Long Term Investor Quotes

Corporate governance involves its fair share of differing investor expectations, but focusing on long-term value creation aligns interests.

Ultimately, Investing is about holistic ROI. It’s not about just owning stocks or crypto or flipping for quick income. When we talk about holistic ROI, we are looking at our long term profit, short term profit, income security, cash flow, social impact, environmental impact, spiritual impact, stability of the permaculture economy, and more. That’s how we see it at Mayflower-Plymouth.

Transparency is a good quality to have in business. Honesty, integrity and transparency will gain you the right customers and the right investors. And dishonesty always results in long term losses.

Speculators buy the trend; investors are in for the long haul; "they are a different breed of cats." One reason that people lose money today is that they have lost sight of this distinction; they profess to have the long term in mind and yet cannot resist following where the hot money has led.

Investing is a special thing. In terms of functionality, almost anyone can invest. But in terms of achieving the results of long-term profit and sustainable growth, only some people have the talent or skill sets for that. It’s like baseball for example… anyone can swing a bat at a ball. But only a few people make it to the big league, and even fewer become world champs. These days there are so many apps and platforms for individual investing, but that doesn’t mean everyone is achieving good results or ROI. There are great investors, good investors, and bad investors. A professional investor can achieve exponential growth and profit. A professional investor understands markets and industries and can account for both the traditional and the new.

Investing is a special thing. In terms of functionality, almost anyone invest. But in terms of achieving the results of long-term profit and sustainable growth, only some people have the talent or skill sets for that. It’s like baseball for example… anyone can swing a bat at a ball. But only a few guys make it to the big league, and even fewer become world champs. These days there are so many apps and platforms for individual investing, but that doesn’t mean everyone is achieving the same results. There are great investors, good investors, and bad investors. A professional investor can achieve exponential growth and profit. A professional investor understands markets and industries and can account for both the traditional and the new.

Investors need to understand not only the magic of compounding long-term returns, but the tyranny of compounding costs; costs that ultimately overwhelm that magic.

Investors long for steady waters, but paradoxically, the opportunities are richest when markets turn turbulent.

As the famed investor Benjamin Graham said, “In the short term, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term, it’s a weighing machine.

Everybody is a long-term investor till the market drops by 10% or more.

You, far more than the market or the economy, are the most important factor in your long-term investment success.

Being net value adders puts us better positioned for long-term growth and longevity – because in the long term, capital flows to net value adders.

If Wall Street is to learn just one lesson from the Long-Term debacle, it should be that. The next time a Merton proposes an elegant model to manage risks and foretell odds, the next time a computer with a perfect memory of the past is said to quantify risks in the future, investors should run—and quickly—the other way. On Wall Street, though, few lessons remain learned.

For Gracias, the Tesla and SpaceX investor and Musk’s friend, the 2008 period told him everything he would ever need to know about Musk’s character. He saw a man who arrived in the United States with nothing, who had lost a child, who was being pilloried in the press by reporters and his ex-wife and who verged on having his life’s work destroyed. “He has the ability to work harder and endure more stress than anyone I’ve ever met,” Gracias said. “What he went through in 2008 would have broken anyone else. He didn’t just survive. He kept working and stayed focused.” That ability to stay focused in the midst of a crisis stands as one of Musk’s main advantages over other executives and competitors. “Most people who are under that sort of pressure fray,” Gracias said. “Their decisions go bad. Elon gets hyperrational. He’s still able to make very clear, long-term decisions. The harder it gets, the better he gets. Anyone who saw what he went through firsthand came away with more respect for the guy. I’ve just never seen anything like his ability to take pain.

The best ideas are those that create a new mind-set or sense a need before others do, and it takes an astute investor to recognize an idea that not only is ahead of its time but also has long-term prospects.

As long as investors care only about maximizing their own returns, and focus only on the short term and on what can be easily measured, firms will be reluctant to take the risks inherent in seeking to exploit shared value and to embrace high road labor practices.

Permaculture Investing™ is an investment strategy based on achieving the goals of (a) long-term Return on Investment, (b) consistent income and (c) resilient growth for investors, by combining Permaculture philosophy with various traditional approaches to investing.

tiny differences matter in investing—a pursuit where small structural changes can add up to big differences in returns over time. Long-term compounding is an investor’s best friend, so why get in its way? There’s a huge benefit to getting these seemingly minor details

Strategic tax management also enhances a company's competitiveness by enabling them to make informed financial decisions, attract investors, and adapt to changing tax regulations. It helps in minimizing financial risk and ensuring that the company's financial health remains strong, fostering long-term sustainability and growth.

Many new investors, eager to see quick profits, need to develop the patience and research skills necessary for successful long-term investing.

Part of the problem is that a finely trained but rarefied academic mind can be damaging to your long-term success.

Developing a long-term financial plan, with a keen eye on your saving and spending levels, is essential for you to reach your long-term goals. The

Supremely rational investors take the further step of acting against consensus, rebalancing to long-term portfolio targets by buying the out-of-favor and selling the in-vogue.

For all long-term investors, there is only one objective - maximum total real return after taxes

Investors in training understand that, as a long‐term investor, you don't sell shares as soon as they bring up capital gains; you hold on to them until you have reached your investing goal.

Similarly, the buy-and-hold investor who prudently holds a diversified portfolio of low-cost index funds through thick and thin is the investor most likely to achieve her long-term investment goals.

In the aggregate, real wealth was made, not by the crooks, but by long-term investors, who overlooked the cacophony of the stock market and instead focused on the fundamentals of businesses, and that of India.

Why should not the effects of changing interest rates be divided on some practical and equitable basis between the borrower and the lender? One possibility would be to sell long-term bonds with interest payments that vary with an appropriate index of the going rate.

When navigating the financial markets, the long-term investor must keep in mind the four basic dimensions of long-term return — reward, risk, cost and time — and must apply them to every asset class. Never forget that these four dimensions are remarkably interdependent.

A common adage on Wall Street is that the markets are motivated by two emotions: fear and greed. Indeed, this book suggests that investors are affected by these emotions. However, acting on these emotions is rarely the wise move. The decision that benefits investors over the long term is usually made in the absence of strong emotions.

A trader needs to be highly skilled and extremely lucky to beat the market consistently. If a trader is highly skilled but not lucky enough or extremely lucky but modestly skilled, he will beat the market occasionally but not consistently. Traders that are modestly skilled and modestly lucky will briefly beat the market but will be behind the market most of the time. Everybody else will lose money on a long-term basis, that is, 90% of the traders.

Making money in the markets is tough. The brilliant trader and investor Bernard Baruch put it well when he said, “If you are ready to give up everything else and study the whole history and background of the market and all principal companies whose stocks are on the board as carefully as a medical student studies anatomy—if you can do all that and in addition you have the cool nerves of a gambler, the sixth sense of a clairvoyant and the courage of a lion, you have a ghost of a chance.” In retrospect, the mistakes that led to my crash seemed embarrassingly obvious. First, I had been wildly overconfident and had let my emotions get the better of me. I learned (again) that no matter how much I knew and how hard I worked, I could never be certain enough to proclaim things like what I’d said on Wall $ treet Week: “There’ll be no soft landing. I can say that with absolute certainty, because I know how markets work.” I am still shocked and embarrassed by how arrogant I was. Second, I again saw the value of studying history. What had happened, after all, was “another one of those.” I should have realized that debts denominated in one’s own currency can be successfully restructured with the government’s help, and that when central banks simultaneously provide stimulus (as they did in March 1932, at the low point of the Great Depression, and as they did again in 1982), inflation and deflation can be balanced against each other. As in 1971, I had failed to recognize the lessons of history. Realizing that led me to try to make sense of all movements in all major economies and markets going back a hundred years and to come up with carefully tested decision-making principles that are timeless and universal. Third, I was reminded of how difficult it is to time markets. My long-term estimates of equilibrium levels were not reliable enough to bet on; too many things could happen between the time I placed my bets and the time (if ever) that my estimates were reached. Staring at these failings, I realized that if I was going to move forward without a high likelihood of getting whacked again, I would have to look at myself objectively and change—starting by learning a better way of handling the natural aggressiveness I’ve always shown in going after what I wanted. Imagine that in order to have a great life you have to cross a dangerous jungle. You can stay safe where you are and have an ordinary life, or you can risk crossing the jungle to have a terrific life. How would you approach that choice? Take a moment to think about it because it is the sort of choice that, in one form or another, we all have to make.

Integrity, honesty, and decency are long-term cultural investments. Their purpose is not to make the quarter, beat a competitor, or attract a new employee. Their purpose is to create a better place to work and to make the company a better one to do business with in the long run. This value does not come for free. In the short run it may cost you deals, people, and investors, which is why most companies cannot bring themselves to actually, really, enforce it. But as we’ll see, the failure to enforce good conduct often brings modern companies to their knees.

The billionaire investor and former senior executive at Facebook, Chamath Palihapitiya, argues that we must rewire our brain to focus on the long term, which starts by removing social media apps from our phones. In his words, such apps, “wire your brain for super-fast feedback.” By receiving constant feedback, whether through likes, comments, or immediate replies to our messages, we condition ourselves to expect fast results with everything we do. And this feeling is certainly reinforced through ads for schemes to help us “get rich quick”, and through cognitive biases (i.e., we only hear about the richest and most successful YouTubers, not about the ones who fail).

The Keynesian world is a world in which there are two distinct classes of actors: the skilled investor, ‘who, unperturbed by the prevailing pastime, continues to purchase investments on the best genuine long-term expectations he can frame’, and, on the other hand, the ignorant ‘game-player’. It does not seem to have occurred to Keynes that either of these two may learn from the other, and that, in particular, company directors and even the managers of investment trusts may be the wiser for learning from the market what it thinks about their actions. In this Keynesian world the managers and directors already know all about the future and have little to gain by devoting their attention to the misera plebs of the market. In fact, Keynes strongly feels that they should not! This pseudo-Platonic view of the world of high finance forms, we feel, an essential part of what Schumpeter called the ‘Keynesian vision’. This view ignores progress through exchange of knowledge because the ones know all there is to be known whilst the others never learn anything.

Women select short-term sexual relationships when men cannot improve their children’s survival, when there are too few men, or when their upbringing has signaled that men are unreliable investors in their progeny. Short-term relationships for women often amount to serial monogamy in response to a population of males, none of whom can or will provide sustained economic and emotional commitment. And if she can maintain her attractiveness in the face of her increasing age, decreasing looks, and the handicap (from a prospective partner’s viewpoint) of already born children, she can also gain the advantage of genetic diversity and perhaps better genetic quality in her children. But the most secure and stable route is to attract a male who will commit, providing the long-term assistance and resources that she needs to raise multiple offspring simultaneously. Unfortunately that idea has occurred to other women also and she is in a competitive market-place. The currency of the marketplace is what men want in a female partner. To trade successfully, she must advertise her assets by showing that she has more desirable qualities than her female rivals.

I believe that social media, and the internet as a whole, have negatively impacted our ability to both think long-term and to focus deeply on the task in front of us. It is no surprise, therefore, that Apple CEO, Steve Jobs, prohibited his children from using phones or tablets—even though his business was to sell millions of them to his customers! The billionaire investor and former senior executive at Facebook, Chamath Palihapitiya, argues that we must rewire our brain to focus on the long term, which starts by removing social media apps from our phones. In his words, such apps, “wire your brain for super-fast feedback.” By receiving constant feedback, whether through likes, comments, or immediate replies to our messages, we condition ourselves to expect fast results with everything we do. And this feeling is certainly reinforced through ads for schemes to help us “get rich quick”, and through cognitive biases (i.e., we only hear about the richest and most successful YouTubers, not about the ones who fail). As we demand more and more stimulation, our focus is increasingly geared toward the short term and our vision of reality becomes distorted. This leads us to adopt inaccurate mental models such as: Success should come quickly and easily, or I don’t need to work hard to lose weight or make money. Ultimately, this erroneous concept distorts our vision of reality and our perception of time. We can feel jealous of people who seem to have achieved overnight success. We can even resent popular YouTubers. Even worse, we feel inadequate. It can lead us to think we are just not good enough, smart enough, or disciplined enough. Therefore, we feel the need to compensate by hustling harder. We have to hurry before we miss the opportunity. We have to find the secret that will help us become successful. And, in this frenetic race, we forget one of the most important values of all: patience. No, watching motivational videos all day long won’t help you reach your goals. But, performing daily consistent actions, sustained over a long period of time will. Staying calm and focusing on the one task in front of you every day will. The point is, to achieve long-term goals in your personal or professional life, you must regain control of your attention and rewire your brain to focus on the long term. To do so, you should start by staying away from highly stimulating activities.

It is difficult to evaluate their recommendations of individual securities. Each service is entitled to be judged separately, and the verdict could properly be based only on an elaborate and inclusive study covering many years. In our own experience we have noted among them a pervasive attitude which we think tends to impair what could otherwise be more useful advisory work. This is their general view that a stock should be bought if the near-term prospects of the business are favorable and should be sold if these are unfavorable—regardless of the current price. Such a superficial principle often prevents the services from doing the sound analytical job of which their staffs are capable—namely, to ascertain whether a given stock appears over- or undervalued at the current price in the light of its indicated long-term future earning power. The intelligent investor will not do his buying and selling solely on the basis of recommendations received from a financial service. Once this point is established, the role of the financial service then becomes the useful one of supplying information and offering suggestions.

The investor with a long-term horizon begins with a portfolio composed entirely of risky assets. Then, as the investor’s investment horizon contracts, the investor moves assets from high-risk to low-risk positions.

Sensible investors take great care to minimize the tax bill associated with moving assets from the high-risk, long-term portfolio to the low-risk, short-term portfolio. Although the tax code introduces many complexities to investment decision making, as a starting point consider moving taxable long-term assets to the low-risk portfolio, thereby allowing tax-deferred holdings to continue to receive shelter from taxes.

In addition to the 60 million ether sold to the public, roughly 6 million was created to compensate early contributors to Ethereum, and another 6 million for long-term reserves of the Ethereum Foundation. The extra allocation of 12 million ether for the early contributors and Ethereum Foundation has proved problematic for Ethereum over time, as some feel it represented double dipping.

Long term, the thinking is that bitcoin will become so entrenched within the global economy that new bitcoin will not need to be issued to continue to gain support. At that point, miners will be compensated for processing transactions and securing the network through fees on high transaction volumes.

If “nonrecurring” charges keep recurring, “extraordinary” items crop up so often that they seem ordinary, acronyms like EBITDA take priority over net income, or “pro forma” earnings are used to cloak actual losses, you may be looking at a firm that has not yet learned how to put its shareholders’ long-term interests first.9

Graham feels that five elements are decisive.1 He summarizes them as: the company’s “general long-term prospects” the quality of its management its financial strength and capital structure its dividend record and its current dividend rate.

But the intelligent investor has no interest in being temporarily right. To reach your long-term financial goals, you must be sustainably and reliably right.

A long-term investor is the only kind of investor there is. Someone who can’t hold on to stocks for more than a few months at a time is doomed to end up not as a victor but as a victim.

You don’t need to be a twit in articulating these expectations, and you shouldn’t ask people to do the truly impossible. But you do need to request the seemingly impossible, putting it to them in a kindly way and even with a sense of humor. It is possible to overdo it, as I have on occasion. On balance, though, organizations, people, and leaders would do well to be much more demanding of themselves than they are. Whatever you do, stay hungry. Investors often asked us what would cause us to miss our numbers, thinking I would name some industry or economic issue, but I always gave the same answer: “If we ever lose our hunger.” That hunger starts with the leader.

many people become long-term investors after they lose money, postponing

many people become long-term investors after they lose money, postponing their decision to sell as part of their denial.

Neither defensive investors who limit their losses in a decline nor aggressive investors with substantial gains in a rising market have proved they possess skill. For us to conclude that investors truly add value, we have to see how they perform in environments to which their style isn’t particularly well suited. Can the aggressive investor keep from giving back gains when the market turns down? Will the defensive investor participate substantially when the market rises? This kind of asymmetry is the expression of real skill. Does an investor have more winners than losers? Are the gains on the winners bigger than the losses on the losers? Are the good years more beneficial than the bad years are painful? And are the long-term results better than the investor’s style alone would suggest? These things are the mark of the superior investor. Without them, returns may be the result of little more than market movement and beta.

Buffett himself is a grand master of simplification. Writing to his shareholders in 1977, he laid out his four criteria for selecting any stock: “We want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price.” These may not strike you as earth-shattering secrets. But it’s hard to beat this distillation of eternal truths about what makes a stock desirable.

At a business forum I attended, a senior executive of a Fortune 100 company proclaimed that his company manages “not for the next quarter, but for the next quarter century.” Ugh. Such platitudes do not instill confidence in investors. Most managers don’t have any idea what’s going to happen in the next five years, much less the next twenty-five years. How do you manage for an ambiguous future? Yet managers must clearly strike some balance between the short term and the long term. It’s like speeding down the highway in a car. If you focus just beyond the hood, you’re going to have a hard time anticipating what’s coming. Look too far ahead, on the other hand, and you lose perspective on the actions that you need to take now to navigate safely. There’s a tradeoff between the short term and the long term, and the appropriate focal point shifts as conditions warrant.

Step by Step… Can you write out your ideal business step by step Here is a business I am setting up for a client. She wants to shipping start her own shipping company… One she will need a US partner to collect and transfer packages to her in Jamaica. She will also need one in China. I have two contacts. One has a warehouse in Florida The other has two in China. Chinese connect makes goods available within 3 weeks, she has to tell her customers four. The US connect makes it within 3-5 days. She has to tell them within a week… Next she will need a website where her customers can login and track their packages. This will come with individual dashboards. She will need an interface and warehouse management software and logistics APIs. She will also need an automated email set up (journey) to send emails to her customers without her or her agents needing to do that. Without this Saas she would have to hire someone to reply to messages and emails about , someone to call and track, use usps and FedEx tracking numbers to track and reply back to customers. She also needs a beta ApI to allow her warehouse guy to update the CRM with information about her customers packages… Key nodes such as - Intransit to destinations Held at customs Clearance In transit to store Pick up available etc… These will come in as email notifications Fully automated. Everything will be connected using Webhooks… entire system. Saas she might need to use a combination of GOhighlevel, Workiz and To run this as a System as as Service. Each platform can work together using webhooks. Gohighlevel as a Saas is $500 a month Workiz is $200 dollars She can use Odoo which is open source alternative as a CRM And Clickup as Management. This is how a conversational business plan looks. You can see it. You can research it. You can confirm that it’s plausible. It doesn’t sound like pipedreams. It sounds workable to credit companies /banks and investors. It sounds doable to a BDO Client. I also sound as if I know what I am doing. Not a lot of technical language. A confused prospective business investor or banker don’t want to use a dictionary to figure out everything… They want to see the vision as clear as day. You basically need to do to them what I did to you when you joined my programme. It must sound plausible. All businesses is a game of wit. Every deal that is signed benefits both party. Whether initially or in the long term. Those are the sub-tenets of business. Every board meeting or meeting with regulatory boards, banks, credit facilities, municipalities is a game of convincing people to see your thing through… Everyone does Algorithm is simple. People want you to solve their problems with speed and efficiency. Speed is very important and automation. Progress, business and production are tied to ego… that’s why people love seh oh dem start a business or dem have dem online business and nah sell one rass thing. Cause a lot of people think being successful and looking successful are one and the same thing until they meet someone like me or people who done the work… Don’t rush it… you are young and you have time. There are infact certain little nuances Weh yuh only ago learn through experience. Experience and reflection. One of the drawbacks of wanting to run your business by yourself with you and your family members is that you guys will have to be reliant on yourself for feedback which is not alw

If Benartzi and Thaler are right, the implication is critical: Long-term investors (individuals who evaluate their portfolios infrequently) are willing to pay more for an identical risky asset than short-term investors (frequent evaluation). Valuation depends on your time horizon. This may be why many long-term investors say they don’t care about volatility. Immune to short-term squiggles, these investors hold stocks long enough to get an attractive probability of a return and, hence, a positive utility.

There is almost never a clear winner in the arms race between the senders and receivers of signals in the natural world. You may have heard of cuckoos leaving their eggs in the nests of other bird species so that someone else can rear their chicks. The signals here are the size, shape, and color of the cuckoo egg, which match those of the eggs of some other bird species. However, scientists have found that some of the parasitized bird species have not allowed themselves to be exploited—they have evolved to produce eggs that are distinctly different, even compared to eggs of their own species.24 As a result, they recognize cuckoo eggs as interlopers. They have evolved a way to detect the dishonest signal from cuckoos. This race has no winner, and there will probably never be one. In sharp contrast, in the business world, the senders of signals—the companies—are clearly winning over the receivers—us, the gullible investors. No wonder our community performs poorly compared to the broader market. What should we long-term investors do?

The failure of most investors does not lie in pursuing a wrong model but in failing to repeatedly pursue a good model. It does not take a genius to theorize that investing in quality management teams running excellent businesses should lead to success over the long term, but how many can translate this theory into practice day after day and year after year?

have seen too many people make a profit of 50 to 100 percent on an investment in a great company and then press the exit button. We investors take pride in being math savvy. Mention the word “compounding” to us, and you will get knowing smiles. Unfortunately, most of those knowing smiles do not seem to know that what they know about compounding—that it can lead to big numbers over time—hides two great unknowns. The first is that compounding does not lead to significant numbers for a very long time. The second is that investing would be easy if companies could compound predictably. But, alas, they don’t. The real world is quite messy, and the path to long-term success is treacherous, unpredictable, and full of disappointments. What is needed to become a successful investor is not intellect, a commodity, but patience, which is not.

There are three key financial statements that are made up of 5 main elements. These elements include: 1. Assets: Assets are items of value that are owned by the company. Items that can be listed under assets include cash, equipment, real estate, etc. 2. Liabilities: These are items that decrease the net worth of the business. In other words, liabilities are what the company owes other companies, individuals, or investors. Liabilities include items such as accounts payable, long term and short term loans, etc. 3. Equities: These refer to cash or cash equivalents that are used to represent the ownership of the company. The term equity, as used in accounting, determines the value of the company and its ownership. 4. Revenues: Revenue is one component of financial statements that mainly appears on the income sheet and the cash flow statement. Revenue represents all the money that is earned by a business over a given trading period. The revenue of a business can vary from one accounting period to another. The revenue of a business determines the net income of business after expenses have subtracted. 5. Expenses: The expenses of a business are usually used in preparing the income sheet and the cash flow statement. Expenses represent the ways a company uses its funds. Among the expenses include direct expenses such as the cost of goods sold and indirect expenses such as rent and taxes.

For anyone looking to successfully learn how to invest in shares, they must also include a plan for creating and sustaining long-term profitability. This is a crucial stage, which is overlooked by many, and is how those who are profitable investors get the job done. We educate our clients, so they can enjoy long terms success in markets, enabling them to truly build wealth, based on a consistent process, that has comprehensive professional risk management, allowing our clients the opportunity to enjoy peace of mind and profitability.

McCulley was an economist who worked at a giant investment firm called PIMCO. He looked out across this world of money-market funds and asset-backed commercial paper and said: this is not just a bunch of arcane investment vehicles. It’s an entire banking system that nobody quite recognizes as a banking system. A bank borrows money from depositors, who can ask for their money back at any time. Then the bank turns around and makes long-term loans. The fundamental bank thing that the bank is doing is borrowing short-term and lending long-term. The money-market funds and asset-backed commercial paper markets were doing the same thing: taking money that investors could demand at a moment’s notice and turning around and lending it out. In the shadows of the regulated banking system, a whole new system of quasi-banks had sprung up. And now there was a problem.

Some of you may view your investment policies on a shorter term basis. For your convenience, we include our usual table indicating the gains from compounding $100,000 at various rates: This table indicates the financial advantages of: 1. A long life (in the erudite vocabulary of the financial sophisticate this is referred to as the Methuselah Technique) 2. A high compound rate 3. A combination of both (especially recommended by this author) To be observed are the enormous benefits produced by relatively small gains in the annual earnings rate. This explains our attitude which while hopeful of achieving a striking margin of superiority over average investment results, nevertheless, regards every percentage point of investment return above average as having real meaning.

Bezos even implores potential investors to avoid investing in Amazon if their investment philosophy is inconsistent with long-term thinking. And he did so right in the 1997 Letter to Shareholders, written at a time when most startup companies were virtually begging for investors.

So, if the company is better positioned today than it was a year ago, why is the stock price so much lower than it was a year ago? As the famed investor Benjamin Graham said, “In the short term, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term, it’s a weighing machine.” Clearly there was a lot of voting going on in the boom year of ’99—and much less weighing. We’re a company that wants to be weighed, and over time, we will be—over the long term, all companies are. In the meantime, we have our heads down working to build a heavier and heavier company.

Precious metals are a little better than cash but still a terrible investment from a long-term investor’s perspective.

The long-term increase in the stock market is entirely the result of the increase in long-term dividends and earnings growth of the companies that make up the market. How much investors are willing to pay for those earnings and dividends will change constantly. Much of these fluctuations have to do with speculation, but most of them have to do with the fact that investors are constantly projecting out the recent past into an uncertain future. That doesn't mean the odds are stacked against individual investors; just the ones who are unable to control their emotions.

The market’s long-term trajectory is upward, which is the only direction the market can go over a long period.

The advantage of the information-bias in favor of professional money-managers and large investors is almost irrelevant for a long-term investor.

Graham’s criterion of financial strength still works: If you build a diversified basket of stocks whose current assets are at least double their current liabilities, and whose long-term debt does not exceed working capital, you should end up with a group of conservatively financed companies with plenty of staying power.

Bubbles do their damage when long-term investors playing one game start taking their cues from those short-term traders playing another.

This verity is well worth remembering: the securities might be unrelated, but the same investors owned them, implicitly linking them in times of stress. And when armies of financial soldiers were involved in the same securities, borders shrank. The very concept of safety through diversification—the basis of Long-Term’s own security—would merit rethinking.

Having gained a deeper sense of who I am, I’ve also stopped worrying about trying to get the best returns. I’m more comfortable aiming for decent returns that beat the market indexes over the long term despite my personal limitations.

Successful leaders understand their image reflects what and who they are as opposed to what they plan to become. If you would like to be known as a sustainable organization, there are four things you can do. Think and act in ways that support long-term viability and ESG ideals. Help stakeholders understand how you think and act. Help stakeholders see how you think and act. Continuously reinforce all of the above with stakeholders.

Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business’. On the subject of For how long should an investor hold the shares they buy, Warren Buffett, in 1988’s Berkshire Hathaway’s letters to shareholders stated, ‘When we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favourite holding period is forever.

The lessons we should have learned about excess leverage from the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management were ignored. Ten years later, history repeated on a worldwide scale when loose regulation and high leverage led to the near-collapse of the entire financial system in 2008. As part of the overall meltdown, hedge fund assets fell from $2 trillion to $1.4 trillion from losses and withdrawal of capital. Hedge funds were now a mature asset class. I predicted to The Wall Street Journal that any edge for investors would gradually disappear.

Hence, after this foreshortened discussion of the major considerations, we once again enunciate the same basic compromise policy for defensive investors—namely that at all times they have a significant part of their funds in bond-type holdings and a significant part also in equities. It is still true that they may choose between maintaining a simple 50–50 division between the two components or a ratio, dependent on their judgment, varying between a minimum of 25% and a maximum of 75% of either. We shall give our more detailed view of these alternative policies in a later chapter. Since at present the overall return envisaged from common stocks is nearly the same as that from bonds, the presently expectable return (including growth of stock values) for the investor would change little regardless of how he divides his fund between the two components. As calculated above, the aggregate return from both parts should be about 7.8% before taxes or 5.5% on a tax-free (or estimated tax-paid) basis. A return of this order is appreciably higher than that realized by the typical conservative investor over most of the long-term past. It may not seem attractive in relation to the 14%, or so, return shown by common stocks during the 20 years of the predominantly bull market after 1949. But it should be remembered that between 1949 and 1969 the price of the DJIA had advanced more than fivefold while its earnings and dividends had about doubled. Hence the greater part of the impressive market record for that period was based on a change in investors’ and speculators’ attitudes rather than in underlying corporate values. To that extent it might well be called a “bootstrap operation.” In

P2 - We are well on the way in a number of areas. Both billionaires and big Pharma are getting increasingly interested and money is starting to pour into research because it is clear we can see the light at the end of the tunnel which to investors equates to return on investment. Numerous factors will drive things forward and interest and awareness is increasing rapidly among both scientists, researchers and the general population as well as wealthy philanthropists. The greatest driving force of all is that the baby boomers are aging and this will place increasing demands on healthcare systems. Keep in mind that the average person costs more in medical expenditure in the last year of their life than all the other years put together. Also, the number of workers is declining in most developed countries which means that we need to keep the existing population working and productive as long as possible. Below are a list which are basically all technologies potentially leading to radical life extension with number 5 highlighted which I assume might well be possible in the second half of the century: 1. Biotechnology - e.g stem cell therapies, enhanced autophagy, pharmaceuticals, immunotherapies, etc 2. Nanotechnology - Methods of repairing the body at a cellular and molecular level such as nanobots. 3. Robotics - This could lead to the replacement of increasing numbers of body parts and tends to go hand in hand with AI and whole brain emulation. It can be argued that this is not life extension and that it is a path toward becoming a Cyborg but I don’t share that view because even today we don’t view a quadriplegic as less human if he has four bionic limbs and this will hold true as our technology progresses. 4. Gene Therapies - These could be classified under the first category but I prefer to look at it separately as it could impact the function of the body in very dramatic ways which would suppress genes that negatively impact us and enhance genes which increase our tendency toward longer and healthier lives. 5. Whole brain emulation and mindscaping - This is in effect mind transfer to a non biological host although it could equally apply to uploading the brain to a new biological brain created via tissue engineering this has the drawback that if the original brain continues to exist the second brain would have a separate existence in other words whilst you are identical at the time of upload increasing divergence over time will be inevitable but it means the consciousness could never die provided it is appropriately backed up. So what is the chance of success with any of these? My answer is that in order for us to fail to achieve radical life extension by the middle of the century requires that all of the above technologies must also fail to progress which simply won't happen and considering the current rate of development which is accelerating exponentially and then factoring in that only one or two of the above are needed to achieve life extension (although the end results would differ greatly) frankly I can’t see how we can fail to make enough progress within 10-20 years to add at least 20 to 30 years to current life expectancy from which point progress will rapidly accelerate due to increased funding turning aging at the very least into a manageable albeit a chronic incurable condition until the turn of the 22nd century. We must also factor in that there is also a possibility that we could find a faster route if a few more technologies like CRISPR were to be developed. Were that to happen things could move forward very rapidly. In the short term I'm confident that we will achieve significant positive results within a year or two in research on mice and that the knowledge acquired will then be transferred to humans within around a decade. According to ADG, a dystopian version of the post-aging world like in the film 'In Time' not plausible in the real world: "If you CAREFULLY watch just the first

Is the CEO allocating capital in a rational way that will enhance the company’s long-term value? Is the company underpaying its employees, mistreating its suppliers, violating its customers’ trust, or engaging in any other shortsighted behavior that could jeopardize its eventual greatness?

Be passionate about the business but dispassionate about the stock. Celebrate the big successes of your businesses and reflect on failures. A true feeling of ownership gives an investor the conviction to hold. When you think like a business owner, you no longer view stocks as pieces of paper or buy them with “target prices” in mind. Instead, you view stocks as part ownership in a business and you want to savor the journey alongside the promoters. As companies grow larger and more profitable, their stockholders share in the increased profits and dividends. Invest for the long term. Live fully today. Every day, millions of hardworking people around the world are doing great things at so many companies. As investors, we are thankful.

Here are some quick considerations for the intelligent investor: Is the “net pension benefit” more than 5% of the company’s net income? (If so, would you still be comfortable with the company’s other earnings if those pension gains went away in future years?) Is the assumed “long-term rate of return on plan assets” reasonable? (As of 2003, anything above 6.5% is implausible, while a rising rate is downright delusional.)

When there's a sale on eggs or chicken, we're happy- but when the stock market gets cheaper, we think it's bad. (Long-term investors should love when the market drops: You can buy more shares for the same price.)p97

When Wimdu launched, the Samwers reached out to Airbnb to discuss combining forces, as they had done with Groupon and eBay to facilitate a speedy exit. Discussions ensued between Airbnb and Wimdu cofounders and investors—meeting multiple times, touring the Wimdu offices, and checking with other founders like Andrew Mason from Groupon to best understand the potential outcome. In the end, Airbnb chose to fight. Brian Chesky described his thought process: My view was, my biggest punishment, my biggest revenge on you is, I’m gonna make you run this company long term. So you had the baby, now you gotta raise the child. And you’re stuck with it for 18 years. Because I knew he wanted to sell the company. I knew he could move faster than me for a year, but he wasn’t gonna keep doing it. And so that was our strategy. And we built the company long term. And the ultimate way we won is, we had a better community. He couldn’t understand community. And I think we had a better product.82 To do this, the company would mobilize their product teams to rapidly improve their support for international regions. Jonathan Golden, the first product manager at Airbnb, described their efforts: Early on, Airbnb’s listing experience was basic. You filled out forms, uploaded 1 photo—usually not professional—and editing the listing after the fact was hard. The mobile app in the early days was lightweight, where you could only browse but not book. There were a lot of markets in those days with just 1 or 2 listings. Booking only supported US dollars, so it catered towards American travelers only, and for hosts, they could get money out via a bank transfer to an American bank via ACH, or PayPal. We needed to get from this skeleton of a product into something that could work internationally if we wanted to fend off Wimdu. We internationalized the product, translating it into all the major languages. We went from supporting 1 currency to adding 32. We bought all the local domains, like airbnb.co.uk for the UK website and airbnb.es for Spain. It was important to move quickly to close off the opportunity in Europe.83 Alongside the product, the fastest way to fight on Wimdu’s turf was to quickly scale up paid marketing in Europe using Facebook, Google, and other channels to augment the company’s organic channels, built over years. Most important, Airbnb finally pulled the trigger on putting boots on the ground—hiring Martin Reiter, the company’s first head of international, and also partnering with Springstar, a German incubator and peer of Rocket Internet’s, to accelerate their international expansion.

While the rich became richer, the taxation policy of the government, instead of correcting this trend, actively strengthened it. One of the first decisions of the first Modi government was to abolish the wealth tax that had been introduced in 1957. While the fiscal resources generated by this tax were never significant, the decision was more than a symbolic one.126 The wealth tax was replaced with an income tax increase of 2 percent for households that earned more than Rs 10 million (133,333 USD) annually.127 Few people pay income tax in India anyway: only 14.6 million people (2 percent of the population) did in 2019. As a result, the income-tax-to-GDP ratio remained below 11 percent. Not only has the Modi government not tried to introduce any reforms to change this, but it has instead increased indirect taxes (such as excise taxes), which are the most unfair as they affect everyone, irrespective of income. Taxes on alcohol and petroleum products are a case in point. As some state governments have also imposed their own taxes, this strategy means that India has one of the highest taxation rates on fuel in the world. The share of indirect taxes in the state’s fiscal resources has increased under the Modi government to reach 50 percent of the total taxes—compared to 39 percent under UPA I and 44 percent under UPA II.128 Modi’s taxation policy, a supply-side economics approach, is in keeping with the managerial rhetoric of promoting the spirit of enterprise that the prime minister, who readily presents himself as an efficiency-conscious “apolitical CEO,” relishes. One of the neoliberal measures the Modi government enacted in the name of economic rationality, right from his very first budget in 2015, was to lower the corporate tax.129 For existing companies it was reduced from 30 to 22 percent, and for manufacturing firms incorporated after October 1, 2019 that started operations before March 31, 2023, it was reduced from 25 to 15 percent—the biggest reduction in twenty-eight years. In addition to these tax reductions, the government withdrew the enhanced surcharge on long- and short-term capital gains for foreign portfolio investors as well as domestic portfolio investors.130

s. These seven steps helped us find our own financial Fast Track, and we continue to use them today. I trust they can assist you in charting your own course to financial freedom. To do so, you must be true to yourself. If you are not yet a long-term investor, get yourself there as fast as you can. What does this mean? Sit down and map out a plan to get control of your spending habits. Minimize your debt and liabilities. Live within your means, and then expand your means. Find out how much money invested per month, for how many months, at a realistic rate of return it will take to reach your goals of retiring, creating cash flow, and gaining financial freedom. Simply having a long-term plan that reduces your consumer debt while putting away a small amount of money regularly will give you a head start if you start early enough and keep an eye on what you are doing. At this level, keep it simple. Don’t get fancy

In the stock market, the shares that are most popular and familiar to investors change hands more often, and that, in turn, attracts still more attention to these stocks as they turn up in the day’s list of “most active shares.” Because of all that extra exposure, the stocks with the highest trading volume have higher returns in the short run—but, in the long term, they tend to underperform by two to five percentage points per year. In the stock market, which is a game of inches, that’s a country mile.

Let’s say, for example, that you figure you’re 25% better than average at picking stocks, and you think you can earn 15% a year on your portfolio. That sounds realistic enough—until you consider the third question. The long-term average annual return on the Standard & Poor’s 500 index of blue-chip stocks is 10.4%. If, however, you adjust that number for the cash that people added to and subtracted from their portfolios, the average return drops to just 8.6% annually since 1926. Factor in taxes, trading costs, and inflation, and the annual return of the typical investor drops below 4%. If you really are 25% better than average, you shouldn’t expect to earn much more than 5% annually after all your costs. You still might be able to earn 15% a year—if you are at least three times better than average. Only by asking all three questions can you tell just how crazy your inner con man is.

While most people would say they want a great life, they rarely plan beyond the current year. As a result, they choose a financial model that fits only their short-term goals, and that financial shortsightedness can be devastating to their long-term dreams.

A successful investor is one who holds on for the long term and continues to monitor the fundamental story, and if it remains in place you stay, and if not you move on.

inaction and patience are almost always the wisest options for investors in the stock market. For the same reason, I find it better not to check the performance of my stocks every day (or, for that matter, every week) since this makes it harder to keep a long-term focus.

Mark Twain defined a classic as something everyone wants to have read and nobody wants to read. One classic that deserves the attention of all investors is John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, and more specifically chapter 12, “The State of Long-Term Expectation.” Expectations are embedded in all the decisions we make, especially investment decisions, but we rarely step back and consider how and why we form our expectations. Keynes guides this reflection.

While weather forecasters and handicappers get accurate and timely feedback, long-term investors don’t. Maybe one day we’ll create a simulator that provides investors the training they need to make better decisions. Of course, the result will be markets that are even harder to beat.

Which brings me to the second reason I detest any debt. This answer is often underappreciated and even ignored by investors and management. It is this: Debt diminishes strategic flexibility and hence long-term value creation. For a day trader or even an investor whose holding period ranges from three to five years, a reasonable amount of leverage may not matter. But for a permanent owner like Nalanda, any constraint that prevents a business from taking calculated strategic bets is undesirable.

Many have been supposedly foolproof but zany formulae that have made no one rich but the hucksters who sold them to the gullible. But over the years there have been some approaches that have enjoyed at least a modicum of success. These range from the Dow Theory first espoused by Wall Street Journal founder Charles Dow—essentially using technical indicators to try to identify and profit from different market phases—and David Butler’s CANSLIM system, to the value investing school articulated by Benjamin Graham. The earth-shattering suggestion of the research conducted in the 1960s and 1970s was that the code might actually be unbreakable, and efforts to decipher it were expensive and futile. Harry Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory and William Sharpe’s CAPM indicated that the market itself was the optimal balance between risks and return, while Gene Fama presented a cohesive, compelling argument for why that was: The net effect of the efforts of thousands upon thousands of investors continually trying to outsmart each other was that the stock market was efficient, and in practice hard to beat. Most investors should therefore just sit on their hands and buy the entire market. But in the 1980s and 1990s, a new round of groundbreaking research—some of it from the same efficient-markets disciples who had rattled the investing world in the 1960s and 1970s—started revealing some fault lines in the academic edifice built up in the previous decades. Perhaps the stock market wasn’t entirely efficient, and maybe there were indeed ways to beat it in the long run? Some gremlins in the system were always known, but often glossed over. Already in the early 1970s, Black and Scholes had noted that there were some odd issues with the theory, such as how less volatile stocks actually produced better long-term returns than choppier ones. That contradicted the belief that return and risk (using volatility as a proxy for risk) were correlated. In other words, loopier roller coasters produce greater thrills. Though the theory made intuitive sense, in practice it didn’t seem to hold up to rigorous scrutiny. This is why Scholes and Black initially proposed that Wells Fargo should set up a fund that would buy lower-volatility stocks (that is, low-beta) and use leverage to bring the portfolio’s overall volatility up to the broader stock market.7 Hey, presto, a roller coaster with the same number of loops as everyone else, but with even greater thrills. Nonetheless, the efficient-markets hypothesis quickly became dogma at business schools around the United States.

Ross’s “arbitrage pricing theory” and Rosenberg’s “bionic betas” posited that the returns of any financial security are the result of several systematic factors. Although seemingly stating the obvious, this was a seminal moment in the move toward a more vibrant understanding of markets. The eclectic Rosenberg was even put on the cover of Institutional Investor in May 1978, the bald, mustachioed man depicted as a giant meditating guru with flowers in his hair, worshipped by a gathering of besuited portfolio managers. The headline was “Who Is Barr Rosenberg? And What the Hell Is He Talking About?”8 What he was talking about was how academics were beginning to classify stocks according to not just their industry or their geography, but their financial characteristics. And some of these characteristics might actually prove to deliver better long-term returns than the broader stock market. In 1973, Sanjoy Basu, a finance professor at McMaster University in Ontario, published a paper that indicated that companies with low stock prices relative to their earnings did better than the efficient-markets hypothesis would suggest. Essentially, he showed that the value investing principles espoused by Benjamin Graham in the 1930s—which revolved around buying cheap, out-of-favor stocks trading below their intrinsic worth—was a durable investment factor. By systematically buying all cheap stocks, investors could in theory beat the broader market over time. Then Banz showed the same for small caps, another big moment in the evolution of factor investing. Follow-up studies on smaller stocks in Japan and the UK showed similar results, so in 1986 DFA launched dedicated small-cap funds for those two markets as well. In the early 1990s, finance professors Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Sheridan Titman published a paper indicating that simply surfing market momentum—in practice buying stocks that were already bouncing and selling those that were sliding—could also produce market-beating returns.9 The reasons for these apparent anomalies divide academics. Efficient-markets disciples stipulate that they are the compensation investors receive for taking extra risks. Value stocks, for example, are often found in beaten-up, unpopular, and shunned companies, such as boring industrial conglomerates in the middle of the dotcom bubble. While they can underperform for long stretches, eventually their underlying worth shines through and rewards investors who kept the faith. Small stocks do well largely because small companies are more likely to fail than bigger ones. Behavioral economists, on the other hand, argue that factors tend to be the product of our irrational human biases. For example, just like how we buy pricey lottery tickets for the infinitesimal chance of big wins, investors tend to overpay for fast-growing, glamorous stocks, and unfairly shun duller, steadier ones. Smaller stocks do well because we are illogically drawn to names we know well. The momentum factor, on the other hand, works because investors initially underreact to news but overreact in the long run, or often sell winners too quickly and hang on to bad bets for far longer than is advisable.

Whatever the reason, the existence of some persistent investment factors is today accepted by almost every (if not all) financial economist and investor. In an ingenious bit of marketing, factors are often called “smart beta.” Sharpe himself grew to hate the term, as it implies that all other forms of beta are dumb.10 Most financial academics prefer the term “risk premia,” to more accurately reflect the fact that they think these factors primarily yield an investment premium from taking some kind of risk—even if they cannot always agree what the precise risk is. An important milestone was when Fama and his frequent collaborator Ken French—another Chicago finance professor who would later also join DFA—in 1992 published a paper with the oblique title “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.”11 It was a bombshell. In what would become known as the three-factor model, Fama and French used data on companies listed on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange, and the Nasdaq from 1963 to 1990 and showed that both value (the tendency of cheap stocks to outperform expensive ones) and size (the tendency of smaller stocks to outperform bigger ones) were distinct factors from the broader market factor—the beta. Although Fama and French’s paper termed these factors as rewards for taking extra risks, coming from the father of the efficient-markets hypothesis, it was a signal event in the history of financial economics.12 Since then academics have identified a panoply of factors, with varying degrees of durability, strength, and acceptance. Of course, factors do not always work. They can go through long fallow stretches where they underperform the market. Value stocks, for example, suffered a miserable bout of performance in the dotcom bubble, when investors wanted to buy only trendy technology stocks. And to DFA’s chagrin, after small caps enjoyed a robust year in DFA’s first year of existence, they would then undergo a long, painful seven-year period of trailing dramatically behind the S&P 500.13 DFA managed to keep growing, losing very few clients, partly because it had always stressed to them that stretches like this could happen. But it was an uncomfortable period that led to many awkward conversations with clients.

The takeaway from these studies is simple. Broad diversification is the only guaranteed way to approximate the superior returns that stocks have historically offered investors. Putting together a narrow portfolio of stocks may be a big winner, but usually is a loser.

Raising capital. Organisations like Rio Tinto, TomTom and GKN have all raised significant sums through the equity markets. Refinancing debt. Some companies, like Yell and Schaeffler, have rolled over billions in bank finance. However, many businesses are still finding banks reluctant to lend and have turned to bond issuance as an alternative. Divestment. Companies can sell off valuable assets, such as Barclays did with Barclays Global Investors, and it is always better to do so before a crisis; otherwise it will be seen for the fire sale it is and the price will be a fire-sale price. Furthermore, any sell-off that weakens a firm’s core capability or its long-term competitive position may also shorten its life. Cut costs but not capability The managing uncertainty survey revealed that the most common action that companies took when the financial crisis struck was to cut costs. Some 82% of respondents cut costs. When asked about their future responses to uncertainty, 76% indicated they would continue to focus on cost reduction.

It’s time for everyone to acknowledge that the term “long-term investor” is redundant. A long-term investor is the only kind of investor there is. Someone who can’t hold on to stocks for more than a few months at a time is doomed to end up not as a victor but as a victim.

If your needs are not attainable through safe instruments, the solution is not to increase the rate of return by upping the level of risk. Instead, goals may be revised, savings increased, or income boosted through added years of work. . . . Somebody has to care about the consequences if uncertainty is to be understood as risk. . . . As we’ve seen, the chances of loss do decline over time, but this hardly means that the odds are zero, or negligible, just because the horizon is long. . . . In fact, even though the odds of loss do fall over long periods, the size of potential losses gets larger, not smaller, over time. . . . The message to emerge from all this hype has been inescapable: In the long run, the stock market can only go up. Its ascent is inexorable and predictable. Long-term stock returns are seen as near certain while risks appear minimal, and only temporary. And the messaging has been effective: The familiar market propositions come across as bedrock fact. For the most part, the public views them as scientific truth, although this is hardly the case. It may surprise you, but all this confidence is rather new. Prevailing attitudes and behavior before the early 1980s were different. Fewer people owned stocks then, and the general popular attitude to buying stocks was wariness, not ebullience or complacency. . . . Unfortunately, the American public’s embrace of stocks is not at all related to the spread of sound knowledge. It’s useful to consider how the transition actually evolved—because the real story resists a triumphalist interpretation. . . . Excessive optimism helps explain the popularity of the stocks-for-the-long-run doctrine. The pseudo-factual statement that stocks always succeed in the long run provides an overconfident investor with more grist for the optimistic mill. . . . Speaking with the editors of Forbes.com in 2002, Kahneman explained: “When you are making a decision whether or not to go for something,” he said, “my guess is that knowing the odds won’t hurt you, if you’re brave. But when you are executing, not to be asking yourself at every moment in time whether you will succeed or not is certainly a good thing. . . . In many cases, what looks like risk-taking is not courage at all, it’s just unrealistic optimism. Courage is willingness to take the risk once you know the odds. Optimistic overconfidence means you are taking the risk because you don’t know the odds. It’s a big difference.” Optimism can be a great motivator. It helps especially when it comes to implementing plans. Although optimism is healthy, however, it’s not always appropriate. You would not want rose-colored glasses in a financial advisor, for instance. . . . Over the long haul, the more you are exposed to danger, the more likely it is to catch up with you. The odds don’t exactly add, but they do accumulate. . . . Yet, overriding this instinctive understanding, the prevailing investment dogma has argued just the reverse. The creed that stocks grow steadily safer over time has managed to trump our common-sense assumption by appealing to a different set of homespun precepts. Chief among these is a flawed surmise that, with the passage of time, downward fluctuations are balanced out by compensatory upward swings. Many people believe that each step backward will be offset by more than one step forward. The assumption is that you can own all the upside and none of the downside just by sticking around. . . . If you find yourself rejecting safe investments because they are not profitable enough, you are asking the wrong questions. If you spurn insurance simply because the premiums put a crimp in your returns, you may be destined for disappointment—and possibly loss.

Find out how you can get in touch with investors for a business near you. KrugerInvest provides best investors for your business, who have with you in long term. Meet us personally and we give you a better solution. Call at +49-617420920

Chambers et al. conclude that Keynes had no skill as a market timer. By then, however, the man who had started out as a top-down speculator relying upon his “superior knowledge” to forecast the macroeconomic climate, was behaving more like a bottom-up, fundamental investor who sought solid, dividend-paying stocks with good long-term prospects. His gains came from taking large positions in those securities that had financial statement sheets he could understand, and sold products or services he believed he could assess objectively.

You want to ensure that you bring in the “right” money from people you trust and who believe in the long-term path to building a viable company with you. Too many times, entrepreneurs bring in the “wrong” money, which leads to turmoil (investor pressure, misunderstandings, lawsuits, and a great amount of time dealing with investor expectations) down the road when things are not going well, and often the demise of the company. My

A lot of us asked why we weren't pricing it at a premium. We could have got a premium but Deepak said, "leave money on the table for investors. They will appreciate this in the long term." Today, when we have arguments with our promoters, one of the big lessons I learnt from our float is to price an IPO cheap,' Luis said. 'Should we really scalp the shareholders? This is a start-up company. On what basis are we putting valuations? Today they will put a valuation even on a start-up idea,' Satwalekar was blunt in his assessment.

Groupon is a study of the hazards of pursuing scale and valuation at all costs. In 2010, Forbes called it the “fastest growing company ever” after its founders raised $135 million in funding, giving Groupon a valuation of more than $1 billion after just 17 months.5 The company turned down a $6 billion acquisition offer from Google and went public in 2011 with one of the biggest IPOs since Google’s in 2004.6 It was one of the original unicorns. However, the business model had serious problems. Groupon sometimes sold so many Daily Deals that participating businesses were overwhelmed . . . even crippled. Other businesses accused Groupon of strong-arming them to sign up for Daily Deals. Customers started to view the group discount (the company’s bread and butter) as a sign that a participating business was desperate. Businesses stopped signing up. Journalists suggested that Groupon was prioritizing customer acquisition over retention — growth over value — and that it had gone public before it had a solid, proven business model.7 Groupon is still a player, with just over $3 billion in annual revenue in 2015. But its stock has fallen from $26 a share to about $4 today, and it has withdrawn from many international markets. Also revealing is that the company is suing IBM for patent infringement, something that will not create customer value.8 Many promising startups have paid the price for rushing to scale. We can see clues to potential future failures in the recent “down rounds” (stock purchases priced at a lower valuation than those of previous investors) hitting companies like Foursquare, Gilt Group, Jet, Jawbone, and Technorati. In their rush to build scale, executives and founders search for shortcuts to sustainable, long-term revenue growth.

With that said, if you were to be a long-term investor in Ethereum, you have to focus on the long-term timeline, with short-term volatility being a necessary even to find traction within the market, and for value to solidify. Thus, if you believe that the demand for Ethereum will be higher in one, two, five, or ten years (your duration in which you plan to hold), then you need not worry about the fluctuations that occur in the interim. Let’s

Another great resource is podcasts, but these generally take time to sift through. I think the best all-around podcast comes from the heavyweights at Andreessen Horowitz (stylized as “a16z”). The a16z podcast has become a true force in understanding any given sector through interviews with thought leaders and great entrepreneurs in their space. I began to develop an interest in the bitcoin blockchain protocol, how it works, and if a blockchain network independent of bitcoin (or any other currency) could really exist in the long-term. Aside from the incredible reporting and research coming out of the CoinDesk news site, there seems to be no better resource than a16z’s interview with the CEO of Chain, Adam Ludwin. In a16z’s “Blockchain vs./ and Bitcoin,” Adam explained what bitcoin is, its limitations, and how blockchain can prosper and create decentralized networks for other financial instruments and stores of value like merchant-issued currency (gift card transfer), airtime on a mobile phone, energy credits on a grid and even tokens for machine-to-machine communication as we enter into the internet-of-things (IoT) and the autonomous vehicle era. The Product Hunt, Rocketship.fm and Accidental Creative podcasts are also not bad places to start.

The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance With the acquisition of General Re — and with GEICO’s business mushrooming — it becomes more important than ever that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most important of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors. To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money. A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones. The table that follows shows the float generated by Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 32 years ago. The data are for every fifth year and also the last, which includes General Re’s huge float. For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)

Getting to fifty-fifty is incredibly complex and nuanced, requiring many detailed solutions that will take decades to fully play out. To accelerate the process, change needs to start at the top. Like Stewart Butterfield, CEOs need to make hiring and retaining women an explicit priority. In addition, here is the bare minimum of what we can do at an individual and a systemic level: First of all, people, be nice to each other. Treat one another with respect and dignity, including those of the opposite sex.That should be pretty simple. Don’t enable assholes. Stop making excuses for bad behavior, or ignoring it. CEOs must embrace and champion the need to reach a fair representation of gender within their companies, and develop a comprehensive plan to get there. Be long-term focused, not short-term. It may take three weeks to find a white man for the job, but three months to find a woman. Those three months could save three years of playing catch-up in the future. Invest in not just diversity but inclusion. Even if your company is small, everything counts. And take the time to educate your employees about why this is important. Companies need to appoint more women to their boards. And boards need to hold company leadership to account to get to fifty-fifty in their employee ranks, starting with company executives. Venture capital firms need to hire more women partners, and limited partners should pressure them to do so and, at the very least, ask them what their plans around diversity are. Investors, both men and women, need to start funding more women and diverse teams, period. LPs need to fund more women VCs, who can establish new firms with new cultural norms. Stop funding partnerships that look and act the same. Most important, stop blaming everybody else for the problem or pretending that it is too hard for us to solve. It’s time to look in the mirror. This is an industry, after all, that prides itself on disruption and revolutionary new ways of thinking. Let’s put that spirit of innovation and embrace of radical change to good use. Seeing a more inclusive workforce in Silicon Valley will encourage more girls and women studying computer science now.

Skilled investors can maximize their long-term performance by maximizing the margin of safety of each stock held in the portfolio, which is to say, by concentrating on the best ideas. To be “skilled,” an investor must be able to identify which stocks are more undervalued than others, and then construct a portfolio containing only the most undervalued stocks. In doing so, investors take on the risk that an unforeseeable event leads to an unrecoverable loss in the intrinsic value of any single holding, perhaps through financial distress or fraud. This unrecoverable diminution in intrinsic value is referred to in the value investing literature as a permanent impairment of capital, and it is the most important consideration for value investors. Value investors distinguish the partial or total diminution in the firm’s underlying value, which is a risk to be considered, from a mere drop in the share price, no matter how significant the drop may be, which is an event to be ignored or exploited. The extent to which the portfolio value is impacted by a portfolio holding suffering a permanent impairment of capital will depend on the size of the holding relative to the portfolio value—the bigger the holding, the greater the impact on the portfolio. Thus the more concentrated an investor becomes, the greater the need to understand individual holdings. Says Buffett of the “know-something” investor:28 [If] you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to 10 sensibly priced companies that possess important

however, the round trip was a very long one (fourteen months was in fact well below the average). It was also hazardous: of twenty-two ships that set sail in 1598, only a dozen returned safely. For these reasons, it made sense for merchants to pool their resources. By 1600 there were around six fledgling East India companies operating out of the major Dutch ports. However, in each case the entities had a limited term that was specified in advance – usually the expected duration of a voyage – after which the capital was repaid to investors.10 This business model could not suffice to build the permanent bases and fortifications that were clearly necessary if the Portuguese and their Spanish allies* were to be supplanted. Actuated as much by strategic calculations as by the profit motive, the Dutch States-General, the parliament of the United Provinces, therefore proposed to merge the existing companies into a single entity. The result was the United East India Company – the Vereenigde Nederlandsche Geoctroyeerde Oostindische Compagnie (United Dutch Chartered East India Company, or VOC for short), formally chartered in 1602 to enjoy a monopoly on all Dutch trade east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Straits of Magellan.11 The structure of the VOC was novel in a number of respects. True, like its predecessors, it was supposed to last for a fixed period, in this case twenty-one years; indeed, Article 7 of its charter stated that investors would be entitled to withdraw their money at the end of just ten years, when the first general balance was drawn up. But the scale of the enterprise was unprecedented. Subscription to the Company’s capital was open to all residents of the United Provinces and the charter set no upper limit on how much might be raised. Merchants, artisans and even servants rushed to acquire shares; in Amsterdam alone there were 1,143 subscribers, only eighty of whom invested more than 10,000 guilders, and 445 of whom invested less than 1,000. The amount raised, 6.45 million guilders, made the VOC much the biggest corporation of the era. The capital of its English rival, the East India Company, founded two years earlier, was just £68,373 – around 820,000 guilders – shared between a mere 219 subscribers.12 Because the VOC was a government-sponsored enterprise, every effort was made to overcome the rivalry between the different provinces (and particularly between Holland, the richest province, and Zeeland). The capital of the Company was divided (albeit unequally) between six regional chambers (Amsterdam, Zeeland, Enkhuizen, Delft, Hoorn and Rotterdam). The seventy directors (bewindhebbers), who were each substantial investors, were also distributed between these chambers. One of their roles was to appoint seventeen people to act as the Heeren XVII – the Seventeen Lords – as a kind of company board. Although Amsterdam accounted for 57.4 per cent of the VOC’s total capital, it nominated only eight out of the Seventeen Lords.

In February 2017, the Institute of International Finance reported that capital flows to emerging markets remained flat, at around US$680 billion, with high downside risks for FDI. Financial market expectations for interest rate hikes in the United States are a contributing factor to weakness in capital flows destined for the emerging markets, as investors look to gain from higher-interest-rate environments. However, the anemic economic growth conditions across the developing world also lower the opportunity for returns and hurt capital inflows. The softness in capital flows to emerging economies could prove more damaging in the long term as the prospects for economic growth continue to wane. Already the world’s largest and most strategically vital emerging nations—such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey—are only growing at 3 percent or less a year. Ever more damning is the implication of the IMF’s October 2014 “World Economic Outlook” that the world will never again see the rates of growth witnessed prior to 2007.12 This weak economic backdrop comports with a weak capital inflow story. According to the Reserve Bank of Australia, the movement of money through the financial system has been stagnant over the past decade. In dollar terms, cross-border capital inflows among the G20 economies have fallen nearly 70 percent since mid-2007.13 Ultimately, slow economic growth leads to decreased investment, which in turns leads to even slower growth.

Entry and exit points are vital parts of trading and investing. That is worth repeating.  Entry and Exit points are vital parts of Trading and Investing. Whether you are Day Trading, Swing Trading, or are a Long Term Investor. Why would you ever buy a stock at the wrong time? Unfortunately, there are many market participants with no training that do it every day.

Entry and exit points are vital parts of trading and investing. That is worth repeating.  Entry and Exit points are vital parts of Trading and Investing. Whether you are Day Trading, Swing Trading, or are a Long Term Investor. Why would you ever buy a stock at the wrong time? Unfortunately, there are many market participants with no training that do it every day. The Pros love the uninformed, the novices, and the Pigs. Who else are they going to sell to when a stock has reached a resistance point, or reached an all time high? You guessed it. They are going to sell to the novices and the pigs who are hoping for more advance. Then when the stock drops, falls to support, or finds support somewhere, the Pros will buy it back from the novice who has just taken a loss and a beating. “The time to buy is when blood is running in the streets” ~Baron Rothschild

A long-term temperament as well as long-term circumstances A Japanese man went into a bank to change some Japanese notes into sterling. He was surprised at how little he got. “Please explain,” he said to the cashier. “Yesterday I was changing same yen for sterling and I received many more sterling. Why is this?” The cashier shrugged his shoulders. “Fluctuations,” he explained. The Japanese man was aghast. “And fluck you bloody Europeans too,” he responded, grabbed the notes, and walked out. Fluctuations matter if the money could be needed soon. Money invested in equities must not be money which will be wanted in a year or two, or might be urgently wanted at any time, because there is a fair chance that the moment when it is needed will be a bad one for the stock market and the investor will therefore be selling at low prices. If investors think they might need the money soon, the message is clearly stay away: the chance of a minus return is just too great. Even if investors are in a position to allocate a fair amount to equities, they should not necessarily do so. It is not enough that the circumstances are right. Investors need to be temperamentally inclined to the sort of long-term investment which equities are. Long-termness must be subjective as well as objective. The fact that the circumstances of a particular investor might objectively lead to a certain viewpoint does not mean that he or she necessarily has that viewpoint. A baby is in an objective position to take a long-term view, but will not actually look beyond the next feeding-time.

different meanings of safety to different investors. For someone needing a lump of money in a year’s time, the only safe investment is a cash deposit or a short-term government bond. For someone with no imminent need of the money and a desire to accumulate capital and increase purchasing power in the long-term, it may be safer to invest in equities – volatile but with the historic and likely future characteristic of a high return after inflation – than to put money on deposit with the risk that over the years the real value of the investment will be eroded by inflation.

There is a good reason why stocks are not reacting to Fed policy as they have in the past. Investors have become so geared to watching and anticipating Fed policy that the effect of its tightening and easing is already discounted in the market. If investors expect the Fed to stabilize the economy, this will be built into stock prices long before the Fed even begins to take its stabilizing actions.

It took just over 15 years to recover the money invested at the 1929 peak, following a crash far worse than Smith had ever examined. And since World War II, the recovery period for stocks has been even better. Even including the recent financial crisis, which saw the worst bear market since the 1930s, the longest it has ever taken an investor to recover an original investment in the stock market (including reinvested dividends) was the five-year, eight-month period from August 2000 through April 2006.

In fact, for someone in the highest tax bracket, short-term Treasury bills have yielded a negative after-tax real return since 1871, even lower if state and local taxes are taken into account. In contrast, top-bracket taxable investors would have increased their purchasing power in stocks 288-fold over the same period.

The government can put dividends on the same tax basis as capital gains if the tax authorities allow investors to obtain a tax deferral on reinvested dividends until the stock is sold.

a declining Dow gives us our chance to shine and pile up the percentage advantages which, coupled with only an average performance during advancing markets, will give us quite satisfactory long-term results. Our target is an approximately ½% decline for each 1% decline in the Dow and if achieved, means we have a considerably more conservative vehicle for investment in stocks than practically any alternative.8 Buffett

I learned an important lesson—that the value of the stock is not the same as the underlying value of the company. The stock goes up and down according to the whims and wiles of Wall Street. The value of the company depends on elements that contribute to the creation of real value—things like providing superior products at fair prices. You need to be learning and innovating, giving your people interesting, motivating work and compensating them fairly, creating value for your community, and doing it all in a way that yields a good profit. That’s not what much of Wall Street values, but it’s what creates long-term value for investors.

In value investing, you must grasp the fact that a security will probably go down further after you buy it. Trying to time the market is a fool’s errand. Very few have been able to time the market consistently over the long-term. As an investor, you can look very silly for a long period of time before ultimately being proven correct.

South-east Asia’s high savings rates, most of which flowed into bank deposits, lent themselves to outsize banking systems, which invited godfather abuse. There is, in turn, a pretty direct line from the insider manipulation of regional banks to the Asian financial crisis. The ‘over-banked’ nature of south-east Asia also helps explain a conundrum that has occupied some of the region’s equity investors: why, despite heady economic growth, have long-term stock market returns in south-east Asia been so poor? Since 1993, when a flood of foreign money increased capitalisation in regional markets by around 2.5 times in one calendar year,37 dollar-denominated returns with dividends reinvested (what investors call ‘total’ returns) in every regional market have been lower than those in the mature markets of New York and London, and a fraction of those in other emerging markets in eastern Europe and Latin America.38

In retrospect, I think our view of market expectations was too dependent on our survey of securities dealers. Futures markets gave us a reliable read of where markets thought the federal funds rate was going—but not for our securities purchases. For that, economists at the New York Fed asked their counterparts at the securities firms, who paid careful attention to every nuance of Fed policymakers’ public statements. In effect, our PhD economists surveyed their PhD economists. It was a little like looking in a mirror. It didn’t tell us what the rank-and-file traders were thinking. Many traders, apparently, didn’t pay much attention to their economists and were betting our purchases would continue more or less indefinitely. Some called it “QE-ternity” or “QE-infinity.” Their assumption was unreasonable and entirely inconsistent with what we had been saying. Nevertheless, some investors had evidently established market positions based on it. Now, like Metternich, they looked at our statements about securities purchases and asked, “What do they mean by that?” Their conclusion, despite the plain meaning of what I said at the press conference, was that we were signaling an earlier increase in our federal funds rate target. They sold their Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities, driving up long-term interest rates.

Using his models, his computers look for moments when the short-term traders are moving opposite to the long-term investors-and then he bets that the imbalance will correct itself.

The company made an additional $9.4 billion in Alibaba’s 2014 IPO (Initial Public Offering). 54   Son wasn’t finished yet. He kept his 34.4% stake in Alibaba.  It was worth $57.8 billion at the time of the Initial Public Offering in 2014. He waited for almost 14 years to see the payout and he is still holding on to his shares. He doesn’t need to sell. That is long-term investing at its finest, where one single decision can make all the difference and everything else pale in comparison. The

The rumors were that at least one of the three largest commercial banks would go bankrupt, similar to LTCB (Long Term Capital Bank) a couple of years before, causing a market shock that would reverberate around the world.   I

Peter Bernstein and Robert Arnott reflected on this question in a recent article in the Journal of Portfolio Management: “Bull Market? Bear Market? Should You Really Care?” They concluded that “for most long-term investors, bull markets are not nearly as beneficial, and bear markets not nearly as damaging as most investors seem to think.” They noted, correctly, that “a bull market raises the asset value, but delivers a proportionate reduction in the prospective real yields that the portfolio can deliver from that point forward, while a bear market does the reverse, reducing portfolio value, which is largely offset by an increase in prospective yields, other things being equal.

In the competitive world of money management, performance is measured not by absolute returns but the returns relative to some benchmark. For stocks these benchmarks include the S&P 500 Index, the Wilshire 5000, global stock indexes, or the latest “style” indexes popular on Wall Street. But there is a crucially important difference about investing compared with virtually any other competitive activity: Most of us have no chance of being as good as the group of individuals who practice for hours to hone their skills. But anyone can be as good as the average investor in the stock market with no practice at all. The

So the twentieth century has seen three severe drops in stock prices, one of them catastrophic. The message to the average investor is brutally clear: expect at least one, and perhaps two, very severe bear markets during your investing career. Long-term

During bull markets, everyone believes that he is committed to stocks for the long term. Unfortunately, history also tells us that during bear markets, you can hardly give stocks away. Most investors are simply not capable of withstanding the vicissitudes of an all-stock investment strategy. The

A major advantage of indexing is that index funds are tax efficient. Actively managed funds can create large tax liabilities if you hold them outside your tax-advantaged retirement plans. To the extent that your funds generate capital gains from their portfolio turnover, this active trading creates taxable income for you. And short-term capital gains are taxed at ordinary income tax rates that can go well over 50 percent when state income taxes are considered. Index funds, in contrast, are long-term buy-and-hold investors and typically do not generate significant capital gains or taxable income. To

The right response to a fall in the price of one asset class is never to panic and sell out. Rather, you need the long-term discipline and personal fortitude to buy more. Remember: The lower stock prices go, the better the bargains if you are truly a long-term investor. Sharp market declines may make rebalancing appear a frustrating “way to lose even more money.” But in the long run, investors who rebalance their portfolios in a disciplined way are well rewarded.

As we saw earlier, over half of UK ordinary shares are owned by “rest of the world” investors. The notion of “social responsibility” applies to a particular society, and it is not clear that overseas shareholders have a long-term commitment to the country in which they are investing.

Mutual fund investors, too, have inflated ideas of their own omniscience. They pick funds based on the recent performance superiority of fund managers, or even their long-term superiority, and hire advisers to help them do the same thing. But, the advisers do it with even less success (see Chapters 8, 9, and 10). Oblivious of the toll taken by costs, fund investors willingly pay heavy sales loads and incur excessive fund fees and expenses, and are unknowingly subjected to the substantial but hidden transaction costs incurred by funds as a result of their hyperactive portfolio turnover. Fund investors are confident that they can easily select superior fund managers. They are wrong.

The message is clear: in the long run, stock returns depend almost entirely on the reality of the investment returns earned by our corporations. The perception of investors, reflected by the speculative returns, counts for little. It is economics that controls long-term equity returns; emotions, so dominant in the short-term, dissolve.

When you have identified your long-term objectives, defined your tolerance for risk, and carefully selected an index fund or a small number of actively managed funds that meet your goals, stay the course. Hold tight. Complicating the investment process merely clutters the mind, too often bringing emotion into a financial plan that cries out for rationality. I am absolutely persuaded that investors’ emotions, such as greed and fear, exuberance and hope—if translated into rash actions—can be every bit as destructive to investment performance as inferior market returns. To reiterate what the estimable Mr. Buffett said earlier: “Inactivity strikes us as intelligent behavior.” Never forget it.

But it is the long-term merits of the index fund—broad diversification, weightings paralleling those of the stocks that comprise the market, minimal portfolio turnover, and low cost—that commend it to wise investors. Consider these words from perhaps the wisest investor of all, Warren E. Buffett, from the 1996 Annual Report of Berkshire Hathaway Corporation: Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals.

For most investors, the hardest part is not figuring out the optimal investment policy; it is staying committed to sound investment policy through bull and bear markets and maintaining what Disraeli called “constancy to purpose.” Sustaining a long-term focus at market highs or market lows is notoriously difficult. At either kind of market extreme, emotions are strongest when current market action appears most demanding of change and the apparent “facts” seem most compelling. Being

It is interesting that an investor who has some knowledge of the principles of equity valuations often performs worse than someone with no knowledge who decides to index his portfolio.

Investors can take advantage of this mispricing by buying low-cost passively managed portfolios of value stocks or fundamentally weighted indexes that weight each stock by its share of dividends or earnings rather than by its market value.

Because markets are efficient, any attempt to beat the market is likely to prove disastrous to your long-term financial health. Thus, it is essential that you capture the entire return of each asset class, and leave it at that. 3.

For Gracias, the Tesla and SpaceX investor and Musk’s friend, the 2008 period told him everything he would ever need to know about Musk’s character. He saw a man who arrived in the United States with nothing, who had lost a child, who was being pilloried in the press by reporters and his ex-wife and who verged on having his life’s work destroyed. “He has the ability to work harder and endure more stress than anyone I’ve ever met,” Gracias said. “What he went through in 2008 would have broken anyone else. He didn’t just survive. He kept working and stayed focused.” That ability to stay focused in the midst of a crisis stands as one of Musk’s main advantages over other executives and competitors. “Most people who are under that sort of pressure fray,” Gracias said. “Their decisions go bad. Elon gets hyperrational. He’s still able to make very clear, long-term decisions. The harder it gets, the better he gets. Anyone who saw what he went through firsthand came away with more respect for the guy. I’ve just never seen anything like his ability to take pain.” fn1

For Long-Term Investors   Stock investments are ideal for reaping profits within a long timeframe. Stocks beat other investment vehicles (e.g. bonds) when measured in a period of ten years or more. Actually, the people who invested in the stock market during the Great Depression collected profits over the long-term.   If you will analyze the performance of all investment vehicles for the past 50 years and divide the results into ten-year periods, you'll see that stocks outclass other investment types in terms of total profits (considering that investors collected dividends and experienced capital compounding).

Gold belongs only in the portfolios of fearmongers and speculators. If you own gold in your portfolio, expect to not get paid an income, pay higher taxes on your returns, take a more volatile ride than the stock market, and get a long-term return lower than bonds.

for the stock market, corporate earnings and dividends; for the bond market, interest payments. Market returns, however, are calculated before the deduction of the costs of investing, and are most assuredly not based on speculation and rapid trading, which do nothing but shift returns from one investor to another. For the long-term investor, returns have everything to do with the underlying economics of corporate America and very little to do with the mechanical process of buying and selling pieces of paper. The art of investing in mutual funds, I would argue, rests on simplicity and common sense.

He defined investment as an operation that was carried out based on sound principles and had a high probability of success. The high probability of success resulted from the use of sound principles. This makes the principles an investor follows the central driver of profits. The stronger your principles, the higher your overall likelihood of long term profits.

When losses mount, leveraged investors such as Long-Term are forced to sell, lest their losses overwhelm them. When a firm has to sell in a market without buyers, prices run to the extremes beyond the bell curve.

Blue-chip stocks are a reasonable investment for the elderly investor because they usually pay cash dividends which the retired person may need to live on, and are usually more conservative than other investments, excluding bonds. Holdings in these stocks should be long-term to avoid trading costs and speculation.

Since the Firm’s IPO, the Founder and the partners have realized that the listed market seems to value more highly the stable, recurring management fees that the Firm brings in, come rain or shine—the two percent—over the larger, supposedly more volatile performance fees that crystallize when investment gains are monetized—the twenty percent. The stock price is largely driven by a regular stream of management fees under long-term contracts, and as assets under management grow for the Firm, the stock’s attractiveness to public market investors increases because this fee pile grows alongside the assets. Of course, there is a strong track record of delivering performance fees on top, because the funds perform well, but these are incremental to the equity story; they do not underpin it. For the stock market, the Two is mission-critical. The Twenty is important, but it is not taken for granted.

The prevailing narrative about Silicon Valley’s culture lionizes company founders, and Tom Wolfe’s exquisite storytelling has played up Noyce’s roots in small-town Iowa as the genesis of the egalitarian, stock-for-everyone business culture of the West Coast.[66] But, as we have seen, it was Arthur Rock who provided the impetus for Fairchild’s creation and who opened the founders’ eyes to the possibility of owning the fruits of their research. It was Rock who demonstrated the potential of the limited partnership that developed the Valley’s equity culture, and Rock who helped to catalyze the failure of the corporate venture model at Fairchild by prying away Jean Hoerni and Jay Last. When it came to the creation of Intel’s employee stock plan, moreover, it was probably Rock who proposed access for everyone, and it was certainly Rock who devised the plan’s details.[67] In a letter laying out his thinking in August 1968, Rock described a way of balancing the interests of investors and workers: Intel should avoid equity grants to short-term employees but extend them to everyone who made a long-term commitment. “There are too many millionaires who did nothing for their company except leave after a short period,” he observed wisely.[68] Without Rock’s judicious counsel, Intel’s employee stock program would not have set the standard in the Valley, because it would not have been sustainable.

The other major oil industry suppliers were similarly weary, trying to shore up earnings by slashing jobs, trimming project costs, and squeezing their own customers and suppliers wherever they could. (The wildcatters had it worse: many of the mom-and-pop operators of the American oil patch started to file for bankruptcy.) One year later, GE would merge its oil and gas unit into the oil-field giant Baker Hughes, keeping for itself a more than 50 percent stake in the company and spinning out a new public company to be run by Simonelli, under GE’s control. The transaction eased GE’s exposure to the ongoing oil rout and gave the new company, dubbed “Baker Hughes, a GE company,” vast new areas of redundant employees and operations to eliminate. With Baker Hughes, GE changed its tone a bit. The deal was transformational, but in which intended direction wasn’t made clear. GE execs like Bornstein would proclaim that the deal gave them “optionality,” but the reality was that investors were left in the dark on the strategy: Was GE doubling down on oil? Or was it preparing to exit the industry? The idea of holding such a long-term option was nice, but the game pieces in the positioning were people, and those who didn’t leave their job had no idea where the future of the company might be. The new arrangement didn’t spare Lufkin. The historic foundry was closed. The city’s annual financial report now just shows a blank line when listing the company’s employment tally, evidence of the more than four thousand jobs that evaporated after GE came to town. Between two Mondays—the day GE announced it was coming to Lufkin and the day the company said it would move on, leaving a shuttered foundry at the center of town—just 868 days had passed.

Stock prices do not always reflect the true value of companies, so an investor should study a company thoroughly and really understand its business, capital, and management when deciding whether it had sufficient underlying value to make an investment for the long term worthwhile.

Few Can Stick with 100% Stocks Long-Term Let's say you invested $100,000 into the S&P 500 in January 2007 then slipped into a coma for ten years. When you woke up, you would have been delighted to see your money at $195,000. If you had remained conscious, you would have watched your account value cut in half by May of 2009 . Would you have been able to watch your account fall by 50% and still held on? Or would you have panicked and sold at the bottom?

Quality and investment return are antithetical,” Gumbiner concluded, “because in order to generate short-term profits, the company cannot put money into research and development, new long-range concepts, management training, and all the things that will build a long-term successful organization. People who strictly have investors’ return as their motive are not interested in long-term corporate guarantees.

And, by being a serious long-term investor, you anyway guard against the systematic risk of investment.

Leaders often panic when recessions strike. They go into survival mode, managing quarter-to-quarter and shoring up their numbers by cutting back on the long-term growth projects we’ve described in previous pages. Such actions might please investors in the moment, but they undo hard-won progress the organization has made. This is a big mistake, and one thankfully we avoided. By looking for creative solutions to the financial challenges we faced during the Great Recession, we maintained our investments while still delivering results that outdid our competitors’ performance.

I asked our business leaders in the depths of the recession to begin working with their suppliers to prepare for the recovery. This seemed impossible to leaders at the time, since many economists and some of my staff were predicting that we’d see an L-shaped recovery—one that was essentially nonexistent. Our sales, according to this view, would never rebound to their prerecession levels. I insisted that recovery would come, just as it always had in the past. And when it did, our short-cycle businesses had to make sure they were first in line for supplies. Our leaders began these conversations, working with suppliers up front to lock in first priority over our competitors when the recovery came. This represented independent thinking on our part—our competitors weren’t doing this. We also took the opportunity to negotiate better payment terms, price reductions, and long-term deals, which were all easier to obtain during a recession. As a result of this effort, we got a big lift as the economy improved, outpacing our competitors in our sales growth, to the delight of our investors.

Nobody likes recessions, but as our experience proves, they don’t have to destroy the foundations for long-term growth you’ve laid. The key is to stay calm while everyone else is panicking. Remember, as I’ve said, recessions are temporary. Good times will return eventually. As a leader, you have to think about the recovery and what your organization will need to perform. Don’t cut all of your growth investments just to get the best possible shareholder returns. Do everything you can not to cut them, delivering returns that are good enough to keep investors reasonably happy. By taking control of the downturn in this way, you can maintain all of the investments you’ve made in your business up to that point, and keep your ability to perform over the long-term intact.

This focus on the short term is hard to reconcile with any fundamental view of investing. We can examine the drivers of equity returns to see what we need to understand in order to invest. At a one-year time horizon, the vast majority of your total return comes from changes in valuation—which are effectively random fluctuations in price. However, at a five-year time horizon, 80 percent of your total return is generated by the price you pay for the investment plus the growth in the underlying cash flow. These are the aspects of investment that fundamental investors should understand, and they clearly only matter in the long term.

Although much of what is written about finance would give a different impression, you are not providing funds for business investment by holding a company’s shares, directly or indirectly. As I have explained, companies large enough to be quoted on a stock exchange are, overwhelmingly, self-financing. The relationship between the long-term investor and Exxon Mobil is one of stewardship.

Charles T. Munger is fond of saying that there are “more banks than bankers.” A competitive advantage based on a willingness to make loans in an instant would be anathema to old-fashioned bankers. Of particular concern to us is the extent to which Irish bankers engage in the hard-sell to investors. One of them declared at the conference we recently attended: “I am here unashamedly to sell you X bank!” This rather goes against our preference for bankers as cautious individuals, obsessed with long-term downside risks. As we have seen in many other businesses, an obsession with growth, combined with overpromotion, is likely to end in tears. As to when this will happen, we must wait for time, Ireland’s proverbial story teller.

To apply first principles thinking to the field of value investing, consider several fundamental truths. Understand and practice the following if you want to become a good investor: 1. Look at stocks as part ownership of a business. 2. Look at Mr. Market—volatile stock price fluctuations—as your friend rather than your enemy. View risk as the possibility of permanent loss of purchasing power, and uncertainty as the unpredictability regarding the degree of variability in the possible range of outcomes. 3. Remember the three most important words in investing: “margin of safety.” 4. Evaluate any news item or event only in terms of its impact on (a) future interest rates and (b) the intrinsic value of the business, which is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out during its remaining life, adjusted for the uncertainty around receiving those cash flows. 5. Think in terms of opportunity costs when evaluating new ideas and keep a very high hurdle rate for incoming investments. Be unreasonable. When you look at a business and get a strong desire from within saying, “I wish I owned this business,” that is the kind of business in which you should be investing. A great investment idea doesn’t need hours to analyze. More often than not, it is love at first sight. 6. Think probabilistically rather than deterministically, because the future is never certain and it is really a set of branching probability streams. At the same time, avoid the risk of ruin, when making decisions, by focusing on consequences rather than just on raw probabilities in isolation. Some risks are just not worth taking, whatever the potential upside may be. 7. Never underestimate the power of incentives in any given situation. 8. When making decisions, involve both the left side of your brain (logic, analysis, and math) and the right side (intuition, creativity, and emotions). 9. Engage in visual thinking, which helps us to better understand complex information, organize our thoughts, and improve our ability to think and communicate. 10. Invert, always invert. You can avoid a lot of pain by visualizing your life after you have lost a lot of money trading or speculating using derivatives or leverage. If the visuals unnerve you, don’t do anything that could get you remotely close to reaching such a situation. 11. Vicariously learn from others throughout life. Embrace everlasting humility to succeed in this endeavor. 12. Embrace the power of long-term compounding. All the great things in life come from compound interest.

Investors with a long-term perspective understand that short-term market fluctuations and noise can often overshadow the true value and growth potential of an investment. By focusing on the long-term horizon, investors can identify opportunities that may not be immediately apparent and position themselves to benefit from significant growth over time.

One of the top questions I get from managers is: “How can I carve out time to focus on long-term work when there’s so much to do right now to keep the trains running?” In the framing of this question, there is an assumption that popping your head up to plan for the months or years ahead comes at the expense of successful near-term execution. It doesn’t have to be this way. One of my colleagues runs her team with a strategy that is similar to that of an investor’s. Just as no financial advisor would recommend putting all your money into one kind of asset, neither should you tackle projects with one kind of time horizon. My colleague makes sure that a third of her team works on projects that can be completed on the order of weeks, another third works on medium-term projects that may take months, and finally, the last third works on innovative, early-stage ideas whose impact won’t be known for years. By taking this portfolio approach, her team balances making constant improvements to their core features while casting an eye toward the horizon. Over the past decade, they’ve shown that this strategy works: her team has an amazing track record of identifying new opportunities and scaling them to huge businesses over the course of three years.

Like all traders and investors, I periodically review the performance of my portfolios and check in on whether they are getting the job done. I say periodically, because the temptation – a dangerous one for many – is to be constantly watching and let’s face it, this is a long term game, not a get rich quick punt, right? As such, over the past few months, one of my personal favourites – the covered call, has continued to deliver the cash flow I seek from that particular portfolio. For example, this calendar year, in the Australian market, FMG being the one blot on the ledger, we have had only one loser from 13 closed positions. For those that obsess about win/loss ratios – a flawed measure in my book – that is a 92% win rate for the calendar year. Of course, this is a reflection of the underlying market conditions, which have been supportive of the strategy.

the protocols themselves are not companies. They don’t have income statements, cash flows, or shareholders they report to. The creation of these foundations is intended to help the protocol by providing some level of structure and organization, but the protocol’s value does not depend on the foundation. Furthermore, as open-source software projects, anyone with the proper merits can join the protocol development team. These protocols have no need for the capital markets because they create self-reinforcing economic ecosystems. The more people use the protocol, the more valuable the native assets within it become, drawing more people to use the protocol, creating a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop. Often, core protocol developers will also work for a company that provides application(s) that use the protocol, and that is a way for the protocol developers to get paid over the long term. They can also benefit from holding the native asset since inception.

some cryptoassets are commodities, this could open them up to different tax treatment than if they were considered solely as property. Commodities fall under the 60/40 tax ruling, meaning 60 percent of the gains on a commodity transaction are treated as long-term capital gains and 40 percent are treated as short-term capital gains. This is different from taxing stocks where profitably selling an equity after 12 months is classified as a long-term capital gain with a current tax rate cap of 15 percent. Selling prior to 12 months would be considered a short-term gain with the tax ramification based on an investor’s income bracket.

1)Insufficient research and knowledge: Many beginners dive into investing without fully understanding the fundamentals or conducting thorough research. It's crucial to educate yourself about different investment options, financial markets, and investment strategies before getting started. 2)Failure to establish clear investment goals: Investing without clear goals can lead to haphazard decision-making and poor portfolio management. Beginners should define their investment objectives, such as saving for retirement, buying a home, or funding education, and then align their investment strategy accordingly. 3)Lack of diversification: Beginners sometimes make the mistake of investing all their money in a single investment or asset class. This lack of diversification can expose them to significant risks. It's important to spread investments across different asset classes, industries, and geographies to reduce the impact of any individual investment's performance on the overall portfolio. 4)Emotion-driven decision-making: Emotions can often cloud investment decisions. Beginners may get swayed by market hype, fear, or short-term fluctuations, leading to impulsive buying or selling. It's essential to make investment decisions based on rational analysis and a long-term perspective rather than reacting to short-term market movements. 5)Chasing quick profits: Beginner investors may be tempted by get-rich-quick schemes or investments promising high returns in a short period. Such investments often involve higher risks, and pursuing quick profits can lead to significant losses. It's important to have realistic return expectations and focus on long-term, sustainable investment strategies.

So, if the company is better positioned today than it was a year ago, why is the stock price so much lower than it was a year ago? As the famed investor Benjamin Graham said, “In the short term, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term, it’s a weighing machine.” Clearly there was a lot of voting going on in the boom year of ’99—and much less weighing. We’re a company that wants to be weighed, and over time, we will be—over the long term, all companies are. In the meantime, we have our heads down working to build a heavier and heavier company.

The sophisticated investor is not watching a long-term average, but a moving average.

The adversary politics thesis contends that attempts to generate long-term solutions to problems are thwarted by a system that encourages an adversary relationship between the two main political parties, with those parties vying with one another for the all-or-nothing spoils of a general election victory.39 Investors and managers are unable to plan ahead because the

Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better long-term results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.

Bubbles form when the momentum of short-term returns attracts enough money that the makeup of investors shifts from mostly long term to mostly short term.

Successful long-term investors like Warren Buffett know that bear markets are buying opportunities.

There are numerous examples of successful cultures among our portfolio companies: the empowerment of branch managers that promotes responsible banking at Sweden’s Svenska Handelsbanken, for instance. Reckitt Benckiser, another holding, fosters an entrepreneurial spirit among its senior managers. Yet even if a strong culture is instilled in a company, it can take many years for its full effects to play out. That may be beyond Wall Street’s limited investment horizon. Long-term investors, however, would be wise to take heed.

The longer one owns the shares, however, the more important the firm’s underlying economics will be to performance results. Long-term investors therefore seek answers with shelf life. What is relevant today may need to be relevant in ten years’ time if the investor is to continue owning the shares. Information with a long shelf life is far more valuable than advance knowledge of next quarter’s earnings. We seek insights consistent with our holding period. These principally relate to capital allocation, which can be gleaned from examining the company’s advertising, marketing, research and development spending, capital expenditures, debt levels, share repurchase/ issuance, mergers and acquisitions and so forth.

To satisfy those criteria, an investor needs the following things: staunch reliance on value, little or no use of leverage, long-term capital and a strong stomach.

While the case for long-term investment has tended to centre around simple mathematical advantages such as reduced (frictional) costs and fewer decisions leading (hopefully) to fewer mistakes, the real advantage to this approach, in our opinion, comes from asking more valuable questions. The short-term investor asks questions in the hope of gleaning clues to near-term outcomes: relating typically to operating margins, earnings per share and revenue trends over the next quarter, for example. Such information is relevant for the briefest period and only has value if it is correct, incremental, and overwhelms other pieces of information. Even when accurate, the value of the information is likely to be modest, say, a few percentage points in performance. In order to build a viable, economically important track record, the short-term investor may need to perform this trick many thousands of times in a career and/ or employ large amounts of financial leverage to exploit marginal opportunities. And let’s face it, the competition for such investment snippets is ferocious. This competition is fed by the investment banks. Wall Street relies heavily on promoting client myopia to earn its crust. Why

Prudential has learned from its long-term investment in Newark that once an investor chooses a specific issue to dedicate itself to, it can systematically target investments toward specific social and environmental solutions through a program of interrelated and interconnected investments. (See chapter 3 for details on this locally targeted initiative.)

Like all traders and investors, I periodically review the performance of my portfolios and check in on whether they are getting the job done. I say periodically, because the temptation – a dangerous one for many – is to be constantly watching and let’s face it, this is a long term game, not a get rich quick punt, right?

In an interview with Business Wire in November 2011, Buffett said, “If you understand chapters 8 and 20 of The Intelligent Investor (Benjamin Graham, 1949) and chapter 12 of The General Theory (John Maynard Keynes, 1936), you don’t need to read anything else and you can turn off your TV.”2 This advice from Buffett references two classics from the field of investing and economics. Chapter 8 of Graham’s book talks about not letting the mood swings of Mr. Market coax us into speculating, selling in panic, or trying to time the market. Chapter 20 explains that, after careful analysis of a company’s ongoing business and its prospects for future earnings, we should consider buying only if its current price implies a large margin of safety. In chapter 12 of The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (“The State of Long-Term Expectation”), Keynes remarks that most professional investors and speculators were “largely concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an investment over

Adequate Size of the Enterprise All our minimum figures must be arbitrary and especially in the matter of size required. Our idea is to exclude small companies which may be subject to more than average vicissitudes especially in the industrial field. (There are often good possibilities in such enterprises but we do not consider them suited to the needs of the defensive investor.) Let us use round amounts: not less than $100 million of annual sales for an industrial company and, not less than $50 million of total assets for a public utility. 2. A Sufficiently Strong Financial Condition For industrial companies current assets should be at least twice current liabilities—a so-called two-to-one current ratio. Also, long-term debt should not exceed the net current assets (or “working capital”). For public utilities the debt should not exceed twice the stock equity (at book value). 3. Earnings Stability Some earnings for the common stock in each of the past ten years. 4. Dividend Record Uninterrupted payments for at least the past 20 years. 5. Earnings Growth A minimum increase of at least one-third in per-share earnings in the past ten years using three-year averages at the beginning and end. 6. Moderate Price/Earnings Ratio Current price should not be more than 15 times average earnings of the past three years.

Thus this matter of choosing the “best” stocks is at bottom a highly controversial one. Our advice to the defensive investor is that he let it alone. Let him emphasize diversification more than individual selection. Incidentally, the universally accepted idea of diversification is, in part at least, the negation of the ambitious pretensions of selectivity. If one could select the best stocks unerringly, one would only lose by diversifying. Yet within the limits of the four most general rules of common-stock selection suggested for the defensive investor (on pp. 114–115) there is room for a rather considerable freedom of preference. At the worst the indulgence of such preferences should do no harm; beyond that, it may add something worthwhile to the results. With the increasing impact of technological developments on long-term corporate results, the investor cannot leave them out of his calculations. Here, as elsewhere, he must seek a mean between neglect and overemphasis.

How is it not possible for the leaders of such giant, public, dispersed-ownership conglomerate companies to take a such a bold step as well to focus on creating long-term value for shareholders and institutional investors? Many investors do not invest in companies for the short term: institutional investors, mutual funds, index funds, and many shareholders, buy and hold patiently for dividends and capital appreciation for the long term. Why, then, do corporate leaders insist that they are unable to invest for the long term due to financial market and analyst pressures? These are interesting research questions that could generate interesting empirical studies.

I have seen many investors pass up great deals because the property needed a little rehab, or didn’t need enough rehab, or the numbers were .0001 percent off on their spreadsheet. Don’t pass up a great opportunity because you’re too rigid in your approach. It’s also important to keep in mind that what works in one market does not always work in another.

Investment wisdom, however, begins with the realization that long-term returns are the only ones that matter. Investors who can earn an 8 percent annualized return will multiply their wealth tenfold over the course of 30 years, and if they have half a brain, they will care little that many days, or even years, along the way their portfolios will suffer significant losses. If they are, in fact, anguished by the bad days and years, they can at least comfort themselves that the rewards of equity ownership are paid for in the universal currencies of financial risk: stomach acid and sleepless nights.

Corporate investors, who have poured billions into the business of mass incarceration, expect long-term returns. And they will get them. It is their lobbyists who write the draconian laws that demand absurdly long sentences, deny paroles, determine immigrant detention laws, and impose minimum-sentence and Three-Strikes laws, which mandate life sentences after three felony convictions. Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the largest owner of for-profit prisons and immigration detention facilities in the country, earned $1.7 billion in revenues and collected $300 million in profits in 2013.50 CCA holds an average of 81,384 inmates in its facilities on any one day.51 Aramark Holdings Corp., a Philadelphia-based company that contracts through Aramark Correctional Services, provides food for six hundred correctional institutions across the United States.52 Goldman Sachs and other investors acquired it in 2007 for $8.3 billion.53 The three top for-profit prison corporations spent an estimated $45 million over a recent ten-year period for lobbying to keep the prison business flush.54 The resource center In the Public Interest documented in its report “Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and ‘Low-Crime Taxes’ Guarantee Profits for Private Prison Corporations” that private prison companies often sign state contracts that guarantee prison occupancy rates of 90 percent.55 If states fail to meet the quota they have to pay the corporations for the empty beds. CCA in 2011 gave $710,300 in political contributions to candidates for federal or state office, political parties, and so-called 527 groups (PACs and super PACs), the American Civil Liberties Union reported.56 The corporation also spent $1.07 million lobbying federal officials plus undisclosed sums to lobby state officials.57 The GEO Group, one of the nation’s largest for-profit prison management companies, donated $250,000 to Donald Trump in 2017.58 The United States, from 1970 to 2005, increased its prison population by about 700 percent, the ACLU reported.59 Private prisons account for nearly all newly built prisons.60 And nearly half of all immigrants detained by the federal government are shipped to for-profit prisons, according to Detention Watch Network.61

Even though most investors see their work as active, assertive, and on the offensive, the reality is and should be that stock and bond investing alike are primarily a defensive process. The great secret for success in long-term investing is to avoid serious losses.

While exchanges, by default, will store the assets they trade, that is not always the safest place to store the asset long-term. Cryptoassets are stored in either a hot wallet or cold storage. The hot in hot wallet refers to the connection to the Internet. A wallet is hot when it can be directly accessed through the Internet or is on a machine that has an Internet connection.

It turns out that there was good reason to be skeptical. Thanks in large part to increased transparency, the financial services world is now unhealthily tied to an annual compensation cycle. The desire to be paid the most each and every year has created perverse incentives directly impacting almost every facet of the banking and investment world. As the focus on and opportunity for outsized compensation in the financial industry has shifted from investment banking to the investing world, the short-term compensation arms race has moved to the realms of private equity, hedge funds, and managers of public market securities. Given investment managers’ desire to boost their annual—and, in some cases, quarterly—compensation, they’re motivated to pursue strategies that maximize returns on an annual basis, rather than allowing for longer hold periods. As such, these annual compensation structures often lead to shorter-than-ideal investment horizons and lower relative returns, all at the expense of investors—and, arguably, at the expense of the long-term compensation of the investment managers themselves. This was not always the way things were done. Of course it happened, but much less when the investment strategy wasn’t so laser-focused on an annual bonus cycle.

We’ll see how reducing the jaw-dropping levels of CEO salaries isn’t actually the most effective way to reform pay to benefit society. We’ll understand how an investor selling his shares in the short term can encourage businesses to act more long term. We’ll learn how a company using cash to buy back shares rather than investing it may create long-run value, not just for its shareholders, but also the economy as a whole.

Shareholders imply passive holding of an enterprise’s stock. Investors highlight their responsibility to invest in the long-term success of a firm through active monitoring or engagement.

Because despite all of our modernity, learning, and market-focused technology, passions and emotions remain the most important aspect of investing. Learning about, understanding, and accounting for your own behavioral quirks can do more to improve your long-term investing results than even a roaring bull market can.

When interest rates move up, the stock market moves down, and vice versa. Investors should be fully aware of this relationship, as it is the most important factor to consider in assessing long-term trends in the securities market;

In 2012, President Obama signed the JOBS Act into law. This bill, among many other things, included the ability for private companies like Gumroad to sell shares to the general public, making it possible for almost anyone to invest in the business. On March 15, 2021, the legal limit for regulation crowdfunding went from $1.07 million to $5 million. These new rules also allow for “testing the waters,” allowing companies like Gumroad to see how much demand there is to invest in the company before committing to a crowdfunding campaign. I believe that crowdfunding will reorganize the funding landscape. There will always be a place for venture capitalists, but who better to fund a business than its customers, who understand how valuable its offering is? And once founders can vet demand before committing, we should see the numbers skyrocket. In the old way, the number one downside of raising money was that you created two distinct sets of stakeholders: your investors and your customers. This new practice will allow entrepreneurs to minimize complexity by turning customers into investors. All of a sudden, you have a single group of people you are serving: your community. I can speak from experience: On March 15, 2021, I used Regulation Crowdfunding to allow some of Gumroad’s creators to become part-owners. In 12 hours, we raised $5 million from more than 7,000 individual investors. Now we have thousands of our creators as our investors too, keeping our interests more cleanly aligned. For the businesses that neither need to bootstrap completely nor want to go the venture-backed path, I’m hopeful that Regulation Crowdfunding will offer a middle ground. But the ultimate long-term goal remains profitability (read: sustainability). Once you’re in control of your destiny, you should never let it go.

Investors shouldn’t always be suppressed; they’re allies in reforming capitalism to a more purposeful and more sustainable form. Business and society aren’t adversaries, but play for the same team. When all members of an organisation work together, bound by a common purpose and focused on the long term, they create shared value in a way that enlarges the slices of everyone – shareholders, workers, customers, suppliers, the environment, communities and taxpayers.

The motives to sell during a market capitulation are rarely rooted in a long-term plan. If they were, the market would never be oversold.

Never mind that the long term is a series of short terms, or that in the long run we are all dead. The phrases “patient investor” and “long-term appreciation” ring with the virtues of capitalist ethos.

s Chairman, Yunus Dogan provides strategic leadership, oversight, and governance for Atlas Group’s diverse operations. He is responsible for defining the company’s long-term vision, driving global expansion, ensuring financial sustainability, and cultivating key partnerships with governments, investors, and stakeholders worldwide. His ability to identify emerging opportunities, mitigate risks, and develop sustainable business models has established Atlas Group as a leader across multiple industries.

For the year The Art of the Deal was published, Trump’s core businesses reported a negative income of $45.4 million. His stock bluffs and inherited wealth had produced greater results than his business acumen. He reported $25.4 million in short-term capital gains, mostly, if not entirely, from the stocks he sold after letting investors believe he might take over the company. And he reported another $9.3 million in long-term capital gains, which appeared to be almost entirely from his father’s efforts. And despite his promise to donate royalties from the book, the records we obtained showed that he reported no charitable contributions through at least 1995.