โ
In the end, everyone came to the conclusion that however ungainly, however inefficient, however elliptical ASEAN's ways are, it's still better than not having an ASEAN. That is the genius of ASEAN foreign policy.
โ
โ
George Yeo
โ
What do you and the ASEAN countries want us to do?โ Lee replied, โStop the radio broadcasts.
โ
โ
Ezra F. Vogel (Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China)
โ
Asia is being shaped largely by the outlook of the US, the power of China, the weight of Russia, the collectivism of ASEAN, the volatility of the Middle East and the rise of India.
โ
โ
S. Jaishankar (The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World)
โ
Clearly, ASEAN needs to strengthen its secretariat. In contrast to the budget of the EU Secretariat, which is US$154 billion, the annual budget of the ASEAN Secretariat is US$19 million.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
At a meeting of business leaders from India and Southeast Asia in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, the secretary general of the ASEAN, Ong Keng Yong, introduced Dr Singh as โthe worldโs most highly qualified head of governmentโ. A standing ovation followed.
โ
โ
Sanjaya Baru (The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh)
โ
and so his secretary of state, Acheson, was told to wait until February 1949, after the election, to present to Congress our changeover from a Western Hemisphere republic to an imperial European polity, symmetrically balanced by our Asian empire, centered on occupied Japan and, in due course, its tigerish pendant, the ASEAN alliance.
โ
โ
Gore Vidal (The Last Empire: Essays 1992-2000 (Vintage International))
โ
As a method of warfare with โbeyond limitsโ as its major feature, its principle is to assemble and blend together more means to resolve a problem in a range wider than the problem itself. For example, when national is threatened, the answer is not simply a matter of selecting the means to confront the other nation militarily, but rather a matter of dispelling the crisis through the employment of โsupra-national combinations.โ We see from history that the nation-state is the highest form of the idea of security. For Chinese people, the nation-state even equates to the great concept of all-under-heaven [tianxia, classical name for China]. Nowadays, the significance of the word โcountryโ in terms of nationality or geography is no more than a large or small link in the human society of the โworld village.โ Modern countries are affected more and more by regional or world-wide organizations, such as the European Community [sic; now the European Union], ASEAN, OPEC, APEC, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the WTO, and the biggest of them all, the United Nations. Besides these, a large number of multinational organizations and non-state organizations of all shapes and sizes, such as multinational corporations, trade associations, peace and environmental organizations, the Olympic Committee, religious organizations, terrorist organizations, small groups of hackers, etc., dart from left and right into a countryโs path. These multinational, non-state, and supra-national organizations together constitute an up and coming worldwide system of power.3
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โ
Qiao Liang (Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America)
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์ด๋ฌํ ๊ตฐ์ฐ์ถ์ฅ์๋ง( Ymz44.COM )๊น์ ์นํ์
์ธ๋ฐฐ๊ฒฝ์์ 2012๋
๋์๋ โํจ๊ป ์์ฌ๋ ์ธ์์ ๋ง๋๋ ํ, ๋
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, ์ด๋ฆฐ์ด๋ด๋น์์ ์ญ๋ ๊ฐํ๋ฅผ ์ํ ์ํฌ์ ๋ฐ ์ฌ์ด๋ฒ๊ต์ก์ ์ด์(8๊ฐ ๊ณผ์ , 2,965๋ช
์๋ฃ) ํ์๋ค. ํํธ, ์ด๋ฆฐ์ด์ ๊ตฐ์ฐ์ถ์ฅ์๋ง( Ymz44.COM )๊น์ ์นํ์
์ธ๋ค์ ๋
์์งํฅ๊ณผ ๋
์ ์ํํ๋ฅผ ์ํ์ฌ ๋งค๋
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์๊ต์ค ์ด์ยท์ง์(884๊ฐ๊ด, 27,216๋ช
์๋ฃ)๊ณผ ใ2012 ๋
์์ ํดใ๋ฅผ ๊ณ๊ธฐ๋ก ์ด๋ฆฐ์ดยท์ฒญ์๋
๋
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ธ๋ ฅํ์๋ค. ์์ธ๋ฌ, ์ฒญ์๋
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์๋ฌธํ ์งํฅ ๊ตฐ์ฐ์ถ์ฅ์๋ง( Ymz44.COM )๊น์ ์นํ์
์ธํ๋ก์ ํธ๋ ์ํํ์๋ค.
โ
โ
๊ตฐ์ฐ์ถ์ฅ์๋ง Ymz44.COM ๊น์ ์นํ์
์ธ
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1. Omnipresent and Omnipotent Authoritarianism: Authoritarian Media vs. Social Media?2. Istanbul Mobil'ized: Mobile Phones' Contribution to Political Participation and Activism in Istanbul Gezi Park Protests and Onwards. 3. The Gezi Park Protest and #resistgezi: A Chronicle of Tweeting the Protests. 4. Peace Journalism: Urgently and Desperately Needed in Post-Election Turkey.5. Critical Thinking Skills on Social Media: A Blooming Season Or A Period Of Decline? 6. Social media, blended learning and constructivism: A jigsaw completed by the uses and gratifications theory? 7. Educational uses of social media and problem-based learning. 8. The future of the new media: The mobile generation and interpersonal communication. 9. "Keep in E-Touch" Personality and Facebook use (with Ng)10. Of Kate Moss & Marilyn Monroe: Body Dissatisfaction and its Relation to Media (with Dev)11. Media psychology and intercultural communication: The social representations of Vietnam on Turkish newspapers. 12. Regional Journalism in Southeast Asia and ASEAN Identity in Making
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โ
Ulaล Baลar Gezgin (Connecting Social Science Research with Human Communication Practices: Politics, Education and Psychology of Social Media, Media and Culture)
โ
Perwira militer di abad 21 ini harus memiliki wawasan dan pengetahuan yang baik, knowledgeable. Kita paham, geopolitik terus berkembang. Kita juga paham, banyak sekali ancaman terhadap keamanan, baik yang tradisional maupun yang nontradisional. Dan kita juga tahu, diperlukan kolaborasi, kerja sama, dan kemitraan antarmiliter dari banyak negara, sebagaimana yang menjadi semangat ASEAN, semangat East Asia Summit, semangat APEC, dan semangat Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa.
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Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
โ
The political scientist John Ikenberry lauds the liberal international order America has built.11 The global order is today durable and stable thanks to the many multilateral mechanisms America helped build and continues to support: institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, and NATO that have fostered security and development, or the EU and NAFTA, which have promoted prosperity and lured the likes of Mexico and Turkey to embrace capitalism and democracy.12 America has lost some of its own authority to international institutions it created and sustained. But that is a good thing. It means that the liberal international order has legs; it will last longer and continue to define the world order around values and practices that will foster peace, freedom, and prosperity. As Ikenberry notes, โThe underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thriveโ without Americaโs guiding hand.13 In the Middle East, though, where simmering instability threatens global security and prosperity, America has done very little institution building of the kind Ikenberry writes about. There is no equivalent to ASEAN or APEC (the Asia Pacific Economic Council), or rival to the SCO, which is backed by China, Russia, and Iran. Perhaps America should help create those kinds of institutions, which could foster order but also make the regionโs security and prosperity less dependent on the exercise of American authority. Only then should America think about pivoting somewhere else.
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Vali Nasr (The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat)
โ
Di kawasan Asia Tenggara dan Asia Pasifik, kita masih dihadapkan pada tantangan tradisional, seperti potensi konflik akibat sengketa perbatasan dan klaim wilayah. Kita juga masih menghadapi berbagai tantangan non-tradisional yang membawa dampak langsung terhadap keamanan dan kesejahteraan rakyat di kawasan. Kita menyadari, berbagai persoalan itu dapat memicu ketegangan baru, dan berdampak bagi upaya bersama untuk mewujudkan Komunitas ASEAN dan kerja sama di kawasan Asia Pasifik.
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Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
โ
Few Americans can claim to know China as well as Ambassador Stapleton Roy. Born in China, a fluent Mandarin speaker, Roy also served as the American ambassador to China from 1991 to 1995 and has stayed exceptionally well informed on US-China relations. He explained what happened: In a joint press conference with President Obama on September 25, 2015, Xi Jinping had proposed a more reasonable approach on the South China Sea. Xi had supported full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by China and all ten ASEAN members; had called for early conclusion of the China-ASEAN consultations on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea; and had added that China had no intention of militarizing the Spratlys, where it had engaged in massive reclamation work on the reefs and shoals it occupied. Roy said that Obama missed an opportunity to capitalize on this reasonable proposal. Instead, the US Navy stepped up its naval patrols. China responded by proceeding with militarization. In short, Xi did not renege on a promise. His offer was effectively spurned by the US Navy. The big question is how an untruth becomes accepted as a fact by well-informed, thoughtful Western elites.
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Kishore Mahbubani (Has China Won?: The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy)
โ
Or perhaps the best that can be hoped forโas a play on the โMADโ (mutually assured destruction) of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff in the Cold War yearsโmay be โMAA,โ โmutually assured ambiguity.โ But seeking to address issues in a multilateral framework, with a critical role for ASEAN, would help modulate the conviction that the South China Sea is fundamentally a standoff between China and the United States.
โ
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Daniel Yergin (The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations)
โ
To effectively usher in the Golden Age of Infrastructure, the Duterte Administration created Build, Build, Build, a medium-term development strategy, which aimed to mobilize the largest work force in Philippine history to implement an infrastructure plan consistent with the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity.
โ
โ
Anna Mae Yu Lamentillo , Night Owl: A Nationbuilderโs Manual
โ
Prior to the term of President Rodrigo Duterte, average infrastructure spending for the past five decades was only at 2.5 percent of the countryโs GDP. The 2015 IMF report found that the Philippines had a lower public investment in comparison to other members of ASEAN.
We all know that Build, Build, Build is a program that is not only necessary but is in fact long overdue.
If the Philippines is to achieve its full potential, then it must do something to cut losses due to traffic congestion in Metro Manila, which has gone up to โฑ3.5 billion a day. It was at this point that Secretary Mark Villar presented the plan to decongest the 90-year-old EDSA, a 23.8-kilometer circumferential highway, which has long exceeded its maximum capacity of 288,000 vehicles a day.
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Anna Mae Yu Lamentillo , Night Owl: A Nationbuilderโs Manual
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Without an FTA, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the ASEAN countries will be integrated into Chinaโs economyโan outcome to be avoided.
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โ
Graham Allison (Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World (Belfer Center Studies in International Security))
โ
The frequency of Suhartoโs meetings with his fellow heads of government during his twenty-two-year incumbency prompted an Indonesian label for the encounters: โempat mataโ (four eyes).
โ
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Donald E. Weatherbee (ASEAN's Half Century: A Political History of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
โ
From their strategic location at the Straits of Malacca, early Malay-Indonesian seafarers dominated both the China trade and the Indian Ocean trade. The Indonesians โtraded with India by 500 BCE and China by 400 BCE, and around the beginning of the Common Era, they carried goods between China and Indiaโ.24
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Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
However, America also began to see its many Cold War allies in a new light, questioning their usefulness and seeing their flaws in sharper relief. Since it would have been seen as unethical (not to mention ungrateful) to use and then abandon allies, America needed an ethical justification. Under Jimmy Carter in the 1980s, America started bringing human rights into foreign policy conversations. By the 1990s, human rights were used as a tool to create distance from inconvenient or former allies.
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Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
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2012 Phnom Penh meeting indicated that the South China Sea issue was beginning to affect the ASEAN-China relationship.
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Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
ASEANโs role in providing a neutral geopolitical platform for great-power engagement is particularly valuable in the current context of major great-power shifts. The reason only ASEAN can do this is that it is the only party trusted by all the powers in the region.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
Most Southeast Asia countries look to the United States to provide some sort of counterbalance to China, but they have increasing doubts about Washingtonโs dependability, know-how, resources, and staying power. These uncertainties affect their strategic thinking and planning in their relations with Beijing. โThe U.S. needs to have a long-term consistent, comprehensive, bipartisan approach to the Asia Pacific,โ says an ASEAN diplomat. โCountries in the region believe the U.S. will change its policy depending on who the next president is.
โ
โ
Murray Hiebert (Under Beijing's Shadow: Southeast Asia's China Challenge)
โ
one weakness of ASEAN is that the 600 million people who live in Southeast Asia do not feel a sense of ownership of ASEAN.
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Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
the terms of reference of the AIPR as currently constituted are less ambitious than I had hoped for, including the initial idea to maintain a roster of conflict-resolution experts to whom ASEAN member states could turn to facilitate the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.
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โ
Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
ASEAN member states must have trust in, and entrust, the various mechanisms that they themselves have created. Otherwise there is a real risk that a perception of redundancy or, worse still, irrelevance would begin to creep in.
โ
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Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
like any other international organization, a spectrum of views exists within ASEAN on the appropriate role of the secretariat, essentially between those who envision a more minimalist secretariat focused on fulfilling administrative tasks and those who would be comfortable with a secretariat with a more robust substantive capacity; for example, in ensuring member statesโ compliance with ASEAN Community targets.
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โ
Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
The differentiated timeline between the CLMV and the rest of the ASEAN member states on some of the AEC goals, in particular, simply represents a practical response to the reality of the prevailing economic development gap between the ASEAN 5 and the CLMV, and the need to address it through such specific policies as the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI).
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Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
Of course, the idea of an ASEAN economic community had already been broached by Singapore in 2002. Through its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2003, Indonesia sought to widen the notion of ASEAN community by adding the concept of ASEAN political and security community and, subsequently, with notable Philippine urging, the sociocultural community.
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Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
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While the rules and procedures within the European Union may indeed promote greater efficiency in decision-making โ in contrast to ASEANโs laborious โconsensus-basedโ approach โ it may risk eroding a sense of common ownership and participation.
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Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
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ASEANโs efforts at a more โrules-basedโ organization must not come at the expense of that unquantifiable and abstract, yet important, โASEAN spiritโ.
โ
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Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
When then President Barack Obama visited Laos in September 2016, he reminded us that America had dropped more than two million tons of bombs here in Laosโmore than we dropped on Germany and Japan combined during all of World War II. It made Laos, per person, the most heavily bombed country in history.
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โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
Now imagine a world where Donald Trump (a Christian), Xi Jinping (a Confucian Communist), Vladimir Putin (an Orthodox Christian), Ayatollah Khamenei (a Muslim) and Narendra Modi (a Hindu) came together to sign a declaration for peaceful collaboration.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
how the extraordinary diversity of Southeast Asia came about. In all the many interpretations of the regionโs history, there is one undeniable fact: Southeast Asia has served as the crossroads of the world for over 2,000 years. The remarkable cultural diversity of Southeast Asia is also a result of this. At least four major cultural waves have swept through Southeast Asia: the Indian, Chinese, Muslim and Western waves.
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โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
redeploymentโ (I studiously avoided the word โwithdrawalโ as it tended to trigger endless debate between the parties) of the troops of both countries; as well as respect for the commitment to the avoidance of conflict (the terms โcessation of conflictโ or โceasefireโ proved far too contentious).
โ
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Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
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I drew encouragement from the fact that none of the member states openly expressed opposition. However, I was only too conscious of the fact that it has been the โASEAN wayโ not to be confrontational and openly disagree.
โ
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Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
reservationโs on Timor-Lesteโs application were more openly couched in terms of its likely impact on the fast-approaching ASEAN Community, especially the ASEAN Economic Community.
โ
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Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
ASEAN must henceforth seize the initiative in addressing emerging issues affecting its member countries โ shaping and moulding developments โ and not allow such issues to spiral outside its control.
โ
โ
Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
The US and Thailand signed an accord in October 1985 setting up a war reserve weapons stockpile in Thailand, making it the first country without a US military base to have such an arrangement.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
Indonesiaโs strategic location in the Indian Ocean and its control of the Melaka and Sunda Straits made the country exceptionally important for US strategic and security interests in the region.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
Southeast Asia has been intimately associated and involved with four of the great universalist cultures and civilizations of the world: India, China, Islam and the West.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
With a fine natural harbour accessible even to the largest ocean-going vessels, and located strategically in the Straits of Malacca, the new kingdom of Srivijaya became a more competitive port of call as trade between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean flowed through the straits. Srivijaya prospered rapidly and was able to maintain a commercial hegemony over the smaller ports of the Indonesian archipelago, dominating seaborne commerce from the 7th to the 11th centuries. Srivijaya was the first in a succession of great seaports (Malacca, Aceh, Batavia, Penang and Singapore) that were to derive their strength from occupying a prominent location alongside the Straits of Malacca.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
By the 11th century, after the fall of the Tang and as the rise of the Song dynasty led to new demand from China, Srivijayaโs dominance of Southeast Asia was challenged from an unusual quarter, India.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
By paying tribute, these kingdoms could in turn engage in profitable trade with China. They exported tin, spice and a variety of forest products to China while importing much-coveted Chinese luxury goods (such as ceramics, tea and silk) and metals (such as iron and copper). The shrewd Chinese leaders understood that withholding market access to, or restricting the supply of, coveted Chinese luxury products could provide Beijing with leverage over foreign kingdoms. Occasionally, Chinese rulers introduced sanctions to regulate or limit private trade in order to achieve foreign policy goals.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
In reality, the rulers of Southeast Asia were keen to send tributes to China because they found it to be immensely profitable.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
China usually gave much more than it received from these missions, reflecting the courtโs attitude that its smaller neighbours had little to offer their great nation, and demonstrating Chinese generosityโ.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
a true security community in Southeast Asia could not be attained if ASEAN was to remain limited to its five original founding member states; instead, it required all ten countries of Southeast Asia to fall within the ambit of such an โumbrellaโ.
โ
โ
Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
Among the original ASEAN member states, Indonesia has stood out in eschewing formal alliances or defence security agreements, as it is considered to be inconsistent with its โindependent and activeโ (bebas aktif) or โnon-alignedโ foreign policy.
โ
โ
Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
it can generally be surmised that the other ASEAN founding member states (Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) largely followed pro-West foreign policy orientations. The situation in the remainder of Southeast Asia, however, was far more complex. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, to varying degrees, became battlegrounds for the then prevailing EastโWest tensions
โ
โ
Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
ASEAN itself became the hub for dialogue and communication between the aforementioned countries. All three countries โ China, the Russian Federation and the United States โ have had the โcomfort levelโ to allow ASEAN to take the lead in promoting a cooperative framework in the region.
โ
โ
Marty Natalegawa (Does ASEAN Matter?: A View from Within (Books / Monographs))
โ
Within ASEAN, a culture of peace has evolved as a result of imbibing the Indonesian custom of musyawarah and mufakat (consultation and consensus). Now ASEAN has begun to share this culture of peace with the larger Asia-Pacific region.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
The most important strategic relationship is always that between the worldโs greatest power (today, the US) and the worldโs greatest emerging power (China). Both worked closely together to thwart the Soviet Union in the 1980s. This helped ASEAN. Today, even though there is a remarkable degree of cooperation between the US and China, there is also a rising degree of competition. If this competition gets out of hand, ASEAN could be split apart. This is why a key message of this chapter is that all the great powers, including America, China, India, Japan and the EU, have a stake in keeping ASEAN together.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
โ
The mutual benefits of two-way trade, and the willingness of Southeast Asian rulers to submit, at least symbolically, to China may also explain the relative lack of military conflict between China and Southeast Asia over the centuries.
โ
โ
Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
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The more than 600 million people living in the region have seen remarkable progress in the 50 years since the formation of the association. ASEAN has brought peace and prosperity to a troubled region, generated inter-civilizational harmony in the most diverse corner of the earth
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Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
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The reason ASEAN has emerged as the indispensable platform for great-power engagement in the Asia-Pacific region is that it is too weak to be a threat to anyone. So all the great powers instinctively trust it.
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Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
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No other region in the world can match its cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity. In a relatively small geographical space, we find 240 million Muslims, 130 million Christians, 140 million Buddhists and 7 million Hindus. This range of religious diversity is remarkable in itself. But it actually masks a deeper cultural diversity.
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Kishore Mahbubani (The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace)
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Korea culturally has much in common with China and historically has tilted toward China. For Singapore communist China was an enemy during the Cold War. In the 1980s, however, Singapore began to shift its position and its leaders actively argued the need for the United States and other countries to come to terms with the realities of Chinese power. With its large Chinese population and the anti-Western proclivities of its leaders, Malaysia also strongly tilted in the Chinese direction. Thailand maintained its independence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by accommodating itself to European and Japanese imperialism and has shown every intention of doing the same with China, an inclination reinforced by the potential security threat it sees from Vietnam. Indonesia and Vietnam are the two countries of Southeast Asia most inclined toward balancing and containing China. Indonesia is large, Muslim, and distant from China, but without the help of others it cannot prevent Chinese assertion of control over the South China Sea. In the fall of 1995 Indonesia and Australia joined in a security agreement that committed them to consult with each other in the event of โadverse challengesโ to their security. Although both parties denied that this was an anti-China arrangement, they did identify China as the most likely source of adverse challenges.37 Vietnam has a largely Confucian culture but historically has had highly antagonistic relations with China and in 1979 fought a brief war with China. Both Vietnam and China have claimed sovereignty over all the Spratly Islands, and their navies engaged each other on occasion in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1990s Vietnamโs military capabilities declined in relation to those of China. More than any other East Asian state, Vietnam consequently has the motive to seek partners to balance China. Its admission into ASEAN and normalization of its relations with the United States in 1995 were two steps in this direction.
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Samuel P. Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order)