Lehman Brothers Quotes

I presumably lost $150,000 in the depression of 1937—on my one stock investment—because I did everything Lehman Brothers told me. I said, well, this is a fool’s procedure . . . buying stock in other people’s businesses.

Who, in 2007, would have thought that a drawing by Willem De Kooning would be a safer asset than shares in Lehman Brothers? By autumn 2008, this would clearly be the case.

It may be satisfying to castigate the likes of Geithner and the heads of Lehman Brothers and AIG, but safety experts like Perrow know it is far more productive to design better systems than to hope for better people.

Lehman Brothers’ Repo 105 program—which temporarily moved billions of dollars of liability off the bank’s books at the end of each quarter and replaced them a few days later at the start of the next quarter—was intentionally designed to hide the firm’s financial weaknesses. This was a carefully crafted fraud, detailed by a court-appointed Lehman examiner. But no former Lehman executive ever faced criminal prosecution for it. Contrast this with the fact that a teenager who sells an ounce of marijuana can be put away for years.

The problem wasn’t that Lehman Brothers had been allowed to fail. The problem was that Lehman Brothers had been allowed to succeed.

It’s easy to imagine a young person asking his parents if he should go to work for a startup and being told, “Don’t. It’s too risky. Get a job in a nice, safe company that will be around a long time—like Lehman Brothers, Arthur Andersen, or Enron.

The first of the brothers to leave their home in search of fortune was Henry, then twenty-three and the oldest. Henry settled in this city of 4,000 citizens and 2,000 slaves. His two brothers soon followed, and in 1850 they established a trading and dry-goods business called Lehman Brothers.

No matter whom the people elect, you always get JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs in charge. the shit going on is unbelievable. all to save massively overpriced assets.

Corporate bonds, Treasury bonds, and municipal bonds all represent nothing more than a loan—or, if you wish, debt—for which the lender will be paid an interest rate,

When Lehman Brothers collapsed on September 15, 2008, and inaugurated the biggest crisis since the 1930s, there were no real alternatives to hand. No one had laid the groundwork. For years, intellectuals, journalists, and politicians had all firmly maintained that we’d reached the end of the age of “big narratives” and that it was time to trade in ideologies for pragmatism. Naturally, we should still take pride in the liberty that generations before us fought for and won. But the question is, what is the value of free speech when we no longer have anything worthwhile to say? What’s the point of freedom of association when we no longer feel any sense of affiliation? What purpose does freedom of religion serve when we no longer believe in anything?

When you buy your bond, you are given two key facts—the amount of interest you will receive annually and the date your bond will mature. On that maturity date you will be given your money back. All

Not at Lehman Brothers, which collapsed in 2008, and not on Wall Street; Greece was where the fire broke out. One heard the word contamination again and again, but this time it was no imperial cultural contamination, no creeping process of civilization. This time the crisis was a contagion: debts and obligations that would never be repaid, a gradual deterioration of the financial immune system.

Robert Lehman—who often told his partners, “I bet on people”—made Lehman the driving financial force behind RCA and the birth of television, TWA, Pan Am, Hertz, several Hollywood studios, and various department store and oil and rubber giants. Lehman Brothers was at the epicenter of those business forces that have shaped not just the American economy but the American culture as well. By 1967 the House of Lehman was responsible for $3.5 billion in underwriting. In volume, Lehman was among the top four investment banks.

But there’s a difference between an old-fashioned financial panic and what had happened on Wall Street in 2008. In an old-fashioned panic, perception creates its own reality: Someone shouts “Fire!” in a crowded theater and the audience crushes each other to death in its rush for the exits. On Wall Street in 2008 the reality finally overwhelmed perceptions: A crowded theater burned down with a lot of people still in their seats. Every major firm on Wall Street was either bankrupt or fatally intertwined with a bankrupt system. The problem wasn’t that Lehman Brothers had been allowed to fail. The problem was that Lehman Brothers had been allowed to succeed. This

KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS AND STIMULUS Keynesian economics is based on the notion that unemployment arises when total or aggregate demand in an economy falls short of the economy’s ability to supply goods and services. When products go unsold, jobs are lost. Aggregate demand, in turn, comes from two sources: the private sector (which is the majority) and the government. At times, aggregate demand is too buoyant—goods fly off the shelves and labor is in great demand—and we get rising inflation. At other times, aggregate demand is inadequate—goods are hard to sell and jobs are hard to find. In those cases, Keynes argued in the 1930s, governments can boost employment by cutting interest rates (what we now call looser monetary policy), raising their own spending, or cutting people’s taxes (what we now call looser fiscal policy). By the same logic, when there is too much demand, governments can fight actual or incipient inflation by raising interest rates (tightening monetary policy), increasing taxes, or reducing its own spending (thus tightening fiscal policy). That’s part of standard Keynesian economics, too, although Keynes, writing during the Great Depression, did not emphasize it. Setting aside the underlying theory, the central Keynesian policy idea is that the government can—and, Keynes argued, should—act as a kind of balance wheel, stimulating aggregate demand when it’s too weak and restraining aggregate demand when it’s too strong. For decades, American economists took for granted that most of that job should and would be done by monetary policy. Fiscal policy, they thought, was too slow, too cumbersome, and too political. And in the months after the Lehman Brothers failure, the Federal Reserve did, indeed, pull out all the stops—while fiscal policy did nothing. But what happens when, as was more or less the case by December 2008, the central bank has done almost everything it can, and yet the economy is still sinking? That’s why eyes started turning toward Congress and the president—that is, toward fiscal stimulus—after the 2008 election.

Between 2003 and 2008, Iceland’s three main banks, Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki, borrowed over $140 billion, a figure equal to ten times the country’s GDP, dwarfing its central bank’s $2.5 billion reserves. A handful of entrepreneurs, egged on by their then government, embarked on an unprecedented international spending binge, buying everything from Danish department stores to West Ham Football Club, while a sizeable proportion of the rest of the adult population enthusiastically embraced the kind of cockamamie financial strategies usually only mooted in Nigerian spam emails – taking out loans in Japanese Yen, for example, or mortgaging their houses in Swiss francs. One minute the Icelanders were up to their waists in fish guts, the next they they were weighing up the options lists on their new Porsche Cayennes. The tales of un-Nordic excess are legion: Elton John was flown in to sing one song at a birthday party; private jets were booked like they were taxis; people thought nothing of spending £5,000 on bottles of single malt whisky, or £100,000 on hunting weekends in the English countryside. The chief executive of the London arm of Kaupthing hired the Natural History Museum for a party, with Tom Jones providing the entertainment, and, by all accounts, Reykjavik’s actual snow was augmented by a blizzard of the Colombian variety. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in late 2008 exposed Iceland’s debts which, at one point, were said to be around 850 per cent of GDP (compared with the US’s 350 per cent), and set off a chain reaction which resulted in the krona plummeting to almost half its value. By this stage Iceland’s banks were lending money to their own shareholders so that they could buy shares in . . . those very same Icelandic banks. I am no Paul Krugman, but even I can see that this was hardly a sustainable business model. The government didn’t have the money to cover its banks’ debts. It was forced to withdraw the krona from currency markets and accept loans totalling £4 billion from the IMF, and from other countries. Even the little Faroe Islands forked out £33 million, which must have been especially humiliating for the Icelanders. Interest rates peaked at 18 per cent. The stock market dropped 77 per cent; inflation hit 20 per cent; and the krona dropped 80 per cent. Depending who you listen to, the country’s total debt ended up somewhere between £13 billion and £63 billion, or, to put it another way, anything from £38,000 to £210,000 for each and every Icelander.

Özgün (otantik) liderler, içi dışı bir olan ve üstlendiği misyonu gerçekleştirirken ilkelerinden ve ahlak anlayışından taviz vermeyen liderlerdir. Otantik liderler, statü ayrıcalıklarına ihtiyaç duymazlar; kendilerini oldukları gibi ifade ederler. Otantik liderlik, samimiyet, sahicilik ve doğallık üzerine kuruludur. Bu liderler etraflarında tek tip, kendilerini onaylayan insanlar bulundurmak yerine yaratıcı fikirleri olan insanları barındırmayı ve çeşitlilik içeren bir ortamda ahenge ulaşmayı hedeflerler. Otantik liderler ilişkilerini güven, sevgi ve hoşgörü üzerine inşa ederler. Otantik liderler, egolarını sergilemeye meraklı değildirler. Aksine hayata ve kendilerine daha sakin bir gözle bakan, bireysel dönüşümlerini gerçekleştirmiş insanlardır. Samimi ve içten olmaları, kendileriyle barışık olmalarındandır. Bu nedenle otantik liderler en çok kendilerine benzerler. Otantik liderler, çevrelerindeki insanların kendi yollarını bulmalarına destek olurlar. Herkesi “tek tip” bir kalıba sokmak yerine, insanların içindeki hapsolmuş enerjiyi ateşleyerek onların “kendileri olmalarına” imkan verirler. Fred Walumbwa, William Gardner ve Bruce Avalio otantik liderliği 4 farklı ama birbiriyle bağlantılı bileşen etrafında tarif ediyorlar: 1- Farkındalık: Otantik liderler kendileriyle barışıktırlar. Kendilerini iyi tanırlar. Duygularının, motivasyonlarının farkındadırlar. Zaaflarını, zafiyetlerini de en az güçlü yanları kadar iyi bilirler. Kendileriyle samimi ve dürüst bir ilişkileri vardır. Bundan dolayı da sahicilik, samimiyet ve güvenilirlik onların karakterlerinin en belirgin özellikleridir. Bu içselleştirilmiş kendine güven duygusu, onların çevresindeki insanlarla da olumlu ilişkiler kurmalarında son derece önemli bir rol oynar. Kendilerini tanıma, anlama ve geliştirme yolunda verdikleri emek sayesinde başkalarının da gelişimine saygı duymayı ve gerektiğinde hoşgörülü olmayı da bilirler. 2- Tarafsız düşünebilme: Otantik liderler karar alırken herkesi dinler ve bütün bilgileri analiz ederler. Adam kayırmazlar, herkese eşit mesafede dururlar. Kimi zaman kendi aleyhlerine bile olacak olsa tarafsızlıktan, evrensel ilkelere dayanarak karar almaktan taviz vermezler. Tarafsızlık onların güvenilirliğini pekiştirir, etkilerini artırır. Tarafsız oldukları için, aldıkları kararları onaylamayan insanlar bile onlara saygı ve güven duyarlar. 3- İçselleştirilmiş ahlak anlayışı: Otantik liderlerin üst düzey ahlaki standartları vardır. Karar alırken evrensel insani değerlerden hareket ederler. Olayları ve insanları ilkeli ve ahlaki bir süzgeçle değerlendirir, vicdanlarını dinleyerek karar alırlar. Kriterleri, başkalarının ne düşüneceği değil, sahip oldukları değerlerdir. Otantik liderlerin ahlak standartları kendi vicdanlarında saklıdır. 4-İlişkilerde şeffaflık: Otantik liderler kendi düşüncelerini ve duygularını ifade ederken şeffaf davranırlar. Bir şeyleri saklamak, gizli ajandalarla davranmak, insanları maniple etmek, kapalı kapılar arkasında iş çevirmek gibi huyları yoktur. Otantik liderler kurdukları ilişkilerde şeffaf davrandıkları için güven telkin ederler ve kendileri de başkalarına güvenerek ilişki kurarlar. Bu sebeple de hatalarını kabul etmekte, özür dilemekte ve telafi etmekte hiç zorlanmazlar. Harvard Business School profesörlerinden Bill George, bugüne kadar liderlerin çoğunun otantik liderlik ilkelerine odaklanmamasının, dünyayı krize sokan temel faktörlerin başında geldiğini söyler. Hatta Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs gibi devlerin çöküşünün sadece ekonomik nedenlere dayanmadığını, “karizmatik” diye adlandırılan lider tipinin bu şirketlerin batmasında önemli rol oynadığını savunur. Bugün hepimiz biliyoruz ki bu liderler, bilgi ve beceri konusunda eksiği olan liderler d

In 2005 two thirds of the mortgages contained in Lehman’s issuance of $133 billion in MBS/CDO were sourced from its own subprime loan originators. A top Wall Street name was scraping the very bottom of the credit barrel.

By the mid-twenties, Philip’s son, Robert, began to assume principal responsibility for the partnership. He was a small, trim man, about five feet seven inches, with well-tanned, smooth skin and a dapper appearance. Unfailingly polite, Robert nevertheless knew what he wanted. First he wanted to move the firm. And in 1928 the headquarters of the partnership was transferred from a cramped space in the Farmers Loan & Trust Company building at 16 William Street to Lehman’s very own eleven-story triangular Italian Renaissance-style building at One William Street, in the heart of the financial district.* For the next fifty-two years this would be the home of Lehman Brothers.

The genius of the Wright brothers wasn’t to invent every necessary component from flight from scratch, it was to recognize that we were only a stepping stone away from flight given past innovations.

En otro artículo del New York Times, Erin Callan, ex directora de finanzas de Lehman Brothers, cuenta la historia de cómo “en una fiesta de la oficina, en 2005, una de mis colegas le preguntó al que entonces era mi marido qué hacía yo los fines de semana. Ella me consideraba una persona intensa y llena de energía. ‘¿Hace kayak, escala y luego corre medio maratón?’, dijo en broma. No, dijo él con simplicidad, ‘duerme’. Y era cierto. Cuando no estaba poniéndome al corriente con el trabajo, pasaba el fin de semana recargando las baterías para la semana siguiente.”[5

2. Don’t trade penny stocks. A penny stock is any stock that trades under $5. Unless you are an advanced trader, you should avoid all penny stocks. I would extend this by encouraging you to also avoid all stocks priced under $10. Even if you have a small trading account ($5,000) or less, you are better off buying fewer shares of a higher-priced stock than a lot of shares of a penny stock. That is because low-priced stocks are most often associated with lower quality companies. As a result, they are not usually allowed to trade on the NYSE or the Nasdaq. Instead, they trade on the OTCBB ("over the counter bulletin board") or Pink Sheets, both of which have much less stringent financial reporting requirements than the major exchanges do. Many of these companies have never made a profit. They may be frauds or shell companies that are designed solely to enrich management and other insiders. They may also include former “blue chips” that have fallen on hard times like Eastman Kodak or Lehman Brothers. In addition, penny stocks are inherently more volatile than higher-priced stocks. Think of it this way: if a $100 stock moves $1, that is a 1% move. If a $5 stock moves $1, that is a 20% move. Many new traders underestimate the kind of emotional and financial damage that this kind of volatility can cause. In my experience, penny stocks do not trend nearly as well as higher-priced stocks. They tend to be more mean-reverting (Mean reversion occurs when a stock moves up sharply from its average trading price, only to fall right back down again to its average trading price). Many of them are eventually headed to zero, but they are still not good short candidates. Most brokers will not let you short them. And even if you do find a broker who will let you short a penny stock, how would you like to wake up to see your penny stock trading at $10 when you just shorted it at $2 a few days before? I learned that lesson the hard way. It turned out that I was risking $8 to make $2, which is not a good way to make money over the long term. To add injury to insult, a penny stock might appear to be liquid one day, and the next day, the liquidity dries up and you are confronted by a $2 bid/ask spread. Or the bid might completely disappear. Imagine owning

They had already told Paulson privately that they had reduced most of their risk to Lehman Brothers,

But I drew a distinction between our actions in March with Bear Stearns and now with Lehman Brothers.

On Monday, Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy, and Merrill Lynch, having announced $55.2 billion in losses on subprime bond–backed CDOs, had sold itself to Bank of America. The U.S. stock market had fallen by more than it had since the first day of trading after the attack on the World Trade Center. On Tuesday the U.S. Federal Reserve announced that it had lent $85 billion to the insurance company AIG, to pay off the losses on the subprime credit default swaps AIG had sold to Wall Street banks—the biggest of which was the $13.9 billion AIG owed to Goldman Sachs. When you added in the $8.4 billion in cash AIG had already forked over to Goldman in collateral, you saw that Goldman had transferred more than $20 billion in subprime mortgage bond risk into the insurance company, which was in one way or another being covered by the U.S. taxpayer.

There had always been a divide between the WASP houses and the Jewish houses on Wall Street. But firms such as Kuhn Loeb, Lehman Brothers, and J. W. Seligman represented “Our Crowd,” the German Jewish elite, and for all the anti-Semitic bigotries of old dinosaurs like Jack Morgan, these firms were held in very high regard and viewed as reputable and very prestigious institutions.

I think what’s occurring is a stealthy rebranding: the word ‘problem’ has become too emotionally loaded to be uttered in polite company in case we think bad things about the companies responsible. So software bugs are now issues rather than problems, even if they stop our computers working and ruin our day. Or, for my CEO, the bug is an opportunity. He was in the software business, and the only opportunity a broken computer gives you is the opportunity to wait for tech support to call back. We now have ‘performance issues’ with staff who fall asleep on their keyboard, or ‘brand issues’ with companies that nobody likes, or, worst of all, ‘balance sheet issues’, as described by Lehman Brothers, shortly before it ceased to be Lehman Brothers. At least they didn’t call it a ‘balance sheet opportunity’, though I bet someone suggested it. Rule of thumb on issues: it doesn’t matter whether your company admits to balance sheet issues or problems, it still might be time to send out your CV.

When things can’t get any worse, they always do, and when they can’t get any better, they always do.

commercial paper is short-term money, loaned out for thirty to forty days or less. This market is used by the biggest and best blue-chip companies. Commercial paper is the quickest, cheapest, and easiest way for them to raise a fast loan that is not regulated by the SEC. As