Medvedev Quotes

The New START accord cuts the strategic nuclear arsenals on each side to 1,550 warheads. Can any of its critics make a case that our security would be imperiled if, the very next day, Obama and Medvedev made moves to take the levels down to 1,000—then to 500? If so, come show us the math. If not, it may be time to stop making arms control so politically complicated—time to stop letting arms control get in the way of disarmament.

According to Roy Medvedev, Stalin’s victims numbered forty million. Solzhenitsyn says the number is far greater—perhaps sixty million. The debate continues even now.

Whether or not the decision was made in 2008 or in 2011, Medvedev proved to be nothing more than a pawn in Putin’s gambit to sidestep the letter of the law that limited a leader’s term. Russians

Even with Putin set to remain as prime minister, many wanted to believe that Putin planned eventually to cede political control to a new generation of leaders. With Medvedev at the helm, Putin could become Russia’s Deng Xiaoping, officially handing over the reins while wielding power from behind the scenes to ensure the fulfillment of his policies—as Deng did for another five years until his death in 1997. Many

To win reelection, Medvedev had to win one vote: Putin’s. To win that vote, Medvedev above all else had to demonstrate his unique abilities to work with Obama to achieve results that were good for Russia. We had just handed the Russian president a defeat at the very moment when Medvedev believed Putin was deciding his fate. It played into the narrative of Medvedev’s critics back home that he was weak and susceptible to being pushed around by the Americans. The momentum for missile-defense

Medvedev’s Chernobyl Notebook was explosive. It depicted Viktor Brukhanov as a spineless fool, the mandarins of the Soviet nuclear industry as callous and incompetent, and showed Scherbina unnecessarily delaying the evacuation of the doomed atomgrad.

There is only one road here: the most thorough study of all the details of the Chernobyl disaster, since it is by no means precluded that one of the details of it that is overlooked today will sometime be the main cause of the next calamity or the one after that.

I said I wanted every inch of you, and I meant it. Every part of you will be mine, sweetheart, and that includes me laying claim to that little womb of yours.

The devil, kiska, the dark side of me that wants nothing more than to hold you down and fuck you so hard you’ll feel me in your goddamn throat.

I’m going to try like hell to be gentle, zolotse, but I’ve been picturing you choking on my cock for a very long time.

hanging

I need a villain who doesn’t mind getting his hands dirty, a man who will get revenge for what’s been done to me.

Don’t you even fucking think about it. Those pancakes you wolfed down are the only damn thing of hers you’re tasting.

Every part of you is going to be mine, kiska, including this perfect ass of yours.

Every inch of you will be mine. If I’m going to possess you, then it has to be all of you.

I’ve fallen in love with her, that I could happily get lost in her body again and again for the rest of my life, and that whether she realizes it or not, I’m never letting her go.

I love your daughter, and I’ve never loved anyone before. To be honest, I didn’t think I ever would.

Just because I want you doesn’t mean I’m going to take you without your permission. I can control myself, and when I do fuck you, it’s going to be after you’ve begged me to.

it was A. Petrosyants who in a press conference in Moscow on 6 May 1986, commenting on the Chernobyl tragedy, uttered these words, which astounded many: "Science requires sacrifices.

You’re my wife, and I only want to kiss you. Whether you believe it or not, it doesn’t change the truth of it. I don’t fear monogamy like some men. I’m perfectly content to just have you.

That’s right, kiska. I am your god, but I’m also your devil and I’m going to give you every dark thing you’ve always secretly wanted but never dared to speak. I’m going to be your everything,

There’s no denying the possessive streak that awakens inside me or the way my cock immediately stiffens when I see my name being slowly tattooed onto her skin, permanently marking her as mine.

That’s right, kiska. I am your god, but I’m also your devil and I’m going to give you every dark thing you’ve always secretly wanted but never dared to speak. I’m going to be your everything, just like you are for me.

I don’t bring women home.” “You brought me home,” I say, the words out before I can stop them. “I did, and then I kept you.” “Well, you hired me,” I correct. The corner of his mouth lifts up. “Whatever you say, kiska.

The only way I can get under control is by promising myself that I will make every single one of those fuckers pay for what they’ve done to her. I don’t care how long it takes. I’m going to kill every damn one of them.

Anyone who sees that will know that you belong to me and that you’re protected by my Bratva. To hurt someone with this tattoo is an act of war, and there aren’t many people who are willing to go up against us. This will protect you, Nina.

We’d found some asshole who’d been running dog fights, and when I’d seen this big fur ball of a puppy with droopy eyes, pleading with me to get him out of there, I’d shot the man and taken the puppy home. It was a sound decision. He’s a great dog.

When Putin rose to power in 1999, a new kind of damage to language commenced. Putin declared a “dictatorship of the law.” His main ideologue, Vladislav Surkov, advanced the idea of “managed democracy.” Dmitry Medvedev, who kept Putin’s chair warm between Putin’s second and third terms, declared, “Freedom is better than unfreedom.” These were no longer words used to mean their opposite. These were words used simply to mean nothing. The phrase “dictatorship of the law” is so incoherent as to render both “dictatorship” and “law” meaningless.

Only a devil could’ve rescued me from that hell. You’re exactly who I need, Vasya. I don’t need or want a man who’s afraid to get his hands bloody. I can sleep at night because of you. I know that one by one you’re making damn sure those men will never get their hands on me again.

I’m going to break you, sweetheart,” he murmurs against my skin in between kisses and sharp nips. “You shouldn’t have let me catch you.” “I wanted you to,” I whisper. “All I know how to do is break things, Maddie.” “Then break me,” I pant, meaning every damn word of it. “I trust you, Volodya. Break me and then bring me back to life.

You’re mine now, and I’m never letting you go.” I drag my thumb along her cheek and lean in closer to flick my tongue along her upper lip. “I married you to protect you, and I told myself that later I’d let you go if that’s what you wanted, but I can’t do that, zolotse. I want you all to myself. I’ve fallen completely in love with you.

I’m the only one who gets to make you come, zolotse. Your days of fucking yourself are over. Not when you have my hand,” I say, running my fingers over her swollen clit, “and my mouth.” I lean down and let my teeth graze along her bottom lip before giving it a suck. Grabbing her hand I bring it to the erection that’s straining painfully against my jeans. “And my cock to do it for you.

Three prisoners in the gulag get to talking about why they are there. “I am here because I always got to work five minutes late, and they charged me with sabotage,” says the first. “I am here because I kept getting to work five minutes early, and they charged me with spying,” says the second. “I am here because I got to work on time every day,” says the third, “and they charged me with owning a western watch.

On August 5, 2012, a few days before the fourth anniversary of the war, a forty-seven-minute Russian documentary film “8 Avgusta 2008. Poteryannyy den” (8 August 2008. The Lost Day) was posted on YouTube. In the film retired and active service generals accused former President Medvedev of indecisiveness and even cowardice during the conflict. They praised Putin, on the other hand, for his bold and vigorous action. According to one of Medvedev’s critics, retired Army General Yury Baluevsky, a former First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff, “a decision to invade Georgia was made by Putin before Medvedev was inaugurated President and Commander-in-Chief in May 2008. A detailed plan of military action was arranged and unit commanders were given specific orders in advance.” [...] After the release of the documentary film Putin confirmed that the Army General Staff had, indeed, prepared a plan of military action against Georgia. It was prepared “at the end of 2006, and I authorized it in 2007,” he said. Interestingly, Putin also said “that the decision to ‘use the armed forces’ had been considered for three days—from around 5 August,” which clearly contradicts the official Russian version that the Russian army only reacted to a Georgian attack that started on August 7. According to this plan not only heavy weaponry and troops were prepared for the invasion, but also South Ossetian paramilitary units were trained to support the Russian invading troops [234―35].

As the KGB rezident at Leningrad State University and as an employee of the Leningrad Fifth Chief Directorate, where he worked as a member of the active reserves after returning from East Germany, Putin would certainly have had access to the lists of agents and informants who worked for the KGB during the Soviet period. He also would have been tasked to monitor political activity among faculty and students at the university. Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Zykov,XVII the lead Russian investigator in St. Petersburg for especially important cases, who was assigned to examine Putin’s activities for criminal behavior, even went so far as to allege that two of Putin’s later associates, Anatoliy Sobchak and Dmitriy Medvedev, both of whom were teaching law at Leningrad State University at the time, had provided Putin with information (“I Anatoliy Sobchak, i Dmitriy Medvedev byli ego stykachkami”).127 Thus Putin would not have been the only person interested in “cleansing” his own file of damaging materials. Eastern Europe at this time was awash with exposés as high-ranking politicians were unmasked as agents of either the KGB or local security services. No one in Russia wanted a repeat of this, and indeed there has never been such a period in post-Soviet Russia. Clearly the KGB got there first, and files, lots of files, were burned. As mentioned earlier, Putin himself admits that in Dresden, after the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, he burned so many files that the furnace exploded. But also the entire mood in Russia, the heart of the Soviet Empire, was quite different compared to the rest of the Soviet Bloc—it was one thing to unmask someone in Poland who had worked for the Russians; it was quite another to reveal that a Russian son had been spying on his father, for example.128 Russians as a whole sensed that such a settling of accounts would be divisive, ruinous, and pointless. And those tens of thousands of people coming out of the collapsed CPSU and KGB had other tasks in mind—most notably making a living in new conditions. The elites from these two organizations knew where the money was and how to use it. They had more lucrative assignments in mind than revenge.

The progressive socialists normally operate—to borrow a Fabian socialist term—by stealth. But Obama himself accidentally revealed his duplicitous program in a now notorious “open microphone” incident with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. Americans were momentarily stunned to hear the two in private conversation on the sidelines of a March 26, 2012, Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea: Obama: “On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this, this can be solved but it’s important for him to give me space.” Medvedev: “Yeah, I understand. I understand your message about space. Space for you…” Obama: “This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility.” Medvedev: “I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir.

Had Putin allowed Medvedev to run for reelection as president in 2012, the prospects for the Russian people and for the U.S.-Russian relationship would be far brighter. I felt that Medvedev understood Russia’s deep internal problems—economic, demographic, and political, as well as the absence of the rule of law, among others—and had realistic ideas about how to deal with them, including the need to more closely align Russia with the West and to attract foreign investment. However, Putin’s lust for power led him to shoulder Medvedev aside and reclaim the presidency.

Pope Pius XI called for a world-wide day of prayer, to be held on 16 March 1930, on behalf of the persecuted believers in Russia. This action led Stalin to suspend temporarily the antireligious campaign, according to Roy Medvedev

One American political figure saw Russia for the growing menace that it was and was willing to call Putin out for his transgressions. During President Obama’s reelection campaign, Mitt Romney warned of a growing Russian strategic threat, highlighting their role as “our number one geopolitical foe.”[208] The response from President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and other Democrats was not to echo his sentiment, but actually to ridicule Romney and support the Russian government. President Obama hurled insults, saying Romney was “stuck in a Cold War mind warp” [209] and in a nationally televised debate mocked the former governor, saying “the 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back…” [210] When asked to respond to Romney’s comment, Secretary Clinton refused to rebuke the over-the-top and false Obama campaign attacks. Instead, she delivered a message that echoed campaign talking points arguing that skepticism of Russia was outdated: “I think it’s somewhat dated to be looking backwards,” she said, adding, “In many of the areas where we are working to solve problems, Russia has been an ally.”[211] A month after Secretary Clinton’s statement on Romney, Putin rejected Obama’s calls for a landmark summit.[212] He didn’t seem to share the secretary’s view that the two countries were working together. It was ironic that while Obama and Clinton were saying Romney was in a “Cold War mind warp,”[213] the Russian leader was waging a virulent, anti-America “election campaign” (that’s if you can call what they did in Russia an “election”). In fact, if anyone was in a Cold War mind warp, it was Putin, and his behavior demonstrated just how right Romney was about Russia’s intentions. “Putin has helped stoke anti-Americanism as part of his campaign emphasizing a strong Russia,” Reuters reported. “He has warned the West not to interfere in Syria or Iran, and accused the United States of ‘political engineering’ around the world.”[214] And his invective was aimed not just at the United States. He singled out Secretary Clinton for verbal assault. Putin unleashed the assault Nov. 27 [2011] in a nationally televised address as he accepted the presidential nomination, suggesting that the independent election monitor Golos, which gets financing from the United States and Europe, was a U.S. vehicle for influencing the elections here. Since then, Golos has been turned out of its Moscow office and its Samara branch has come under tax investigation. Duma deputies are considering banning all foreign grants to Russian organizations. Then Putin accused U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton of sending a signal to demonstrators to begin protesting the fairness of the Dec. 4 parliamentary elections.[215] [Emphasis added.] Despite all the evidence that the Russians had no interest in working with the U.S., President Obama and Secretary Clinton seemed to believe that we were just a Putin and Obama election victory away from making progress. In March 2012, President Obama was caught on a live microphone making a private pledge of flexibility on missile defense “after my election” to Dmitry Medvedev.[216] The episode lent credence to the notion that while the administration’s public unilateral concessions were bad enough, it might have been giving away even more in private. So it shouldn’t have been a surprise that Putin didn’t abandon his anti-American attitudes after he won the presidential “election.” In the last few weeks of Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State, Putin signed a law banning American adoption of Russian children,[217] in a move that could be seen as nothing less than a slap in the face to the United States. Russia had been one of the leading sources of children for U.S. adoptions.[218] This disservice to Russian orphans in need of a home was the final offensive act in a long trail of human rights abuses for which Secretary Clinton failed to hold Russia accountable.

Behind closed doors Medvedev was very engaged,

Medvedev’s term ran out in 2012.

The plan, ostensibly, was for Medvedev to sit out his four years doing nothing but talking pretty, and then to cede the throne to Putin, this time for two consecutive six-year terms.

Under Putin, resources once again began to be allocated to the police, but there was no substantive reform. Instead, it was during the single term in which he retreated to the position of prime minister (as the Russian constitution forbade anyone serving three consecutive terms as president), with his client Dmitry Medvedev as titular president (2008–12), that this process began. A lawyer by training, Medvedev appreciated the problems with Russian law enforcement. He introduced a new Law on the Police in 2011, which not only changed the force’s name back to politsiya, “police,” but also mandated compulsory re-accreditation of all serving officers, with the aim of cutting the size of the force by 22 percent to 1,106,472 officers. At the same time, salaries were to be increased by 30 percent.

If socialism is not combined with democracy, it can become a breeding ground for new crimes.

Once again, the Empire of Russia has defeated the nation. It is important to recognize it now, when Russia is suffering a moral, military and, broadly speaking, civilizational defeat in Ukraine. The attack on Ukraine is a fiasco of the still-born idea of ‘the Russian world,’ russky mir, as one lot of Russian speakers bomb, torture and shoot other Russian speakers; as they burn Orthodox churches and demolish Russian-speaking cities of Mariupol and Kherson. This is not a war for Russia but for the re-establishment of the Empire, a war of revenge on Ukrainians (it is even crueller, because they are considered ‘one of us,’ ‘our brothers’) for daring to think that they could break away and follow their own path.

This is a world war, unleashed by Russia to overturn the modern liberal world order. It has many open and hidden global supporters, and there are neutral countries that are watching carefully to see how this challenge that has been thrown down to mankind pans out. The war in Ukraine is merely the prelude, and it does not matter whether Putin’s regime triumphs (whatever he might call ‘a victory’) or he has to back down, he will continue to try to break the modern world, by using either ‘hybrid wars’ or open aggression, information sabotage or nuclear blackmail, until he suffers a decisive military defeat and the regime is utterly destroyed. What we have come up against here is not a temporary aberration, not the madness of a dictator who has overplayed his hand - nor is it simply the nostalgia of the older generation of Russians; it is a tectonic geopolitical process in the protracted decay of a huge Eurasian empire.

Putin casually accepted that there had been fraud; Medvedev helpfully added that all Russian elections had been fraudulent. By dismissing the principle of “one person, one vote” while insisting that elections would continue, Putin was disregarding the choices of citizens while expecting them to take part in future rituals of support. He thereby accepted Ilyin’s attitude to democracy, rejecting what Ilyin had called “blind faith in the number of votes and its political significance,” not only in deed but in word. A claim to power was staked: he who fakes wins.

Biden’s national security advisor, Tony Blinken, didn’t like that format; he felt it disadvantaged Biden, as Medvedev had primary responsibility in his government for foreign policy and all things American, while Biden was not our point person for Russia. Obama was.

Putin, it seemed, didn’t see how intervention in Libya could produce a good outcome for Russia; instead, he viewed Russia’s abstention as Medvedev caving in to American influence. In the name of advancing the Reset, Medvedev had just violated a central principle of Russian (and Soviet) foreign policy: resisting American military interventions

After Georgia’s humiliation in 2008, Yanukovych repudiated the Orange Revolution by winning the next Ukrainian presidential election in 2010, setting Moscow further at ease about its dominion over the former Soviet republics Medvedev once called part of Russia’s “special zone of influence.

Bulletins containing the text of the testament were, according to Medvedev, distributed to the 1,669 delegates who gathered in Moscow in December for the Fifteenth Party Congress; judging by the fact that they were printed up in an edition of 13,500, they were intended for a larger party audience. The unpublished papers of E. P. Frolov, who was one of the delegates, reveal that the congress on December 9, 1927, passed a decision, on a motion by Rykov, that the testament and other previously unpublished Lenin letters on intra-party matters should be published as part of the congress record.[568] This was not done, however, nor were the surplus copies of the bulletins distributed to party organizations after the congress. Nearly all the delegates who failed to destroy their personal copies of the bulletins in good time were among the victims of Stalin’s purges of the thirties, at which time party members were condemned to death or long terms of confinement for possessing “a counter-revolutionary document, the so-called testament of Lenin.

As secretary of State, Hillary Clinton worked with Russian leaders, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and then-President Dmitri Medvedev, to create US technology partnerships with Moscow’s version of Silicon Valley, a sprawling high-tech campus known as Skolkovo.

The “Lost Day” film and the comments by Putin and Medvedev have revealed a great deal: that the invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was indeed a preplanned aggression and that so-called “Russian peacekeepers” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were in fact the vanguard of the invading forces that were in blatant violation of Russia’s international obligations and were training and arming the separatist forces. The admission by Putin that Ossetian separatist militias acted as an integral part of the Russian military plan transfers legal responsibility for acts of ethnic cleansing of Georgian civilians and mass marauding inside and outside of South Ossetia to the Russian military and political leadership. Putin’s admission of the prewar integration of the Ossetian separatist militias into the Russian General Staff war plans puts into question the integrity of the independent European Union war report, written by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini that accused the Georgians of starting the war and attacking Russian “peacekeepers,” which, according to Tagliavini, warranted a Russian military response.

Sometime between the Obama-Medvedev summit in Prague in 2010 and Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, public opinion in both countries also flipped: solid majorities in both Russia and the United States now perceived each other as enemies.

Anatoly Chubais, who was Yeltsin’s campaign manager at the time, said that “of course” there were violations in the campaign, but if the 1996 vote were to be dismissed as a fraud, “then we automatically have to deem both of President Putin’s terms illegitimate along with the presidency of Medvedev. … There would be nothing left of Russia’s post-Soviet history.

. Even though nowadays you can say the words any way you like, some of them may at least give you pause: In the halcyon days of internecine tergiversation, a concupiscent chargé d'affaires at the Tanzanian consulate had the onerous assignment of arranging assignations amongst Zbigniew Brzezinski, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Deng Xiao Peng, Angela Merkel, and Dmitri Medvedev. “What a concatenation of blackguards,” expatiated this amanuensis, who was a bona fide dilettante. “It's a veritable farrago of inextricable idiosyncrasies. They will discuss laissez-faire, hypotenuses, synapses, kamikazes, Clio, Melpomene, Mnemosyne, and other such viragoes, before arriving, apocalyptically, at the dénouement. A priori, it is de rigueur that I not err, though embarrassed and harassed vituperatively by such vagaries.” Grasping