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Agamben has elaborated upon how certain
subjects undergo a suspension of their ontological status as subjects
when states of emergency are invoked. He argues that a subject
deprived of rights of citizenship enters a suspended zone, neither
living in the sense that a political animal lives, in community and
bound by law, nor dead and, therefore, outside the constituting
condition of the rule of law. These socially conditioned states of
suspended life and suspended death exemplify the distinction that
Agamben offers between "bare life" and the life of the political being
(bios politikon ), where this second sense of "being" is established only
in the context of political community. If bare life, life conceived as
biological minimum, becomes a condition to which we are all
reducible, then we might find a certain universality in this condition.
Agamben writes, "We are all potentially exposed to this condition,"
that is, "bare life" underwrites the actual political arrangements in
which we live, posing as a contingency into which any political
arrangement might dissolve. Yet such general claims do not yet tell us
how this power functions differentially, to target and manage certain
populations, to derealize the humanity of subjects who might
potentially belong to a community bound by commonly recognized
laws; and they do not tell us how sovereignty, understood as state
sovereignty in this instance, works by differentiating populations on
the basis of ethnicity and race, how the systematic management and
derealization of populations function to support and extend the
claims of a sovereignty accountable to no law; how sovereignty
extends its own power precisely through the tactical and permanent
deferral of the law itself.
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