Aviation Security Quotes

Difficult, is being the head Aviation Security in the Middle East and your hands tied from behind, as vested interests carry the day. However good you are, you will be the sacrificial lamb.

Aviation Security-AVSEC, is National Security, and a key component at that too. Parliamentary Committees on National Security are therefore duty bound to ensure, the stepmotherly treatment meted on AVSEC is done away with. It becomes an agenda item in their sittings and follow ups especially after a country is audited by ICAO USAP CMA teams are conducted without fail. In short, they must regulate the regulators by ensuring the CAA's as Appropriate Authorities have what it takes to safeguard National interests against Acts of Unlawful Interferences.

The fundamental challenge in most developing Countries, Kenya included, is the establishment and management of a national civil aviation security oversight system, that creates a security regime that is highly effective in preventing acts of unlawful interference, but does not unduly inhibit industrial growth, interfere with its efficiency, productivity, impose excessive costs,create unwarranted operational inconveniences, and or intrude unnecessarily into civil rights nor liberties. Without the political will required to enact the changes, some painful at that, that such an oversight regime requires, in a nutshell all efforts for redress standing to amount to nought.

When it comes to oversight, especially at the airport operational level, I am skeptical of Civil Aviation as a Civilian entity without a constitutional mandate at that, regulating uniformed Ministry of Interior agents (read Airport Police), who technically own the security component being regulated.

Aviation Security Management goes over and beyond what a police officer was taught at the police college as a recruit. There are various, tenets that need being understood and adhered to by all, regardless of their police background. This is essentially why the ICAO Annex 17 Standards & Recommended Practices-SARP's and the Doc 8973 Security Manual need to be translated into a language the Airport Police components can understand, worldwide. That of standing orders to be executed when on duty. Only then will we be heading towards the right direction.

To achieve a standardized level of security for aviation, States, through their appropriate aviation security authorities need to establish a comprehensive policy, supported by appropriate legislation, to be implemented by the many entities involved in any civil aviation security structure. These include aircraft operators, airport operators, air traffic service providers (ATSPs), law enforcement authorities, providers of security services and intelligence organizations, amongst others. This policy is typically contained in the NCASP, but its implementation on the other hand, and by a civilian entity like CAA, especially where service providers such as Airport Police are concerned, leaves a lot to be desired. How do we expect a civilian entity to regulate a gazetted uniformed one ?

To achieve a standardized level of security for aviation, Countries, through their appropriate aviation security authorities (CAA’s) must establish a comprehensive policy, supported by appropriate legislation, to be implemented by the many entities involved in any civil aviation security structure. Including aircraft operators, airport operators, air traffic service providers (ATSPs), law enforcement authorities, providers of security services and intelligence organizations, amongst various others. The policy herewith being the National Civil Aviation Security Program- NCASP. However, without the political will to enact any meaningful change, a lot of the efforts become rhetoric, since as civilian entities, CAA’s often have no say when it comes to implementing the NCASP, and or regulating service providers such as the Airport Police, who being uniformed makes them an unspoken law unto themselves.

Airport Police Screeners are duty bound to remain vigilant whilst on duty, conduct random surveillance/screening of arriving and departing passengers (and their baggage) for persons who may pose a threat to civil aviation; How is this possible when most of them in some Middle East Countries for instance, are Smartphone addicts, who can be seen busy on them, whilst at post ?

What I do not understand is the '' Airport Full Emergency Drill'' concept. Are they ''full emergency'' by coverage, meaning the subject matter or are they so by virtue of the stakeholders involved? The bi-annual aerodromes certification parameters under Annex 14 Chapter 9 which dwells mostly on the monotony of air crashes and or aircraft in distress is hardly all encompassing. With an evolving ingenious adversary we face today in terms of terrorists and their capabilities, why is it that these so called ''Full Emergency Drills'' hardly address terrorism, yet the stakeholders are zero prowess rated when it comes to terror consequence management ?

Trying to explain aviation security needs to a political appointee of a boss, who is scared of being seeing as rocking the boat from within. Is tantamount to trying to sing to, and or teach music to a goat. One ends up doing two things-: 1. Wasting time, and, 2. Annoying the goat.

Where security is concerned, we need to change the reactive approach the aviation industry has been known to have for the last 74 years since the birth of ICAO in 1944. We must stop rushing to close the barn door, after the horse already bolted. And become a proactive risk driven industry, only then will we stop being caught with our pants down.

Where flight safety & or aerodomes safety is concerned, no country plays around, simply because ICAO has a red flagging system & the EU have a blacklisting system. As such no Country can risk it. But, where aviation security is concerned, all hide under the sacredeness of National security and sovereignty. Were ICAO to begin a red flagging system and the EU a blacklisting one past the ACC3 or RA3 lukewarm approach. Every country will begin being serious about it, and the laziness in CAA's as regards aviation security management will disappear overnight.

There is nothing wrong with being God fearing and all spiritual, but where putting proper aviation security measures in place is concerned. 'In Shaa Allah'' (God Willing) it will not happen to us, is not an adequate measure, nor an SOP. It only works after you have put the measures in place and have a robust working quality control system.

Nationalization of AVSEC is quite okay and in order, but before embarking on it, the authorities professing it, must try to fit the Nationals to job, as opposed to trying to fit the job to the Nationals. Most Nationals simply don't have what it takes, and that's just the tip of the iceberg.

What ails AVSEC in most Countries Kenya included, and thus remains their fundamental challenge is simply the lack of political will and means to bring forth the establishment and management of a national civil aviation security oversight system. Creating a security regime that is highly effective in preventing acts of unlawful interference, but does not unduly inhibit industrial growth, interfere with its efficiency, productivity, impose excessive costs, create unwarranted operational inconveniences, and or intrude unnecessarily into civil rights nor liberties.

ICAO Annex 17 Standard 3.2.2 On States ensuring an authority at each airport serving civil aviation is responsible for coordinating the implementation of security controls is clear and self-explanatory. But for a regulator to usurp from the operator, security control measures such as the issuance of airport passes. It is simply power play, airport passes are a power tool and can easily be used to gain favors from the who is who.

Annex 17 Standard 3.3.1 is clear on Regulators ensuring airlines establish, implement and maintain a written operator security programme that meet the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme of that State. That is as far as it goes, airlines especially National ones are often sacred and easily get away with murder, especially in the MENA Region. Security checks, for example are sacrificed for the on time craze, and the regulator says nadda!

To me the ICAO Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices-SARP's are the foundation to build on. They are at the very best very basic and states need to realize they are to build on them to make their National standards better, over and above the SARP's. Adopting the Annex 17 SARP's as National Civil Aviation Security Regulations-CASR's is simply lazy & myopic. There are various aspects on the ground, that the SARP's deal with rather passively if not reactively at most, and that need a proactive approach to them. A good example the trusted insider threat, nowhere is it covered within the SARP's but does that mean CAA's shouldn't address it yet it is a clear & present danger?

Yes training is important in AVSEC, but if it is to be done using ASTP's that last saw any meaningful revision a decade ago, and are thus overtaken by neo technological inventions. Not to mention the terror peddlers ingenuity & evolution beating most of the aspects covered by the ASTP's hands down. To me modern day AVSEC training needs outside the bos thinking, not the ICAO, IATA tunnel vision staleness of unrevised ASTP's

Yes training is very important in AVSEC, but if it is to be done using ASTP's that last saw any meaningful revision a decade ago, and are thus overtaken by neo technological inventions. Not to mention the terror peddlers ingenuity & evolution beating most of the aspects covered by the ASTP's hands down. It belongs to the dust bin, Modern day AVSEC training needs outside the box thinking, not the ICAO, IATA tunnel vision staleness of unrevised ASTP's

When Albert Einstein said '' We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them'', I believe he had Arab Civil Aviation Authorities in mind. Their mentality and bootlickers populating most of them are the main problem and thus practical change for the better is virtually impossible.

Corruption ? Yes there is corruption in Civil Aviation Authorties and a lot of it is unspoken. For, starters, what do you call, issuing an airport pass to a royal house help, or a Ministers son with zero duties at the airport other than meeting his girlfriend on arrival ?

Civil Aviation Authoritues are the custodians of the National Air Transport Critical Infrastructure in their respective countries, They are therefore duty bound towards having a Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy geared towards the continued operation of air transport in the face of all hazards. As a mandatory, CAA's are duty bound therefore to ensure their charge achieves the continued provision of essential services (provided by the critical infrastructure in their charge) to businesses, governments and the stakeholding community within the aviation industry, as well as to other critical infrastructure sectors.

The Atlanta International Airport, power outage of 2017, its economic impact in terms of losses and inconveniences to the travelling public with more than 1,000 flights grounded just days before the start of the Christmas travel rush, was a good lesson. Not, to mention a reminder of the importance of Business Continuity Planning-BCP to aviation as an industry. What is surprising is, nobody seems to have learned anything from it. BCP is still where it was before the debacle, largely unheard off since the international sectoral leadership, as well as airports continue to feign selective amnesia, the regulators- CAA’s are even worse off, as many pretend to have never, heard of it, since the industrial gospel is yet to begin propagating for it !

Hartsfield-Jackson, which serves 104 million passengers a year, is the world’s busiest airport, a distinction it has held since 1998. A sudden power outage caused by a fire in an underground electrical facility serving it, brought the airport to a standstill. All outgoing flights were halted, and arriving planes were held on the ground at their point of departure. With, International flights diverted elsewhere. Such is the impact of the lack of proper Business Continuity Planning-BCP. Something still considered alien, as time progresses. One wonders, what will it take the International Aviation leadership to begin propagating for its inclusion into industrial best practices?

On September 11, 2001, the FAA’s “no-fly list” included a grand total of twelve names.25 By contrast, the State Department’s so-called TIPOFF terrorist watchlist included sixty thousand names. Yet the FAA’s head of civil aviation security didn’t even know that the State Department list existed.26 Two names on that State Department list were Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, both on board Flight 77.

After residents had secured the major markers of wealth - the home, the right schools, the serenity of private aviation - they turned their attention to the real game in town: the refining of advantage, the expansion of the margins, the hedging against trouble, real and imagined. If you knew where to look you could hone every edge of your life - from your life expectancy to your tax avoidance to your child's performance on the SATs. You could, in other words, make sure that the winners keep winning.

Which would you choose, airplane, polished linoleum floors and a life secure behind purple-velvet rope, or the insecurities of mud and moonlight, of bent propellers and wingtips for repair?

Synthetics diminished the great powers' need for strategic raw materials by offering substitutes. Aviation, cryptography, radio, and satellites, meanwhile, enabled those powers to run secure transportation and communication networks without worrying about contiguous territorial access. Innovations in medicine and engineering - such as DDT, antimalarials, plastic-based packaging, and "world-proofed" electronic equipment - further reduced the need for territorial control. They allowed objects and humans to safely travel to hostile terrains, meaning that colonizers didn't have to soften the ground beforehand. Standardization, similarly, made foreign places more accessible. (Page 314, 315)

Hiring and paying ones own regulators is as easy as hiring a private rent-a-cop. In Canada, for about $100 million, the financial industry can fund any of our Securities Commissions, and the ability to then obtain exemptions to the law from the regulator, is by itself worth hundreds of billions. Just ONE exemption to the law, can earn billions. Capturing and funding regulators is the simply best (but corrupt) investment any industry can make. Another example comes to us from Boeing in late 2019, with the 737 Max, and the news that Boeing’s influence over the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA ) was powerful enough to allow Boeing itself to legally approve its own aircraft, which is like being able to mark your own exams…(or print your own money).

So there we were, in the middle of the night, on our hands and knees with scrub brushes, steel wool, sponges, scouring powder and buckets of water making the old shop look spic and span. We secured from the task at 0400. I should have hit the rack but instead went topside and out to the canoe, the sacred spot where Lieutenant Goldberg and I had sat together contemplating the why's of life. I was saying farewell in my own way. I wanted to experience the Oriskany for the last time on the high seas. It was still dark – the dark that comes just before dawn. The waning moon, merely a fluorescent nail clipping, hung near the horizon. The night air was crisp; the sky a deep, cold black with pinpoints of stars shimmering through the earth’s canopy. Above me was the endless universe; below me, the deep mystical sea. Large undulating swells gently rocked the ship like a babe in its mother’s arms. Mother Ocean. Father Sky. I meditated upon this new life that I am now obliged to live. I thought about youth. I thought about old age. Apparently bad memories fade away with time and only the moments of goodness and joy remain. Those who are nearing the end of their lives revel in the bliss of yesterday but we the young have this day and tomorrow to contend with. Today, we see the world naked, exposed before our eyes. We see hatred, misery and pain. We find it difficult to live for today. Only the desires for tomorrow’s better world can alleviate the suffering that is today. Only tomorrow can offer us hope that glimmering moments will again materialize. So we continue to exist for a dream, a wish that tomorrow we can say: “This is a day worth living.” Excerpted from God, Bombs & Viet Nam: Based on the Diary of...

air force STS team made up of combat controllers and pararescue personnel. The team specialized in securing landing sites and evacuating wounded and downed aviators. They were a crucial part of the mission,

I also enjoyed praying at night for forgiveness, secure in the knowledge I’d not really done anything in need of forgiving.

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