Klinger Quotes

...when one considers that there are more than 750,000 police officers in the United States and that these officers have tens of millions of interactions with citizens each year, it is clear that police shootings are extremely rare events and that few officers--less than one-half of 1 percent each year--ever shoot anyone.

I had chosen the dead rather than the living, the thing thought rather than the thing thinking!

It’s hard sometimes to see through the fog, the pain, hurt, fear and everything else we live with every day. Virginia Woolf couldn’t do it. Annette Klinger couldn’t, either. My heart breaks for them—that they couldn’t get the help they needed for a disease they couldn’t control.

other people can lose themselves in the world of her characters. Has she lost herself to them, as well? Is that what happened to Annette Klinger, Virginia Woolf, and Sylvia Plath? Do they give so much of themselves to people who aren’t real that they lose who they are? Their grip on what reality is or is not?

Fear has no brains; it is an idiot.

Най-добрата украса на книгата си остава все пак нейният текст.

We’re going on strike,” I announced. “And we’re not coming back inside until Joey Harrington is suspended. I don’t know what else because I’m too angry to think!” Mr. Feinman stuffed his hands in his pockets. “Huh.” He looked at the other students. “Is that what you all want?” “Man!” Clyde exclaimed, shaking his head. “I’ve got some demands, all right.” “Are we going to get in trouble for missing class?” asked Samantha Klinger, one of the gamers who kept pink streaks in her hair. Mr. Feinman shrugged. “I’d say yes. The real question is what if you win?” “We need an anti-bully committee,” said Bryce Smith, a theater kid with thick glasses. “Made up of students and teachers so bullies have to answer to someone other than the principal. So there’s no favorites.” The class murmured an agreement. The students behind me seconded the motion. “So go,” Mr. Feinman said. “Go and fight for your education, then.

Recipe for a Perfect Wife, the Novel INGREDIENTS 3 cups editors extraordinaire: Maya Ziv, Lara Hinchberger, Helen Smith 2 cups agent-I-couldn’t-do-this-without: Carolyn Forde (and the Transatlantic Literary Agency) 1½ cup highly skilled publishing teams: Dutton US, Penguin Random House Canada (Viking) 1 cup PR and marketing wizards: Kathleen Carter (Kathleen Carter Communications), Ruta Liormonas, Elina Vaysbeyn, Maria Whelan, Claire Zaya 1 cup women of writing coven: Marissa Stapley, Jennifer Robson, Kate Hilton, Chantel Guertin, Kerry Clare, Liz Renzetti ½ cup author-friends-who-keep-me-sane: Mary Kubica, Taylor Jenkins Reid, Amy E. Reichert, Colleen Oakley, Rachel Goodman, Hannah Mary McKinnon, Rosey Lim ½ cup friends-with-talents-I-do-not-have: Dr. Kendra Newell, Claire Tansey ¼ cup original creators of the Karma Brown Fan Club: my family and friends, including my late grandmother Miriam Christie, who inspired Miriam Claussen; my mom, who is a spectacular cook and mother; and my dad, for being the wonderful feminist he is 1 tablespoon of the inner circle: Adam and Addison, the loves of my life ½ tablespoon book bloggers, bookstagrammers, authors, and readers: including Andrea Katz, Jenny O’Regan, Pamela Klinger-Horn, Melissa Amster, Susan Peterson, Kristy Barrett, Lisa Steinke, Liz Fenton 1 teaspoon vintage cookbooks: particularly the Purity Cookbook, for the spark of inspiration 1 teaspoon loyal Labradoodle: Fred Licorice Brown, furry writing companion Dash of Google: so I could visit the 1950s without a time machine METHOD: Combine all ingredients into a Scrivener file, making sure to hit Save after each addition.

According to the Institute for Policy Studies (Anderson, Collins, Klinger, Pizzigati, 2011) the ratio between a CEO and an average company salary stood at 42 to 1 back in 1980, while it climbed to 263 to 1 and to 325 to 1 in 2009 and 2010 respectively.

You mean to make me beg for it?” “Not at all, my lord. I mean to keep it,

you would only laugh at me, not because my thoughts were stupid, but because I was so foolish as to attempt to tell them to you. If

The Dream of Egypt was Eternity: her odors have the solidity of granite, and endure as long. I

but you are very well aware that I belong to that remarkable class of authors who, when they are bearing anything about in their minds in the manner I have just described, feel as if everybody who comes near them, and also the whole world to boot, were asking, “Oh! what is it? Oh! do tell us, my good sir?

No matter who we are or what we do, we should never be afraid to stand up, speak the truth, or show our true colors. Though the costs are great at times, and we find ourselves forced to let go of what's considered safe, it's denial that hurts us so much more in the end.

I have always known who I am, even when I was too afraid to admit it.

it is the character who performs the act of translation by switching from his native language, Igbo, to English. This self-translation occurs on the level of story and is represented on the level of text. Example 2.2, however, is a case of translational mimesis: it is the narrator who performs the translation of the character’s discourse and signals the event of this translation through the use of hybrid language. This act of translation occurs on the level of narration. What both cases have in common is the fact that (i) the translator is a textual agent and (ii) that the translation occurs not on the level of text, but on a deeper narrative level. We can therefore construct the notion of what I will call the fictional translator, for want of a better term. This fictional translator inhabits the story-world or the level of narration—both in the ST and, provided no TT shift occurs when the ST is translated into another language, also in the TT. In other words, the fictional translator can be either a narrator or a character.

Self-translation, therefore, can occur both on the level of story and on the level of narration. In both cases, the linguistic hybridity on the level of text represents translation as object. Example 2.1

when translating experimental, polylingual texts such as those of the Evolutionists/Experimenters, linguistic hybridity might be added to the TT in an attempt to compensate for nontranslated linguistic hybridity in other text segments and thus, to preserve the text type. In the

Above I made the assumption that the reader will construct a world-view for the implied author. This assumption is presumably even more valid if the reader is also the translator. As Boase-Beier puts it, “translators have to know what they think the writer meant” (2011:90; emphasis added). Her

Hence, the TT reader’s construction of the TT’s world-view will depend ultimately also on the translator’s world-view and the extent to which this world-view clashes with the world-view the translator inferred from the ST and the extent to which this clash is reflected in the TT.

Semino suggests using the term “ideational point of view” to “capture those aspects of world views that are social, cultural, religious or political in origin, and which an individual is likely to share with others belonging to similar social, cultural, religious or political groups” (2002:97). The term “mind-style”, on the other hand, should be reserved to “capture those aspects of world views that are primarily personal and cognitive in origin, and which are either peculiar to a particular individual, or common to people who have the same cognitive characteristics” (2002:97).

it represents a variety that in the narrative is portrayed as nonstandard and therefore is marked as such in the text. Symbolic hybridity, on the other hand, represents another language, not a language variety—or, more precisely, it represents what in the narrative is portrayed as the standard variety of this other language.

Like Lawrence Venuti’s (1998; 2008) foreignization, the goal of translational mimesis is not to imitate the other language, but rather to disrupt the illusion of direct access and to highlight the translatorial intervention through the mixing of different codes (see further Boase-Beier 2006:68–69 on Venuti’s foreignization and its “virtually non-mimetic view of style”). However, although translational mimesis does not aim to mimic the foreign language (i.e. the language as object), it nevertheless aims to represent the foreign language in the language as medium. In this aim to represent the foreign language (and the culture that is tied to this language) rather than the translational act as such lies a fundamental difference from foreignization. This difference can explain why translational mimesis and foreignization, although sharing many strategies such as the use of archaisms, the selective reproduction of foreign words or the transposing of foreign syntax, do not share others such

refers to linguistic hybridity on the level of text that has no representational function within the narrative. In other words, it has no object: it is neither translational mimesis representing another language nor does it represent the self-translation of a character or an embodied narrator. It is characterized by the absence of a fictional translator. If,

Furthermore—and more importantly for the argument I develop here—in the case of this type of hybridity, we, as the readers, are expected to suspend our disbelief and imagine that these are the actual words spoken or thought by the character or the embodied narrator. Therefore, I

is crucial if we want to investigate how linguistic hybridity contributes to the construction of perspective, cultural identity and allegiance. An investigation of this relation is therefore a prerequisite for

space, time, ideology, language, perception. To return to our example from Great Expectations, and adopting Schmid’s model and terminology, we can therefore argue that the facets of ideology and language in this text segment are narratorial, but the facet of perception is figural. Perspective—just “like everything else in the text”—is

Language is therefore “both the medium and the object of representation” (Fludernik 2009:64), and while we have direct access to the medium (i.e. the language(s) on the level of text), the latter (i.e. the language(s) on the level of narration and on the level of story) can only be constructed from the former. As pointed out in the introduction, this distinction between language as medium and language as object and the relationship between the two has so far not been awarded a significant role in scholarly writing about the linguistic hybridity typical for cross-cultural writing. Differentiating between the language(s) as medium and the language(s) as object becomes necessary, as the relation between medium and object is not one-to-one. The same medium can represent different objects. Two short

the text-level form of “english” itself does not necessarily provide clues about its representational function on the levels of story and narration. Generally, co-text and/or context is needed to establish this representational function. In the

translation can create linguistic hybridity in the form of source-language interference. This source-language interference might be deliberate (e.g. to convey the foreignness of the ST) or not (e.g. unconscious calquing). If the translator adds linguistic hybridity in the TT, a diegetic discourse-presentation category (i.e. ID or NRDA) or also narrative report (NR) might be transformed into a mimetic discourse-presentation category (i.e. MID, FID, DD, or FDD). This

[i]n those cases (especially in recent translations that owe a conceptual debt to Bakhtin and narratology) where editors and publishers have allowed translators to exercise more freedom, more true authority, voices within the translated novels have found more free play as well” (1994:5). Such

Attempting to pin down in which ways the language of translations differs from that of nontranslated texts in the same target language is the focus of corpus-based descriptive studies such as Jarle Ebeling 1998, Sara Laviosa 1998 and Linn Øverås 1998.

Drawing on Booth, Jeremy Munday (2008:14) argues that “[i]f the author’s judgment is always present, then in translation so is the translator’s”. However, unless this presence of the translator is clearly marked as a translatorial intervention such as translator footnotes and prefaces—in other words, unless “the presence of an enunciating subject other than the Narrator becomes discernible in the translated text itself” (Hermans 1996:33; emphasis original)—it is most likely to “be read in isolation and judged as the unmediated words of the ST author” (Munday 2008:14). As Theo Hermans puts it, “given the dominant conception of transparent translation in modern fiction, the reader’s awareness of reading a translation lies dormant” (1996:33).

aligned text units by definition combine a figural and a narratorial perspective, then onto which narrative level do readers actually project their origo in aligned text segments? This issue has been

On the level of signified object, iconic hybridity constitutes a subcategory of English, whereas symbolic hybridity constitutes a separate category.

rather than attempting to establish one main focalizer, it seems “more appropriate to analyze focalization as a more abstract and variable feature of the text” (2013a:§17).

Moreover, in the case of cross-cultural writing, source and target language meet not only during the writing process itself, but frequently also in the (fictional or nonfictional) story-world. Often, translation is therefore not only the medium but also the object of representation in cross-cultural writing. The

Every narrative has two realities: the reality of the world represented—which can be fictional or not—and the reality of the representation of this (fictional) world (see e.g. Fludernik 2009:21). In

translational mimesis always represents not only another language but also another’s speech or thought act. Therefore, translator and translatee cannot be the same textual agent. In other words, translational mimesis and represented self-translation are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, translator and translatee inhabit different narrative levels. Only a textual agent inhabiting a level of narration can present another textual agent’s speech or thought act. Hence, in the case of translational mimesis, the fictional translator has to be a narrator. This can be a heterodiegetic narrator, a homodiegetic narrator or—in the case of embedded narratives—an intradiegetic narrator. Heterodiegetic narrators

Iconic hybridity, on the other hand, is the product of representing the self-translation performed by a character or an embodied narrator and therefore represents hybridity as object. The representation of this self-translation is immediate, or rather, it purports to be immediate. This verbatim reproduction is of course an illusion, as all speech and thought presentation is mediated by the narrator (see also Fludernik 2009:65). Furthermore,

and what one reader might read as translational mimesis, another might read as the represented self-translation of an embodied textual agent or even as nonrepresentational hybridity and vice versa. In other words, the reading of an instance of linguistic hybridity on the level of text as nonrepresentational hybridity, symbolic hybridity or iconic hybridity is a cognitive construct based on the interaction of linguistic cues in the text on the one hand and our prior knowledge, assumptions and beliefs on the other hand. The

not only that symbolic hybridity can signal perspective—both the language facet of perspective and, indirectly, the perception facet of perspective—but also that symbolic hybridity can only feature in specific discourse categories, namely those categories that can contain elements of the character’s discourse and thus have a mimetic quality. TT shifts in linguistic hybridity can therefore lead to TT shifts in discourse category and these discourse-category shifts in turn can trigger TT shifts in the language facet of perspective. The following discussion will illustrate this in more detail. For this, I will draw on Leech and Short’s (2007) as well as Brian McHale’s (1978) classification of speech and thought presentation. Leech and Short (2007:255ff.) distinguish the following five speech-presentation categories: Narrative Report of Speech Act (NRSA) Indirect Speech (IS) Free Indirect Speech (FIS) Direct Speech (DS) Free Direct Speech (FDS) For a detailed discussion of these five speech-presentation categories see Leech and Short 2007:255–270. McHale (1978:258–259) further subdivides indirect discourse into (i) “indirect content paraphrase” and (ii) “indirect discourse, mimetic to some degree”. Building on McHale, I will therefore distinguish between (i) indirect speech (IS) and (ii) mimetic indirect speech (MIS). Short (1996:293) refers to NRSA as “Narrative Representation of Speech Acts” rather than “Narrative Report of Speech Act” and adds another category, that of “Narrator’s Representation of Speech (NRS)”. NRS is the most minimalist form of speech presentation, as it “merely tells us that speech occurred” without “specify[ing] the speech act(s) involved

first level, which he terms recognition, “concerns the way in which we individuate and reidentify characters—that is, perceive them as unique and distinct from other characters, and as continuous across the narrative” (2005:97). Alignment, the second level of engagement, “describes the way in which our access to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of characters is controlled and organized” (2005:97). The third and highest level of engagement, allegiance, “describes an emotional reaction that arises out of the moral structuring of the film, that is, the way the film invites us to respond with regard to characters morally” (2005:97). In other words, “[w]hile alignment denotes our knowledge of a character’s actions, feelings, and states of mind, allegiance refers to our evaluation of and emotional response to such actions, feelings, and states of mind” (2005:97). Our

In Cohn’s terminology, discordant narration refers to a narration in which the author signals to the reader that s/he “intends his or her work to be understood differently from the way the narrator understands it” (2000:307). The

TT shifts in linguistic hybridity can erase the narrator’s alignment with this particular culture. If no discordancy markers are present, this alignment is concordant (i.e. the default assumption). When the alignment is concordant and the TT erases the ST’s alignment, it simultaneously also erases the narrator’s sympathetic allegiance with this culture. Erasing the narrator’s sympathetic allegiance, as we have seen in the previous section, can in turn prevent the TT reader from forming a sympathetic response towards this culture on the level of allegiance.

In other words, the mapping process will depend on the TT reader’s awareness of reading a TT and, therefore, on the TT reader’s awareness of the translator’s presence in the discourse-world. This

Gillian Gane, who refers to Sternberg’s distinction in her paper “Achebe, Soyinka, and Other-Languagedness” (2003), unfortunately then

Although narratology has provided us with a general distinction between language as object and language as medium, and although Meir Sternberg (1981), building on this distinction, proposed to distinguish between represented translation and representing translation according to the narrative level on which the translational act occurs—I

If we therefore assume that the TT erasure or dilution of linguistic hybridity present in the ST as well as the TT addition of linguistic hybridity not present in the ST is a common phenomenon, then the question that arises is whether and how TT shifts in linguistic hybridity can alter the meaning potential of a text. In particular, can TT shifts in linguistic hybridity affect the reader’s construction of the narrator’s and the characters’ world-view and, hence, ultimately also the reader’s own world-view, and if so, how? We can only address this

I intend the term “hybrid English” here to mean an English that has roots in both worlds—the former colonies as well as the former colonial centre in the case of postcolonial writing, the country of origin as well as the destination country in the case of migrant writing and the target audience’s culture as well as the travel destination in the case of travel writing. In the context of postcolonial writing, Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (2002:8) set up the useful distinction between “english” and “English” (also “metropolitan English”), where the former refers to the several varieties of English (“englishes”) that have developed in the former British colonies—including fictional varieties only to be found in postcolonial literature—and the latter to those varieties of English indigenous to the erstwhile colonial centre itself. In the context of postcolonial writing, my term “hybrid English” is therefore synonymous with Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin’s coinage “english”. Of

As the discussion in this chapter is predominantly concerned with TT shifts in representational hybridity, and as representational hybridity is linked to its speaker, that is, it is defined by its quality of representing the language of a character or—in the case of iconic hybridity—also an embodied narrator, it makes sense to postulate a separate language facet, as this is the facet where the absence or presence of linguistic hybridity can signal perspective, as long as we keep in mind (i) that the language facet does not necessarily belong to the same textual agent as the other facets of perspective and (ii) that TT shifts in the language facet can trigger TT shifts in other facets too. For

Patrick Goethals and July De Wilde notice that “in comparison with the ST, in the TT the deictic center is more frequently anchored to the main narrated situation […], except when the narrating situation is explicitly referred to” (2009:791). They conclude that rather than showing a tendency towards anchoring the deictic centre to the level of narration, translators tend “to emphasize the most secure vantage point” (2009:792; emphasis original). Goethals and De Wilde are of the opinion that “the translational shifts are traces of the translator’s cognitive deictic center shift, i.e., the interpreter’s effort of adopting the vantage point of the […] voice(s) in the text” (2009:791). Whether the translator is oriented more towards the vantage point of a character or that of the narrator “is text-dependent” (2009:792). Hence,

Thus, a TT that normalizes ST hybridity, but on the other hand does not introduce TT hybridity in text segments that originally featured narratorial perspective, might comply less with Western stereotypes than a TT that violates target-language rules and norms and thus only translates the author’s subversion of the colonial language but not the narrative function that the absence or presence of linguistic hybridity plays in the ST. This

When reading a ST, the reader will map the ST author onto the narrator (and vice versa). In Munday’s model, the ST reader/translator assumes the position in the TT that is occupied by the author in the ST. However, from this it does not necessarily follow that the TT reader will map the TT narrator onto the translator and vice versa, in analogy with the mapping process that occurs in the ST.

The more accentuated this awareness of reading a TT—that is, a mediated version of the words of the ST author—the more likely it is that the TT reader maps both the ST and the TT author (or characteristics of each one of them) onto the TT narrator. Some textual strategies,

due to its iconic quality (i.e. the representing language and the represented language are identical) iconic hybridity (i) signifies a norm departure and (ii) highlights in-betweenness. Symbolic hybridity, on the other hand, (i) signifies a norm and (ii) highlights otherness. This is

Verbal transposition often takes the form of inverted word order, unusual noun-verb or adjective-noun collocations, epizeuxis (a common characteristic of West African languages; see e.g. Zabus 2007:140) or literally translated idiomatic expressions such as in the following example:

David Klinger did with police officers for his fascinating book Into the Kill Zone.

There is a theory that any one who talks enough on any subject must, if only by chance, finally say something not altogether incorrect.

Aѕѕiѕtаnt principal Mindу Stаrr shivered аѕ she hurried bеhind ѕсhооl соunсilоr Nаnсу Oliviа.

Du schriebst mir in Deinem letzten Brief von der Frau Reiher, daß ich dieselbe vom Bahnhof abholen sollte etc. Das ist mir sehr unangenehm, erstens kenne ich sie gar nicht, zweitens wird mit demselben Zuge Heinrich ankommen, drittens kennst du ja meine Bockbeinigkeit, Unbeholfenheit, Steifheit und was der schönen gesellschaftlichen Tugenden mehr sind selbst. Dann fürchte ich auch von ihr bei Präsedin's eingeführt zu werden. Ich kann Dir versichern, daß ich keine, gar keine Zeit zu Visiten habe, und zweitens wüßte ich gar nicht, warum ich die Leute belästigen sollte. Gott im Himmel mir grauts schon davor. Ich bitte Dich also recht herzlich darum, der Frau Reiher das alles gleich zu sagen, denn ich habe wirklich keine Zeit dazu. Max Klinger (17) an die Mutter

Stress hormones are like hallucinogenic drugs. Almost no one gets through an ordeal like this without experiencing some kind of altered reality. In one study of shootings of civilians by police officers, 94 percent of officers experienced at least one distortion, according to criminologist David Klinger’s interviews with the officers involved. But very few knew what to expect beforehand. So their distortions distracted and even embarrassed some of them.

Back in 2001, another study by The Washington Post found that police officers were more likely to be killed by black people, rather than vice versa. Specifically, it noted that blacks committed 43 percent of cop killings, despite being just 13 percent of the U.S. population. Data from ProPublica (a center-left organization) found that 62 percent of black people shot by police between 2005 and 2009 were either resisting arrest or assaulting an officer. David Klinger, a criminology professor at the University of Missouri–St. Louis, studied more than three hundred cops to find that “multiple” officers were disinclined to use deadly force against a black suspect—even when it was permitted. Conversely, black offenders committed 52 percent of homicides in America between 1980 and 2008. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 93 percent of black victims were killed by other African Americans, while 84 percent of white victims were killed by other Caucasians.

Erwürg mein Gefühl; oder schaff' mir einen Platz, wo ich all meine Tätigkeit, all mein Vermögen brauch‘.