Jomini Quotes

I had read the usual books (too many books), Clausewitz and Jomini, Mahan and Foch, had played at Napoleon’s campaigns, worked at Hannibal’s tactics, and the wars of Belisarius, like any other man at Oxford; but I had never thought myself into the mind of a real commander compelled to fight a campaign of his own.

The celebrated maxim of the Romans, not to undertake two great wars at the same time, is so well known and so well appreciated as to spare the necessity of demonstrating its wisdom. A government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two neighboring states; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it does not find an ally to come to its aid, with a view to its own safety and the maintenance of the political equilibrium. It will seldom be the case that the nations allied against it will have the same interest in the war and will enter into it with all their resources; and if one is only an auxiliary, it will be an ordinary war.

La bataille de Waterloo est une énigme. Elle est aussi obscure pour ceux qui l’ont gagnée que pour celui qui l’a perdue. Pour Napoléon, c’est une panique* ; Blücher n’y voit que du feu ; Wellington n’y comprend rien. Voyez les rapports. Les bulletins sont confus, les commentaires sont embrouillés. Ceux-ci balbutient, ceux-là bégayent. Jomini partage la bataille de Waterloo en quatre moments ; Muffling la coupe en trois péripéties ; Charras, quoique sur quelques points nous ayons une autre appréciation que lui, a seul saisi de son fier coup d’œil les linéaments caractéristiques de cette catastrophe du génie humain aux prises avec le hasard divin.

Admittedly, careful reading of each man's final treatise, Jomini's Summary of the Art of War and Clausewitz's On War, blurs the sharp distinctions some like to draw between their respective thoughts on success in war. It reveals the ironic twist that, in their theoretical approaches to the study of conflict, Jomini is more Clausewitzian, and Clausewitz more Jominian, than many people believe. Jomini is often, and unjustly, depicted as rigid, methodical, and legalistic in his approach to military theory. Yet, in the opening passages of his magnum opus, he defends himself against such accusations. the ensemble of my principles and of the maxims which are derived from them, has been badly comprehended by several writers; that some have made the most erroneous application of them; that others have drawn from them exaggerated consequences which have never been able to enter my head; for a general officer, after having assisted in a dozen campaigns, ought to know that war is a great drama, in which a thousand physical or moral causes operate more or less powerfully, and which cannot be reduced to mathematical calculations.1

The fundamental difference between Clausewitz and Jomini is that while the Prussian roamed in the psychological and philosophic domains of battle, peering into the metaphysical darkness whence come the intangible but nevertheless omnipresent components of combat, Jomini was more concerned with the more immediate character of war as it exists, and so dealt more with the tangible, less with the philosophic.3

For Jominians, the duty of theory is to uncover these immutable truths and to advocate their adoption and use. In the words of Jomini himself, "convinced that I had seized the true point of view under which it was necessary to regard the theory of war in order to discover its veritable rules, . . . I set myself to the work with the ardor of a neophyte."5 The Jominian school acknowledges that the nature of war is complex and dramatic, and that, consequently, its complete mastery is truly an art form. However, the strategy of war is scientific, knowable, constant, and governed by principles of eternal validity.

He meant that Patton could not be bothered with details before making a decision. After Patton made a decision, he worked out everything in great detail, in true von Clausewitz style. Hodges and Bradley, like true Jomini planners, worked out all the details beforehand-they thought that was how you made decisions in the first place.

From this basis, Boyd sets out to develop a normative view on a design for command and control. As in Patterns of Conflict, he starts with some ‘samples from historical environment’, offering nine citations from nine practitioners, including from himself (see Box 6.1):6 Sun Tzu (around 400 BC) Probe enemy strength to unmask his strengths, weaknesses, patterns of movement and intentions. Shape enemy’s perception of world to manipulate/undermine his plans and actions. Employ Cheng/Ch’I maneuvers to quickly and unexpectedly hurl strength against weaknesses. Bourcet (1764–71) A plan ought to have several branches . . . One should . . . mislead the enemy and make him imagine that the main effort is coming at some other part. And . . . one must be ready to profit by a second or third branch of the plan without giving one’s enemy time to consider it. Napoleon (early 1800s) Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less chary of the latter than the former. Space we can recover, time never. I may lose a battle, but I shall never lose a minute. The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack. Clausewitz (1832) Friction (which includes the interaction of many factors, such as uncertainty, psychological/moral forces and effects, etc.) impedes activity. Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. In this sense, friction represents the climate or atmosphere of war. Jomini (1836) By free and rapid movements carry bulk of the forces (successively) against fractions of the enemy. N.B. Forrest (1860s) Git thar the fustest with the mostest. Blumentritt (1947) The entire operational and tactical leadership method hinged upon . . . rapid concise assessment of situations, . . . and quick decision and quick execution, on the principle: each minute ahead of the enemy is an advantage. Balck (1980) Emphasis upon creation of implicit connections or bonds based upon trust, not mistrust, that permit wide freedom for subordinates to exercise imagination and initiative – yet harmonize within intent of superior commanders. Benefit: internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability. Yours truly Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops to enmesh adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos . . . and/or fold adversary back inside himself so that he cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold.

Clausewitz’ decisive point referred to a mass against which to concentrate force; Jomini’s represented “a portion of the enemy, such as a flank, or it may be a piece of terrain, the destruction of which will lead to a decision in the operation.” In a sense, Clausewitz looked at a decisive point as something to demolish; Jomini saw it as something to leverage. Those possessed with a Clausewitzian orientation usually talk of destroying decisive points, while those with a Jominian persuasion most often describe decisive points as places to dislocate or “unhinge” an enemy.

Las varias vías que se han estudiado en este libro comenzaban todas apuntando, con excesiva confianza, que una vez que se adoptaran las medidas adecuadas, los objetivos se podrían conseguir casi inevitablemente. El fenómeno napoleónico condujo a Jomini y a Clausewitz a explicar a los generales novatos cómo podían vencer en batallas decisivas y así decidir el destino de las naciones. El recuerdo de la Revolución francesa y la comprensión del malestar político y social animó a los primeros revolucionarios profesionales a imaginar insurrecciones decisivas de donde emergerían nuevas formas de órdenes sociales. Más de un siglo después, las grandes empresas americanas —aparentemente inatacables y disfrutando de unas condiciones del mercado benignas— fueron animadas por Chandler, Drucker y Sloan a considerar la estrategia como una guía para sus estructuras organizativas y para elaborar sus planes a largo plazo, de modo que pudieran mantener aquel feliz estado empresarial y económico. En los tres casos (los militares, los revolucionarios y los empresarios) la experiencia acabó socavando los cimientos de aquella confianza. La victoria en la batalla no necesariamente conducía a la victoria en la guerra. Las clases dominantes encontraban modos para someter las exigencias populares de más derechos políticos y económicos, y esos modos eran muy distintos a los que utilizaban los revolucionarios. La cómoda posición dominante de los fabricantes americanos empezó a tambalearse con la competencia internacional, sobre todo —aunque no solamente— de Japón.