Article 2 Of The Constitution Quotes

1. brains cause mind Now of course, that proposition is really too crudely put. What we mean by that is that mental processes we consider to constitute a mind are caused by processes going on inside the brain. But let's say it in three words: brains cause minds. And this is just a fact about how brains work. 2. Syntax is not sufficient for semantics That proposition is a conceptual truth. It just articulates our distinction between the notion of what is purely formal and what has content. Now, to these two propositions, lets add two more: 3. Computer programs are entirely defined by their formal, or syntactical structure That proposition, I take it, is true by definition - it is part of what we mean by the notion of computer programs. 4. Minds have mental contents - specifically, they have semantic contents. And that, I take it, is just an obvious fact about how our minds work. My thoughts and beliefs and desires are about something, or they reference something, or they concern states of affairs in the world; and they do that because their contents direct them at these states of affairs naturally. Now, from these four premises, we can draw our first conclusion; it follows obviously from premises 2, 3, and 4. Conclusion 1. No computer program by itself is sufficient to give a system a mind; programs in short are not minds, and they are not by themselves sufficient for having minds. (See original paper for elaboration) Conclusion 2. The way that brain functions cause minds cannot be solely in virtue of running a computer program. (See original article) Conclusion 3. Anything else that caused minds would have to have causal powers at least equivalent to those of the brain. Conclusion 4. For any artefact that we may build which had mental states equivalent to human mental states, the implimentation of a computer program would not by itself be sufficient, but rather, the artefact would have to have the powers equivalent to the powers of the human brain.

Jews were thus being reclaimed as fellow Germans, while their previously asserted racial or ethnic “difference” was disavowed on the grounds that, after all, they had been born in Germany, spoke German as a mother tongue, or at any rate wrote for a German readership. Those exiles whom the Nazis had deprived of their German citizenship on political and racial grounds were now entitled to renaturalization according to Article 116, Paragraph 2 of the German constitution, the Grundgesetz.29 Yet with the exception of Adorno, who renewed his German citizenship in 1955, the public speakers considered here did not seek to repatriate: Arendt, a secular German Jew, never reapplied for German citizenship, even though she took her German readers seriously enough to personally produce German versions of books she had originally written in English. In a similar vein, Weiss, son of a Jewish-Hungarian father and a Swiss mother, acquired Swedish citizenship

When our Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution—the successor document to the Articles of Confederation—they recognized that the proper role of government is not a nanny or Big Brother but a limited entity designed to protect the people’s natural liberties. “The Fathers rather frequently indicated that our rights were founded on the law of nature.”1 Almost uniformly, individuals like Madison, Jefferson, and Washington subscribed to the concept of the Natural Law and the inherent dignity of all persons:2 A dignity that bears with it the promise of “certain unalienable Rights, . . . among [which] are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.

Article 5 of the Nauruan Constitution provides: (1)No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty, except as authorised by law in any of the following cases: (a) in execution of the sentence or order of a court in respect of an offence of which he has been convicted; (b) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court; (c) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, an offence; (d) under the order of a court, for his education during any period ending not later than the thirty-first day of December after he attains the age of eighteen years; (e) under the order of a court, for his welfare during any period ending not later than the date on which he attains the age of twenty years; (f) for the purpose of preventing the spread of disease; (g) in the case of a person who is, or is reasonably suspected to be, of unsound mind or addicted to drugs or alcohol, for the purpose of his care or treatment or the protection of the community; and (h) for the purpose of preventing his unlawful entry into Nauru, or for the purpose of effecting his expulsion, extradition or other lawful removal from Nauru. (2)A person who is arrested or detained shall be informed promptly of the reasons for the arrest or detention and shall be permitted to consult in the place in which he is detained a legal representative of his own choice. (3)A person who has been arrested or detained in the circumstances referred to in paragraph (c) of clause (1) of this Article and has not been released shall be brought before a Judge or some other person holding judicial office within a period of twenty-four hours after the arrest or detention and shall not be further held in custody in connection with that offence except by order of a Judge or some other person holding judicial office. (4)Where a complaint is made to the Supreme Court that a person is unlawfully detained, the Supreme Court shall enquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order that person to be brought before it and shall release him. Detention of asylum seekers in Nauru is contrary to the Nauruan Constitution. By offering financial and personal incentives to Nauruan politicians, the Australian government has engaged in unlawful people trading. The

To sum up, these provisions deal with the citizenship of (a) persons domiciled in India; (b) persons migrated from Pakistan; (c) persons migrated to Pakistan but later returned; and (d) persons of Indian origin residing outside India. The other constitutional provisions with respect to the citizenship are as follows: 1.No person shall be a citizen of India or be deemed to be a citizen of India, if he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of any foreign state (Article 9). 2.Every person who is or is deemed to be a citizen of India shall continue to be such citizen, subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament (Article 10). 3.Parliament shall have the power to make any provision with respect to the acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship (Article 11).

Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further notice. It is therefore permissible to restrict the rights of personal freedom, freedom of expression, including the freedom of the press, the freedom to organize and assemble, the privacy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications. Warrants for house searches, orders for confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed. The Reichstag Fire Decree

If the men who wrote the Constitution of the Untied States had been able to foreseen how politicians would become so influenced by private interest, along with their own financial gain rather than the doctrine of civic duty their title bestows them. I believe they would have written Article 1 section thru 9; Article 2 section 1; and Article 3 section 1; very differently.

The Supreme Court was beyond their constitutional power when they handed George W. Bush the victory in 2000 by ruling that if all the votes were counted in Florida, as that state’s supreme court had ordered, it would “cause irreparable harm to petitioner [George W. Bush].” They were beyond their constitutional power every single time they struck down a law passed by Congress and signed by the president over the years. And most important, the Supreme Court was way beyond their constitutional authority every single time they created out of whole cloth new legal doctrines, such as “separate but equal” in Plessy v. Ferguson, “privacy” in Roe v. Wade, or “corporations are people” in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. But in the fine tradition of John Marshall, today’s Supreme Court wants you to believe that they are the über-overlords of our nation. They can make George W. Bush president, without any appeal. They can make money into speech, they can turn corporations into people, and the rest of us have no say in it. And they’re wrong. It’s not what the Constitution says, and it’s not what most of our Founders said. Which raises the question: If the Supreme Court can’t decide what is and what isn’t constitutional, then what is its purpose? What’s it really supposed to be doing? The answer to that is laid out in the Constitution in plain black-and-white. It’s the first court where the nation goes for cases involving disputes about treaties, ambassadors, controversies between two or more states, between a state and citizen of another state, between citizens of different states, and between our country and foreign states. Read Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution—it’s all there. Not a word in there about “judicial supremacy” or “judicial review”—the supposed powers of the court to strike down (or write) laws by deciding what is and what isn’t constitutional. President Thomas Jefferson was pretty clear about that—as were most of the Founders—and the court didn’t start seriously deciding “constitutionality” until after all of them were dead. But back in the day, here’s what Jefferson had to say: The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves… When the legislative or executive functionaries act unconstitutionally, they are responsible to the people in their elective capacity.177 Their elective capacity? That’s a fancy presidential-founder way of saying that the people can toss out on their butts any member of Congress or any president who behaves in a way that’s unconstitutional. The ultimate remedy is with the people—it’s the ballot box. If we don’t like the laws being passed, then we elect new legislators and a new president. It’s pretty simple.

Government servants. These provisions are applicable only to the employees of the various Ministries, Departments and Attached and Subordinate Offices.Further, the employees, being citizens of the country also enjoy Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and can enforce them though the Writ jurisdiction of the Courts. In addition to the constitutional provisions, there are certain rules which are applicable to the conduct of the proceedings for taking action against the erring employees. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal) Rules 1965 cover a vast majority of the Central Government employees.Besides, there are also several other Rules which are applicable to various sections of the employees in a number of services.(b) Semi Governmental Organisations: By this, we mean the Public Sector Undertakings and Autonomous Bodies and Societies controlled by the Government. Provisions of Part XIV of the Constitution do not apply to the employees of these Organisations.However, as these organisations can be brought within the definition of the term ‘State’ as contained in Article 12 of the Constitution, the employees of these organisations are protected against the violation of their Fundamental Rights by the orders of their employer. The action of the employer can be challenged by the employees of these organisations on the grounds of arbitrariness, etc. These organisations also have their own sets of rules for processing the cases for conducting the disciplinary proceedings against their employees.(c) Purely private organisations: These are governed by the various industrial and labour laws of the country and the approved standing orders applicable for the establishment.4. Although the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 apply only to a limited number of employees in the Government, essentially these are the codification of the Principles of Natural Justice, which are required to be followed in any quasi judicial proceedings. Even the Constitutional protections which are contained in Part XIV of the Constitution are the codification of the above Principles.Hence, the procedures which are followed in most of the Government and semi-governmental organisations are more or less similar. This handout is predominantly based on the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965.5. Complexity of the statutory provisions, significance of the stakes involved, high proportion and frequency of the affected employees seeking judicial intervention, high percentage of the cases being subjected to judicial scrutiny, huge volume of case law on the subject - are some of the features of this subject.These, among others have sparked the need for a ready reference material on the subject. Hence this handbook2

Originally (1949), the Constitution contained a Preamble, 395 Articles (divided into 22 Parts) and 8 Schedules. Presently (2013), it consists of a Preamble, about 465 Articles (divided into 25 Parts) and 12 Schedules2. The various amendments carried out since 1951 have deleted about 20 Articles and one Part (VII) and added about 85 Articles, four Parts (IVA, IXA, IXB and XIVA) and four Schedules (9, 10, 11 and 12). No other Constitution in the world has so many Articles and Schedules3.

However, the legislature is supreme vis-à-vis the executive, which is accountable to it under Articles 75(2) and 164(2), and Parliament is supreme vis-à-vis the judiciary as it has the power to remove a judge of the higher judiciary through a resolution in both Houses supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and not less than two-thirds of the members of the House present and voting. It is also supreme in the sense that it has powers to decide the constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts. (Article 246, Entries 77, 78 and 79 of List I.)

regime also imposed a further restriction on religious parties (and independent parliamentary candidates), namely an amendment of Articles 1 and 2 of the constitution to define Egypt as ‘a state of citizenship’ and remove the reference to Islam as ‘the religion of the state’. The change in theory would have the effect of allowing women, and Christians, to run for any position, including the presidency.

As Calhoun first articulated, the rights of Southern slaveholders were protected by no less than the Constitution itself: Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3, which promised that those “held to service or labor in one state,” who escaped to another, would be “delivered up.” Without this promise, the South’s forefathers would never have signed the compact that drew them into the Union. Without the guaranteed rights to slave ownership, in other words, the United States of America would not exist. And yet, these promised rights were under siege daily, as fugitives disappeared into the North. This was the first grievance stated in the Address, and it spoke loudly for Southerners like Collins.

All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit. The faith of the people of Texas stands pledged to the preservation of a republican form of government, and, subject to this limitation only, they have at all times the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think expedient.” ~ The Texas Constitution (Article 1, Section 2)

Thus access to education, which was virtually impeded in T.M.A. Pai, was somewhat restored in view of three factors: (1) Article 15(5) of the Constitution, which was inserted by the 93rd Constitution Amendment Act; and (2) the RTE Act 2009 and (3) the Supreme Court judgment in Society for Unaided Private Schools, which upheld the RTE Act 2009.

The more we examine the influence of human agency in the formation of political constitutions, the greater will be our conviction that it enters there only in a manner infinitely subordinate, or as a simple instrument; and I do not believe there remains the least doubt of the incontestable truth of the following propositions:— 1. That the fundamental principles of political constitutions exist before all written law. 2. That a constitutional law is, and can only be, the developement or sanction of an unwritten pre-existing right. 3. That which is most essential, most intrinsically constitutional, and truly fundamental, is never written, and could not be, without endangering the state. 4. That the weakness and fragility of a constitution are actually in direct proportion to the multiplicity of written constitutional articles.

Mormon Thought, the first appearing in 1969 and the second in 1973. In his 1969 essay “A Commentary on Steven G. Taggart’s Mormonism’s Negro Policy: Social and Historical Origins,” Bush excoriated Taggart for his limited, incomplete research.7 Bush systematically dismantled Taggart’s central thesis that Joseph Smith initiated black priesthood denial in response to Latter-day Saint difficulties in Missouri. Bush supported his refutation with extensive documentation.8 Bush further developed his arguments in a second in-depth Dialogue article entitled “Mormonism’s Negro Doctrine: An Historical Overview” published in 1973. His fifty-seven page essay containing some 219 footnotes constituted by far the most comprehensive examination of Mormon racial policy up to that time.9 Bush’s essay drew heavily from a four-hundred-page compendium of primary and secondary documents compiled over some ten years. Covering the period from the 1830s to the 1970s, Bush’s “Compilation on the Negro in Mormonism” contains First Presidency minutes, Quorum of the Twelve meeting minutes, and other General Authority interviews and writings.10 Bush’s carefully written text found minimal evidence to support the LDS Church’s official position that the priesthood ban resulted from divine revelation—thus contradicting a major justification for its existence. Seeking to undermine its legitimacy and thus prod the Church toward change, Bush summarily dismissed the ban as the unfortunate product of socio-historical forces present in the larger nineteenth century American society. The scholarly studies of Stephen Taggart and especially Lester E. Bush Jr. greatly influenced my own work, which commenced as

Amendment XVI Passed by Congress July 2, 1909. Ratified February 3, 1913. Note: Article I, section 9, of the Constitution was modified by amendment 16. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

Page 37: Article 1, Section 2, of the Constitution counted each slave (usually treated in the law as chattel property) as three fifths of a person in determining Southern representation in the House of Representatives (this compromise, it should be noted, served Northern interests; had each slave been counted as a complete person for purposes of congressional representation, the South would have had even more representatives in Congress).

It nevertheless remains true that the intensity of European integration is thin in many areas for which the Member States retain primary or sole responsibility; that the limits of Union competence are governed by the principle of conferral, in other words, that the Union can act ‘only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein’ and that competences not so conferred remain with the Member States (Article 4(1) and Article 5(2) TEU); and that, particularly in the TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union is ordained to respect not only the national identities of Member States and their equality before the Treaties, but also their essential state functions (Article 4(2) TEU).