Gru Quotes

There’s no English equivalent for silovik. It doesn’t translate succinctly because to create something as Machiavellian as a silovik requires both the KGB and the GRU, and then a shift from communism to capitalism followed by a gear-grinding reverse into despotism.

We stole the Statue of Liberty…! [the minions cheer] …the small one, from Las Vegas!” [the cheers stop] — as Gru

It’s unbelievable; the man is dressed as Gru, for fuck’s sake, but I swear one touch, and I’m going to combust.

Si que­da­ba al­gu­na es­pe­ran­za, debía estar en los pro­les, por­que solo en esas masas des­pre­cia­das, que cons­ti­tuían el ochen­ta y cinco por cien­to de la po­bla­ción de Ocea­nía, podía ge­ne­rar­se la fuer­za ne­ce­sa­ria para des­truir al Par­ti­do. Este no podía de­rro­car­se desde den­tro. Sus enemi­gos, si es que los había, no te­nían forma de unir­se o si­quie­ra de re­co­no­cer­se mu­tua­men­te. In­clu­so en caso de que exis­tie­ra la le­gen­da­ria Her­man­dad —lo cual no era del todo im­po­si­ble— re­sul­ta­ba in­con­ce­bi­ble que sus miem­bros pu­die­ran re­unir­se en gru­pos de más de dos o tres. La re­be­lión se li­mi­ta­ba a un cruce de mi­ra­das, una in­fle­xión de la voz o, como mucho, una pa­la­bra su­su­rra­da oca­sio­nal­men­te. En cam­bio los pro­les, si pu­die­ran ser cons­cien­tes de su fuer­za, no ten­drían ne­ce­si­dad de cons­pi­rar. Bas­ta­ría con que se en­ca­bri­ta­ran como un ca­ba­llo que se sa­cu­de las mos­cas. Si qui­sie­ran, po­drían volar el Par­ti­do en pe­da­zos a la ma­ña­na si­guien­te. Tarde o tem­prano tenía que ocu­rrír­se­les. Y sin em­bar­go…

GRU. O riddle for the executioner [4], as I guess it will turn out; they'll be so pinking you with goads, as you carry your gibbet [5] along the streets one day, as soon as ever the old gentleman returns here.

Do you hear? ho! you must meet my master to countenance my mistress. Why, she hath a face of her own. Who knows not that? Thou, it seems, that callest for company to countenance her. 40 Curt. I call them forth to credit her. Gru. Why, she comes to borrow nothing of them.

Yes, I could be wrong too. Someday one of the tasks will be my last.

On July 13, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging Russian military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various U.S. computers used by the Clinton Campaign, DNC, DCCC, and other U.S. persons, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count One); committing identity theft and conspiring to commit money laundering in furtherance of that hacking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A and 1956(h) (Counts Two through Ten); and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U.S. election, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count Eleven). Netyksho Indictment.1277 As of this writing, all 12 defendants remain at large.

The highest ranking Russian intelligence officer to defect from Russia, Stanislav Lunev, testified at a Congressional hearing held in California in January, 2000. Before his defection the former Russian spy official was with the GRU (the Foreign Military Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation). Hooded while testifying, to protect his identity, as Lunev is in the U.S. Witness Protection Program, he told Congressmen that not only did Russia manufacture the RA-115 suitcase nukes, but that some were currently planted in the United States.

Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the thirty thousand emails that are missing,” Trump said, referring to the messages that Clinton had deleted from her private server. “I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press.” There was a hush in the hotel lobby, broken by the exclamation of a single editor: “Holy shit.” Hours later, GRU hackers for the first time launched spearphishing attacks against private email accounts used by Clinton’s personal office and seventy-six addresses associated with the campaign.

He sensed genuine grief on Anatoly’s face. The GRU man had a mission, but something of it all touched him on a human level. After all, doesn’t every man suffer the pangs of the human condition—no matter how far he’s strived to remove himself from feeling?

Dov'era Amore (o l'Es, parafrasando Freud), là sarà l'io (o l'anima razionale, o il libero arbitrio); è esattamente su questo punto che Dante prende le distanze dalle gru guinizzelliane e dalle parole di Francesca, e s'innalza al proprio paradiso in cui ragione e talento, disio e velle sincronizzano i propri moti come ingranaggi di un ordigno celeste, affidandosi al solo Amore con la maiuscola, alla sola ipostasi, che d'altra parte non è più un'ipostasi perché gode di esistenza reale: l'energia cosmica, la potenza divina che move il sole e l'altre stelle.

Have you ever seen that movie “Despicable me,” the first one? Gru, the main character has become a criminal, and in a simple way, the creators of the movie suggest that he became that way because he was neglected by his mother.

Without any question, no matter what side of the aisle one sits on, the simple fact is that the United States was attacked by Russian cyber commandos deployed by Vladimir Putin and organized by his intelligence apparatus, the FSB and GRU. It was a serious act of political warfare.

both hands against the door. “Feet wider apart. That’s right. Like in the American movies.” Satisfied, Qazi patted the man down. “What, no gun? A GRU man without a gun …” Qazi carefully felt the man’s crotch and the arms above the wrists. “First humor and now this! The GRU will become a laughingstock. But of course there is a microphone.” Qazi lifted all the pens from the Russian’s shirt pocket and examined them, one by one. “It had better be here, Chekhov, or you will have to part with your buttons and your shoes.” It was in the third pen. “Now turn around and sit against the door.” The Russian’s face was covered with perspiration, his fleshy lips twisted in a sneer. “The shoes.” Qazi examined them carefully and tossed them back. “Now the coat.” This he scrutinized minutely. From the uppermost of the large three buttons on the front of the coat a very fine wire was just visible buried amid the thread that held the button on. Qazi sawed the button free with a small pocketknife, then dropped the pen and button down a commode. He tossed the coat back to Chekhov. “And the belt.” After a quick glance, Qazi handed it back. “Hurry, we have much to say to each other.” He unscrewed the silencer and replaced the pistol in his ankle holster. He opened the door as the Russian scrambled awkwardly to his feet. An hour later the two men were seated in the Sistine Chapel against the back wall, facing the altar and Michelangelo’s masterpiece The Last Judgment behind it. On the right the high windows admitted a subdued light. Qazi kept his eyes on the tourists examining the paintings on the ceiling and walls. “Is it in Rome, as General Simonov promised?” “Yes. But you must tell us why you want it.” “Is it genuine, or is it a masterpiece from an Aquarium print shop?” The Aquarium was the nickname for GRU headquarters in Moscow. The Russian’s lips curled, revealing yellow, impacted teeth. This was his smile. “We obtained it from Warrant Officer Walker.” “Ah, those Americans! One wonders just how long they knew about Walker’s activities.” The Russian raised his shoulders and lowered them. “Why do you want the document?” “El Hakim has not authorized me to reveal his reasons. Not that we don’t trust you. We value the goodwill of the Soviet Union most highly. And we intend to continue to cultivate that goodwill. But to reveal what you do not need to know is to take the risk that the Americans will learn of our plans through their activities against you.” “If you are implying they have penetrated—” “Chekhov, I am not implying anything. I am merely weighing risks. And I am being very forthright with you. No subterfuge. No evasion. Just the plain truth. Surely a professional like you can appreciate that?” “This document is very valuable.

An example of the extent of the FSB and GRU covert cyber collection and exploitation was the exposure of what was most likely a Russian State Security & Navy Intelligence covert operation to monitor, exploit and hack targets within the central United States from Russian merchant ships equipped with advanced hacking hardware and tools. The US Coast guard boarded the merchant ship SS Chem Hydra and in it they found wireless intercept equipment associated with Russian hacking teams. Apparently the vessel had personnel on board who were tasked to collect intelligence on wireless networks and attempt hackings on regional computer networks in the heartland of America.59

You, Jamie Grimm, are the new Gru!” “From

Defense Minister, General Militaru was definitely from the latter category. Iliescu wanted terrorists and he was about to provide them. The whole country wanted the terrorists caught and he wanted to provide that, too, he wanted to serve. Ceauşescu had stopped Militaru from serving eleven years before 1989. It was 1978 and Militaru was a three star general when he was pulled out of active duty and given a position in management in the Construction Industry Ministry - luckily for him. He was lucky. Ceauşescu feared the Russians. Militaru’s name came out in the Raven’s file as a GRU agent. The GRU was the secret service of the Red Army, and this was the reason why Ceauşescu took the Second Army from Militaru’s command and gave him that petty job in the construction industry. He would have been killed if Ceauşescu didn’t fear the Soviet backlash, that’s for sure. Twenty years after 1989 I see the events more clearly. But on that night I was young and stupid, and open to being manipulated like the other 23 million Romanians.

It began two years earlier when Karetnikov seized the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine in broad daylight and dared the West to make him pay. As sanctions were levied against Karetnikov’s associates, the European Commission passed regulation after regulation to prevent South Stream from being built and leaned on the Bulgarian government, where the pipeline would come ashore, to end their involvement. Gazprom executives and Kremlin emissaries began clandestine pilgrimages to Bojan Siderov, the prime minister of Bulgaria, and showered the country with politically strategic investments. Ivanov warily helped the GRU, Russian military intelligence, funnel millions to Ataka, a far-right party opposed to European integration and the exploration of Bulgarian shale gas. After parliamentary elections, Ataka gained enough seats to bolster Siderov’s coalition and pass a bill clearing the way for the pipeline. Everything was in order, and even as of that morning, pipe-laying ships were at work in the Black Sea.

The first report from the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti—the Federal Security Service, or FSB—concerned domestic threats, such as the latest on counterterrorism operations in the Caucasus. The next was from the FSO and contained recent information on opposition figures that displeased him. Another from the GRU outlined the directorate’s support to separatist militias in the eastern Donbass region of Ukraine. Finally, a report from the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki—the Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR—kept him abreast of phone conversations placed from the hotels of the Ukrainian and American diplomats currently meeting in Berlin with his foreign minister, Uri Popoff.

June 1943, Stalin passed Molotov a list of twelve questions about the atomic bomb project and demanded swift answers; the Russian foreign minister passed the list to the GRU’s director, Lieutenant General Ivan Ilyichev, who immediately sent a telegram to the London residency, for the attention of Sonya. On June 28, Ursula met Fuchs in Banbury and passed on Stalin’s “twelve urgent requirements.” They were now spying to a shopping list drawn up by the Soviet leader himself. Fuchs duly compiled a complete account of all the intelligence he had furnished to date and everything he knew about the Tube Alloys project, a remarkable testament to his scientific prowess and, if it fell into British hands, the most damning evidence of his guilt.

the midst of that fog of confusion and misdirection, a leak to The Washington Post’s Ellen Nakashima cut through with an unequivocal statement. Her headline: “Russian Spies Hacked the Olympics and Tried to Make It Look Like North Korea Did It, U.S. Officials Say.” Again, the Post cited anonymous U.S. intelligence sources—two of them—who claimed that the GRU’s Main Center for Special Technology was behind the attack, the same hackers responsible for NotPetya. Olympic Destroyer, it seemed to follow, was the work of Sandworm, or at least its colleagues at the same agency.

Nakashima’s report didn’t merely suggest that the U.S. government strongly believed the Russian state was behind the attack. It also went on to name the exact organization NotPetya’s programmers worked for: the Main Center for Special Technology, or GTsST, a part of Russia’s military spy agency known as the Main Intelligence Directorate, or Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye, commonly referred to by its Russian acronym. The GRU.

But by the beginning of 2018, they were adding up to something remarkable: A single agency within the Russian government was responsible for at least three of the most brazen hacking milestones in history, all in just the past three years. The GRU, it now seemed, had masterminded the first-ever hacker-induced blackouts, the plot to interfere in a U.S. presidential election, and the most destructive cyberweapon ever released. A larger question now began to loom in my mind: Who are the GRU?

He meant that Sandworm was Unit 74455 of the GRU.

But that soldier mentality also meant GRU hackers had fewer qualms about carrying out high-risk or even highly destructive campaigns, Galeotti said. The agency maintains a macho, military culture that rewards risk taking, even to the point of shortsightedness.

WHERE ARE THE BUKS

Every single inch of my body feels blistering; it’s suffocating, maddening. I’m not even drunk, but I feel intoxicated by him, his touch, his smell. It’s unbelievable; the man is dressed as Gru, for fuck’s sake, but I swear one touch, and I’m going to combust.

On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta’s emails that had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016.

Hver gang jeg fik åbnet en af de frygtede døre, konstaterede jeg på den ene side, at låsen ikke var så indviklet, som jeg troede, og på den anden side, at jeg dér, hvor jeg frygtede at finde rædsel, tortur og gru, i stedet fandt den lille pige i alle hendes forskellige sindstemninger: ulykkelig, forvirret, rædselsslagen. Jeg var bange for at finde noget, der kunne skræmme en fireogtrediveårig kvinde, der havde set mennesker slå sig ihjel på gaden, der havde følt sine børn blive født, så hendes indvolde sprængtes, der vidste hvad napalm, tortur og koncentrationslejre var. Med det var et barns angst, jeg fandt. Omme bag ved døren stod den lille pige fuldstændig rædselsslagen fordi...

Victims included U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities.186 The GRU also targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.187 The GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity. By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as "SQL injection," by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).188 In one instance in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,189 and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.190 GRU officers [REDACTED: Investigative Technique] scanned state and local websites for vulnerabilities. For example, over a two-day period in July 2016, GRU officers [REDACTED: Investigative Technique] for vulnerabilities on websites of more than two dozen states.

On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta’ s emails that had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016.

On July 13, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging Russian military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various U.S. computers used by the Clinton Campaign, DNC, DCCC, and other U.S. persons, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count One); committing identity theft and conspiring to commit money laundering in furtherance of that hacking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A and 1956(h) (Counts Two through Ten); and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U.S. election, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count Eleven).

Valerie stared at the television screen in a daze, watching as Gru and his minions prepared to steal the moon.

George Abramovich Koval … was an American who acted as a Soviet intelligence officer for the Soviet atomic bomb project. According to Russian sources, Koval's infiltration of the Manhattan Project as a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) agent "drastically reduced the amount of time it took for Russia to develop nuclear weapons." … Koval was born to Russian Jewish immigrants in Sioux City, Iowa. … George Koval attended Central High School, a red-brick Victorian building better known as "the Castle on the Hill". Neighbors recalled that Koval spoke openly of his Communist beliefs. … He graduated in 1929 at the age of 15. … Abram Koval became the secretary for ICOR, the Organization for Jewish Colonization in the Soviet Union. Founded by American Jewish Communists in 1924, the group helped to finance and publicize the development of the "Jewish Autonomous Region" – the Soviet answer to Jewish emigration to the British Mandate of Palestine then being undertaken by the Zionist movement.

you can also play with the LSTM. We’ve used a simple approach, but you can increase num_layers to create stacked LSTMs, increase or decrease the number of hidden features in the layer, or set bidirectional=true to create a biLSTM. Replacing the entire LSTM with a GRU layer would also be an interesting thing to try; does it train faster? Is it more accurate? Experiment and see what you find!

No American press was allowed in to record the meeting. Lavrov, however, had brought a photographer who worked for the state news agency Tass. In Soviet times, journalists for Tass were typically KGB or GRU officers. The photographer took equipment into the Oval Office. What, exactly? The photos show Trump warmly shaking Lavrov’s hand. Another reveals him patting Lavrov on the shoulder. Trump and Kislyak posed together. The president grins.

Obama expelled thirty-five people described as Russian “intelligence operatives.” He slapped sanctions on two Russian intelligence agencies—the military and civilian spy services, respectively, the GRU and FSB, as well as four “cyber officials” and three companies said to support Russian cyber operations. Further, he shuttered Russian-owned buildings on Long Island and Maryland’s eastern shoreline, which were suddenly branded as intelligence operations. Mind you, these facilities and operatives had been up and running throughout Obama’s presidency. No meaningful action was taken against them throughout the 2016 campaign, while Obama was being extensively briefed about Russia’s hacking and propaganda operations. Nor when Russia annexed Crimea, consolidated its de facto seizure of eastern Ukraine, propped up Assad, armed Iran, buzzed U.S. naval vessels, and saber-rattled in the Baltics. Only now, to prop up a postelection emphasis on the Trump–Russia narrative.

Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, GRU officers targeted for the first time Clinton's personal office. After candidate Trump's remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain [REDACTED: Personal Privacy] including an email account belonging to Clinton aide [REDACTED: Personal Privacy] The investigation did not find evidence of earlier GRU attempts to compromise accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was able to identify these email accounts, which were not public.184

By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as "SQL injection," by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).188 In one instance in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,189 and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.190

At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus on supporting candidate Trump in early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions (hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army (GRU) carried out these operations.

The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.

Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta's emails that had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a joint public statement "that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations." Those "thefts" and the "disclosures" of the hacked materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, "are intended to interfere with the US election process.

For all that we have so far explained about the future, how could a KGB spy be included with the likes of Nostradamus or a Roman emperor’s Chaldean astrologer? What if I told you that KGB and GRU spies have made many accurate predictions about the future? What if I told you that one particular defector made 148 predictions with an accuracy rating of almost 94 percent?

Nå vet jeg saktens at Hagbart levde et liv som var mørkere og ondere enn vårt. Så vanskelig må det ha vært, at når ikke ble knekket, så måtte han bli hard og innadvendt fjern og voksen altfor tidlig. Armert og usårbar kanskje. For mange som vokste opp i gru og elendighet, de får enten sår i sjelen og frost i sinnet, eller de danner skall om seg av træler og arr. Da eier de liten varme, men seig styrke. Til godt eller ondt.

Jeg kan ikke minnes å ha vært så skjelvende vettskremt noen gang i min oppvekst. Hva i herrens navn var det som forestod? Kom denne brystfagre valkyrien til å gå løs på meg med knytnevene? Da var jeg fortapt. Eller planla hun det som langt verre var: leke far og mor i høyet, - voksen klining og sånt der som bare hadde vage teorier om? I så fall var jeg slått ut og fornedret for all fremtid. Aldri skal jeg glemme Holmboe-stallen! Dunkel, lummer med ram stank av hest og høy. Svanger av synd og gru. Jeg håpet: nå slår hun.

Both GRU spetsnaz and KBG osnaz teams disguised themselves as enlisted men and mingled on special assignments with regular military units, including submariners. The special operations units were broken into teams of eight to ten men with an officer, warrant officer, or senior petty officer in charge. This unit description corresponds to the odd group of sailors who boarded K-129 at the last minute. That group numbered ten men and a leader wearing the insignia of a senior petty officer. It was later reported that, while a number of crew replacements came from other submarines in the Kamchatka Flotilla, the origin of this last group of eleven men has never been determined—or at least never been reported by Russians authorities writing about the K-129 incident.