Bruno Latour Quotes

The world is not a solid continent of facts sprinkled by a few lakes of uncertainties, but a vast ocean of uncertainties speckled by a few islands of calibrated and stabilized forms

I have sought to offer humanists a detailed analysis of a technology sufficiently magnificent and spiritual to convince them that the machines by which they are surrounded are cultural artifacts worthy of their attention and respect.

My kingdom for a more embodied body

There is no control and no all-powerful creator, either – no more ‘God’ than man – but there is care, scruple, cautiousness, attention, contemplation, hesitation and revival.

Philosophy is not in the business of explaining anything. Actual occasions explain what happened, not philosophy.

The various manifestations of socialism destroyed both their peoples and their ecosystems, whereas the powers of the North and the West have been able to save their peoples and some of their countrysides by destroying the rest of the world and reducing it's people to abject poverty.

Machines are the concealed wishes of actants which have tamed forces so effectively that they no longer look like forces

You who are on the inside, don’t condemn my lack of faith too quickly; you who are on the outside, don’t be too quick to mock my overcredulity; you who are indifferent, don’t be too quick to wax ironic about my perpetual hesitations.

What is an organization actually, even in organization theory, even in the most classical sense in management, if not a serial redescription which starts again (and it’s true) every morning.

You who are on the inside, this world terrifies you because, according to you, it’s ‘without a divine master’. But don’t you see that it’s also without a human master? You who are on the outside, this call for renewal of ‘God’ horrifies you because, according to you, it would bring back the old tyranny of the divine. Don’t you see that this world is forever without a creator?

The new universality consists in feeling that the ground is in the process of giving way.

Facts remain robust only when they are supported by a common culture, by institutions that can be trusted, by a more or less decent public life, by more or less reliable media.

Alas, the historical name is ‘actor-network-theory’, a name that is so awkward, so confusing, so meaningless that it deserves to be kept.

No one knows any longer whether the reintroduction of the bear in Pyrenees, kolkhozes, aerosols, the Green Revolution, the anti-smallpox vaccine, Star Wars, the Muslim religion, partridge hunting, the French Revolution, service industries, labour unions, cold fusion, Bolshevism, relativity, Slovak nationalism, commercial sailboats, and so on, are outmoded, up to date, futuristic, atemporal, nonexistent, or permanent.

And here I want to interject and say that Heidegger is an absolute occasionalist and has no theory of time despite “time” being included in the title Being and Time

Using a slogan from ANT, you have 'to follow the actors themselves', that is try to catch up with their often wild innovations in order to learn from them what the collective existence has become in their hands, which methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts best define the new associations that they have been forced to established.

In the letters section, a Scot reminds his readers of the ‘Glorious Alliance’ between France and Mary Queen of Scots, which explains why Scotland should not share the rabid Europhobia of Englishmen.

To the migrants from outside who have to cross borders and leave their countries behind at the price of immense tragedies, we must from now on add the migrants from inside who, while remaining in place, are experiencing the drama of seeing themselves left behind by their own countries.

The difficulty lies in the very expression “relation to the world,” which presupposes two sorts of domains, that of nature and that of culture, domains that are at once distinct and impossible to separate completely.

epistemological disaster

Nancy Cartwright here in this School has written the funniest paper on scientific method ever, by taking the average advice from all the books about scientific method, and they are extreme banalities

The social sciences are obsessed by epistemological questioning in a way that no science, no real science is. You never have a chemistry class that starts with the methodology of chemistry; you start by doing chemistry. And the problem is that since the social sciences don’t know what it is to be scientific, because they know nothing about the real sciences, they imagine that they have to be listing endless numbers of criteria and precautions before doing anything. And they usually miss precisely what is interesting in natural sciences which is [LAUGHS] a laboratory situation and the experimental protocol!

Few people will campaign for an alternative vision of black holes or magnetic inversion, but we know from experience that about soils, vaccines, earthworms, bears, wolves, neurotransmitters, mushrooms, water circulation, or the composition of air, the smallest study will immediately be plunged into a full-scale battle of interpretations. The Critical Zone is not a classroom; the relationship between researchers and the public is anything but purely pedagogical. If we still had any doubts on this point, the pseudocontroversy over the climate suffices to dispel them. There is no evidence that any major corporation has spent a penny to produce ignorance about the detection of the Higgs boson. But denying the climatic mutation is another matter entirely: financing floods in. Ignorance on the part of the public is such a precious commodity that it justifies immense investments.

Politics is not about "freshly dead" people, but about the living ; not about ghoulish stories of the afterworld, but about gory stories of this world.

But then is no one at home any longer?” No, as a matter of fact. Neither state sovereignty nor inviolable borders can take the place of politics any longer.

If, of course, to serial and redescription you add… how would I put it, punctual? …Or the key with which they maintain their subsistence. And in that sense serial redescription seems to be a very good definition for the social sciences as well as for philosophy. We accompany the task of the entities in their survival, so to speak, and their maintaining their subsistence in a very, very practical manner.

there is no Earth corresponding to the infinite horizon of the Global, but at the same time the Local is much too narrow, too shrunken, to accommodate the multiplicity of beings belonging to the terrestrial world.

What has become of critique when someone as eminent as Stanley Fish, the “enemy of promises” as Lindsay Waters calls him, believes he defends science studies, my field, by comparing the laws of physics to the rules of baseball? What has become of critique when there is a whole industry denying that the Apollo program landed on the moon? What has become of critique when DARPA uses for its Total Information Awareness project the Baconian slogan Scientia est potentia? Didn’t I read that somewhere in Michel Foucault? Has knowledge-slash-power been co-opted of late by the National Security Agency? Has Discipline and Punish become the bedtime reading of Mr. Ridge?

The hypothesis of this essay is that the word ‘modern’ designates two sets of entirely different practices which must remain distinct if they are to remain effective, but have recently begun to be confused. The first set of practices, by ‘translation’, creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature and culture. The second, by ‘purification’, creates two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand; that of nonhumans on the other.

But in situations where innovations proliferate, where group boundaries are uncertain, when the range of entities to be taken into account fluctuates, the sociology of the social is no longer able to trace actors’ new associations. At this point, the last thing to do would be to limit in advance the shape, size, heterogeneity, and combination of associations. To the convenient shorthand of the social, one has to substitute the painful and costly longhand of its associations. The duties of the social scientist mutate accordingly: it is no longer enough to limit actors to the role of informers offering cases of some well-known types. You have to grant them back the ability to make up their own theories of what the social is made of. Your task is no longer to impose some order, to limit the range of acceptable entities, to teach actors what they are, or to add some reflexivity to their blind practice. Using a slogan from ANT, you have ‘to follow the actors themselves’, that is try to catch up with their often wild innovations in order to learn from them what the collective existence has become in their hands, which methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts could best define the new associations that they have been forced to establish.

In sum, then, our discussion is informed by the conviction that a body of practices widely regarded by outsiders as well organised, logical, and coherent, in fact consists of a disordered array of observations with which scientists struggle to produce order.

The creation of new symbioses by mergers on a crowded planet is called symbiogenesis. And we might call all aspects of its study “symbiogenetics”—the science of normative symbioses, the word commanding respect because of its apparent coinage from genetics; in fact, I derived it directly from symbiogenesis, though the connotation is a good one. Although this type of evolution sounds bizarre—a monstrous breach of Platonic etiquette in favor of polymorphous perversity—it is now confirmed by genetic evidence, taught in textbooks. It is a fact, or what the French philosopher of science Bruno Latour and the Belgian physicist-turned-philosopher Isabelle Stengers, not putting too fine a point on it, would call a factish. Nonetheless, although symbiogenesis—the evolution of new species by symbiosis—is now recognized, it is still treated as marginal, applicable to our remote ancestors but not relevant to present-day core evolutionary processes. This is debatable. We are crisscrossed and cohabited by stranger beings, intimate visitors who affect our behavior, appreciate our warmth, and are in no rush to leave. Like all visible life-forms, we are composites.

Pasteur had no sooner injected an anti-rabies vaccine into Joseph Meister than the hygienists were already declaring the ‘end of infectious diseases’; Sony gets the heads of two anthropomorphic robots to nod, and voilà, posthumanism is already declared to have arrived! The Moderns could never check a fact or promote a technique except by combining the ideal of objective knowledge with magic. They were always looking for a magic bullet.

And yet, it is true that the third attractor doesn’t look very attractive. It requires too much care, too much attention, too much time, too much diplomacy. Even today it is the Global that shines, that liberates, that arouses enthusiasm, that makes it possible to remain so unaware, that emancipates, that gives the impression of eternal youth. Only it does not exist. It is the Local that reassures, that calms, that offers an identity. But it does not exist either.

For example, our concern with the “social” is not confined to those nontechnical observations amenable to the application of sociological concepts such as norms or competition. Instead, we regard the process of construction of sense implied by the application of sociological concepts as highly significant for our own approach. It is this process of construction of sense which forms the focus of our discussion. As a working definition, therefore, it could be said that we are concerned with the social construction of scientific knowledge in so far as this draws attention to the process by which scientists make sense of their observations.

By extending this argument to the observer’s use of any observation, rather than just an utterance, we can provide the following provisional formulation of a major theme of our discussion. The observer has to base his analysis on shifting ground. He is faced with the task of producing an ordered version of observations and utterances when each of his readings of observations and utterances can be counter-balanced with an alternative. In principle, then, the task of producing an incorrigible version of the actions and behaviour of the subjects of his study is hopeless. Nevertheless, we know that observers regularly produce such ordered versions for consumption by others. His production of order must therefore be done “for practical purposes,” which means that he proceeds by evading or ignoring difficulties of principle.5 If this is the case, then it becomes important to understand how observers routinely ignore the philosophical problem of the constant availability of alternative descriptions and readings. In other words, one reaction to the recognition of these fundamental problems is to investigate the methods and procedures by which observers produce ordered versions of the utterances and observations which they have accumulated. The focus of investigation from this point of view is the production of order.

As we have mentioned, the adoption of the belief that science is well ordered has a corollary, that any study of its practice is relatively straightforward and that the content of science is beyond sociological study. However, we argue that both scientists and observers are routinely confronted by a seething mass of alternative interpretations. Despite participants’ well-ordered reconstructions and rationalisations, actual scientific practice entails the confrontation and negotiation of utter confusion. The solution adopted by scientists is the imposition of various frameworks by which the extent of background noise can be reduced and against which an apparently coherent signal can be presented. The process whereby such frameworks are constructed and imposed is the subject of our study.

The above comments are intended to justify the emphasis in our discussion on the ways in which scientists produce order. This necessarily involves an examination of the methodical way in which observations and experiences are organised so that sense can be made of them. As already noted, we have every reason to believe that the accomplishment of this kind of task is no mean feat, as is clear from a consideration of the corresponding task faced by the observer when confronted by his field notes. The observer’s task is to transform notes of the kind presented at the beginning of this chapter into an ordered account. But exactly how and where should the observer begin this transformation? It is clear that when seen through the eyes of a total newcomer, the daily comings and goings of the laboratory take on an alien quality. The observer initially encounters a mysterious and apparently unconnected sequence of events. In order to make sense of his observations, the observer normally adopts some kind of theme by which he hopes to be able to construct a pattern. If he can successfully use a theme to convince others of the existence of a pattern, he can be said, at least according to relatively weak criteria, to have “explained’’ his observations. Of course, the selection and adoption of “themes” is highly problematic. For example, the way in which the theme is selected can be held to bear upon the validity of his explanation; the observer’s selection of a theme constitutes his method for which he is accountable. It is not enough simply to fabricate order out of an initially chaotic collection of observations; the observer needs to be able to demonstrate that this fabrication has been done correctly, or, in short, that his method is valid.

It might also be objected that the work of the particular laboratory we have studied is unusual in that it is relatively poor at the intellectual level; that its activity comprises routinely dull work, which is not typical of the drama and conjectural daring prevalent in other areas of scientific work. However, the Nobel Prize for Medicine was awarded to one of the members of our laboratory in 1977, soon after we began preparation of this manuscript. If the work of the laboratory is merely routine, then it is possible to receive what is perhaps the most prestigious kind of acclaim from the scientific community for the kind of routine work we portray.

The extent to which the distinction between “social” and “intellectual” is accepted as unproblematic by observers of science may have significant consequences for the reports about science which they produce. The Social and the Scientific: The Observer’s Dilemma At one extreme, we can envisage the wholesale adoption by an observer of the distinction mentioned above. In this case, the observer holds an assumption that scientific phenomena occupy a realm largely distinct from that of social phenomena, and that it is only to the latter that the concepts, procedures, and expertise of sociology can be applied. As a result, the procedures and achievements central to scientists’ work become largely immune from sociological explanation. Approaches which implicitly adopt this standpoint have been roundly criticised on several grounds. Rather than repeat these criticisms in detail, we shall merely outline some of the main critical themes. Firstly, the decision to concentrate only on “social” rather than “technical” aspects of science severely limits the range of phenomena that can be selected as appropriate for study. Put simply, this means that there is no point in doing sociology of science unless one can clearly identify the presence of some politician breathing down the necks of working scientists. Where there is no such obvious interference by external agencies, it is argued, science can proceed without the need for sociological analysis. This argument hinges on a particularly limited notion of the occasional influence of sociopolitical factors; the substance of science proceeds unaffected if such factors are absent. Secondly, emphasis on “social” in contradistinction to “technical” can lead to the disproportionate selection of events for analysis which appear to exemplify “mistaken” or “wrong” science. As we shall show, an important feature of fact construction is the process whereby “social” factors disappear once a fact is established. Since scientists themselves preferentially retain (or resurrect) the existence of “social” factors where things scientific are thought to have gone wrong, the adoption of the same viewpoint by an observer will necessarily lead him to the analysis of the way social factors affect, or have given rise to, “wrong” beliefs.

Scientific achievements held to be correct should be just as amenable to sociological analysis as those thought to be wrong. Thirdly, emphasis on the “social” has led commentators to argue for some redress of an imbalance: not enough attention is thought to have been paid to the “technical.” For example, Whitley has argued that sociological interest in science is in danger of turning into a sociology of scientists rather than a fully fledged sociology of science:

It is unlikely that our discussion will tell working scientists anything they do not already know. We would not presume, for example, to reveal hitherto undiscovered facts about the details of scientific work to the subjects of our study. It is clear (as we show) that most members of our laboratory would admit to the kinds of craft activities which we portray. At the same time, however, our description of the way in which such craft activities become transformed into “statements about science” might constitute a new perspective on what working scientists know to be the case. We anticipate that hackles might rise where participants hold an obdurate commitment to descriptions of scientific activity formulated in terms of research reports. Often this commitment stems from the perceived utility of such statements in procuring funds or claiming other privileges.

The conclusion I draw from the writings in this anthology, then, is finally this. That the overwhelming majority of attempts to supplant the postmodern consist in large measure of attaching a new prefix to the word 'modern' strikes me as a clear indication that we are not yet done with our modernity; and that such a number of new prefixes are being mooted (such as 're-' and 'dis-'; 'alter-' and 'auto-'; 'hyper-' and "meta-'; 'ana-' and 'digi-'; you might also have come across 'geo-' and 'neo-', too? suggests to me that there is a broadening variety of ways in which we experience or negotiate our modernity - or, alternatively, a broadening awareness that there is, and probably always has been, a variety of modernities. It was always simplistic to assume that for some reason they all came to an end suddenly, whether that was in May 1968, or when the Pruitt-Igoe housing project was dynamited, or at any other time. By the same token, it is no more sensible to assume that some new modernity was born when the Berlin Wall fell, or when American Airlines flight 1 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, or at some other arbitrarily selected moment of historical significance. Instead, ti might be worth suggesting that - with a nod to Bruno Latour - we have never been postmodern. Hence, I predict that debating the end of postmodernity will ultimately prove futile, but no more and no less futile than debating its origins and its birth. What the newly prefixed modernisms to be found in this anthology suggest to my mind is that what supplants postmodernity is a realization that we never left modernity behind in the first place, and that the discourses seeking to formulate or describe the late twentieth century as an era that was somehow (though there was never much clarity as to h o w 'post-'modernity amount to little more than half a century of groping down a blind alley.

[Bruno] Latour argues that one of the foundational gestures of western modernity has been the effort to formulate and police a heightened antimony between nonhuman nature and human culture. -- Randall Styers, Making Magic, p. 17

Estamos frente a un nuevo tipo de capitalismo caliente, psicotrópico y punk. Estas trasformaciones recientes apuntan hacia la articulación de un conjunto de nuevos dispositivos microprostéticos de control de la subjetividad con nuevas plataformas técnicas biomoleculares y mediáticas. La nueva «economía-mundo» no funciona sin el despliegue simultáneo e interconectado de la producción de cientos de toneladas de esteroides sintéticos, sin la difusión global de imágenes pornográficas, sin la elaboración de nuevas variedades psicotrópicas sintéticas legales e ilegales (Lexomil, Special K, Viagra, speed, cristal, Prozac, éxtasis, popper, heroína, Omeoprazol, etc.), sin la extensión a la totalidad del planeta de una forma de arquitectura urbana difusa en la que megaciudades miseria se codean con nudos de alta concentración de capital, sin el tratamiento informático de signos y de transmisión numérica de comunicación. Estos son solo algunos de los índices de aparición de un régimen postindustrial, global y mediático que llamaré a partir de ahora, tomando como referencia los procesos de gobierno biomolecular (fármaco-) y semiótico-técnico (-porno) de la subjetividad sexual, de los que la pildora y Playboy son paradigmáticos, «farmacopornográfico». Si bien sus líneas de fuerzas hunden sus raíces en la sociedad científica y colonial del siglo XIX, sus vectores económicos no se harán visibles hasta el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, ocultos en principio bajo la apariencia de la economía fordista y quedando expuestos únicamente tras el progresivo desmoronamiento de esta en los años setenta. Durante el siglo XX, período en el que se lleva a cabo la materialización farmacopornográfica, la psicología, la sexología, la endocrinología han establecido su autoridad material transformando los conceptos de psiquismo, de libido, de conciencia, de feminidad y masculinidad, de heterosexualidad y homosexualidad en realidades tangibles, en sustancias químicas, en moléculas comercializables, en cuerpos, en biotipos humanos, en bienes de intercambio gestionables por las multinacionales farmacéuticas. Si la ciencia ha alcanzado el lugar hegemónico que ocupa como discurso y como práctica en nuestra cultura, es precisamente gracias a lo que Ian Hacking, Steve Woolgar y Bruno Latour llaman su «autoridad material», es decir, su capacidad para inventar y producir artefactos vivos. Por eso la ciencia es la nueva religión de la modernidad. Porque tiene la capacidad de crear, y no simplemente de describir, la realidad. El éxito de la tecnociencia contemporánea es transformar nuestra depresión en Prozac, nuestra masculinidad en testosterona, nuestra erección en Viagra, nuestra fertilidad/ esterilidad en püdora, nuestro sida en triterapia. Sin que sea posible saber quién viene antes, si la depresión o el Prozac, si el Viagra o la erección, si la testosterona o la masculinidad, si la píldora o la maternidad, si la triterapia o el sida. Esta producción en auto-feedback es la propia del poder farmacopornográfico.

the world is conceived as multiple and performative, i.e., shaped through practices, as different from a single pre-existing reality. This is why, for Bruno Latour, politics should become material, a Dingpolitik revolving around things and issues of concern, rather than around values and beliefs.

designate this class, Bruno Latour and Nikolaj Schultz coined the term “geo-social class.”3 Much of this class is not exploited in the classic Marxist sense of working for those who own the means of production; they are “exploited” with regard to the way they relate to the material conditions of their life: access to water and clean air, health, safety, Local

Saying “We are earthbound, we are terrestrials amid terrestrials,” does not lead to the same politics as saying “We are humans in nature.” The two are not made of the same cloth – or rather of the same mud.

sinister or radiant, it hardly matters –

Por eso dice Bruno Latour que la política debe volverse material, una Dingspolitik moviéndose en torno a las cosas y a los temas que preocupan, más que en torno a los valores y a las creencias.

The absence of a common world we can share is driving us crazy.

While he has not written about bullshit directly, the sociologist of science Bruno Latour has had a formative effect on our thinking about how people bullshit their audiences. Latour looks at the power dynamics between an author and a reader. In Latour’s worldview, a primary objective of nonfiction authors is to appear authoritative. One good way to do this is to be correct, but that is neither necessary nor sufficient. Correct or not, an author can adopt a number of tactics to make her claims unassailable by her readers—who in turn strive not to be duped. For example, the author can line up a phalanx of allies by citing other writers who support her point, or whose work she builds upon. If you question me, she implies, you have to question all of us. She can also deploy sophisticated jargon. Jargon may facilitate technical communication within a field, but it also serves to exclude those who have not been initiated into the inner circle of a discipline.

We always misunderstand the strength of the strong. Though people attribute it to the purity of an actant, it is invariably due to a tiered array of weaknesses

In this vision, the worlds is conceived as multiple and performative, i.e. shaped through practices, as different from a single pre-existing reality. This is why, for Bruno Latour, politics should become material, a Dingpolitik revolving around things and issues of concern, rather than around values and beliefs. Stem cells, mobile phones, genetically modified organisms, pathogens, new infrastructure and new reproductive technologies brings concerned publics into being that create diverse forms of knowledge about these matters and diverse forms of action - beyond institutions, political interests or ideologies that delimit the traditional domain of politics. Whether it is called ontological politics, Dingpolitik or cosmopolitics, this form of politics recognizes the vital role of nom-humans, in concrete situations, co-creating diverse forms of knowledge that need to be acknowledged and incorporated rather than silenced. Particular attention has gone to that most central organization of all for political geographers: the state. Instead of conceiving the state as a unified actor, it should be approached as an assemblage, which makes heterogenous points of order - geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, technological particularities - resonate together. As such, the state is an effect rather than the origin of power, and one should focus on reconstructing the socio-material basis of its functioning. The concept of assemblage questions the naturalization of hegemonic assemblages and renders them open to political challenge by exposing their contingency.

Readers may recall that Empire, a book by Michael Hardt and Tony Negri ended curiously by praising St. Francis.

In the absence of definitive resolutions, morality is the business of preventing any settlement from being treated as final.

Como si hubiésemos pasado, justamente, de un Antiguo Régimen a uno Nuevo, marcado por la irrupción multiforme de la cuestión de los climas y, cosa aún más extraña, de su vínculo con el gobierno.

Man macht sich gar nicht klar genug, dass die gesamte Politik der Gegenwart auf das Problem der Klimaleugnung fokussiert ist.

I know neither who I am nor what I want, but others say they know on my behalf, others who define me, link me up, make me speak, interpret what I say, and enroll me. Whether I am a storm, a rat, a lake, a lion, a child, a worker, a gene, a slave, the unconscious, or a virus, they whisper to me, they suggest, they impose an interpretation of what I am and what I could be” (PF 192).

Si esas personas mantienen la calma es porque están seguros de que los datos de los científicos han sido manipulados por fuerzas oscuras, y en todo caso son tan exagerados que hay que resistir valientemente las opiniones de aquellos que se llaman “catastrofistas” y aprender, como dicen, “a conservar la cordura” viviendo como antes, sin preocuparse demasiado.

Si la ecología enloquece, es porque en efecto es una alteración de la alteración de las relaciones con el mundo.

No hay otro modo de sanarse sin esperar curar: hay que ir hasta el fondo de la situación de desamparo en la que todos nos encontramos, cualquiera sea el matiz que adquieran nuestras angustias.[18]

cultura y naturaleza, en tanto categorías parejamente codificadas.

El manipulador existe realmente: es un pintor. Cuando decimos que los occidentales son “naturalistas” queremos decir que son amantes de los paisajes pintados y que Descartes imagina el mundo como proyectado sobre el lienzo, de una naturaleza muerta de la que Dios sería el agenciador.[30]

In tenth and last place comes the conquest of the myth of the rapture of the cognitive person in recent academic research. Bruno Latour is the most important name here. He has also raised subversive demands in political theory for the reinclusion of experts. From

Pour se repérer dans l’incertitude, il faut d’abord se perdre dans la complexité.

To appreciate that objectivity is a highly contested phenomenon does not mean that reality is nothing more than a social construction, a fleeting figment of our imaginations. What needs challenging is the idea that there is some underlying, inviolable reality called nature that does not change (the natural sciences are claimed to study this), while our awareness and cultural sensibilities do (the social sciences and humanities are claimed to study this). There is no “raw” access to the world, because the moment we try to enter the “objective world,” we find ourselves already there. What we face is always a joint history of the human sciences and the physical world together. Bruno Latour wisely suggests that when we abandon the notion of a stable, unchanging nature, “we are leaving intact the two elements that matter the most to us: the multiplicity of non-humans and the enigma of their interaction [with us].”29 We open a space in which genuine interaction and reciprocal learning between creatures can occur. We look for opportunities in which the reality of life together can inspire, correct, and inform our understanding.

When it comes to objects, our salvation is intertwined. Neither can we be saved without them, nor they without us.

As Bruno Latour notes, there is a scandalous likeness between conspiracy theory and academic critique, and many conspiracy theories are strikingly akin to expert discourse (Latour 2004, 229).