Legitimate Einstein Quotes

Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and accept them as unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as “necessities of thought”, “a priori givens”, etc. The path of scientific advance is often made impassable for a long time through such errors. For that reason, it is by no means an idle game if we become practiced in analyzing the long commonplace concepts and exhibiting those circumstances upon which their justification and usefulness depend, how they have grown up, individually, out of the givens of experience. By this means, their all-too-great authority will be broken. They will be removed if they cannot be properly legitimated, corrected if their correlation with given things be far too superfluous, replaced by others if a new system can be established that we prefer for whatever reason.

How does it happen that a properly endowed natural scientist comes to concern himself with epistemology? Is there not some more valuable work to be done in his specialty? That's what I hear many of my colleagues ask, and I sense it from many more. But I cannot share this sentiment. When I think about the ablest students whom I have encountered in my teaching — that is, those who distinguish themselves by their independence of judgment and not just their quick-wittedness — I can affirm that they had a vigorous interest in epistemology. They happily began discussions about the goals and methods of science, and they showed unequivocally, through tenacious defence of their views, that the subject seemed important to them. Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and accept them as unalterable givens. Thus they might come to be stamped as "necessities of thought," "a priori givens," etc. The path of scientific progress is often made impassable for a long time by such errors. Therefore it is by no means an idle game if we become practiced in analysing long-held commonplace concepts and showing the circumstances on which their justification and usefulness depend, and how they have grown up, individually, out of the givens of experience. Thus their excessive authority will be broken. They will be removed if they cannot be properly legitimated, corrected if their correlation with given things be far too superfluous, or replaced if a new system can be established that we prefer for whatever reason.

Einstein completely failed to address the elephant in the room, namely that light – from its own perspective – isn’t in any inertial reference frame. We can therefore legitimately say that it obeys entirely different laws of physics – those of non-locality (singularities) rather than locality (spacetime) – and, in fact, actually the laws of pure mathematics. Light is the non-inertial container for all inertial reference frames, and ensures that they are all part of an absolute system, not a relative system. It imposes a principle of absolutism, not a principle of relativism!

Whilst Einstein accepts that the gratification of basic needs is a legitimate and indispensable goal, he regards it nevertheless as an elementary goal. In this respect, the infantile and isolated consciousness of the primitive person regards self and its immediate demands as the most vital concerns in which all its awareness should be invested. Other people, depending on their distance from the self, are interesting to it insofar as they can be employed as tools by which the needs of the self can be gratified. Einstein terms this experience as a delusion.

The memorization of quotes allows a person to seem more legitimate,” he told them, while I sat in the back of his classroom. “Who are you going to be more impressed by, the person who has a litany of his own opinions, or the historian who can draw on the great thinkers who came before him?

as well, the chaotic jangle of microscopic particles was christened Brownian motion in his honor. Much effort throughout the nineteenth century went into explaining it, and by the 1860s at least three natural philosophers independently suggested that Brownian motion was caused by the collision of the suspended particles with invisible molecules.* This would turn out to be the correct explanation, but at the time it was speculation, which met fierce objections. A legitimate calculation of Brownian motion, not dissimilar in spirit to the one Einstein would perform in 1905, was attempted in 1900 by one Felix Exner. Unfortunately for Exner, he got the wrong answer. As the story goes, Einstein wrote his paper “blissfully unaware of the detailed history of Brownian motion,” a claim that he himself also made to Conrad Habicht. According to this version, he not only predicted the phenomenon but explained it as well. Maybe. To be sure, Einstein omits any mention of Brownian motion in the title of his paper, remarking only in the first paragraph, “It is possible that the motions to be discussed here are identical with the so-called Brownian molecular motion; however, the data available to me on the latter are so imprecise that I could not form a judgement on the question.” On the other hand: From Maurice Solovine we do know that a few years earlier the Olympians had pounced on and devoured the great

Another analogy. The idea of length contraction and time dilation may be easier to accept when you consider that objects contract and processes slow down when cooled. The only difference between the effect of temperature and the effect of motion is the mechanism: In a cooler chest it is the slowing down of atomic motion that affects rates and interatomic distances, while in moving objects it is the extra distance through which fields must propogate. Would we think it paradoxical if a twin was placed in a cold chamber for 50 years and then emerged to find that her brother was old and she was young? No, we would not; in fact there are firms that offer to preserve people by freezing them. Why then should we not accept that motion can have a similar effect on chemical and physical processes? As Lorentz himself said, We may, I think, even go so far as to say that...the conclusion is no less legitimate than the inferences concerning the dilation by heat. - H. Lorentz

Cantor began a practice, long associated with Vallee, of introducing new talent via radio. Gracie Allen made her first radio appearance with Cantor: Burns and Allen would occasionally be mentioned, only half-jokingly, as a Cantor “discovery,” but George Burns had his own grim version of that affair (see BURNS AND ALLEN). A more legitimate discovery was Harry Einstein. Cantor was in Boston in 1934 when he happened to hear, on a local radio station, a man doing a funny Greek dialect. Einstein was then the advertising director of Boston’s Kane Furniture Company. He had been dabbling radio for years and had created a character named Nick Parkyakakas, a comedy candidate for mayor who could be heard on WNAC Mondays and Fridays at 10:30. Cantor thought it the funniest Greek impersonation he had ever heard: by wire, he offered Einstein a slot on NBC, and the following Sunday Parkyakakas played to the nation for the first time.

I think that Harry Hess, who coined the term geopoetry, like Charles Darwin, Albert Einstein, or any other creative scientist, enters a mental space beyond ordinary analysis, where conjecture and imaginative play are needed and legitimate, and that this is a mental space shared with poets. But even more than this poetic license, I would say, the practice of geopoetry promotes astonishment as part of the acceptable perceptual frame. Geopoetry makes it legitimate for the natural historian or scientist to speculate and gawk, and equally legitimate for the poet to benefit from close observation, and from some of the amazing facts that science turns up. It provides a crossing point, a bridge over the infamous gulf separating scientific from poetic frames of mind, a gulf which has not served us well, nor the planet we inhabit with so little reverence or grace.

It is also very legitimate to criticize the scientists and philosophers who drew unnecessarily pessimistic conclusions based on an incomplete picture that neglected the positive effects of self-organization in far-from-equilibrium systems.