Boeing 737 Max Quotes

Her biggest clients were transportation companies. She helped plan their PR campaigns, write white papers, and set up “Astroturf” organizations to give corporate messaging the appearance of grassroots support. A

This shift in the balance of power between Boeing and the FAA was the culmination of a decades- long war for influence, one embedded in the very nature of a place sometimes derided as “the tombstone agency” because it only seemed to act swiftly when people were dead.

Even the newest military planes had checklists that appeared on touch screens. If a hydraulic pump failed, a message would pop up showing specific actions the pilot should take. On the 737, a light showing “low hydraulic pressure” might illuminate with no further explanation. Pilots would have to rely on memory or turn to their paper handbook. “Training issue,” the Boeing executive responded to Reed, in rejecting such changes. If Boeing had been building a brand- new plane, it would have been required to have the electronic checklist. But because the MAX was being examined as an amendment to the original type certificate awarded in 1967, managers could pursue an exception. The MAX was actually the thirteenth version of the plane, counting all the variants along the way— the official application would call it an update of the 737- 100,

In just a few years, his headline would read as prophecy: “Boeing Will Pay High Price for McNerney’s Mistake of Treating Aviation Like It Was Any Other Industry.

Hiring and paying ones own regulators is as easy as hiring a private rent-a-cop. In Canada, for about $100 million, the financial industry can fund any of our Securities Commissions, and the ability to then obtain exemptions to the law from the regulator, is by itself worth hundreds of billions. Just ONE exemption to the law, can earn billions. Capturing and funding regulators is the simply best (but corrupt) investment any industry can make. Another example comes to us from Boeing in late 2019, with the 737 Max, and the news that Boeing’s influence over the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA ) was powerful enough to allow Boeing itself to legally approve its own aircraft, which is like being able to mark your own exams…(or print your own money).

The Boeing 737 Max is turning into the Ford Pinto of modern commercial aviation.

Airline window seats were so wonderful until the explosive decompression of the Boeing 737 Max 9.

I will fly on a Boeing 737 Max if it is my only option.

The explosive decompression of the Boeing 737 Max 9 is expected to lead to airline travelers avoiding the window seats.

The Boeing 737 Max will forever be known as a poor quality product that has proven to be dangerous on numerous occasions.

As a radiation researcher, I always try and sit next to the window on an airplane to observe the extreme altitude atmosphere. Since the Boeing 737 Max door plug blowout, I try to ensure my seat is not next to an exit for safety reasons.

Max 8 crash, Max 8 crash and Max 9 explosive decompression. Which Max is next?

Crash, crash, bang!

Crash, crash, bang, and what will the next one be?

There are no doubts that the FAA and NTSB are 'In A Relationship’ with Boeing.

The stock market control of the FAA, NTSB and Boeing needs to end for the safety of air travelers.

Airlines that buy the Boeing 737 Max are showing commitment to a product that is known to have dangerous quality control issues and disrespect to their customers.

The Boeing 737 Max serious accident scorecard in January 2024: Max 7: 0, Max 8: 2, Max 9: 1, Max 10: 0.

If the choice is between an airline flying the Boeing 737 Max and an airline that does not, I will be purchasing my ticket from the safer airline.

I flew on a Boeing 737 Max 9 in 2019. I remember it had a very weird climb to cruising altitude compared to other airplanes I had flown on. It was also a wireless WiFi streaming entertainment airplane that needed passengers to use their phones to stream to the airline app that had to be installed prior to take off. It had weird cabin lighting I had not seen before.

Every time I get on a Boeing 737 Max, I am aware it was ‘Designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys’.

The Boeing 737 Max accidents are a reflection of modern USA corporate culture.

Like many things in the USA, the Boeing 737 Max was built on a low budget.

I blame the toxic stock market for the Boeing 737 Max accidents.

I blame the toxic USA management culture for the Boeing 737 Max accidents.

The root cause of the Boeing 737 Max accidents can be traced back to the failure of the FAA and NTSB to properly regulate Boeing.

There are no doubts that the FAA and NTSB are in bed with Boeing.

The science of pressurized airplanes is well understood, but Boeing forgot some of the theory.

Pressurized airplanes are a product that you never try to cut corners on, as the outcome can be catastrophic.

There is a huge amount of energy stored inside of a pressurized airplane.

The general population has no real comprehension of how dangerous an airplane explosive decompression is.

There are numerous long term health issues associated with airplane explosive decompression.

Despite the crashes, airplanes remain one of the safest forms of transportation known to man, as long as you are not part of the crew.

The dangerous relationship that the FAA and NTSB has with Boeing needs to end.

The tax rate on upper brackets of income fell from 70 percent to 50 percent (and later to 33 percent), causing a 9 percent drop in federal revenue in two years.

a dozen industrial executives in the country who earned more than $1 million in 1978. (Adjusted for inflation, his pay was equivalent to $5 million in 2019—less than a quarter of the average CEO compensation of $21.3 million that year.)

Airbus, a consortium of European manufacturers it had always derided as a glorified jobs program, actually had a cost advantage over Boeing. Its factories produced planes 12 percent to 15 percent cheaper than Boeing’s, the study reported. Ironically, this was in part because of rigid labor laws in Europe, which made layoffs more expensive and, in places like Germany, forced the involvement of labor unions in management decisions. As a consequence, Airbus was quicker to adopt automated machinery, but also more likely to train and develop its workers rather than to fire them.

Once ruled by engineers who thumbed their noses at Wall Street, Boeing had reinvented itself into one of the most shareholder-friendly creatures of the market. It celebrated managers for cost cutting, co-opted regulators with heaps of money, and pressured suppliers with Walmart-style tactics.

The acquisition of McDonnell Douglas a year earlier had brought hordes of cutthroat managers, trained in the win-at-all-costs ways of defense contracting, into Boeing’s more professorial ranks in the misty Puget Sound. A federal mediator who refereed a strike by Boeing engineers two years later described the merger privately as “hunter killer assassins” meeting Boy Scouts.

Some of the very people who ran McDonnell Douglas into the ground resurrected the same penny-pinching policies that sank their old company. Borrowing a page from another flawed idol, Jack Welch’s General Electric, they executed what today might be called the standard corporate playbook: anti-union, regulation-light, outsourcing-heavy. But pro-handout, at least when it comes to tax breaks and lucrative government contracts.

Rather than investing in new aircraft, Boeing’s leaders poured more than $30 billion of cash into stock buybacks during the MAX’s development, enriching shareholders and ultimately themselves. Muilenburg made more than $100 million as CEO, and he left with an additional $60 million golden parachute.

That consensus was just starting to fray when Milton Friedman, the Reaganites’ favorite economist, argued what was then still the contrarian viewpoint in the New York Times Magazine in 1970: “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.

All stem at least in part from the failed belief that corporations will police themselves and shower us in riches if they’re just left alone to do so (and are lightly taxed all the while).

Agriculture Department in 2019 quietly cut the number of inspectors in pork plants by more than half. Finding defects—feces, sex organs, toenails, bladders—was mostly left to the companies themselves, much in the way that the FAA relied on Boeing’s own employees to ensure aircraft safety.

By the count of a former Boeing executive who scoured incident reports for a congressional committee, one in twenty-five MAX planes experienced some sort of safety issue in the months after they were delivered.

The Clinton administration downsized federal agencies and introduced market-based performance metrics as part of what it called “reinventing government.

When Fortune interviewed Collins in 2000, he was already starting to rethink the idea. “If in fact there’s a reverse takeover, with the McDonnell ethos permeating Boeing, then Boeing is doomed to mediocrity,” he said. “There’s one thing that made Boeing really great all the way along. They always understood that they were an engineering-driven company, not a financially driven company. If they’re no longer honoring that as their central mission, then over time they’ll just become another company.

Boeing had sought to keep cost data out of the hands of rank-and-file engineers, to keep the information from compromising their designs; now the opposite was true. Boeing wanted them all to make decisions with the cold eye of a Jack Welch or a Harry Stonecipher. After finishing the course, engineers were meant to “understand, God, that program has to be produceable, I can’t put every bell and whistle on it,” said Boeing’s vice president of learning, Steve Mercer, the former deputy at Crotonville.

It emerged that Douglas engineers had known the design was vulnerable to a catastrophic failure, and indeed, two years earlier, a near disaster had ensued on a flight over Windsor, Ontario, which also lost a cargo door. The pilot had been able to land the plane in that case. Instead of fixing the issue immediately, McDonnell Douglas had convinced the FAA to let it add a support plate over time to the doors—a “gentlemen’s agreement” revealed in the congressional hearings. Records at Douglas showed that the support plate had been added to the Turkish Airlines plane, when it had not. Three company inspectors had signed off on the nonexistent fix.

In rejecting the safety enhancement, managers twice cited concerns about the “cost and potential (pilot) training impact.

The Boeing 737 Max 9 is just one of the numerous problems the USA airline industry has.

If you think the Boeing 737 Max 9 is the only issue the USA airline has, you are easily misled.

The Boeing 737 Max 9 is just the tip of an iceberg of problems the USA airline industry has.

The FAA is your typical ‘Captured’ government agency.

People have to die before Boeing will change things,

It is important to realize the Boeing of 2024 is a very different company to that of the past.

A pressurized airplane with poor quality control is a potential death trap.

Boeing 737 Max, are you going to be naughty or nice to me?

I can honestly say my flight on the Boeing 737 Max 9 was one of the worst I could remember.

The cozy relationship that Boeing has with the FAA and NTSB is potentially dangerous for the traveling public.

Is anyone monitoring the long term health outcomes of all passengers from the Boeing 737 Max 9 explosive decompression?

The Boeing 737 Max is a really old design that had to be adapted to fit much larger modern engines it was never supposed to have.

The 737 Max will be remembered as the airplane that trashed Boeing’s global reputation.

The 737 Max was Boeing’s gift of a brighter future at Airbus.

Some American products have become hazardous in the deregulated USA.

Made in the deregulated USA.

When I realized that I could not get the WiFi entertainment system to work on the Boeing 737 Max, my thoughts were: What else is faulty on this airplane?

Illegal activity thrives on deregulation.

The deregulation of the Boeing 737 Max occurred during the Obama administration and the tragic fatal fallout of deregulation occurred during the Trump administration.

An aircraft cabin that is filled with wireless radio frequency (RF) devices that are charging is comparable to filling an aircraft with hundreds of known biologically toxic smart meters.

Health and safety in the USA is largely a sham and it is not surprising that the new Boeing 737 Max started repeatedly flying itself into the ground with a total loss of all life.

If it ain’t Boeing, it ain’t going down.

The ultimate vote of confidence in the Boeing 737 Max would be for the USA government to buy one to fly president Trump everywhere in it.

While many blame Boeing for the fatal 737 Max crashes, it was an expected outcome of government deregulation.

I will be avoiding the Boeing 737 Max for at least two years after it resumes operation.

It is unreasonable to expect unregulated scallywags to do the right thing.

Having researched health and safety in the USA, I am not surprised that airplanes are fatally flying themselves into the ground and biologically toxic telescopes are being built atop sacred Hawaiian mountains.

The 737 Max is a minor problem for Boeing compared to the emergence of High Altitude Diseases (HAD) in pilots, cabin crew and frequent fliers.

The 737 Max is a small problem for Boeing compared to the larger problem of long term toxicity of modern air travel to pilots, cabin crew and frequent fliers.

Boeing is a classic example of what happens to a company when the general public becomes aware that it has serious quality control issues, safety problems, and a dangerous lack of government regulation.

To blow the whistle or not to blow the whistle, that is the question.

The Boeing 737 Max has become a classic example of the failure of deregulation.

The Boeing 737 Max is the Ford Pinto of aviation.

It is reasonable to think that the health and well-being of your family will eventually be damaged by the effects of corporate government deregulation.

To fly Boeing or not to fly Boeing, that is the question.

I find it concerning that by the time I flew on a new Boeing 737 Max airplane that numerous pilots knew that it had uncontrolled descent issues that had already caused a fatal crash.

After seeing the passenger cabin of the Boeing 737 Max that I flew on, I was not surprised when one fatally crashed shortly afterwards, killing everyone on board.

When I flew on a Boeing 737 Max and saw that there were electrical outlets in every seat and the entertainment system was wireless radio frequency WiFi streaming to passenger mobile devices, I became very concerned about the health and safety of these new airplanes.

Hello Boeing 737 Max, goodbye world.

Flying high with WiFi in the sky.

Sitting on top of an electrical outlet and having radio frequency WiFi devices charging their batteries while streaming wireless movies is a very undesirable dynamic for the biological health of the passengers and aircraft crew.

My message to Boeing is this: I am watching you.

Had the government done its job of regulating Boeing, it is highly unlikely that the 737 Max would have been globally grounded.

The problem is not Boeing, it is the corrupt government regulator.

Deregulation is in the process of trashing some of the most prestigious brands in the USA, with Boeing being the biggest name so far.

What is government if regulation of industry is a sham?

The Boeing 737 Max let the cat out of the bag that health and safety fraud is rampant in the USA.

Until I see President Trump routinely flying on a Boeing 737 Max, I will be avoiding it.

Health and safety fraud is part of the toxic corporate culture in the USA.

Michaelis asked if any alert would tell them when the sensors had failed. “On your airplane, yes,” Sinnett answered. Without mentioning that Boeing had botched the software implementation on other planes, he explained that American had purchased the optional angle-of-attack indicator, which Lion Air had not. Had it been Michaelis’s plane, a little flag notice would have popped up alerting him to disagreement between the AoA vanes, and mechanics would have fixed the sensor on the ground. “So you would not have taken the airplane,” he said.