Long Term Investor Quotes

Corporate governance involves its fair share of differing investor expectations, but focusing on long-term value creation aligns interests.

Ultimately, Investing is about holistic ROI. It’s not about just owning stocks or crypto or flipping for quick income. When we talk about holistic ROI, we are looking at our long term profit, short term profit, income security, cash flow, social impact, environmental impact, spiritual impact, stability of the permaculture economy, and more. That’s how we see it at Mayflower-Plymouth.

Transparency is a good quality to have in business. Honesty, integrity and transparency will gain you the right customers and the right investors. And dishonesty always results in long term losses.

Speculators buy the trend; investors are in for the long haul; "they are a different breed of cats." One reason that people lose money today is that they have lost sight of this distinction; they profess to have the long term in mind and yet cannot resist following where the hot money has led.

Investing is a special thing. In terms of functionality, almost anyone can invest. But in terms of achieving the results of long-term profit and sustainable growth, only some people have the talent or skill sets for that. It’s like baseball for example… anyone can swing a bat at a ball. But only a few people make it to the big league, and even fewer become world champs. These days there are so many apps and platforms for individual investing, but that doesn’t mean everyone is achieving good results or ROI. There are great investors, good investors, and bad investors. A professional investor can achieve exponential growth and profit. A professional investor understands markets and industries and can account for both the traditional and the new.

Investing is a special thing. In terms of functionality, almost anyone invest. But in terms of achieving the results of long-term profit and sustainable growth, only some people have the talent or skill sets for that. It’s like baseball for example… anyone can swing a bat at a ball. But only a few guys make it to the big league, and even fewer become world champs. These days there are so many apps and platforms for individual investing, but that doesn’t mean everyone is achieving the same results. There are great investors, good investors, and bad investors. A professional investor can achieve exponential growth and profit. A professional investor understands markets and industries and can account for both the traditional and the new.

Investors need to understand not only the magic of compounding long-term returns, but the tyranny of compounding costs; costs that ultimately overwhelm that magic.

Investors long for steady waters, but paradoxically, the opportunities are richest when markets turn turbulent.

Everybody is a long-term investor till the market drops by 10% or more.

As the famed investor Benjamin Graham said, “In the short term, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term, it’s a weighing machine.

You, far more than the market or the economy, are the most important factor in your long-term investment success.

Being net value adders puts us better positioned for long-term growth and longevity – because in the long term, capital flows to net value adders.

If Wall Street is to learn just one lesson from the Long-Term debacle, it should be that. The next time a Merton proposes an elegant model to manage risks and foretell odds, the next time a computer with a perfect memory of the past is said to quantify risks in the future, investors should run—and quickly—the other way. On Wall Street, though, few lessons remain learned.

For Gracias, the Tesla and SpaceX investor and Musk’s friend, the 2008 period told him everything he would ever need to know about Musk’s character. He saw a man who arrived in the United States with nothing, who had lost a child, who was being pilloried in the press by reporters and his ex-wife and who verged on having his life’s work destroyed. “He has the ability to work harder and endure more stress than anyone I’ve ever met,” Gracias said. “What he went through in 2008 would have broken anyone else. He didn’t just survive. He kept working and stayed focused.” That ability to stay focused in the midst of a crisis stands as one of Musk’s main advantages over other executives and competitors. “Most people who are under that sort of pressure fray,” Gracias said. “Their decisions go bad. Elon gets hyperrational. He’s still able to make very clear, long-term decisions. The harder it gets, the better he gets. Anyone who saw what he went through firsthand came away with more respect for the guy. I’ve just never seen anything like his ability to take pain.

The best ideas are those that create a new mind-set or sense a need before others do, and it takes an astute investor to recognize an idea that not only is ahead of its time but also has long-term prospects.

As long as investors care only about maximizing their own returns, and focus only on the short term and on what can be easily measured, firms will be reluctant to take the risks inherent in seeking to exploit shared value and to embrace high road labor practices.

Permaculture Investing™ is an investment strategy based on achieving the goals of (a) long-term Return on Investment, (b) consistent income and (c) resilient growth for investors, by combining Permaculture philosophy with various traditional approaches to investing.

tiny differences matter in investing—a pursuit where small structural changes can add up to big differences in returns over time. Long-term compounding is an investor’s best friend, so why get in its way? There’s a huge benefit to getting these seemingly minor details

Strategic tax management also enhances a company's competitiveness by enabling them to make informed financial decisions, attract investors, and adapt to changing tax regulations. It helps in minimizing financial risk and ensuring that the company's financial health remains strong, fostering long-term sustainability and growth.

Many new investors, eager to see quick profits, need to develop the patience and research skills necessary for successful long-term investing.

Part of the problem is that a finely trained but rarefied academic mind can be damaging to your long-term success.

Developing a long-term financial plan, with a keen eye on your saving and spending levels, is essential for you to reach your long-term goals. The

Supremely rational investors take the further step of acting against consensus, rebalancing to long-term portfolio targets by buying the out-of-favor and selling the in-vogue.

For all long-term investors, there is only one objective - maximum total real return after taxes

Similarly, the buy-and-hold investor who prudently holds a diversified portfolio of low-cost index funds through thick and thin is the investor most likely to achieve her long-term investment goals.

In the aggregate, real wealth was made, not by the crooks, but by long-term investors, who overlooked the cacophony of the stock market and instead focused on the fundamentals of businesses, and that of India.

Why should not the effects of changing interest rates be divided on some practical and equitable basis between the borrower and the lender? One possibility would be to sell long-term bonds with interest payments that vary with an appropriate index of the going rate.

A common adage on Wall Street is that the markets are motivated by two emotions: fear and greed. Indeed, this book suggests that investors are affected by these emotions. However, acting on these emotions is rarely the wise move. The decision that benefits investors over the long term is usually made in the absence of strong emotions.

A trader needs to be highly skilled and extremely lucky to beat the market consistently. If a trader is highly skilled but not lucky enough or extremely lucky but modestly skilled, he will beat the market occasionally but not consistently. Traders that are modestly skilled and modestly lucky will briefly beat the market but will be behind the market most of the time. Everybody else will lose money on a long-term basis, that is, 90% of the traders.

Making money in the markets is tough. The brilliant trader and investor Bernard Baruch put it well when he said, “If you are ready to give up everything else and study the whole history and background of the market and all principal companies whose stocks are on the board as carefully as a medical student studies anatomy—if you can do all that and in addition you have the cool nerves of a gambler, the sixth sense of a clairvoyant and the courage of a lion, you have a ghost of a chance.” In retrospect, the mistakes that led to my crash seemed embarrassingly obvious. First, I had been wildly overconfident and had let my emotions get the better of me. I learned (again) that no matter how much I knew and how hard I worked, I could never be certain enough to proclaim things like what I’d said on Wall $ treet Week: “There’ll be no soft landing. I can say that with absolute certainty, because I know how markets work.” I am still shocked and embarrassed by how arrogant I was. Second, I again saw the value of studying history. What had happened, after all, was “another one of those.” I should have realized that debts denominated in one’s own currency can be successfully restructured with the government’s help, and that when central banks simultaneously provide stimulus (as they did in March 1932, at the low point of the Great Depression, and as they did again in 1982), inflation and deflation can be balanced against each other. As in 1971, I had failed to recognize the lessons of history. Realizing that led me to try to make sense of all movements in all major economies and markets going back a hundred years and to come up with carefully tested decision-making principles that are timeless and universal. Third, I was reminded of how difficult it is to time markets. My long-term estimates of equilibrium levels were not reliable enough to bet on; too many things could happen between the time I placed my bets and the time (if ever) that my estimates were reached. Staring at these failings, I realized that if I was going to move forward without a high likelihood of getting whacked again, I would have to look at myself objectively and change—starting by learning a better way of handling the natural aggressiveness I’ve always shown in going after what I wanted. Imagine that in order to have a great life you have to cross a dangerous jungle. You can stay safe where you are and have an ordinary life, or you can risk crossing the jungle to have a terrific life. How would you approach that choice? Take a moment to think about it because it is the sort of choice that, in one form or another, we all have to make.

The billionaire investor and former senior executive at Facebook, Chamath Palihapitiya, argues that we must rewire our brain to focus on the long term, which starts by removing social media apps from our phones. In his words, such apps, “wire your brain for super-fast feedback.” By receiving constant feedback, whether through likes, comments, or immediate replies to our messages, we condition ourselves to expect fast results with everything we do. And this feeling is certainly reinforced through ads for schemes to help us “get rich quick”, and through cognitive biases (i.e., we only hear about the richest and most successful YouTubers, not about the ones who fail).

The Keynesian world is a world in which there are two distinct classes of actors: the skilled investor, ‘who, unperturbed by the prevailing pastime, continues to purchase investments on the best genuine long-term expectations he can frame’, and, on the other hand, the ignorant ‘game-player’. It does not seem to have occurred to Keynes that either of these two may learn from the other, and that, in particular, company directors and even the managers of investment trusts may be the wiser for learning from the market what it thinks about their actions. In this Keynesian world the managers and directors already know all about the future and have little to gain by devoting their attention to the misera plebs of the market. In fact, Keynes strongly feels that they should not! This pseudo-Platonic view of the world of high finance forms, we feel, an essential part of what Schumpeter called the ‘Keynesian vision’. This view ignores progress through exchange of knowledge because the ones know all there is to be known whilst the others never learn anything.

Women select short-term sexual relationships when men cannot improve their children’s survival, when there are too few men, or when their upbringing has signaled that men are unreliable investors in their progeny. Short-term relationships for women often amount to serial monogamy in response to a population of males, none of whom can or will provide sustained economic and emotional commitment. And if she can maintain her attractiveness in the face of her increasing age, decreasing looks, and the handicap (from a prospective partner’s viewpoint) of already born children, she can also gain the advantage of genetic diversity and perhaps better genetic quality in her children. But the most secure and stable route is to attract a male who will commit, providing the long-term assistance and resources that she needs to raise multiple offspring simultaneously. Unfortunately that idea has occurred to other women also and she is in a competitive market-place. The currency of the marketplace is what men want in a female partner. To trade successfully, she must advertise her assets by showing that she has more desirable qualities than her female rivals.

I believe that social media, and the internet as a whole, have negatively impacted our ability to both think long-term and to focus deeply on the task in front of us. It is no surprise, therefore, that Apple CEO, Steve Jobs, prohibited his children from using phones or tablets—even though his business was to sell millions of them to his customers! The billionaire investor and former senior executive at Facebook, Chamath Palihapitiya, argues that we must rewire our brain to focus on the long term, which starts by removing social media apps from our phones. In his words, such apps, “wire your brain for super-fast feedback.” By receiving constant feedback, whether through likes, comments, or immediate replies to our messages, we condition ourselves to expect fast results with everything we do. And this feeling is certainly reinforced through ads for schemes to help us “get rich quick”, and through cognitive biases (i.e., we only hear about the richest and most successful YouTubers, not about the ones who fail). As we demand more and more stimulation, our focus is increasingly geared toward the short term and our vision of reality becomes distorted. This leads us to adopt inaccurate mental models such as: Success should come quickly and easily, or I don’t need to work hard to lose weight or make money. Ultimately, this erroneous concept distorts our vision of reality and our perception of time. We can feel jealous of people who seem to have achieved overnight success. We can even resent popular YouTubers. Even worse, we feel inadequate. It can lead us to think we are just not good enough, smart enough, or disciplined enough. Therefore, we feel the need to compensate by hustling harder. We have to hurry before we miss the opportunity. We have to find the secret that will help us become successful. And, in this frenetic race, we forget one of the most important values of all: patience. No, watching motivational videos all day long won’t help you reach your goals. But, performing daily consistent actions, sustained over a long period of time will. Staying calm and focusing on the one task in front of you every day will. The point is, to achieve long-term goals in your personal or professional life, you must regain control of your attention and rewire your brain to focus on the long term. To do so, you should start by staying away from highly stimulating activities.

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It is difficult to evaluate their recommendations of individual securities. Each service is entitled to be judged separately, and the verdict could properly be based only on an elaborate and inclusive study covering many years. In our own experience we have noted among them a pervasive attitude which we think tends to impair what could otherwise be more useful advisory work. This is their general view that a stock should be bought if the near-term prospects of the business are favorable and should be sold if these are unfavorable—regardless of the current price. Such a superficial principle often prevents the services from doing the sound analytical job of which their staffs are capable—namely, to ascertain whether a given stock appears over- or undervalued at the current price in the light of its indicated long-term future earning power. The intelligent investor will not do his buying and selling solely on the basis of recommendations received from a financial service. Once this point is established, the role of the financial service then becomes the useful one of supplying information and offering suggestions.

The investor with a long-term horizon begins with a portfolio composed entirely of risky assets. Then, as the investor’s investment horizon contracts, the investor moves assets from high-risk to low-risk positions.

Sensible investors take great care to minimize the tax bill associated with moving assets from the high-risk, long-term portfolio to the low-risk, short-term portfolio. Although the tax code introduces many complexities to investment decision making, as a starting point consider moving taxable long-term assets to the low-risk portfolio, thereby allowing tax-deferred holdings to continue to receive shelter from taxes.

In addition to the 60 million ether sold to the public, roughly 6 million was created to compensate early contributors to Ethereum, and another 6 million for long-term reserves of the Ethereum Foundation. The extra allocation of 12 million ether for the early contributors and Ethereum Foundation has proved problematic for Ethereum over time, as some feel it represented double dipping.

Long term, the thinking is that bitcoin will become so entrenched within the global economy that new bitcoin will not need to be issued to continue to gain support. At that point, miners will be compensated for processing transactions and securing the network through fees on high transaction volumes.

If “nonrecurring” charges keep recurring, “extraordinary” items crop up so often that they seem ordinary, acronyms like EBITDA take priority over net income, or “pro forma” earnings are used to cloak actual losses, you may be looking at a firm that has not yet learned how to put its shareholders’ long-term interests first.9

Graham feels that five elements are decisive.1 He summarizes them as: the company’s “general long-term prospects” the quality of its management its financial strength and capital structure its dividend record and its current dividend rate.

But the intelligent investor has no interest in being temporarily right. To reach your long-term financial goals, you must be sustainably and reliably right.

A long-term investor is the only kind of investor there is. Someone who can’t hold on to stocks for more than a few months at a time is doomed to end up not as a victor but as a victim.

You don’t need to be a twit in articulating these expectations, and you shouldn’t ask people to do the truly impossible. But you do need to request the seemingly impossible, putting it to them in a kindly way and even with a sense of humor. It is possible to overdo it, as I have on occasion. On balance, though, organizations, people, and leaders would do well to be much more demanding of themselves than they are. Whatever you do, stay hungry. Investors often asked us what would cause us to miss our numbers, thinking I would name some industry or economic issue, but I always gave the same answer: “If we ever lose our hunger.” That hunger starts with the leader.

many people become long-term investors after they lose money, postponing

many people become long-term investors after they lose money, postponing their decision to sell as part of their denial.

Neither defensive investors who limit their losses in a decline nor aggressive investors with substantial gains in a rising market have proved they possess skill. For us to conclude that investors truly add value, we have to see how they perform in environments to which their style isn’t particularly well suited. Can the aggressive investor keep from giving back gains when the market turns down? Will the defensive investor participate substantially when the market rises? This kind of asymmetry is the expression of real skill. Does an investor have more winners than losers? Are the gains on the winners bigger than the losses on the losers? Are the good years more beneficial than the bad years are painful? And are the long-term results better than the investor’s style alone would suggest? These things are the mark of the superior investor. Without them, returns may be the result of little more than market movement and beta.

Buffett himself is a grand master of simplification. Writing to his shareholders in 1977, he laid out his four criteria for selecting any stock: “We want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price.” These may not strike you as earth-shattering secrets. But it’s hard to beat this distillation of eternal truths about what makes a stock desirable.

At a business forum I attended, a senior executive of a Fortune 100 company proclaimed that his company manages “not for the next quarter, but for the next quarter century.” Ugh. Such platitudes do not instill confidence in investors. Most managers don’t have any idea what’s going to happen in the next five years, much less the next twenty-five years. How do you manage for an ambiguous future? Yet managers must clearly strike some balance between the short term and the long term. It’s like speeding down the highway in a car. If you focus just beyond the hood, you’re going to have a hard time anticipating what’s coming. Look too far ahead, on the other hand, and you lose perspective on the actions that you need to take now to navigate safely. There’s a tradeoff between the short term and the long term, and the appropriate focal point shifts as conditions warrant.

Step by Step… Can you write out your ideal business step by step Here is a business I am setting up for a client. She wants to shipping start her own shipping company… One she will need a US partner to collect and transfer packages to her in Jamaica. She will also need one in China. I have two contacts. One has a warehouse in Florida The other has two in China. Chinese connect makes goods available within 3 weeks, she has to tell her customers four. The US connect makes it within 3-5 days. She has to tell them within a week… Next she will need a website where her customers can login and track their packages. This will come with individual dashboards. She will need an interface and warehouse management software and logistics APIs. She will also need an automated email set up (journey) to send emails to her customers without her or her agents needing to do that. Without this Saas she would have to hire someone to reply to messages and emails about , someone to call and track, use usps and FedEx tracking numbers to track and reply back to customers. She also needs a beta ApI to allow her warehouse guy to update the CRM with information about her customers packages… Key nodes such as - Intransit to destinations Held at customs Clearance In transit to store Pick up available etc… These will come in as email notifications Fully automated. Everything will be connected using Webhooks… entire system. Saas she might need to use a combination of GOhighlevel, Workiz and To run this as a System as as Service. Each platform can work together using webhooks. Gohighlevel as a Saas is $500 a month Workiz is $200 dollars She can use Odoo which is open source alternative as a CRM And Clickup as Management. This is how a conversational business plan looks. You can see it. You can research it. You can confirm that it’s plausible. It doesn’t sound like pipedreams. It sounds workable to credit companies /banks and investors. It sounds doable to a BDO Client. I also sound as if I know what I am doing. Not a lot of technical language. A confused prospective business investor or banker don’t want to use a dictionary to figure out everything… They want to see the vision as clear as day. You basically need to do to them what I did to you when you joined my programme. It must sound plausible. All businesses is a game of wit. Every deal that is signed benefits both party. Whether initially or in the long term. Those are the sub-tenets of business. Every board meeting or meeting with regulatory boards, banks, credit facilities, municipalities is a game of convincing people to see your thing through… Everyone does Algorithm is simple. People want you to solve their problems with speed and efficiency. Speed is very important and automation. Progress, business and production are tied to ego… that’s why people love seh oh dem start a business or dem have dem online business and nah sell one rass thing. Cause a lot of people think being successful and looking successful are one and the same thing until they meet someone like me or people who done the work… Don’t rush it… you are young and you have time. There are infact certain little nuances Weh yuh only ago learn through experience. Experience and reflection. One of the drawbacks of wanting to run your business by yourself with you and your family members is that you guys will have to be reliant on yourself for feedback which is not alw

If Benartzi and Thaler are right, the implication is critical: Long-term investors (individuals who evaluate their portfolios infrequently) are willing to pay more for an identical risky asset than short-term investors (frequent evaluation). Valuation depends on your time horizon. This may be why many long-term investors say they don’t care about volatility. Immune to short-term squiggles, these investors hold stocks long enough to get an attractive probability of a return and, hence, a positive utility.

There is almost never a clear winner in the arms race between the senders and receivers of signals in the natural world. You may have heard of cuckoos leaving their eggs in the nests of other bird species so that someone else can rear their chicks. The signals here are the size, shape, and color of the cuckoo egg, which match those of the eggs of some other bird species. However, scientists have found that some of the parasitized bird species have not allowed themselves to be exploited—they have evolved to produce eggs that are distinctly different, even compared to eggs of their own species.24 As a result, they recognize cuckoo eggs as interlopers. They have evolved a way to detect the dishonest signal from cuckoos. This race has no winner, and there will probably never be one. In sharp contrast, in the business world, the senders of signals—the companies—are clearly winning over the receivers—us, the gullible investors. No wonder our community performs poorly compared to the broader market. What should we long-term investors do?

The failure of most investors does not lie in pursuing a wrong model but in failing to repeatedly pursue a good model. It does not take a genius to theorize that investing in quality management teams running excellent businesses should lead to success over the long term, but how many can translate this theory into practice day after day and year after year?

have seen too many people make a profit of 50 to 100 percent on an investment in a great company and then press the exit button. We investors take pride in being math savvy. Mention the word “compounding” to us, and you will get knowing smiles. Unfortunately, most of those knowing smiles do not seem to know that what they know about compounding—that it can lead to big numbers over time—hides two great unknowns. The first is that compounding does not lead to significant numbers for a very long time. The second is that investing would be easy if companies could compound predictably. But, alas, they don’t. The real world is quite messy, and the path to long-term success is treacherous, unpredictable, and full of disappointments. What is needed to become a successful investor is not intellect, a commodity, but patience, which is not.

There are three key financial statements that are made up of 5 main elements. These elements include: 1. Assets: Assets are items of value that are owned by the company. Items that can be listed under assets include cash, equipment, real estate, etc. 2. Liabilities: These are items that decrease the net worth of the business. In other words, liabilities are what the company owes other companies, individuals, or investors. Liabilities include items such as accounts payable, long term and short term loans, etc. 3. Equities: These refer to cash or cash equivalents that are used to represent the ownership of the company. The term equity, as used in accounting, determines the value of the company and its ownership. 4. Revenues: Revenue is one component of financial statements that mainly appears on the income sheet and the cash flow statement. Revenue represents all the money that is earned by a business over a given trading period. The revenue of a business can vary from one accounting period to another. The revenue of a business determines the net income of business after expenses have subtracted. 5. Expenses: The expenses of a business are usually used in preparing the income sheet and the cash flow statement. Expenses represent the ways a company uses its funds. Among the expenses include direct expenses such as the cost of goods sold and indirect expenses such as rent and taxes.

For anyone looking to successfully learn how to invest in shares, they must also include a plan for creating and sustaining long-term profitability. This is a crucial stage, which is overlooked by many, and is how those who are profitable investors get the job done. We educate our clients, so they can enjoy long terms success in markets, enabling them to truly build wealth, based on a consistent process, that has comprehensive professional risk management, allowing our clients the opportunity to enjoy peace of mind and profitability.

McCulley was an economist who worked at a giant investment firm called PIMCO. He looked out across this world of money-market funds and asset-backed commercial paper and said: this is not just a bunch of arcane investment vehicles. It’s an entire banking system that nobody quite recognizes as a banking system. A bank borrows money from depositors, who can ask for their money back at any time. Then the bank turns around and makes long-term loans. The fundamental bank thing that the bank is doing is borrowing short-term and lending long-term. The money-market funds and asset-backed commercial paper markets were doing the same thing: taking money that investors could demand at a moment’s notice and turning around and lending it out. In the shadows of the regulated banking system, a whole new system of quasi-banks had sprung up. And now there was a problem.

Some of you may view your investment policies on a shorter term basis. For your convenience, we include our usual table indicating the gains from compounding $100,000 at various rates: This table indicates the financial advantages of: 1. A long life (in the erudite vocabulary of the financial sophisticate this is referred to as the Methuselah Technique) 2. A high compound rate 3. A combination of both (especially recommended by this author) To be observed are the enormous benefits produced by relatively small gains in the annual earnings rate. This explains our attitude which while hopeful of achieving a striking margin of superiority over average investment results, nevertheless, regards every percentage point of investment return above average as having real meaning.

Bezos even implores potential investors to avoid investing in Amazon if their investment philosophy is inconsistent with long-term thinking. And he did so right in the 1997 Letter to Shareholders, written at a time when most startup companies were virtually begging for investors.

So, if the company is better positioned today than it was a year ago, why is the stock price so much lower than it was a year ago? As the famed investor Benjamin Graham said, “In the short term, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term, it’s a weighing machine.” Clearly there was a lot of voting going on in the boom year of ’99—and much less weighing. We’re a company that wants to be weighed, and over time, we will be—over the long term, all companies are. In the meantime, we have our heads down working to build a heavier and heavier company.

Precious metals are a little better than cash but still a terrible investment from a long-term investor’s perspective.

The long-term increase in the stock market is entirely the result of the increase in long-term dividends and earnings growth of the companies that make up the market. How much investors are willing to pay for those earnings and dividends will change constantly. Much of these fluctuations have to do with speculation, but most of them have to do with the fact that investors are constantly projecting out the recent past into an uncertain future. That doesn't mean the odds are stacked against individual investors; just the ones who are unable to control their emotions.

The market’s long-term trajectory is upward, which is the only direction the market can go over a long period.

The advantage of the information-bias in favor of professional money-managers and large investors is almost irrelevant for a long-term investor.

Graham’s criterion of financial strength still works: If you build a diversified basket of stocks whose current assets are at least double their current liabilities, and whose long-term debt does not exceed working capital, you should end up with a group of conservatively financed companies with plenty of staying power.

Bubbles do their damage when long-term investors playing one game start taking their cues from those short-term traders playing another.

This verity is well worth remembering: the securities might be unrelated, but the same investors owned them, implicitly linking them in times of stress. And when armies of financial soldiers were involved in the same securities, borders shrank. The very concept of safety through diversification—the basis of Long-Term’s own security—would merit rethinking.

Having gained a deeper sense of who I am, I’ve also stopped worrying about trying to get the best returns. I’m more comfortable aiming for decent returns that beat the market indexes over the long term despite my personal limitations.

Successful leaders understand their image reflects what and who they are as opposed to what they plan to become. If you would like to be known as a sustainable organization, there are four things you can do. Think and act in ways that support long-term viability and ESG ideals. Help stakeholders understand how you think and act. Help stakeholders see how you think and act. Continuously reinforce all of the above with stakeholders.

Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business’. On the subject of For how long should an investor hold the shares they buy, Warren Buffett, in 1988’s Berkshire Hathaway’s letters to shareholders stated, ‘When we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favourite holding period is forever.

The lessons we should have learned about excess leverage from the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management were ignored. Ten years later, history repeated on a worldwide scale when loose regulation and high leverage led to the near-collapse of the entire financial system in 2008. As part of the overall meltdown, hedge fund assets fell from $2 trillion to $1.4 trillion from losses and withdrawal of capital. Hedge funds were now a mature asset class. I predicted to The Wall Street Journal that any edge for investors would gradually disappear.

Hence, after this foreshortened discussion of the major considerations, we once again enunciate the same basic compromise policy for defensive investors—namely that at all times they have a significant part of their funds in bond-type holdings and a significant part also in equities. It is still true that they may choose between maintaining a simple 50–50 division between the two components or a ratio, dependent on their judgment, varying between a minimum of 25% and a maximum of 75% of either. We shall give our more detailed view of these alternative policies in a later chapter. Since at present the overall return envisaged from common stocks is nearly the same as that from bonds, the presently expectable return (including growth of stock values) for the investor would change little regardless of how he divides his fund between the two components. As calculated above, the aggregate return from both parts should be about 7.8% before taxes or 5.5% on a tax-free (or estimated tax-paid) basis. A return of this order is appreciably higher than that realized by the typical conservative investor over most of the long-term past. It may not seem attractive in relation to the 14%, or so, return shown by common stocks during the 20 years of the predominantly bull market after 1949. But it should be remembered that between 1949 and 1969 the price of the DJIA had advanced more than fivefold while its earnings and dividends had about doubled. Hence the greater part of the impressive market record for that period was based on a change in investors’ and speculators’ attitudes rather than in underlying corporate values. To that extent it might well be called a “bootstrap operation.” In

P2 - We are well on the way in a number of areas. Both billionaires and big Pharma are getting increasingly interested and money is starting to pour into research because it is clear we can see the light at the end of the tunnel which to investors equates to return on investment. Numerous factors will drive things forward and interest and awareness is increasing rapidly among both scientists, researchers and the general population as well as wealthy philanthropists. The greatest driving force of all is that the baby boomers are aging and this will place increasing demands on healthcare systems. Keep in mind that the average person costs more in medical expenditure in the last year of their life than all the other years put together. Also, the number of workers is declining in most developed countries which means that we need to keep the existing population working and productive as long as possible. Below are a list which are basically all technologies potentially leading to radical life extension with number 5 highlighted which I assume might well be possible in the second half of the century: 1. Biotechnology - e.g stem cell therapies, enhanced autophagy, pharmaceuticals, immunotherapies, etc 2. Nanotechnology - Methods of repairing the body at a cellular and molecular level such as nanobots. 3. Robotics - This could lead to the replacement of increasing numbers of body parts and tends to go hand in hand with AI and whole brain emulation. It can be argued that this is not life extension and that it is a path toward becoming a Cyborg but I don’t share that view because even today we don’t view a quadriplegic as less human if he has four bionic limbs and this will hold true as our technology progresses. 4. Gene Therapies - These could be classified under the first category but I prefer to look at it separately as it could impact the function of the body in very dramatic ways which would suppress genes that negatively impact us and enhance genes which increase our tendency toward longer and healthier lives. 5. Whole brain emulation and mindscaping - This is in effect mind transfer to a non biological host although it could equally apply to uploading the brain to a new biological brain created via tissue engineering this has the drawback that if the original brain continues to exist the second brain would have a separate existence in other words whilst you are identical at the time of upload increasing divergence over time will be inevitable but it means the consciousness could never die provided it is appropriately backed up. So what is the chance of success with any of these? My answer is that in order for us to fail to achieve radical life extension by the middle of the century requires that all of the above technologies must also fail to progress which simply won't happen and considering the current rate of development which is accelerating exponentially and then factoring in that only one or two of the above are needed to achieve life extension (although the end results would differ greatly) frankly I can’t see how we can fail to make enough progress within 10-20 years to add at least 20 to 30 years to current life expectancy from which point progress will rapidly accelerate due to increased funding turning aging at the very least into a manageable albeit a chronic incurable condition until the turn of the 22nd century. We must also factor in that there is also a possibility that we could find a faster route if a few more technologies like CRISPR were to be developed. Were that to happen things could move forward very rapidly. In the short term I'm confident that we will achieve significant positive results within a year or two in research on mice and that the knowledge acquired will then be transferred to humans within around a decade. According to ADG, a dystopian version of the post-aging world like in the film 'In Time' not plausible in the real world: "If you CAREFULLY watch just the first

Is the CEO allocating capital in a rational way that will enhance the company’s long-term value? Is the company underpaying its employees, mistreating its suppliers, violating its customers’ trust, or engaging in any other shortsighted behavior that could jeopardize its eventual greatness?

Be passionate about the business but dispassionate about the stock. Celebrate the big successes of your businesses and reflect on failures. A true feeling of ownership gives an investor the conviction to hold. When you think like a business owner, you no longer view stocks as pieces of paper or buy them with “target prices” in mind. Instead, you view stocks as part ownership in a business and you want to savor the journey alongside the promoters. As companies grow larger and more profitable, their stockholders share in the increased profits and dividends. Invest for the long term. Live fully today. Every day, millions of hardworking people around the world are doing great things at so many companies. As investors, we are thankful.

Here are some quick considerations for the intelligent investor: Is the “net pension benefit” more than 5% of the company’s net income? (If so, would you still be comfortable with the company’s other earnings if those pension gains went away in future years?) Is the assumed “long-term rate of return on plan assets” reasonable? (As of 2003, anything above 6.5% is implausible, while a rising rate is downright delusional.)

When there's a sale on eggs or chicken, we're happy- but when the stock market gets cheaper, we think it's bad. (Long-term investors should love when the market drops: You can buy more shares for the same price.)p97

When Wimdu launched, the Samwers reached out to Airbnb to discuss combining forces, as they had done with Groupon and eBay to facilitate a speedy exit. Discussions ensued between Airbnb and Wimdu cofounders and investors—meeting multiple times, touring the Wimdu offices, and checking with other founders like Andrew Mason from Groupon to best understand the potential outcome. In the end, Airbnb chose to fight. Brian Chesky described his thought process: My view was, my biggest punishment, my biggest revenge on you is, I’m gonna make you run this company long term. So you had the baby, now you gotta raise the child. And you’re stuck with it for 18 years. Because I knew he wanted to sell the company. I knew he could move faster than me for a year, but he wasn’t gonna keep doing it. And so that was our strategy. And we built the company long term. And the ultimate way we won is, we had a better community. He couldn’t understand community. And I think we had a better product.82 To do this, the company would mobilize their product teams to rapidly improve their support for international regions. Jonathan Golden, the first product manager at Airbnb, described their efforts: Early on, Airbnb’s listing experience was basic. You filled out forms, uploaded 1 photo—usually not professional—and editing the listing after the fact was hard. The mobile app in the early days was lightweight, where you could only browse but not book. There were a lot of markets in those days with just 1 or 2 listings. Booking only supported US dollars, so it catered towards American travelers only, and for hosts, they could get money out via a bank transfer to an American bank via ACH, or PayPal. We needed to get from this skeleton of a product into something that could work internationally if we wanted to fend off Wimdu. We internationalized the product, translating it into all the major languages. We went from supporting 1 currency to adding 32. We bought all the local domains, like airbnb.co.uk for the UK website and airbnb.es for Spain. It was important to move quickly to close off the opportunity in Europe.83 Alongside the product, the fastest way to fight on Wimdu’s turf was to quickly scale up paid marketing in Europe using Facebook, Google, and other channels to augment the company’s organic channels, built over years. Most important, Airbnb finally pulled the trigger on putting boots on the ground—hiring Martin Reiter, the company’s first head of international, and also partnering with Springstar, a German incubator and peer of Rocket Internet’s, to accelerate their international expansion.

While the rich became richer, the taxation policy of the government, instead of correcting this trend, actively strengthened it. One of the first decisions of the first Modi government was to abolish the wealth tax that had been introduced in 1957. While the fiscal resources generated by this tax were never significant, the decision was more than a symbolic one.126 The wealth tax was replaced with an income tax increase of 2 percent for households that earned more than Rs 10 million (133,333 USD) annually.127 Few people pay income tax in India anyway: only 14.6 million people (2 percent of the population) did in 2019. As a result, the income-tax-to-GDP ratio remained below 11 percent. Not only has the Modi government not tried to introduce any reforms to change this, but it has instead increased indirect taxes (such as excise taxes), which are the most unfair as they affect everyone, irrespective of income. Taxes on alcohol and petroleum products are a case in point. As some state governments have also imposed their own taxes, this strategy means that India has one of the highest taxation rates on fuel in the world. The share of indirect taxes in the state’s fiscal resources has increased under the Modi government to reach 50 percent of the total taxes—compared to 39 percent under UPA I and 44 percent under UPA II.128 Modi’s taxation policy, a supply-side economics approach, is in keeping with the managerial rhetoric of promoting the spirit of enterprise that the prime minister, who readily presents himself as an efficiency-conscious “apolitical CEO,” relishes. One of the neoliberal measures the Modi government enacted in the name of economic rationality, right from his very first budget in 2015, was to lower the corporate tax.129 For existing companies it was reduced from 30 to 22 percent, and for manufacturing firms incorporated after October 1, 2019 that started operations before March 31, 2023, it was reduced from 25 to 15 percent—the biggest reduction in twenty-eight years. In addition to these tax reductions, the government withdrew the enhanced surcharge on long- and short-term capital gains for foreign portfolio investors as well as domestic portfolio investors.130

s. These seven steps helped us find our own financial Fast Track, and we continue to use them today. I trust they can assist you in charting your own course to financial freedom. To do so, you must be true to yourself. If you are not yet a long-term investor, get yourself there as fast as you can. What does this mean? Sit down and map out a plan to get control of your spending habits. Minimize your debt and liabilities. Live within your means, and then expand your means. Find out how much money invested per month, for how many months, at a realistic rate of return it will take to reach your goals of retiring, creating cash flow, and gaining financial freedom. Simply having a long-term plan that reduces your consumer debt while putting away a small amount of money regularly will give you a head start if you start early enough and keep an eye on what you are doing. At this level, keep it simple. Don’t get fancy

In the stock market, the shares that are most popular and familiar to investors change hands more often, and that, in turn, attracts still more attention to these stocks as they turn up in the day’s list of “most active shares.” Because of all that extra exposure, the stocks with the highest trading volume have higher returns in the short run—but, in the long term, they tend to underperform by two to five percentage points per year. In the stock market, which is a game of inches, that’s a country mile.

Let’s say, for example, that you figure you’re 25% better than average at picking stocks, and you think you can earn 15% a year on your portfolio. That sounds realistic enough—until you consider the third question. The long-term average annual return on the Standard & Poor’s 500 index of blue-chip stocks is 10.4%. If, however, you adjust that number for the cash that people added to and subtracted from their portfolios, the average return drops to just 8.6% annually since 1926. Factor in taxes, trading costs, and inflation, and the annual return of the typical investor drops below 4%. If you really are 25% better than average, you shouldn’t expect to earn much more than 5% annually after all your costs. You still might be able to earn 15% a year—if you are at least three times better than average. Only by asking all three questions can you tell just how crazy your inner con man is.

While most people would say they want a great life, they rarely plan beyond the current year. As a result, they choose a financial model that fits only their short-term goals, and that financial shortsightedness can be devastating to their long-term dreams.

A successful investor is one who holds on for the long term and continues to monitor the fundamental story, and if it remains in place you stay, and if not you move on.

inaction and patience are almost always the wisest options for investors in the stock market. For the same reason, I find it better not to check the performance of my stocks every day (or, for that matter, every week) since this makes it harder to keep a long-term focus.

Mark Twain defined a classic as something everyone wants to have read and nobody wants to read. One classic that deserves the attention of all investors is John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, and more specifically chapter 12, “The State of Long-Term Expectation.” Expectations are embedded in all the decisions we make, especially investment decisions, but we rarely step back and consider how and why we form our expectations. Keynes guides this reflection.

While weather forecasters and handicappers get accurate and timely feedback, long-term investors don’t. Maybe one day we’ll create a simulator that provides investors the training they need to make better decisions. Of course, the result will be markets that are even harder to beat.

Which brings me to the second reason I detest any debt. This answer is often underappreciated and even ignored by investors and management. It is this: Debt diminishes strategic flexibility and hence long-term value creation. For a day trader or even an investor whose holding period ranges from three to five years, a reasonable amount of leverage may not matter. But for a permanent owner like Nalanda, any constraint that prevents a business from taking calculated strategic bets is undesirable.

Many have been supposedly foolproof but zany formulae that have made no one rich but the hucksters who sold them to the gullible. But over the years there have been some approaches that have enjoyed at least a modicum of success. These range from the Dow Theory first espoused by Wall Street Journal founder Charles Dow—essentially using technical indicators to try to identify and profit from different market phases—and David Butler’s CANSLIM system, to the value investing school articulated by Benjamin Graham. The earth-shattering suggestion of the research conducted in the 1960s and 1970s was that the code might actually be unbreakable, and efforts to decipher it were expensive and futile. Harry Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory and William Sharpe’s CAPM indicated that the market itself was the optimal balance between risks and return, while Gene Fama presented a cohesive, compelling argument for why that was: The net effect of the efforts of thousands upon thousands of investors continually trying to outsmart each other was that the stock market was efficient, and in practice hard to beat. Most investors should therefore just sit on their hands and buy the entire market. But in the 1980s and 1990s, a new round of groundbreaking research—some of it from the same efficient-markets disciples who had rattled the investing world in the 1960s and 1970s—started revealing some fault lines in the academic edifice built up in the previous decades. Perhaps the stock market wasn’t entirely efficient, and maybe there were indeed ways to beat it in the long run? Some gremlins in the system were always known, but often glossed over. Already in the early 1970s, Black and Scholes had noted that there were some odd issues with the theory, such as how less volatile stocks actually produced better long-term returns than choppier ones. That contradicted the belief that return and risk (using volatility as a proxy for risk) were correlated. In other words, loopier roller coasters produce greater thrills. Though the theory made intuitive sense, in practice it didn’t seem to hold up to rigorous scrutiny. This is why Scholes and Black initially proposed that Wells Fargo should set up a fund that would buy lower-volatility stocks (that is, low-beta) and use leverage to bring the portfolio’s overall volatility up to the broader stock market.7 Hey, presto, a roller coaster with the same number of loops as everyone else, but with even greater thrills. Nonetheless, the efficient-markets hypothesis quickly became dogma at business schools around the United States.

Ross’s “arbitrage pricing theory” and Rosenberg’s “bionic betas” posited that the returns of any financial security are the result of several systematic factors. Although seemingly stating the obvious, this was a seminal moment in the move toward a more vibrant understanding of markets. The eclectic Rosenberg was even put on the cover of Institutional Investor in May 1978, the bald, mustachioed man depicted as a giant meditating guru with flowers in his hair, worshipped by a gathering of besuited portfolio managers. The headline was “Who Is Barr Rosenberg? And What the Hell Is He Talking About?”8 What he was talking about was how academics were beginning to classify stocks according to not just their industry or their geography, but their financial characteristics. And some of these characteristics might actually prove to deliver better long-term returns than the broader stock market. In 1973, Sanjoy Basu, a finance professor at McMaster University in Ontario, published a paper that indicated that companies with low stock prices relative to their earnings did better than the efficient-markets hypothesis would suggest. Essentially, he showed that the value investing principles espoused by Benjamin Graham in the 1930s—which revolved around buying cheap, out-of-favor stocks trading below their intrinsic worth—was a durable investment factor. By systematically buying all cheap stocks, investors could in theory beat the broader market over time. Then Banz showed the same for small caps, another big moment in the evolution of factor investing. Follow-up studies on smaller stocks in Japan and the UK showed similar results, so in 1986 DFA launched dedicated small-cap funds for those two markets as well. In the early 1990s, finance professors Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Sheridan Titman published a paper indicating that simply surfing market momentum—in practice buying stocks that were already bouncing and selling those that were sliding—could also produce market-beating returns.9 The reasons for these apparent anomalies divide academics. Efficient-markets disciples stipulate that they are the compensation investors receive for taking extra risks. Value stocks, for example, are often found in beaten-up, unpopular, and shunned companies, such as boring industrial conglomerates in the middle of the dotcom bubble. While they can underperform for long stretches, eventually their underlying worth shines through and rewards investors who kept the faith. Small stocks do well largely because small companies are more likely to fail than bigger ones. Behavioral economists, on the other hand, argue that factors tend to be the product of our irrational human biases. For example, just like how we buy pricey lottery tickets for the infinitesimal chance of big wins, investors tend to overpay for fast-growing, glamorous stocks, and unfairly shun duller, steadier ones. Smaller stocks do well because we are illogically drawn to names we know well. The momentum factor, on the other hand, works because investors initially underreact to news but overreact in the long run, or often sell winners too quickly and hang on to bad bets for far longer than is advisable.

Whatever the reason, the existence of some persistent investment factors is today accepted by almost every (if not all) financial economist and investor. In an ingenious bit of marketing, factors are often called “smart beta.” Sharpe himself grew to hate the term, as it implies that all other forms of beta are dumb.10 Most financial academics prefer the term “risk premia,” to more accurately reflect the fact that they think these factors primarily yield an investment premium from taking some kind of risk—even if they cannot always agree what the precise risk is. An important milestone was when Fama and his frequent collaborator Ken French—another Chicago finance professor who would later also join DFA—in 1992 published a paper with the oblique title “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.”11 It was a bombshell. In what would become known as the three-factor model, Fama and French used data on companies listed on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange, and the Nasdaq from 1963 to 1990 and showed that both value (the tendency of cheap stocks to outperform expensive ones) and size (the tendency of smaller stocks to outperform bigger ones) were distinct factors from the broader market factor—the beta. Although Fama and French’s paper termed these factors as rewards for taking extra risks, coming from the father of the efficient-markets hypothesis, it was a signal event in the history of financial economics.12 Since then academics have identified a panoply of factors, with varying degrees of durability, strength, and acceptance. Of course, factors do not always work. They can go through long fallow stretches where they underperform the market. Value stocks, for example, suffered a miserable bout of performance in the dotcom bubble, when investors wanted to buy only trendy technology stocks. And to DFA’s chagrin, after small caps enjoyed a robust year in DFA’s first year of existence, they would then undergo a long, painful seven-year period of trailing dramatically behind the S&P 500.13 DFA managed to keep growing, losing very few clients, partly because it had always stressed to them that stretches like this could happen. But it was an uncomfortable period that led to many awkward conversations with clients.

The takeaway from these studies is simple. Broad diversification is the only guaranteed way to approximate the superior returns that stocks have historically offered investors. Putting together a narrow portfolio of stocks may be a big winner, but usually is a loser.

Raising capital. Organisations like Rio Tinto, TomTom and GKN have all raised significant sums through the equity markets. Refinancing debt. Some companies, like Yell and Schaeffler, have rolled over billions in bank finance. However, many businesses are still finding banks reluctant to lend and have turned to bond issuance as an alternative. Divestment. Companies can sell off valuable assets, such as Barclays did with Barclays Global Investors, and it is always better to do so before a crisis; otherwise it will be seen for the fire sale it is and the price will be a fire-sale price. Furthermore, any sell-off that weakens a firm’s core capability or its long-term competitive position may also shorten its life. Cut costs but not capability The managing uncertainty survey revealed that the most common action that companies took when the financial crisis struck was to cut costs. Some 82% of respondents cut costs. When asked about their future responses to uncertainty, 76% indicated they would continue to focus on cost reduction.

It’s time for everyone to acknowledge that the term “long-term investor” is redundant. A long-term investor is the only kind of investor there is. Someone who can’t hold on to stocks for more than a few months at a time is doomed to end up not as a victor but as a victim.

If your needs are not attainable through safe instruments, the solution is not to increase the rate of return by upping the level of risk. Instead, goals may be revised, savings increased, or income boosted through added years of work. . . . Somebody has to care about the consequences if uncertainty is to be understood as risk. . . . As we’ve seen, the chances of loss do decline over time, but this hardly means that the odds are zero, or negligible, just because the horizon is long. . . . In fact, even though the odds of loss do fall over long periods, the size of potential losses gets larger, not smaller, over time. . . . The message to emerge from all this hype has been inescapable: In the long run, the stock market can only go up. Its ascent is inexorable and predictable. Long-term stock returns are seen as near certain while risks appear minimal, and only temporary. And the messaging has been effective: The familiar market propositions come across as bedrock fact. For the most part, the public views them as scientific truth, although this is hardly the case. It may surprise you, but all this confidence is rather new. Prevailing attitudes and behavior before the early 1980s were different. Fewer people owned stocks then, and the general popular attitude to buying stocks was wariness, not ebullience or complacency. . . . Unfortunately, the American public’s embrace of stocks is not at all related to the spread of sound knowledge. It’s useful to consider how the transition actually evolved—because the real story resists a triumphalist interpretation. . . . Excessive optimism helps explain the popularity of the stocks-for-the-long-run doctrine. The pseudo-factual statement that stocks always succeed in the long run provides an overconfident investor with more grist for the optimistic mill. . . . Speaking with the editors of Forbes.com in 2002, Kahneman explained: “When you are making a decision whether or not to go for something,” he said, “my guess is that knowing the odds won’t hurt you, if you’re brave. But when you are executing, not to be asking yourself at every moment in time whether you will succeed or not is certainly a good thing. . . . In many cases, what looks like risk-taking is not courage at all, it’s just unrealistic optimism. Courage is willingness to take the risk once you know the odds. Optimistic overconfidence means you are taking the risk because you don’t know the odds. It’s a big difference.” Optimism can be a great motivator. It helps especially when it comes to implementing plans. Although optimism is healthy, however, it’s not always appropriate. You would not want rose-colored glasses in a financial advisor, for instance. . . . Over the long haul, the more you are exposed to danger, the more likely it is to catch up with you. The odds don’t exactly add, but they do accumulate. . . . Yet, overriding this instinctive understanding, the prevailing investment dogma has argued just the reverse. The creed that stocks grow steadily safer over time has managed to trump our common-sense assumption by appealing to a different set of homespun precepts. Chief among these is a flawed surmise that, with the passage of time, downward fluctuations are balanced out by compensatory upward swings. Many people believe that each step backward will be offset by more than one step forward. The assumption is that you can own all the upside and none of the downside just by sticking around. . . . If you find yourself rejecting safe investments because they are not profitable enough, you are asking the wrong questions. If you spurn insurance simply because the premiums put a crimp in your returns, you may be destined for disappointment—and possibly loss.

Find out how you can get in touch with investors for a business near you. KrugerInvest provides best investors for your business, who have with you in long term. Meet us personally and we give you a better solution. Call at +49-617420920

Chambers et al. conclude that Keynes had no skill as a market timer. By then, however, the man who had started out as a top-down speculator relying upon his “superior knowledge” to forecast the macroeconomic climate, was behaving more like a bottom-up, fundamental investor who sought solid, dividend-paying stocks with good long-term prospects. His gains came from taking large positions in those securities that had financial statement sheets he could understand, and sold products or services he believed he could assess objectively.

You want to ensure that you bring in the “right” money from people you trust and who believe in the long-term path to building a viable company with you. Too many times, entrepreneurs bring in the “wrong” money, which leads to turmoil (investor pressure, misunderstandings, lawsuits, and a great amount of time dealing with investor expectations) down the road when things are not going well, and often the demise of the company. My

A lot of us asked why we weren't pricing it at a premium. We could have got a premium but Deepak said, "leave money on the table for investors. They will appreciate this in the long term." Today, when we have arguments with our promoters, one of the big lessons I learnt from our float is to price an IPO cheap,' Luis said. 'Should we really scalp the shareholders? This is a start-up company. On what basis are we putting valuations? Today they will put a valuation even on a start-up idea,' Satwalekar was blunt in his assessment.