Poultry Farming Business Quotes

Whatand why were never questions for me. How was the only question. When I look back now, I realize that I never thought about what I wanted to become in life. I only thought about how I wanted to live my life. And I knew that the “how” could only be determined within me and by me. There was a big boom in poultry farming at the time. I wanted to make some money to finance my desire for unrestrained, purposeless travel. So I got into it. My father said, “What am I going to tell people? That my son is rearing chickens?” But I built my poultry farm and I built it single-handedly, from scratch. The business took off. The profits started rolling in. I devoted four hours every morning to the business. The rest of the day was spent reading and writing poetry, swimming in the well, meditating, daydreaming on a huge banyan tree. Success made me adventurous. My father was always lamenting that everyone else’s sons had become engineers, industrialists, joined the civil service, or gone to America. And everywhere everyone I met—my friends, relatives, my old school and college teachers—said, “Oh, we thought you’d make something of your life, but you are just wasting it.” I took on the challenge. In partnership with a civil engineer friend, I entered the construction business. In five years, we became a major construction company, among the leading private

feces. If a wild bird infects a chicken on a poultry farm, the virus may get opportunities to interact with a range of additional viruses through close contact with pigs and other animals. This is indeed what has happened in the live animal markets and backyard farms of China and southern Asia. Influenza viruses are notorious for their ability to change, through a combination of mutation and “reassortment”—a borrowing of genes from other viruses. An open farm acts like a virus convention, where different strains swap genetic material like conventioneers swap business cards.

Don Tyson spent a lot of time with bankers. After secretly borrowing $80,000, he had finally convinced his father that taking credit from bankers wouldn’t bring doom to the company. As John grew more comfortable with borrowing, Don traveled throughout Missouri and Arkansas, building relationships with bankers who were increasingly interested in investing in the new business of poultry production. Don discovered a new source of credit that had been overlooked by many of his competitors, in the form of a sleepy federal agency called the Farm Credit Administration.

The agency wasn’t heavily involved in the poultry business, but Don Tyson helped change that. Tyson met with Farm Credit agents and explained to them the new business of industrial chicken farming. The system evened out the wild risks that had characterized the early days of the poultry industry. A farmer growing birds for Tyson could show the Farm Credit Administration a reliable long-range prediction of cash flow and sales, regardless of the season. Perhaps most important, Tyson provided a letter of intent to the lenders, assuring them it would deliver a steady flow of chickens to make the farm profitable. Production wasn’t tied to weather events or the grain markets. It was tied only to Tyson marketing arrangements and contracts. The predictability made it a safe haven for the taxpayer’s money. The Farm Credit Administration was convinced

At that time, private banks started getting edgy about loaning money to poultry farms. The business was getting riskier, even as it was expanding and companies like Tyson were reaping record profits each year. In spite of the growth, more farmers were going under and selling their operations at a loss to get out of the business. It seemed increasingly routine for Tyson to cancel a farmer’s contract if he didn’t meet the company’s expectations. But the rate of chicken house construction didn’t slow, because bankers figured out a new way to keep money flowing to Tyson’s network of contract farms. They turned to the Farm Service Agency. While the agency was limited in how much money it could loan directly to farmers, it had far more leeway in the size of the loan it could guarantee. Under the guaranteed loan program, the FSA would pay back the bank more than 90 percent of the loan value if a farmer defaulted. The bank also got to keep any down payment the farmer made, plus any fees, interest payments, and other money it collected from the farmer before he went bankrupt. This meant the bank had nothing to lose if it could land an FSA guarantee for a poultry farm. One bank after another discovered this lucrative pool of taxpayer-backed loans, first regional banks in towns like Danville and Fort Smith, Arkansas, then national operations like U.S. Bank.

Using cash-basis accounting, Jackson could easily make it look like the corporation suffered massive losses each year. Poultry Growers Inc. paid up front for its feed, fuel, and other farm expenses. Because Tyson sold its birds with long-term contracts to grocery stores and restaurant chains, it could delay reporting its income into the next tax period, when cash from the contracts rolled in. Hypothetically, the company could kick the can of taxable income down the road for years.1 While Tyson couldn’t escape paying taxes altogether, it could reduce its payments substantially. In Jackson’s view, the income tax ploy basically let Tyson take an interest-free loan from taxpayers. By putting off its tax payments, Tyson could put its money to work by investing it in new equipment or more workers. The plan worked, but it was hell on Jackson. After carefully orchestrating Tyson’s cost codes and accounting for all the company’s transactions, Jackson had to translate all the numbers into a different accounting basis. When it came time to pay taxes, he submitted these books to the IRS. When Tyson went to banks to borrow more money, Jackson had the other books on hand, the ones that used accrual-basis accounting. Presumably, all of this was legal. By 1985, Tyson’s Foods had avoided paying $26.5 million in annual taxes through the cash-basis loophole, according to a report written by two economists with the U.S. General Accounting Office.

Don Tyson patiently explained his strategy. Getting bigger would help Tyson survive. The bigger a company was, the more it could drive down its costs. It gained efficiency through its size, using fewer managers to operate bigger slaughterhouses, for example, or buying feed in bulk. It was easier to be more efficient than the next guy if you were bigger than they were. That meant you could outlast them when the poultry business inevitably went underwater. Tyson couldn’t get bigger just by adding more farms or slaughterhouses. If the company expanded its own operations, it would put more chickens on the market, inevitably leading to oversupply. But buying a competitor neatly solved two problems with one move. Tyson could expand, and it could expand without boosting the overall supply of chicken. Tyson simply bought out its competitor’s market share, without adding one bird to the market. It was part of Don Tyson’s new strategy, called “Expand or Expire.

Heffernan’s research was based in the rural area of Union Parish in Louisiana, where a booming poultry industry was expanding in the 1960s. Vertically integrated poultry production was still a radical concept back then, and Heffernan wanted to study it. So he undertook an effort that no one else seems to have duplicated. He went door to door, made phone calls, and drove hundreds of miles between farms. He surveyed farmers and documented their income and their debt. Crucially, he followed up with farmers in Union Parish every ten years until the turn of the century, building a dataset that was forty years deep. But Heffernan did something more than ask about money. He did something most agricultural economists never thought of doing: He asked the farmers how they felt. He asked them, decade after decade, how much they trusted the companies they worked for and how well they were treated. In doing this, Heffernan assembled a picture that most economists missed. He tracked the relationship between the powerful and the powerless.

Don Tyson saw something special as he looked over the balance sheets of his small network of experimental hog farms. He saw a possible new future for his company, one that made it less vulnerable to the brutal swings of the poultry market. Tyson Foods could raise pigs without spending too much money, and it made a decent profit when it sold them to meatpackers like Armour. Tyson realized that pork prices rose and fell on a completely different cycle than chicken prices. If Tyson kept growing hogs, it might buffer the company from chicken’s permanent boom and bust pricing cycles. The hog barns could be an insurance policy of sorts, a hedge against the volatility that drove modern chicken companies out of business.

Business was good but volatile. Farmers were discovering the unique economy of growing chickens, which was riskier than selling crops or raising cattle. One rooster with six hens could produce enough chickens to fill a chicken house in weeks, and the birds grew to maturity in a matter of a few months, rather than the two years it took to raise a cow or the season it took for cotton and corn. That meant the chicken population fluctuated with the frenzy of a stock market. This made John Tyson’s business almost entirely unpredictable. One day he might have too many birds to ship and need to hire extra drivers. Another day, after the price crashed and farmers cut back, he would have nothing. He needed a way to steady his income, since it was seemingly impossible to steady the market. For Tyson, controlling the chicken farms was paramount to his success. What he needed more than anything in the early 1940s was a steady supply of birds. He had more demand than ever from customers up north. World War II was making big demands on resources and the government had rationed beef and pork but not chicken. Grocery stores wanted to buy all the chicken that Tyson could sell them to help fill up their meat counters. But if he came up empty-handed, the grocery chains would look to other suppliers to meet their needs. Left on their own, farmers couldn’t be counted on to supply Tyson enough chickens. They overproduced when prices were up, then grew gun-shy and refused to raise new flocks when prices were low. As orchards disappeared they were being replaced with casino-like poultry farms.

Tyson first pioneered this model in the poultry business. Then the company expanded into raising hogs. Within two short decades America’s independent hog industry was wiped out and replaced with a vertically integrated, corporate-controlled model. Ninety percent of all hog farms disappeared. The amount of money spent at grocery stores went up, but the amount of money farmers received went down. Companies like Tyson keep much of the difference.

Food animals also get antibiotics for “growth promotion,” a metabolically mysterious process that has made possible the entire high-volume, low-margin business of industrial-scale farming. Since the 1950s, when two pharma company scientists discovered that feeding chicks the waste products from drug manufacturing made them put on weight much faster, many U.S. farmers have been giving tiny doses of antibiotics to cattle, swine, and poultry.34

Winnie and Big Leo Chao were serving scallion pancakes decades before you could find them outside of a home kitchen. Leo, thirty-five years ago, winning his first poker game against the owners of a local poultry farm, exchanged his chips for birds that Winnie transformed into the shining, chestnut-colored duck dishes of far-off cities. Dear Winnie, rolling out her bing the homemade way, two pats of dough together with a seal of oil in between, letting them rise to a steaming bubble in the piping pan. Leo, bargaining for hard-to-get ingredients; Winnie subbing wax beans for yard-long beans, plus home-growing the garlic greens, chives, and hot peppers you used to never find in Haven. Their garden giving off a glorious smell.

Expand your egg business through latest technologies In India, poultry farming is still lagging behind in terms of infrastructure, skilled manpower and resources. Government has tried to overcome troubles but still egg farm owners in semi-urban or rural areas aren’t utilized technologies due to lack of knowledge and training. On the contrary, farmers in foreign countries develop smart egg processed plant to produce better quality eggs. Technologies are playing keen role to expand egg business sector. Indian farmers should be trained on modern-day technologies to increase productivity. Fast-growing population demanded delicious egg dishes, thus people who are interested to run a restaurant probably sell eggs. Here also you can use technology to develop effective management system, inventory solutions and check product quality as well. It goes without saying that egg industry encompasses varies business categories but you should involve technology to make most advantage and profits. There is trend among foreign countries to cut down cost on unnecessary labours thus they are concentrating on emerging technologies.