Fichte Quotes

A man can do what he ought to do; and when he says he cannot, it is because he will not.

What sort of philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of man one is; for a philosophical system is not a dead piece of furniture that we can accept or reject as we wish, it is rather a thing animated by the soul of the person who holds it.

The living and efficaciously acting moral order is itself God. We require no other God, nor can we grasp any other.

We do not act because we know, but we know because we are destined for action; practical reason is the root of all reason.

[T]he human being (and so all finite beings generally) becomes human only among others. Self and other stand in a relation of potential reciprocity.

The more narrow-minded a system is the more it will please worldly-wise people. Thus the system of the materialists, the doctrine of Helvetius and also Locke has recieved the most acclaim amongst his class. Thus Kant even now will find more followers than Fichte.

The aim of all government is to make all government superfluous.

The majority of men could sooner be brought to believe themselves a piece of lava in the moon than to take themselves for a self.

Alle Kraft der Menschen wird erworben durch Kampf mit sich selbst und Überwindung seiner selbst.

Hindoo wisdom long ago regarded the world as the dream of Brahma. Must we hold with Fichte that it is the individual dream of each individual ego? Every fool would then be a cosmogonic poet producing the firework of the universe under the dome of the infinite.

Men in the vehement pursuit of happiness grasp at the first object which offers to them any prospect of satisfaction, but immediately they turn an introspective eye and ask, ‘Am I happy?’ and at once from their innermost being a voice answers distinctly, ‘No, you are as poor and as miserable as before.' Then they think it was the object that deceived them and turn precipitately to another. But the second holds as little satisfaction as the first…Wandering then through life restless and tormented, at each successive station they think that happiness dwells at the next, but when they reach it happiness is no longer there. In whatever position they may find themselves there is always another one which they discern from afar, and which but to touch, they think, is to find the wished delight, but when the goal is reached discontent has followed on the way stands in haunting constancy before them.

Upon the progress of knowledge the whole progress of the human race is immediately dependent: he who retards that, hinders this also.

In nearly all the nations of Europe, a powerful, hostile government is growing, and is at war with all the others, and sometimes oppresses the people in dreadful ways: It is Jewry

The most obvious symptoms of an epoch-making system are the misunderstandings and the awkward conduct of its adversaries.

State philosophy reposes on a double identity: of the thinking subject, and of the concepts it creates and to which it lends its own presumed attributes of sameness and constancy. The subjects, its concepts, and also the objects in the world to which the concepts are applied have a shared, internal essence: the self-resemblance at the basis of identity. Representational thought is analogical; its concern is to establish a correspondence between these symmetrically structured domains. The faculty of judgment is the policeman of analogy, assuring that each of these terms is honestly itself, and that the proper correspondences obtain. In thought its end is truth, in action justice. The weapons it wields in their pursuit are limitive distribution (the determination of the exclusive set of properties possessed by each term in contradistinction to the others: logos, law) and hierarchical ranking (the measurement of the degree of perfection of a term’s self-resemblance in relation to a supreme standard, man, god, or gold: value, morality). The modus operandi is negation: x = x = not y. Identity, resemblance, truth, justice, and negation. The rational foundation for order. The established order, of course: philosophers have traditionally been employees of the State. The collusion between philosophy and the State was most explicitly enacted in the first decade of the nineteenth century with the foundation of the University of Berlin, which was to become the model of higher learning throughout Europe and in the United States. The goal laid out for it by Wilhelm von Humboldt (based on proposals by Fichte and Schleiermacher) was the ‘spiritual and moral training of the nation,’ to be achieved by ‘deriving everything from an original principle’ (truth), by ‘relating everything to an ideal’ (justice), and by ‘unifying this principle and this ideal to a single Idea’ (the State). The end product would be ‘a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society’ – each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State. More insidious than the well-known practical cooperation between university and government (the burgeoning military funding of research) is its philosophical role in the propagation of the form of representational thinking itself, that ‘properly spiritual absolute State’ endlessly reproduced and disseminated at every level of the social fabric.

One does not ask about one's true identity simply as a matter of course, but only in rather special circumstances. What this means, I believe, is that "who I really am" becomes an issue for me only when my system of values "breaks down," that is, only when I realize that the values according to which I have lived until now are insufficient to inform a life that I can recognize as satisfying. This realization can occur in variety of circumstances: when my beliefs about myself or the world undergo significant change; when I find that two of my values conflict in a fundamental way; or when, as in the present example, the relations among my previous commitments are insufficiently determinate to tell me what to do in the particular situation I face.

Nietzsche, like Goethe, held no high opinion of the German people,* and in other ways, too, the outpourings of this megalomaniacal genius differ from those of the chauvinistic German thinkers of the nineteenth century. Indeed, he regarded most German philosophers, including Fichte and Hegel, as “unconscious swindlers.” He poked fun at the “Tartuffery of old Kant.” The Germans, he wrote in Ecce Homo, “have no conception how vile they are,” and he came to the conclusion that “wheresoever Germany penetrated, she ruins culture.” He thought that Christians, as much as Jews, were responsible for the “slave morality” prevalent in the world;

The Wissenschaftslehre is Fichte's "means for coming to terms with, and if possible, mitigating, the painful existential division within our own selves".

Communism must be distinguished clearly from socialism, the former being based on a community of goods, an absence of individual property, the latter meaning, in the first place a co-operation of individual with individual, of worker with worker, and a recognition of human individuality in every one. socialism is Aryan (Owen, Carlyle, Ruskin, Fichte). Communism is Jewish (Marx). Modern social democracy has moved far apart from the earlier socialism, precisely because Jews have taken so large a share in developing it. In spite of the associative element in it, the Marxian doctrine does not lead in any way towards the State as a union of all the separate individual aims, as the higher unit combining the purposes of the lower units.

Modern philosophy begins with Descartes, whose fundamental certainty is the existence of himself and his thoughts, from which the external world is to be inferred. This was only the first stage in a development, through Berkeley and Kant, to Fichte, for whom everything is only an emanation of the ego. This was insanity, and, from this extreme, philosophy has been attempting, ever since, to escape into the world of every-day common sense.

Education should aim at destroying free will, so that, after pupils have left school, they shall be incapable, throughout the rest of their lives, of thinking or acting otherwise than as their schoolmasters would have wished.

Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are in my opinion not philosophers; for they lack the first requirement of a philosopher, namely a seriousness and honesty of inquiry. They are merely sophists who wanted to appear to be rather than to be something. They sought not truth, but their own interest and advancement in the world. Appointments from governments, fees and royalties from students and publishers, and, as a means to this end, the greatest possible show and sensation in their sham philosophy-such were the guiding stars and inspiring genii of those disciples of wisdom. And so they have not passed the entrance examination and cannot be admitted into the venerable company of thinkers for the human race. Nevertheless they have excelled in one thing, in the art of beguiling the public and of passing themselves off for what they are not; and this undoubtedly requires talent, yet not philosophical.

Character is fate, the Greeks believed. A hundred years of German philosophy went into the making of this decision in which the seed of self-destruction lay embedded, waiting for its hour. The voice was Schlieffen’s, but the hand was the hand of Fichte who saw the German people chosen by Providence to occupy the supreme place in the history of the universe, of Hegel who saw them leading the world to a glorious destiny of compulsory Kultur, of Nietzsche who told them that Supermen were above ordinary controls, of Treitschke who set the increase of power as the highest moral duty of the state, of the whole German people, who called their temporal ruler the “All-Highest.” What made the Schlieffen plan was not Clausewitz and the Battle of Cannae, but the body of accumulated egoism which suckled the German people and created a nation fed on “the desperate delusion of the will that deems itself absolute.” The

And so now, today, one cannot think of the greats—Kant, Hegel, Spinoza, Marx, Fichte, Freud, Nietzsche, Einstein, Schopenhauer, Leibniz, Schelling—the whole Germanic sphere—without thinking, at some point, of Auschwitz and Treblinka, Sobibor and Dachau, Bergen-Belsen and Chelmno. My God, they have names, as if they were human.

Since Rousseau and Kant, there have been two schools of liberalism, which may be distinguished as the hard-headed and the soft-hearted. The hard-headed developed, through Bentham, Ricardo, and Marx, by logical stages into Stalin; the soft-hearted, by other logical stages, through Fichte, Byron, Carlyle, and Nietzsche, into Hitler. This statement, of course, is too schematic to be quite true, but it may serve as a map and a mnemonic. The stages in the evolution of ideas have had almost the quality of the Hegelian dialectic: doctrines have developed, by steps that each seem natural, into their opposites. But the developments have not been due solely to the inherent movement of ideas; they have been governed, throughout, by external circumstances and the reflection of these circumstances in human emotions. That this is the case may be made evident by one outstanding fact: that the ideas of liberalism have undergone no part of this development in America, where they remain to this day as in Locke.

Hamann sees more wisdom in the innocence of the child than in the learning of the philosopher

La clase de filosofía que se elige depende de la clase de hombre que se es.

Just as we often say of virtue that the greatest witness for its reality is the semblance that hypocrisy borrows from it, so Intellect cannot keep Reason off.

Presupposition, principles, and such like forms still adorn the entrance to philosophy with their cobwebs.

He who has no means of subsistence, has no duty to acknowledge or respect other people's property, considering that the principles of the social convenant have been violated to his prejudice.

Philosophy, as defined by Fichte, is the "science of sciences." Its aim was to solve the problems of the world. In the past, when all exact sciences were in their infancy, philosophy had to be purely speculative, with little or no regard to realities. But if we regard philosophy as a Mother science, divided into many branches, we find that those branches have grown so large and various, that the Mother science looks like a hen with her little ducklings paddling in a pond, far beyond her reach; she is unable to follow her growing hatchlings. In the meantime, the progress of life and science goes on, irrespective of the cackling of metaphysics. Philosophy does not fulfill her initial aim to bring the results of experimental and exact sciences together and to solve world problems. Through endless, scientific specialization scientific branches multiply, and for want of coordination the great world-problems suffer. This failure of philosophy to fulfill her boasted mission of scientific coordination is responsible for the chaos in the world of general thought. The world has no collective or organized higher ideals and aims, nor even fixed general purposes. Life is an accidental game of private or collective ambitions and greeds.

Act! act!—it is to that end we are here. Should we fret ourselves that others are not so perfect as we are, when we ourselves are only somewhat less imperfect than they? Is not this our greatest perfection,—the vocation which has been given to us,—that we must labour for the perfecting of others? Let us rejoice in the prospect of that widely extended field which we are called to cultivate! Let us rejoice that power is given to us, and that our task is infinite!

On a particular occasion I divided the science of knowledge into two main parts; one, which is the doctrine of reason and truth; the second, which is a doctrine of appearance and illusion, but one which is indeed true and is grounded in truth.

Fichte’s teaching was heady wine for a frustrated folk. To him the Latins, especially the French, and the Jews are the decadent races. Only the Germans possess the possibility of regeneration. Their language is the purest, the most original. Under them a new era in history would blossom. It would reflect the order of the cosmos. It would be led by a small elite which would be free of any moral restraints of a “private” nature. These are some of the ideas we have seen Hitler putting down in Mein Kampf.

What does it mean, you see, that the first ting every American child knows about Germany is Hitler? What if the first thing you knew was something else? And maybe some people would say that now it's important, after the Second World War, it's ethical and vital that Hitler is the first thing a child knows. But someone else can argue the opposite. And what would it do, how would it change things, if nobody were allowed to know anything about Hitler, about the war, about any of it, until first they learned about Brahms, Beethoven, and Bach, about Hegel and Lessing and Fichte, about Schopenhauer, about Rilke - but all this, you had to know first. Or one thing only, the Brahms Piano Quintet in F Minor, or the Goldberg Variations, or Laocoon - one of those things you had to know and appreciate before you leaned about the Nazis." "But the world doesn't work like that." "No, it doesn't." He smiled in that vague way, as if amused by a joke only he had heard. "But what does it mean that it doesn't? And what would it mean if it did?

Vellum” is another name for skin—at one point, philosophy was bound up in the stuff. I reached down to pick up James’s first edition of Samuel Clarke’s A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, published in 1705, and gently fingered its cold white surface as if it were a sacred relic. The term “philosophical corpus” had never made sense until now. I turned the book over. Tenderly. It was a little body: skin wrapped around something beautiful and inexplicable. Putting it under my arm, I turned to the back corners of the library. Tucked away on one of the back shelves was Josiah Royce’s library: Descartes, Spinoza, Fichte, Mill, Dilthey, Lotze, Tarde, Boole. These books were filled with marginalia. I took a quick look at one of Royce’s jottings—something written in Greek about God and strife—but then grabbed the books that I could carry. I would think about marginalia later. This wasn’t just any set of books. It was the bridge between European and American philosophy. That afternoon at dusk I had the unshakable sense that I was missing the most important part of West Wind, and over the course of three years I saw that this premonition was more correct than I could have known. Instead

In all this I feel a grave danger, the danger of what might be called cosmic impiety. The concept of 'truth' as something dependent upon facts largely outside human control has been one of the ways in which philosophy hitherto has inculcated the necessary element of humility. When this check upon pride is removed, a further step is taken on the road towards a certain kind of madness--the intoxication of power which invaded philosophy with Fichte, and to which modern men, whether philosophers or not, are prone. I am persuaded that this intoxication is the greatest danger of our time, and that any philosophy which, however unintentionally, contributes to it is increasing the danger of vast social disaster.

A young woman faces the decision of whether to marry a certain man whom she loves but who has deeply rooted, traditional ideas concerning marriage, family life, and the roles of men and women in each. A sober assessment of her future tell the woman that each of the two alternatives offers real but contrasting goods. One life offers the possibility of a greater degree of personal independence, the chance to pursue a career, perhaps more risk and adventure, while the other offers the rewards of parenting, stability, and a life together with a man whom, after all, she is in love with. In order to choose in a self-determined mode the woman must realize that the decision she faces involves more than the choice between two particular actions; it is also a choice between two distinct identities. In posing the questions "Who am I? Which of the two lives is really me?" she asks herself not a factual question about her identity but a fundamental practical question about the relative values of distinct and incommensurable goods. The point I take to be implicit in Tugendhat's (and Fichte's) view of the practical subject is that it would be mistaken to suppose that the woman had at her disposal an already established hierarchy of values that she must simply consult in order to decide whether to marry. Rather, her decision, if self-determined, must proceed from a ranking of values that emerges only in the process of reflecting upon the kind of person she wants to be.

I do not know without knowing something. I do not know anything about myself without becoming something for myself through this knowledge – or, which is simply to say the same thing, without separating something subjective in me from something objective. As soon as consciousness is posited, this separation is posited; without the latter no consciousness whatsoever is possible. Through this very separation, however, the relation of what is subjective and what is objective to each other is also immediately posited. What is objective is supposed to subsist through itself, without any help from what is subjective and independently of it. What is subjective is supposed to depend on what is objective and to receive its material determination from it alone. Being exists on its own, but knowledge depends on being: the two must appear to us in this way, just as surely as anything at all appears to us, as surely as we possess consciousness. We thereby obtain the following, important insight: knowledge and being are not separated outside of consciousness and independent of it; instead, they are separated only within consciousness, since this separation is a condition for the possibility of all consciousness, and it is only through this separation that the two of them first arise. There is no being except by means of consciousness, just as there is, outside of consciousness, no knowing, as a merely subjective reference to a being. I am required to bring about a separation simply in order to be able to say to myself “I”; and yet it is only by saying “I” and only insofar as I say this that such a separation occurs. The unity [das Eine] that is divided – which thus lies at the basis of all consciousness and due to which what is subjective and what is objective in consciousness are immediately posited as one – is absolute = X, and this can in no way appear within consciousness as something simple.

YURT - Birçok zamanlarda ve birçok yerlerde yurtseverlik tutkulu bir inanç olagelmiş ve en iyi kafalar bu inancı tamamıyla onaylamışlardır. Bu, Shakespeare zamanında İngiltere'de de böyleydi, Fichte zamanında Almanya'da da böyleydi, Mazzini zamanında İtalya'da da böyleydi. Daha hâlâ Polonya'da, Çin'de, Dış Moğolistan'da böyledir. Bu inanç, Batı ulusları arasında hâlâ son derece güçlüdür; bu inanç, siyaseti, kamu harcamalarını, askeri hazırlıkları vb. kontrolünde tutmaktadır. Ne var ki, aydın gençlik bunu elverişli bir ülkü olarak kabul edememektedir, gençlik bu inancın, baskı altındaki uluslar için uygun olduğunu, ama baskı altındaki uluslar baskıdan kurtulur kurtulmaz, daha önce kahramanca olan milliyetçiliğin hemen baskıcı hale geldiğini anlamış bulunuyor...

The public had been forced to see [by Kant's writings] that what is obscure is not always without meaning; what was senseless and without meaning at once took refuge in obscure exposition and language. Fichte was the first to grasp and make vigorous use of this privilege; Schelling at least equalled him in this, and a host of hungry scribblers without intellect or honesty soon surpassed them both. But the greatest effrontery in serving up sheer nonsense, in scrabbling together senseless and maddening webs of words, such as had previously been heard only in madhouses, finally appeared in Hegel. It became the instrument of the most ponderous and general mystification that has ever existed, with a result that will seem incredible to posterity, and be a lasting monument of German stupidity.

Why does it matter? The concept of ‘truth’ as something dependent upon facts largely outside human control has been one of the ways in which philosophy hitherto has inculcated the necessary element of humility. When this check upon pride is removed, a further step is taken on the road towards a certain kind of madness – the intoxication of power which invaded philosophy with Fichte, and to which modern men, whether philosophers or not, are prone. I am persuaded that this intoxication is the greatest danger of our time, and that any philosophy which, however unintentionally, contributes to it is increasing the danger of vast social disaster. (Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 1961a, p. 782) Why spend so much time exposing these abuses? Do the postmodernists represent a real danger? Certainly not for the natural sciences, at least not at present.

Character is fate, the Greeks believed. A hundred years of German philosophy went into the making of this decision in which the seed of self-destruction lay embedded, waiting for its hour. The voice was Schlieffen’s, [the general who concocted the attack plan] but the hand was the hand of Fichte who saw the German people chosen by Providence to occupy the supreme place in the history of the universe, of Hegel who saw them leading the world to a glorious destiny of compulsory Kultur, of Nietzsche who told them that Supermen were above ordinary controls, of Treitschke who set the increase of power as the highest moral duty of the state, of the whole German people, who called their temporal ruler the “All-Highest.” What made the Schlieffen plan was not Clausewitz and the Battle of Cannae, but the body of accumulated egoism which suckled the German people and created a nation fed on “the desperate delusion of the will that deems itself absolute.

[T]he most injurious result of Kant's occasionally obscure language is, that it acted as exemplar vitiis imitabile; indeed, it was misconstrued as a pernicious authorisation. The public was compelled to see that what is obscure is not always without significance; consequently, what was without significance took refuge behind obscure language. Fichte was the first to seize this new privilege and use it vigorously; Schelling at least equalled him; and a host of hungry scribblers, without talent and without honesty, soon outbade them both. But the height of audacity, in serving up sheer nonsense, in stringing together senseless and extravagant mazes of words, such as had previously only been heard in madhouses, was finally reached in Hegel, and became the instrument of the most ponderous general mystification that has ever taken place, with a result which will appear fabulous to posterity, and will remain as a lasting monument of German stupidity.

Was ich als Wahrheit finde, wie es auch immer laute, soll mir willkommen sein. Ich will wissen. Mit derselben Sicherheit, mit welcher ich darauf rechne, daß dieser Boden mich tragen wird, wenn ich darauf trete, daß dieses Feuer mich verbrennen würde, wenn ich mich ihm näherte, will ich darauf rechnen können, was ich selbst bin, und was ich sein werde. Und sollte man etwa dies nicht können, so will ich wenigstens das wissen, daß man es nicht kann: Und selbst diesem Ausgange der Untersuchung will ich mich unterwerfen, wenn er sich mir als Wahrheit entdeckt.

Hegel comprehended quite correctly the abstract character of revolutionary self-consciousness of-Fichte's 'Ego = Ego' and French 'egalite'. However, the transition from the abstract to the concrete he interpreted not as a continuous revolutionary process in which the citizens become differ­entiated and class interests concretized, but on the contrary, as an advance from the turbulence of the cosmic spirit in its 'years of discipleship' to bold reconciliation with reality. Hegel's cosmic spirit goes through all the successive stages of the post-revolutionary 'transitory period' of bourgeois society — from Thermidor to constitutional monarchy. True enough, he subjects bourgeois society to sharp criticism; but not in its historically determined form — rather as the material aspect of a society par excellence. This negation is next declared to be abstract and in its transition from the abstract to the concrete is declared to be a return to material, sensuous existence, i.e. to bourgeois society­ with this difference, however, that the prosaic and sordid character of bourgeois relations here acquires a deep mys­tical significance as the embodiment of the active essence of the spirit. Such, briefly, is the meaning of the 'speculat­tive methods' of German idealist philosophy.

In a solemn tone, like a priest chanting a mass, beating time in the air with a stiff finger, Slote quoted: " 'The German Revolution will not prove any milder or gentler because it was preceded by the Critique of Kant, by the Transcendental Idealism of Fichte.  These doctrines served to develop revolutionary forces  that only await their time to break forth.  Christianity subdued the brutal warrior passion of the Germans, but it could not quench it. When the Cross, that restraining talisman, falls to pieces, then  will break forth again the frantic Berserker rage.  The old stone gods will then arise from the forgotten ruins and wipe from their eyes the dust of centuries.  Thor with his giant hammer will arise again, and he will shatter the Gothic cathedrals.' " Slote made an awkward, weak gesture with a fist to represent a hammerblow, and went on: " 'Smile not at the dreamer who warns you against Kantians, Fichteans, and the other philosophers.  Smile not at the fantasy of one who foresees in the region of reality the same outburst of revolution that has taken place in the region of intellect.  The thought precedes the deed as the lightning the thunder.  German thunder is of true German character.  It is not very nimble but rumbles along somewhat slowly.  But come it will. And when you hear a crashing such as never before has been heard in the world's history, then know that at last the German thunderbolt has fallen.' "Heine - the Jew who composed the greatest German poetry, and who fell in love with German philosophy - Heine wrote that," Slote said in a quieter tone. "He wrote that a hundred and six years ago.

Igual que si Kant no hubiera existido, el principio de razón sigue siendo en Fichte lo que era en todos los escolásticos, una aeterna veritas.

society founded on the principle of individuality. That epoch, the mission of which had been, first through the labors of Greek philosophy, and afterwards through Christianity, to rehabilitate, emancipate, and develop individual man appears to have concentrated in them, in Fichte, in Adam Smith, and in the French school des droits de l’homme, its

Tüm bireyler, saf tinin tek büyük birliğine dahildirler.

Formu olmayan, ölü maddeye ilk kez düzen ve uyum getiren Ben’dir. Düzenlilik, yalnızca insandan kaynaklanır, onu sarar ve onun görebildiği yere kadar alabildiğine uzanır.

Ben bir Ben’im ve benim için, bir Ben olan herkes aynıdır. Peki, insan imgesinde içerilen ihtişam karşısında titrememeli miyim?

Tinsel dünyanın eksiksiz sistemi, onun içinde bulunu ve insan, anlaşılabilir biçimde kendisini bu dünya için koyduğu yasanın bu dünyada geçerli olmasını bekler. Ben, düzen ve uyumun, ondan ne düzenin ne de uyumun olduğu sonsuzluğa doğru dışa yayılacağının kesin garantisini kendinde içerir; öyle bir garanti ki, evrenin kültürel gelişimi, aynı zamanda insanın kültürel gelişimi ile birlikte meydana gelir.

İnsanın içinde yaşadığı kilden kulübeyi silkeleyip yıkın! Varoluşunun doğası gereği insan, kendi dışındaki her şeyden bağımsızdır. Kilden kulübesinin içinde bile, kendinde böyle bir varoluş hissine sahiptir –zaman, mekan ve kendisine ait olmayan her şeyin ortadan kaybolduğu, tininin kendisini güçlü bir biçimde bedeninden koparıp aldığı tüm bu sevinç dolu anlarda, artık özgür bir biçimde, tinin yalnızca bir beden yoluyla başarabileceği tüm bu amaçların peşine düşmek için bir bedene geri döner. Onu meydana getiren son toprak parçasını da bölseniz, o hala varolacaktır. Varolacaktır, çünkü varolmayı isteyecektir. Kendi sayesinde, kendi gücüyle o, sonsuzdur.

Ulaşmaya çalıştığı amaçlarının renkleri ve dışsal formları yok olabilir ama amacı aynı kalır: Varoluşunun her anında, kendisinin dışındaki yeni bir şeyi kendi çemberinin içine zorla taşır ve bu işi yapmayı; çember içinde her şey tüketilene, maddi olan tüm şey etkinliğinin damgasını taşıyana ve tinsel olan şeyler, onunkiyle tek bir tini oluşturana kadar sürdürecektir. İşte bu insandır. Bu, kendisine ‘’ben bir insanım’’ diyebilen herkes için böyledir.

Nur mit Johannes kann der Philosoph zusammenkommen, denn dieser allein hat Achtung für die Vernunft, und beruft sich auf den Beweis, den der Philosoph allein gelten lässt: den inneren.

«Düşlerde, günlük yaşam, zahmetleri ve hazları, sevinçleri ve acıları ile asla yinelenmez. Tersine, düşlerin başlıca amacı bizi onlardan arındırmaktır. Hattâ aklımız bir şeylerle dopdolu olduğunda, derin acılarla perişan olduğumuzda ya da tüm zekâ gücümüz bir sorun tarafından emildiğinde bile bir düş, bizim duygusal durumumuza bürünüp gerçekliği simgelerle temsil etmekten başka hiçbir şey yapmayacaktır.»

Mit einem Worte: durch die Wissenschaftslehre kommt der Geist des Menschen zu sich selbst, und ruht von nun an auf sich selbst, ohne fremde Hülfe, und wird seiner selbst durchaus mächtig, wie der Tänzer seiner Füße, oder der Fechter seiner Hände.

Kant and Fichte had said that a man can discover the content of good and evil by his own judgment, independent of the views of society. Hegel rejects this approach as too individualistic. The principles of morality, he claims, are to be determined not by an individual’s mind but by his “real self,” the community or the state—whose traditions and laws, in Hegel’s opinion, constitute the real standard of good and evil. In the ethical man, Hegel tells us, the last vestiges of selfishness have disappeared: “the self-will of the individual has vanished together with his private conscience which had claimed independence....”38

4. Life Consists in Conflict. Life consists in conflict. So long as man remains a social animal he cannot live in isolation. All individual hopes and aspirations depend on society. Society is reflected in the individual, and the individual in society. In spite of this, his inborn free will and love of liberty seek to break away from social ties. He is also a moral animal, and endowed with love and sympathy. He loves his fellow-beings, and would fain promote their welfare; but he must be engaged in constant struggle against them for existence. He sympathizes even with animals inferior to him, and heartily wishes to protect them; yet he is doomed to destroy their lives day and night. He has many a noble aspiration, and often soars aloft by the wings of imagination into the realm of the ideal; still his material desires drag him down to the earth. He lives on day by day to continue his life, but he is unfailingly approaching death at every moment. The more he secures new pleasure, spiritual or material, the more he incurs pain not yet experienced. One evil removed only gives place to another; one advantage gained soon proves itself a disadvantage. His very reason is the cause of his doubt and suspicion; his intellect, with which he wants to know everything, declares itself to be incapable of knowing anything in its real state; his finer sensibility, which is the sole source of finer pleasure, has to experience finer suffering. The more he asserts himself, the more he has to sacrifice himself. These conflictions probably led Kant to call life "a trial time, wherein most succumb, and in which even the best does not rejoice in his life." "Men betake themselves," says Fichte, "to the chase after felicity. . . . But as soon as they withdraw into themselves and ask themselves, 'Am I now happy?' the reply comes distinctly from the depth of their soul, 'Oh no; thou art still just as empty and destitute as before!' . . . They will in the future life just as vainly seek blessedness as they have sought it in the present life." It

Aşa cum arăta Fichte, a filozofa înseamnă la drept vorbind a nu trăi, întocmai după cum a trăi vrea să zică la drept vorbind a nu filozofa.

Our four figures, by contrast, voiced themes of strong collectivism in ethics and politics with calls for individuals to sacrifice for society, whether society was defined as the species, the ethnic group, or the state. We find in the case of Kant a call for individuals to be willing to do their duty to sacrifice for the species; we find in the case of Herder a call for individuals to find their identity in their ethnicity; we find in the case of Fichte a call for education to be process of total socialization; and we find in the case of Hegel a call for total government to which the individual will surrender everything.

Love loves and in loving always looks beyond what it has in hand and possesses. The driving impulse [*Triebimpuls*] which arouses may tire out; love itself does not tire. This *sursum corda* which is the essence of love may take on fundamentally different forms at different elevations in the various regions of value. The sensualist is struck by the way the pleasure he gets from the objects of his enjoyment gives him less and less satisfaction while his driving impulse stays the same or itself increases as he flies more and more rapidly from one object to the next. For this water makes one thirstier, the more one drinks. Conversely, the satisfaction of one who loves spiritual objects, whether things or persons, is always holding out new promise of satisfaction, so to speak. This satisfaction by nature increases more rapidly and is more deeply fulfilling, while the driving impulse which originally directed him to these objects or persons holds constant or decreases. The satisfaction always lets the ray of the movement of love peer out a little further beyond what is presently given. In the highest case, that of love for a person, this movement develops the beloved person in the direction of ideality and perfection appropriate to him and does so, in principle, beyond all limits. However, in both the satisfaction of pleasure and the highest personal love, the same *essentially infinite process* appears and prevents both from achieving a definitive character, although for opposite reasons: in the first case, because satisfaction diminishes; in the latter, because it increases. No reproach can give such pain and act so much as a spur on the person to progress in the direction of an aimed-at perfection as the beloved's consciousness of not satisfying, or only partially satisfying, the ideal image of love which the lover brings before her―an image he took from her in the first place. Immediately a powerful jolt is felt in the core of the soul; the soul desires to grow to fit this image. "So let me seem, until I become so." Although in sensual pleasure it is the *increased variety* of the objects that expresses this essential infinity of the process, here it is the *increased depth of absorption* in the growing fullness of one object. In the sensual case, the infinity makes itself felt as a self-propagating unrest, restlessness, haste, and torment: in other words, a mode of striving in which every time something repels us this something becomes the source of a new attraction we are powerless to resist. In personal love, the felicitous advance from value to value in the object is accompanied by a growing sense of repose and fulfillment, and issues in that positive form of striving in which each new attraction of a suspected value results in the continual abandonment of one already given. New hope and presentiment are always accompanying it. Thus, there is a positively valued and a negatively valued *unlimitedness of love*, experienced by us as a potentiality; consequently, the striving which is built upon the act of love is unlimited as well. As for striving, there is a vast difference between Schopenhauer's precipitate "willing" born of torment and the happy, God-directed "eternal striving" in Leibniz, Goethe's Faust, and J. G. Fichte." ―from_Ordo Amoris_

In seeing the thinkers in this tradition as embodying a certain fundamental viewpoint, I am far from denying that there is disagreement between them. Indeed, I try to show how Fichte’s concept of absolute freedom differs subtly from Kant’s, as well as how Fichte develops the theme of intersubjectivity in a new and creative direction. I also try to show how Kant and Herder differ concerning the correct way of understanding human nature, cultural difference and history; and also how Hegel’s theory of imputation differs from Kant’s, and deepens it. And, of course, I emphasize the radical difference between Marx’s treatment of themes having to do with right and the way these themes were treated by the thinkers earlier in the tradition. At the same time, in treating the German philosophers of this period whose thought interests me, I always tend to emphasize continuities and agreements rather than squabbles and the differences. I think it is both shortsighted and wrongheaded to treat these thinkers as though the fundamental issue is whether we should choose Hegel over Kant, or defend Kant against Hegel, or even champion Marx over against the entire later German idealist tradition, trying to show that he has rendered the entire classical German philosophical tradition obsolete (a dogmatic sectarian attitude that is not as fashionable now as it once was). Instead, I think that despite the controversies within this tradition, there is something unified and important in it, when it comes to themes of freedom, right, ethics, humanity, community, and history, which sets the classical German tradition apart from other strands in modern philosophy.

Nationalism, said Hitler—echoing German thinkers from Fichte through Spengler—means the power of the nation over the individual in every realm, including economics; i.e., it means socialism. Socialism, he said, means rule by the whole, by the greatest of all wholes, Germany.

Look upon yourself as more powerful than they give you out for, and you have more power; look upon yourself as more, and you have more. You are then not merely called to everything divine, entitled to everything human, but owner of what is yours, that is, of all that you possess the force to make your own; you are appropriate and capacitated for everything that is yours. People have always supposed that they must give me a destiny lying outside myself, so that at last they demanded that I should lay claim to the human because I am – man. This is the Christian magic circle. Fichte’s ego too is the same essence outside me, for every one is ego; and, if only this ego has rights, then it is “the ego,” it is not I. But I am not an ego along with other egos, but the sole ego: I am unique. Hence my wants too are unique, and my deeds; in short, everything about me is unique. And it is only as this unique I that I take everything for my own, as I set myself to work, and develop myself, only as this. I do not develop men, nor as man, but, as I, I develop – myself. This is the meaning of the – unique one.

It is his incurable illness to regard the accidental as necessary.

It seems obvious that not only the feeling but also the consciousness of national unity, in the sense of intercourse of thought, which is achieved through unity of language, is a very ancient phenomenon; moreover, the time of its origin cannot be determined with accuracy. In contrast, we hear that the idea of nationality was born for the first time at the beginning of our century. Further, it stimulated “the gradual singling out of the personalities of civilized peoples” “from the original indifference of savage peoples.” And “the great service of the communication of this stimulus” may be credited to certain individuals — “in Germany, among others, to [Johann Gottlieb] Fichte the elder; among us, to the Slavophiles” (Gradovskii 246). Such opinions are voiced by others as well, but only partially with justification. Of course, unlike Ecclesiastes, we believe that everything under the sun is new and that events do not repeat themselves. Our age’s idea of nationality bears an imprint of originality, but similar ideas appeared earlier as well. Their generic similarity seems to me to turn on the following. Such an idea is not a necessary feature of a people but a design of individuals and circles that arises from time to time. It is their intention to make certain qualities that are ascribed to the people the guiding principle of the purposeful activity of individuals, societies, and governments of that people — to impart greater energy of activity by exalting its principles. Accordingly, this idea is partly a certain content of thought, partly a general emotional temper of an individual, a circle, a society, and sometimes, in rare critical moments of national life, of a significant portion of the people. In this sense, we see this idea wherever there arises in the people, in response to conflict with other peoples, an apotheosis of certain national features and there is written on a banner something like “God is with us: understand, O nations, and submit,” or “civilization is with us,” and for this reason, again, “submit.

The freedom fanatics end up as theorists of the police. Fichte's doctrine, for example, culminates in a theory of the passport.

Die Fanatiker der Freiheit enden als Theoretiker der Polizei. Die Doktrin Fichtes zum Beispiel gipfelt in einer Theorie des Reisepasses.

Instead, what ultimately holds Aristotle, Fichte, Marx, and Keynes together are footnotes—those wormholes through which we can travel between crises.

humans inherently make poor decisions when we are alone. When surrounded by a good support system, we thrive and excel. Kate and I are always here for you,

Goethe had always believed that the process of gaining knowledge – Erkenntnis[*1] – came through direct observation. Most idealists, including Fichte, rejected this idea and insisted that all knowledge of reality originated in the mind. But not Schelling. He was an idealist who believed that ‘absolutely all of our knowledge originates in experience’.

Watch and pray, lest you enter into temptation. The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.” Matthew‬ 26:41‬ NKJV‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

Be sober, be vigilant; because your adversary the devil walks about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour. Resist him, steadfast in the faith, knowing that the same sufferings are experienced by your brotherhood in the world. But may the God of all grace, who called us to His eternal glory by Christ Jesus, after you have suffered a while, perfect, establish, strengthen, and settle you. To Him be the glory and the dominion forever and ever. Amen.” — I Peter‬ 5:8-11‬‬ NKJV‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

My future is in your hands. Rescue me from those who hunt me down relentlessly.” Psalms‬ 31:15‬ NLT‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

I have heard the many rumors about me, and I am surrounded by terror. My enemies conspire against me, plotting to take my life. But I am trusting you, O Lord, saying, “You are my God! My future is in your hands. Rescue me from those who hunt me down relentlessly.” Psalms‬ 31:13-15‬ NLT‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

Fichte had become interested in what he called the ‘national self’. Until France’s decisive victory, the Ich-experience had been the lens through which the friends in Jena had experienced reality. Now, Fichte also paved the way for a bigger Ich – the Ich of a nation. This was a dangerous idea, and one that would be exploited in Germany in the future.

We lowly humans inherently have bad instincts without God’s guidance most of the time.

And God said to Moses, “I AM WHO I AM.” And He said, “Thus you shall say to the children of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you.’ Exodus‬ 3:14‬ NKJV‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

You have a purpose. I AM.

Daemon strode forward and took his wife in a firm embrace, placing a kiss in her lips as he did so.

collectivism and individualism complement each other in the wrong direction. Protests against both of them have been voiced by speculative philosophers of history from Fichte onward, in the doctrine of a state of consummate sinfulness and later in the doctrine of lost meaning. The modern world was equated with a de-formed one-whereas Rousseau, the initiator of retrospective hostility to one's own age, had struck the spark of this hostility on the last of the great styles; what he had abhorred was too much form, the denatured society. The time has come to give notice to the image of a world drained of meaning. From a cipher of longing, this image has degenerated to a slogan of order maniacs. Nowhere on earth is today's society "open" as apologists of scientism certify it to be; but it is not de-formed anywhere either. The belief that forms have been lost arose from the devastation of cities and landscapes by planlessly expanding industry; it originated in a lack of rationality, not in its excess. Anyone who traces de-formation to metaphysical processes rather than to the conditions of material production is a purveyor of ideologies.

Well first off, do you plan to live with someone else and live by their rules for the rest of your life? No one wants that, right? Figure out where you want to be, how to achieve it, and set your own rules and routines that fit you the best.

We all endure the pain of loss, Daemon. We are equipped for it, and we start learning how to deal with it from a very young age. Your heart was broken, but your mind and spirit endured. Now,” she placed a gentle hand on his cheek with a sad expression, “your mind and spirit are under attack. You retreated to this place to find solace, but it must be brief. You have to fight back, Daemon.

Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel disagreed with Fichte, because for them philosophy was a never-ending process of thinking about thinking itself. It was an infinite reflection upon self-reflection.

It was clear to Fichte that free will had to be uprooted long before people became soldiers. It should be destroyed while they are still easy to be shaped. Today’s children are tomorrow’s soldiers, said Fichte, and proper education will make it possible to turn them into disciplined and obedient soldiers.

Herein lies the main issue with today’s education system. We see vast changes in all other areas of our lives, but the education system still largely operates according to the principles established by Fichte over two hundred years ago. It prepares youth to function in a reality that no longer exists – obedience and conformity oppose creativity, critical thinking, and originality.

priestly intermediation, and which brought their owner face to face with God? What caused the wildfire influence of Rousseau but the assurance he gave that man's nature was in harmony with the nature of things, if only the paralyzing corruptions of custom would stand from between? How did Kant and Fichte, Goethe and Schiller, inspire their time with cheer, except by saying, "Use all your powers; that is the only obedience the universe exacts"? And Carlyle with his gospel of work, of fact, of veracity, how does he move us except by saying that the universe imposes no tasks upon us but such as the most humble can perform? Emerson's creed that everything that ever was or will be is here in the enveloping now; that man has but to obey himself,—"He who will rest in what he is, is a part of destiny,"—is in like manner nothing but an exorcism of all scepticism as to the pertinency of one's natural faculties. In a word, "Son of Man, stand upon thy feet and I will speak unto thee!" is the only revelation of truth to which the solving epochs have helped the disciple. But that has been enough to satisfy the greater part of his rational need.

When I assumed this great task I laid hold of eternity at the same time. I lift my head boldly to the threatening stony heights, to the roaring cataract, to the crashing clouds in their fire-red sea. […] ‘I defy your power! Rain everything down upon me! You earth, and you, heaven, mingle all of your elements in wild tumult. Foam and roar, and in savage combat pulverize the last dust mote of that body which I call my own. Along with its own unyielding project, my will shall hover boldly and indifferently above the wreckage of the universe. For I have seized my vocation, and it is more permanent than you.

Cermenlik (Almanlık) mefkûresi, Prusya'nın Napolyon ordusu tarafından tezlîl edildiği (aşağılandığı) büyük felâket anında feveran etti (coşkunluk kazandı). O zamana kadar milletim nev-i beşerdir (insanlıktır), vatanım rû-yı zemin (yeryüzü) diyen filozof Fichte bile o anda iliklerine kadar Cermen olduğunu his ve ilân etti.

So, to answer your question specifically, Schelling could integrate Ego and Eco—Fichte and Spinoza, autonomy and wholeness—because, he pointed out, when you realize your supreme identity as Spirit, then you are autonomous in the fullest sense—because nothing is outside you—and therefore you are also whole or unified in the fullest sense—because nothing is outside you. Full autonomy and full wholeness are one and the same thing in the supreme identity. So men and women don’t have to sacrifice their own autonomy or will because their will ultimately aligns itself with the entire Kosmos. The entire Kosmos is something your deepest Self is doing, and you are that Kosmos in its entirety. Full autonomy, full wholeness. This is a profound integration of Ego and Eco, of Ascent and Descent, of transcendence and immanence, of Spirit descending into even the lowest state and ascending back to itself, but with Spirit nonetheless fully present at each and every stage as the process of its own self-realization, a divine play of Spirit present in every single movement of the Kosmos, yet finding more and more of itself as its own Play proceeds, dancing fully and divine in every gesture of the universe, never really lost and never really found, but present from the start and all along, a wink and a nod from the radiant Abyss.

Truly, then, you must be a creature of unusually weak intellect. I see that now. Matter does not exist, then, there is no such thing, really--it is an appearance, a spectrum--every writer not imbecile from Plato to Fichte has, voluntarily or involuntarily, proved that for good. To create it is to produce an impression of its reality upon the senses of others; to destroy it is to wipe a wet rag across a scribbled slate." "Perhaps. I do not care. Since no one can do it." "No one? You are mere embryo--" "Who then?" "Anyone, whose power of Will is equivalent to the gravitating force of a star of the First Magnitude." "Ha! ha! ha! By heaven, you choose to be facetious. Are there then wills of such equivalence?" "There have been three, the founders of religions. There was a fourth: a cobbler from Herculaneum [Winckelmann], whose mere volition induced the cataclysm of Vesuvius in '79 in direct opposition to the gravity of Sirius. There are more fames than you have ever sung, you know.

Truly, then, you must be a creature of unusually weak intellect. I see that now. Matter does not exist, then, there is no such thing, really--it is an appearance, a spectrum--every writer not imbecile from Plato to Fichte has, voluntarily or involuntarily, proved that for good. To create it is to produce an impression of its reality upon the senses of others; to destroy it is to wipe a wet rag across a scribbled slate." "Perhaps. I do not care. Since no one can do it." "No one? You are mere embryo--" "Who then?" "Anyone, whose power of Will is equivalent to the gravitating force of a star of the First Magnitude." "Ha! ha! ha! By heaven, you choose to be facetious. Are there then wills of such equivalence?" There have been three, the founders of religions. There was a fourth: a cobbler from Herculaneum [Winckelmann], whose mere volition induced the cataclysm of Vesuvius in '79 in direct opposition to the gravity of Sirius. There are more fames than you have ever sung, you know.

So lange die Menschen nicht weiser und gerechter werden , sind alle ihre Bemühungen , glücklich zu werden , vergebens. Aus dem Kerker des Despoten entronnen werden sie mit den Trümmern ihrer zerbrochenen Fesseln sich unter einander selbst morden . Das wäre ein zu trauriges Loos , wenn nicht ihr eignes , oder wenn sie sich in Zeiten warnen lassen , fremdes Elend sie zur späten Weisheit und Gerechtigkeit leiten könnte . So scheinen mir alle Begebenheiten in der Welt lehrreiche Schildereien , die der große Erzieher der Menschheit aufstellt, das mit sie an ihnen lerne , was ihr zu wissen Noth ist. Nicht daß sie es aus ihnen lerne ; wir werden in der ganzen Weltgeschichte nie Etwas finden , was wir nicht selbst erst hineinlegten : sondern daß sie durch Beurtheilung wirklicher Begebenheiten auf eine leichtere Art aus sich selbst entwickle was in ihr selbst liegt : und so scheint mir die französische Revolution ein reiches Gemälde über den großen Text : Menschenrecht und Menschenwerth .

So lange ihr in euren Schulen mit Leuten vom Handwerke nach der vorgeschriebenen Form darüber redet , täuscht euch beide eben diese vorgeschriebene Form , und wenn ihr nur über sie einig seyd , schenkt ihr euch gegenseitig manche Frage, deren deutliche Beantwortung euch beschwerlich fallen dürfte.

Where Fichte’s Ich was shaped by its opposition to the non-Ich, Schelling believed that the self and nature were identical.

No una certidumbre metódica, oh no, viejo querido, eso no por lo que más quieras, ni un in vino veritas ni una dialéctica a lo Fichte u otros lapidarios spinozianos, solamente como una aceptación en la náusea, Heráclito se había hecho enterrar en un montón de estiércol para curarse la hidropesía(...) En la mierda hasta el cogote, Heráclito el Oscuro, exactamente igual que ellos pero sin el vino, y además para curarse la hidropesía. Entonces tal vez fuera eso, estar en la mierda hasta el cogote y también esperar, porque seguramente Heráclito había tenido que quedarse en la mierda días enteros, y Oliveira se estaba acordando que también Heráclito había dicho que si no se esperaba jamás se encontraría lo inesperado (...) Apretando el cigarrillo entre los labios hasta sentirlo casi como parte de la boca, Oliveira la escuchaba, la dejaba que se fuera apretando contra él, se repetía fríamente que no era mejor que ella y que en el peor de los casos siempre podría curarse como Heráclito, tal vez el mensaje más penetrante del Oscuro era el que no había escrito, dejando que la anécdota, la voz de los discípulos la transmitiera para que quizá algún oído fino entendiese alguna vez.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to do this under contemporary living arrangements, in which children go to school and then return to corrupting influences in their homes and their neighborhoods at the end of the day. “It is essential,” Fichte then urged, “that from the very beginning the pupil should be continuously and completely under the influence of this education, and should be separated altogether from the community, and kept from all contact with it.”[193]

So far Fichte’s program of education includes the communal separation of children, severe authoritarian top-down training, strict moral duty and selflessness, and total religious immersion. Not quite the Enlightenment model of liberal education.