Treasury Note Price Quotes

It’s importance, however, is bigger than that. Treasury securities are the risk-free yield curve for all of the financial markets. That’s right, the yields of Treasury Bills, Notes, and Bonds from overnight to 30 years make up a yield curve that is used to price all other fixed-income securities. The Treasury market is the reference rate for interest rates. Treasurys are a tool for pricing corporate bonds, municipal bonds, emerging market bonds, federal agencies, mortgage-backed securities, and other dollar assets. On top of that, they’re also a tool for speculation and hedging risk.

Treasury Bills are the shortest securities, and they’re discount securities[8]. The Treasury regularly issues 1 Month, 2 Month, 3 Month, 6 Month, and Year Bills. Treasury Notes are securities that were originally issued with maturities between 2 years and 10 years. Currently, the Treasury issues 2 Year Notes, 3 Year Notes, 5 Year Notes, 7 Year Notes, and 10 Year Notes. In the past, there was a 4 Year Note, but it was discontinued. Treasury Bonds[9] are securities originally issued with maturities of either 20 or 30 years. Treasury securities are issued on a very regular schedule. Auction schedules are announced by the Treasury and don’t change very often. Keeping Treasury securities regular and predictable helps keeps the market liquid, and therefore reduces funding costs, in theory, for the government. On top of that, large liquid Treasury issues are good for the financial markets. Just remember, large and liquid is certainly better than small and illiquid! Small issues can experience price distortions, so the Treasury will make adjustments in their debt sales to keep the market liquid, running smoothly and predictably.

Labor and employment firm Fisher & Phillips LLP opened a Seattle office by poaching partner Davis Bae from labor and employment competitor Jackson Lewis PC. Mr. Bea, an immigration specialist, will lead the office, which also includes new partners Nick Beermann and Catharine Morisset and one other lawyer. Fisher & Phillips has 31 offices around the country. Sara Randazzo LAW Cadwalader Hires New Partner as It Looks to Represent Activist Investors By Liz Hoffman and David Benoit | 698 words One of America’s oldest corporate law firms is diving into the business of representing activist investors, betting that these agitators are going mainstream—and offer a lucrative business opportunity for advisers. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP has hired a new partner, Richard Brand, whose biggest clients include William Ackman’s Pershing Square Capital Management LP, among other activist investors. Mr. Brand, 35 years old, advised Pershing Square on its campaign at Allergan Inc. last year and a board coup at Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. in 2012. He has also defended companies against activists and has worked on mergers-and-acquisitions deals. His hiring, from Kirkland & Ellis LLP, is a notable step by a major law firm to commit to representing activists, and to do so while still aiming to retain corporate clients. Founded in 1792, Cadwalader for decades has catered to big companies and banks, but going forward will also seek out work from hedge funds including Pershing Square and Sachem Head Capital Management LP, a Pershing Square spinout and another client of Mr. Brand’s. To date, few major law firms or Wall Street banks have tried to represent both corporations and activist investors, who generally take positions in companies and push for changes to drive up share prices. Most big law firms instead cater exclusively to companies, worried that lining up with activists will offend or scare off executives or create conflicts that could jeopardize future assignments. Some are dabbling in both camps. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, for example, represented Trian Fund Management LP in its recent proxy fight at DuPont Co. and also is steering Time Warner Cable Inc.’s pending sale to Charter Communications Inc. Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP have done work for activist firm Third Point LLC. But most firms are more monogamous. Those on one end, most vocally Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, defend management, while a small band including Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP primarily represent activists. In embracing activist work, Cadwalader thinks it can serve both groups better, said Christopher Cox, chairman of the firm’s corporate group. “Traditional M&A and activism are becoming increasingly intertwined,” Mr. Cox said in an interview. “To be able to bring that perspective to the boardroom is a huge advantage. And when a threat does emerge, who’s better to defend a company than someone who’s seen it from the other side?” Mr. Cox said Cadwalader has been thinking about branching out into activism since late last year. The firm is also working with an activist fund launched earlier this year by Cadwalader’s former head of M&A, Jim Woolery, that hopes to take a friendlier stance toward companies. Mr. Cox also said he believes activism can be lucrative, pooh-poohing another reason some big law firms eschew such assignments—namely, that they don’t pay as well as, say, a large merger deal. “There is real money in activism today,” said Robert Jackson, a former lawyer at Wachtell and the U.S. Treasury Department who now teaches at Columbia University and who also notes that advising activists can generate regulatory work. “Law firms are businesses, and taking the stance that you’ll never, ever, ever represent an activist is a financial luxury that only a few firms have.” To be sure, the handful of law firms that work for both sides say they do so

If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coalmines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well-tried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again (the right to do so being obtained, of course, by tendering for leases of the note-bearing territory), there need be no more unemployment and, with the help of the repercussions, the real income of the community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a good deal greater than it actually is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the like; but if there are political and practical difficulties in the way of this, the above would be better than nothing.”43

once the issue settled, Tiger and Quantum agreed to have Salomon manage their positions. Salomon had complete control of the entire 2 Year Note. By the middle of May, it was clear there was something wrong. The 2 Year Note’s price was completely distorted; it was trading extremely rich and the yield was extremely low. There was no squeeze in the Repo market, however, because Salomon loaned the securities into the market each day. This created one of the strangest squeezes ever. There was no shortage in the Repo market, but there was a huge premium in the cash market. As the squeeze in the April 2 Year Note continued, Salomon submitted large bids again for the next 2 Year Note settling at the end of May. They were able to accumulate an abnormally large position once again. Prices across the entire 2 year sector were now distorted. Prices were abnormally high and yields were abnormally low. Everyone knew that Salomon had the issue and Salomon was not selling. At this point, all of the trading in the market was from one short seller to another. There were no real owners selling. All of the buyers were existing short-sellers who had ridden their losses as far as they could go and got stopped out. All of the sellers were new short-sellers willing to take short positions and higher and higher prices. There was no way for the squeeze to end without Salomon selling. What was Salomon’s goal? They had already achieved a very successful squeeze. Prices moved in their favor and they had a huge win under their belt. The biggest short-squeeze of all time! However, in July things started to unravel. Market participants started complaining to the Fed. Everyone knew that Salomon owned the entire issue. The Fed passed the information to the Treasury Department. Treasury then passed it to the SEC, who immediately launched an investigation. By the end of July, it was all over.

Put simply, if both a U.S. Treasury note and small company stock appeared likely to return 7 percent per year, everyone would rush to buy the former (driving up its price and reducing its prospective return) and dump the latter (driving down its price and thus increasing its return). This process of adjusting relative prices, which economists call equilibration, is supposed to render prospective returns proportional to risk.