by Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels and inferred from the content of those speeches what had interfered with the weapons' production and when. They then used this information to predict the launch date of the weapons, and their prediction was accurate within a few weeks. *FCC - Federal Communications Commission

IN BERLIN ON SATURDAY MORNING, Joseph Goebbels focused his regular propaganda meeting on how best to take advantage of what he believed must certainly be a rising sense of dread among England’s civilian population. “The important thing now,” he told the gathering, “is to intensify as far as possible the mood of panic which is undoubtedly slowly gaining ground in Britain.” Germany’s secret transmitters and foreign-language service were to continue describing the “frightful effects” of air raids. “The secret transmitters, in particular, should marshal witnesses who must give horrifying accounts of the destruction they have seen with their own eyes.” This effort, he instructed, should also include transmissions warning listeners that fog and mist would not protect them from aerial attack; bad weather merely confused the aim of German bombers and made it more likely that bombs would fall on unintended targets.

Close to forty thousand Germans gathered in front of Berlin’s opera house on May 10, 1933, as a parade of swastika-wearing students and beer-hall thugs carrying torches tossed books into a huge bonfire. Ordinary citizens poured forth carrying volumes looted from libraries and private homes. “Jewish intellectualism is dead,” propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, his face fiery, yelled from the podium. “The German soul can again express itself.” What happened in Germany in 1933 was not just a brutality perpetrated by thuggish leaders and abetted by ignorant mobs. It was also, as Einstein described, “the utter failure of the so-called intellectual aristocracy.” Einstein and other Jews were ousted from what had been among the world’s greatest citadels of open-minded inquiry, and those who remained did little to resist. It represented the triumph of the ilk of Philipp Lenard, Einstein’s longtime anti-Semitic baiter, who was named by Hitler to be the new chief of Aryan science. “We must recognize that it is unworthy of a German to be the intellectual follower of a Jew,” Lenard exulted that May. “Heil Hitler!” It would be a dozen years before Allied troops would fight their way in and oust him from that role.41 Le

Listen to some words: Today Christianity stands at the head of this country. . . . I pledge that I will never tie myself to those who want to destroy Christianity. . . . We want to fill our culture again with the Christian spirit—we want to burn out all the recent immoral development in literature, theater, the arts and in the press. . . . In short, we want to burn out the poison of immorality which has entered into our whole life and culture as a result of liberal excess the past . . . few years.2 Take these words at face value. Do they resonate with you? Here is what one listener said upon hearing them: “This . . . puts in words everything I have been searching for, for years. It is the first time someone gave form to what I want.”3 I suspect many would say the same. There are thousands of people who, upon hearing these words spoken, would cheer and agree and say amen. The words are Adolph Hitler’s, and the listener was someone in the audience who made that comment to Joseph Goebbels in 1933. Goebbels was Hitler’s minister of propaganda and clearly a very good one. Hitler’s words sound like they are inspired by Christian faith and morality. Listeners assumed a certain kind of person stood behind them. But Hitler’s words masked the deception behind them so that those listening, without knowing the character of the man, heard what they longed for but what never came to fruition. What did come was the extermination of millions, the destruction of countries, and evil that has affected generations. The words were said to manipulate the audience whose longings the Third Reich understood well. Hitler deliberately deceived the people and drew them in, calling forth loyalty and service. And he got it, not just from the general population but also from the German church. Words full of promises that cloaked great evil were tailored for a vulnerable culture.

A fierce battle was taking place at Tobruk, and nothing thrilled him more than spirited warfare and the prospect of military glory. He stayed up until three-thirty, in high spirits, “laughing, chaffing and alternating business with conversation,” wrote Colville. One by one his official guests, including Anthony Eden, gave up and went to bed. Churchill, however, continued to hold forth, his audience reduced to only Colville and Mary’s potential suitor, Eric Duncannon. Mary by this point had retired to the Prison Room, aware that the next day held the potential to change her life forever. — IN BERLIN, MEANWHILE, HITLER and Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels joked about a newly published English biography of Churchill that revealed many of his idiosyncrasies, including his penchant for wearing pink silk underwear, working in the bathtub, and drinking throughout the day. “He dictates messages in the bath or in his underpants; a startling image which the Führer finds hugely amusing,” Goebbels wrote in his diary on Saturday. “He sees the English Empire as slowly disintegrating. Not much will be salvageable.” — ON SUNDAY MORNING, a low-grade anxiety colored the Cromwellian reaches of Chequers. Today, it seemed, would be the day Eric Duncannon proposed to Mary, and no one other than Mary was happy about it. Even she, however, was not wholly at ease with the idea. She was eighteen years old and had never had a romantic relationship, let alone been seriously courted. The prospect of betrothal left her feeling emotionally roiled, though it did add a certain piquancy to the day. New guests arrived: Sarah Churchill, the Prof, and Churchill’s twenty-year-old niece, Clarissa Spencer-Churchill—“looking quite beautiful,” Colville noted. She was accompanied by Captain Alan Hillgarth, a raffishly handsome novelist and self-styled adventurer now serving as naval attaché in Madrid, where he ran intelligence operations; some of these were engineered with the help of a lieutenant on his staff, Ian Fleming, who later credited Captain Hillgarth as being one of the inspirations for James Bond. “It was obvious,” Colville wrote, “that Eric was expected to make advances to Mary and that the prospect was viewed with nervous pleasure by Mary, with approbation by Moyra, with dislike by Mrs. C. and with amusement by Clarissa.” Churchill expressed little interest. After lunch, Mary and the others walked into the rose garden, while Colville showed Churchill telegrams about the situation in Iraq. The day was sunny and warm, a nice change from the recent stretch of cold. Soon, to Colville’s mystification, Eric and Clarissa set off on a long walk over the grounds by themselves, leaving Mary behind. “His motives,” Colville wrote, “were either Clarissa’s attraction, which she did not attempt to keep in the background, or else the belief that it was good policy to arouse Mary’s jealousy.” After the walk, and after Clarissa and Captain Hillgarth had left, Eric took a nap, with the apparent intention (as Colville

Third Reich’s propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, “If you repeat a lie a thousand times, people are bound to start believing it.

Principio de orquestación. La propaganda debe limitarse a un número pequeño de ideas y repetirlas incansablemente, presentadas una y otra vez desde diferentes perspectivas, pero siempre convergiendo sobre el mismo concepto. Sin fisuras ni dudas. Si una mentira se repite suficientemente, acaba por convertirse en verdad. Principios de propaganda de JOSEPH GOEBBELS

Principio de la verosimilitud. Construir argumentos a partir de fuentes diversas, a través de los llamados globos sondas o de informaciones fragmentarias. Principios de propaganda de GOEBBELS

Principio de la silenciación. Acallar las cuestiones sobre las que no se tienen argumentos y disimular las noticias que favorecen al adversario, también contraprogramando con la ayuda de medios de comunicación afines. Principios de propaganda de GOEBBELS

Principio de la vulgarización. Toda propaganda debe ser popular, adaptando su nivel al menos inteligente de los individuos a los que va dirigida. Cuanto más grande sea la masa a convencer, más pequeño ha de ser el esfuerzo mental a realizar. La capacidad receptiva de las masas es limitada, y su comprensión, escasa; además, tienen gran facilidad para olvidar. Principios de propaganda de GOEBBELS

Since the 2001 Amerithrax Anthrax spore “attacks,” HHS has increasingly been horizontally integrated with the intelligence community (see Chapter 21) as well as with the Department of Homeland Security to form a health security state with enormous ability to shape and enforce “consensus” through widespread propaganda, censorship, “nudge” technology, and intentional manipulation of the “Mass Formation” hypnosis process using modern adaptations of methods originally developed by Dr. Joseph Goebbels [417

Roy Welker allowed his version of the Hitler Myth, augmented with a brimming tablespoon of Goebbels’s propaganda, to narcotize his view of Nazi Germany.

Life was going swimmingly for Reich minister Goebbels that spring. The old Olympic stadium was being torn down, and Werner March had drawn up elaborate plans for the vast complex that would replace it for the 1936 games—plans that fit the scope of Hitler’s ambitions and Goebbels’s propaganda objectives. The Reichssportfeld would sprawl over more than 325 acres.

To ensure compliance, the film department of the propaganda ministry now directly oversaw the planning and production of all new German films. Goebbels himself—a failed novelist and playwright earlier in life—had taken to reviewing the scripts of nearly all films personally, using a green pencil to strike out or rewrite offending lines or scenes.

Propaganda vs. Truth "If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it." ~ Joseph Goebbels, Reich Minister of Propaganda, Nazi Germany "If you tell a big enough truth that people would prefer not to hear and keep repeating it, people will despise you, think you're fucking crazy and try and hang you by your balls." ~ Beryl Dov, Hated Minister of Truth, Hello Poetry

La estrategia de la implacable propaganda de Goebbels se había consagrado, desde el momento en que la guerra en el este se había vuelto en contra de Alemania, a minar cualquier pensamiento de que existiese alguna elección o alternativa.

The novel’s audience was not restricted to the literati; it had prominent fans in other sectors too. In 1943, Hamsun gave his Nobel medal to one of those fans: Josef Goebbels. Hamsun wanted to thank the Nazi propaganda minister for the hospitality he had enjoyed during a recent trip to Germany. Ten years earlier, a 74-year-old Hamsun had taken to supporting the Nazis in Norwegian newspapers. When the Nazis invaded Norway in April 1940, Hamsun urged his countrymen to surrender. Not long after his meeting with Goebbels, Hamsun paid a visit to Hitler himself. Two years later, when Hitler committed suicide, Hamsun took the opportunity to compose an unsolicited obituary, which was published in Norway’s most prominent broadsheet, Aftenposten. In the obituary, Hamsun mourned the loss of the Führer and praised him as “a preacher of the gospel of justice for all nations.” The Allies liberated Norway the next day.

[...]De Sica fece appello a tutto il suo mestiere di attore brillante e patetico per mostrarsi disinvolto. Ancora qualche convenevole e sarebbe scattato in piedi chiedendo al generale di dirgli che cosa volesse da lui. Finalmente Maltzer gli porse una lettera senza aggiungere nulla. De Sica riuscì soltanto a leggere la firma di Goebbels, il ministro della propaganda del Terzo Reich. Sorridendo come se quella lettera fosse un indovinello difficile chiese al generale di illustrargliene il contenuto, dal momento che egli, purtroppo, e lo disse assai bene quel "purtroppo", non conosceva la meravigliosa lingua di Goethe. Disse la battuta così bene che si sentì su un palcoscenico, di fronte al pubblico. Bastò ad animarlo e a sentirsi addirittura fuori pericolo. Maltzer con il suo italiano inamidato gli spiegò che Goebbels in persona gli chiedeva di trasferirsi a Venezia per partecipare alla rinascita del cinema italiano e fascista. "Ma che cosa gliene frega, poi, ai tedeschi del cinema italiano?" avrebbe voluto rispondere, ma era una battuta che avrebbe rovinato il crescente drammatico della scena. "Conoscendo i suoi sentimenti patriottici e il suo prestigio di artista, il ministro è sicuro di poter contare ciecamente su di lei... Quando intende partire, herr De Sica?" concluse Maltzer. De Sica assunse un'espressione addolorata, allargò le braccia in un gesto di disappunto, come a dire che il destino era crudele con lui e con il cinema fascista. "Non posso... e sono mortificato di non poter accettare questa straordinaria offerta che mi viene da un uomo di riconosciuta cultura" e si interruppe per un attimo, come a chiedere perdono agli amici per quel riconoscimento servile "ma purtroppo ho firmato proprio la settimana scorsa un contratto con il Vaticano per dirigere un film di argomento religioso... Comincio a girare a giorni...". "Il Vaticano?!... Il Vaticano produce film?!" Maltzer era rosso di indignazione, ma l'espressione esprimeva anche la sua impotenza. "Proprio così... Sa... è uno stato estero... e ha la sua cinematografia nazionale..." Ora De Sica gli dava dentro, come se avvertisse che il pubblico invisibile fosse già pronto all'applauso. "Ma voi non siete un prete!" ribatté Maltzer "Anzi... un adultero... un peccatore!" "E chi non pecca?... Del resto né voi, né noi siamo in guerra con la Santa Sede...." "E la pellicola?... Chi vi darà la pellicola?... Tutta la pellicola esistente a Roma è stata sequestrata... Ha una fabbrica di pellicola il Vaticano?" "No... ma ha la pellicola!" "Chi gliel'ha data?" il tono di voce del generale saliva parola per parola eppure faceva sempre meno paura. "Non saprei... dovete chiederlo al cardinal segretario di Stato... o addirittura al Santo Padre..." "Non vi chiedete chi dovrà rilasciare i permessi per le riprese? Io!" "Gireremo nei territori vaticani" rispose De Sica con un sorriso che voleva essere di scusa, ma che gli riuscì male: troppo evidente era l'ironia trionfante che lasciò trapelare. Maltzer tacque. Fra tutte le possibili scuse, pretesti che si aspettava di sentire, non aveva pensato di trovarsi di fronte a uno scritturato dalla cinematografia vaticana. Tambureggiava le dita sul tavolo. "Se ne vada, commediante!" disse fra i denti il generale. "Penserò io a spedirla in Germania appena sarà finito questo film del papa!" De Sica raccolse il cappello, si alzò, ebbe la forza di dire: "Non sono un commediante... sono un artista... un uomo...". Indietreggiò verso la porta. Era felice, ma non poteva mostrarlo, scese le scale una a una, lentamente, gustando il suo trionfo a ogni gradino. Appena all'aperto, avviandosi verso il Bristol, canticchiò la canzone che aveva contribuito alla sua celebrità, quell'indimenticabile Parlami d'amore Mariù.

En 1934, durante una de sus batallas de propaganda más cruentas y espectaculares, Münzenberg envió, indirectamente por supuesto, a André Malraux y André Gide rumbo a Berlín para exigir a Goebbels la liberación del soviético Dimitrov, acusado de incendiar el Parlamento alemán. Se trataba de una guerra de propaganda entre Berlín y Moscú para acusarse mutuamente del incendio: Goebbels contra Münzenberg. Todo el mundo pensaba, dice Koestler, que se trataba de la clásica lucha entre la verdad y la falsedad, entre la culpa y la inocencia; pero ambas partes eran culpables, aunque no de los crímenes que se imputaban mutuamente. Ambas partes mentían y ambas temían que su adversario conociera de los hechos reales más de lo que verdaderamente conocía. La batalla fue en realidad un juego de gallina ciega entre dos gigantes. Si el mundo hubiera comprendido en aquella época las estratagemas y engaños de ese juego habría podido ahorrarse muchos sufrimientos; pero, ni entonces ni después, el mundo occidental comprendió la verdadera psicología del espíritu totalitario

During these last few years when I was immersed in postmodern academic texts, I was repeatedly reminded of a certain diary entry by a young Ph.D., a novelist and playwright, in 1924. “I believe that The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion are a forgery,” he wrote. “I believe in the intrinsic but not the factual truth of the Protocols.” That was Joseph Goebbels, a decade before he became the Nazi Reich Minister of Propaganda.

su comprensión, escasa; además, tienen gran facilidad para olvidar. Principios de propaganda de GOEBBELS

La propaganda debe limitarse a un número pequeño de ideas y repetirlas incansablemente, presentadas una y otra vez desde diferentes perspectivas, pero siempre convergiendo sobre el mismo concepto. Sin fisuras ni dudas. Si una mentira se repite suficientemente, acaba por convertirse en verdad. Principios de propaganda de JOSEPH GOEBBELS

Fascists have been particularly enamored of traditional gender roles. Vichy France made Mother’s Day a major festival and awarded medals to good mothers. Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda chief, argued that “Man should be trained as a warrior and woman as recreation for the warrior,” a precept he put into practice in his own life as far as the recreation was concerned.

Principio de la exageración y desfiguración. Convertir cualquier anécdota, por pequeña que sea, en amenaza grave. Principios de propaganda de GOEBBELS

Principio de renovación. Hay que emitir constantemente informaciones y argumentos nuevos a un ritmo tal que, cuando el adversario responda, el público esté ya interesado en otra cosa. Las respuestas del adversario nunca han de poder contrarrestar el nivel creciente de acusaciones. Principios de propaganda de GOEBBELS

Principio de la transposición. Cargar sobre el adversario los propios errores o defectos, respondiendo el ataque con el ataque. Si no puedes negar las malas noticias, inventa otras que las distraigan. Principios de propaganda de GOEBBELS

Principio del método de contagio. Reunir diversos adversarios en una sola categoría o individuo. Los adversarios han de constituirse en suma individualizada. Principios de propaganda de GOEBBELS

GOEBBELS AND HITLER had a conference about the Grynzspan agitation. “He decides: Let the demonstrations continue,” Goebbels wrote. “Pull back the police. The Jews should for once feel the anger of the people.” Party leaders called their subordinates, and the Gestapo sent out, by Teletype, rules to guide the rioting throughout Germany that was to be the consequence of Ernst vom Rath’s assassination. It was to be savage but orderly. The burning of synagogues was permitted “only if there is no danger of fires for the neighborhood.” Jewish homes and businesses “may be destroyed but not looted.” And foreigners “may not be molested even if they are Jews.” It began at 1:00 in the morning on November 10, 1938. Otto Tolischus reported on it for The New York Times. “There was scarcely a Jewish shop, cafe, office or synagogue that was not either wrecked, burned severely, or destroyed,” he said. “Before synagogues, demonstrators stood with prayer books from which they tore leaves.” The wealthy synagogue on Fasanenstrasse “was a furnace.” Twenty-five thousand people were sent as hostages to concentration camps. It was called Kristallnacht, Crystal Night, because it happened at night and a lot of plate glass was broken, and because the word “crystal” simultaneously distracted from, and raised a toast to, the ferociousness of the rioting—and perhaps finally also because the word echoed the title of one of Goebbels’s favorite books on propaganda technique, Edward Bernays’s Crystallizing Public Opinion. Goebbels had successfully used vom Rath’s assassination to crystallize German anti-Semitism.

NATURE OF THE ENEMY, wartime propaganda. BROADCAST HISTORY: June 16–July 14, 1942, CBS. 30m, Tuesdays at 8:30. PRODUCER-DIRECTOR: Charles Vanda. Nature of the Enemy, though it ran for only a month, was a staunch example of the nature of wartime broadcasting. It spotlighted each week a different Axis leader, dramatizing the record of his “cruelty and treachery.” Among the subjects: Joseph Goebbels, “father of German lies,” and Alfred Rosenberg, “Nazi philosopher” and proponent of “racial purity” as a German right of conquest.

The propaganda maestro of the Third Reich, Joseph Goebbels, famously declared that the capital would be gay and happy—or else. Orders from Berlin specified that the Hôtel Ritz would be the only luxury hotel of its kind in occupied Paris.

And among the most bizarre aspects of the ‘total war’ drive in the second half of 1944 was the fact that at precisely the time he was combing out the last reserves of manpower, Goebbels – according to film director Veit Harlan – was allowing him, at Hitler’s express command, to deploy 187,000 soldiers, withdrawn from active service, as extras for the epic colour film of national heroism, Kolberg, depicting the defence of the small Baltic town against Napoleon as a model for the achievements of total war. According to Harlan, Hitler as well as Goebbels was ‘convinced that such a film was more useful than a military victory’. Even in the terminal crisis of the regime, propaganda had to come first.

will finally be lost.’ They hoped Goebbels would ‘get down to business’ in invigorating the Reich’s war effort. The propaganda minister had ‘awakened large – and justifiable – hopes’.45 The reaction of the ordinary Landser was no different. Barely one in every thousand soldiers supported the putsch according to the censors who monitored troops’ letters from the front. Most regarded

Not unlike Mussolini in his early laissez-faire period with Alberto De Stefani, Hitler named as his first minister of finance the conservative Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk. For a time, the Führer left foreign policy in the hands of professional diplomats (with the aristocratic Constantin von Neurath as foreign minister) and the army in the hands of professional soldiers. But Hitler’s drive to shrink the normative state and expand the prerogative state was much more sustained than Mussolini’s. Total master of his party, Hitler exploited its radical impulses for his own aggrandizement against the old elites and rarely (after the exemplary bloodbath of June 1934) needed to rein it in. Another suggested key to radicalization is the chaotic nature of fascist rule. Contrary to wartime propaganda and to an enduring popular image, Nazi Germany was not a purring, well-oiled machine. Hitler allowed party agencies to compete with more traditional state offices, and he named loyal lieutenants to overlapping jobs that pitted them against each other. The ensuing “feudal” struggles for supremacy within and between party and state shocked those Germans proud of their country’s traditional superbly trained and independent civil service. Fritz-Dietlof Count von der Schulenburg, a young Prussian official initially attracted to Nazism, lamented in 1937 that “the formerly unified State power has been split into a number of separate authorities; Party and professional organizations work in the same areas and overlap with no clear divisions of responsibility.” He feared “the end of a true Civil Service and the emergence of a subservient bureaucracy.” We saw in the previous chapter how the self-indulgently bohemian Hitler spent as little time as possible on the labors of government, at least until the war. He proclaimed his visions and hatreds in speeches and ceremonies, and allowed his ambitious underlings to search for the most radical way to fulfill them in a Darwinian competition for attention and reward. His lieutenants, fully aware of his fanatical views, “worked toward the Führer,” who needed mainly to arbitrate among them. Mussolini, quite unlike Hitler in his commitment to the drudgery of government, refused to delegate and remained suspicious of competent associates—a governing style that produced more inertia than radicalization. War provided fascism’s clearest radicalizing impulse. It would be more accurate to say that war played a circular role in fascist regimes. Early fascist movements were rooted in an exaltation of violence sharpened by World War I, and war making proved essential to the cohesion, discipline, and explosive energy of fascist regimes. Once undertaken, war generated both the need for more extreme measures, and popular acceptance of them. It seems a general rule that war is indispensable for the maintenance of fascist muscle tone (and, in the cases we know, the occasion for its demise). It seems clear that both Hitler and Mussolini deliberately chose war as a necessary step in realizing the full potential of their regimes. They wanted to use war to harden internal society as well as to conquer vital space. Hitler told Goebbels, “the war . . . made possible for us the solution of a whole series of problems that could never have been solved in normal times.

A second indispensable source which can now be used for the first time in full in a biography of Hitler is the diary of the Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, only recently discovered in its entirety, surviving on glass plates (an early form of photocopy) in formerly inaccessible state archives in Moscow.

A lie told once remains a lie but a lie told a thousand times becomes the truth." "...the rank and file are usually much more primitive than we imagine. Propaganda must therefore always be essentially simple and repetitious." "The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly - it must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over." "If you tell a lie long enough, it becomes the truth." "Whoever can conquer the street will one day conquer the state, for every form of power politics and any dictatorship-run state has its roots in the street.

Joseph Goebbels' childhood offers a revealing portrait of the dynamics of exclusion and resentment that would mark his later life.