Treasury Bond Price Quotes

Hamilton argued that the security of liberty and property were inseparable and that governments should honor their debts because contracts formed the basis of public and private morality: “States, like individuals, who observe their engagements are respected and trusted, while the reverse is the fate of those who pursue an opposite conduct.”The proper handling of government debt would permit America to borrow at affordable interest rates and would also act as a tonic to the economy. Used as loan collateral, government bonds could function as money—and it was the scarcity of money, Hamilton observed, that had crippled the economy and resulted in severe deflation in the value of land. America was a young country rich in opportunity. It lacked only liquid capital, and government debt could supply that gaping deficiency. The secret of managing government debt was to fund it properly by setting aside revenues at regular intervals to service interest and pay off principal. Hamilton refuted charges that his funding scheme would feed speculation. Quite the contrary: if investors knew for sure that government bonds would be paid off, the prices would not fluctuate wildly, depriving speculators of opportunities to exploit. What mattered was that people trusted the government to make good on repayment: “In nothing are appearances of greater moment than in whatever regards credit. Opinion is the soul of it and this is affected by appearances as well as realities.” Hamilton intuited that public relations and confidence building were to be the special burdens of every future treasury secretary.

During his time working for the head of strategy at the bank in the early 1990s, Musk had been asked to take a look at the company’s third-world debt portfolio. This pool of money went by the depressing name of “less-developed country debt,” and Bank of Nova Scotia had billions of dollars of it. Countries throughout South America and elsewhere had defaulted in the years prior, forcing the bank to write down some of its debt value. Musk’s boss wanted him to dig into the bank’s holdings as a learning experiment and try to determine how much the debt was actually worth. While pursuing this project, Musk stumbled upon what seemed like an obvious business opportunity. The United States had tried to help reduce the debt burden of a number of developing countries through so-called Brady bonds, in which the U.S. government basically backstopped the debt of countries like Brazil and Argentina. Musk noticed an arbitrage play. “I calculated the backstop value, and it was something like fifty cents on the dollar, while the actual debt was trading at twenty-five cents,” Musk said. “This was like the biggest opportunity ever, and nobody seemed to realize it.” Musk tried to remain cool and calm as he rang Goldman Sachs, one of the main traders in this market, and probed around about what he had seen. He inquired as to how much Brazilian debt might be available at the 25-cents price. “The guy said, ‘How much do you want?’ and I came up with some ridiculous number like ten billion dollars,” Musk said. When the trader confirmed that was doable, Musk hung up the phone. “I was thinking that they had to be fucking crazy because you could double your money. Everything was backed by Uncle Sam. It was a no-brainer.” Musk had spent the summer earning about fourteen dollars an hour and getting chewed out for using the executive coffee machine, among other status infractions, and figured his moment to shine and make a big bonus had arrived. He sprinted up to his boss’s office and pitched the opportunity of a lifetime. “You can make billions of dollars for free,” he said. His boss told Musk to write up a report, which soon got passed up to the bank’s CEO, who promptly rejected the proposal, saying the bank had been burned on Brazilian and Argentinian debt before and didn’t want to mess with it again. “I tried to tell them that’s not the point,” Musk said. “The point is that it’s fucking backed by Uncle Sam. It doesn’t matter what the South Americans do. You cannot lose unless you think the U.S. Treasury is going to default. But they still didn’t do it, and I was stunned. Later in life, as I competed against the banks, I would think back to this moment, and it gave me confidence. All the bankers did was copy what everyone else did. If everyone else ran off a bloody cliff, they’d run right off a cliff with them. If there was a giant pile of gold sitting in the middle of the room and nobody was picking it up, they wouldn’t pick it up, either.” In

To understand what that means in commonsense terms, consider a person who plans to live off the income from $1 million invested in T-bills. Suppose he retires in a given year and converts his investments into an inflation-protected annuity with a return of 4% to 5%. He will receive an annual income of $40,000 to $50,000. But now suppose he retires a few years later, when the return on the annuity has dropped to 0.5%. His annual income will now be only $5,000. Yes, the $1 million principal amount was fully insured and protected, but you can see that he cannot possibly live on the amount he will now receive. T-bills preserve principal at all times, but the income received on them can vary enormously as return on the annuity goes up or down. Had the retiree bought instead a long-maturity U.S. Treasury bond with his $1 million, his spendable income would be secure for the life of the bond, even though the price of that bond would fluctuate substantially from day to day. The same holds true for annuities: Although their market value varies from day to day, the income from an annuity is secure throughout the retiree’s life.

Churchill made a point about the power of government: A National or Municipal Beef Trust, with the United States Treasury at its back, might indeed give more regular employment at higher wages to its servants, and might sell cleaner food to its customers—at a price. But if evil systems corrupt good men, it is no less true that base men will dishonor any system, and while no bond of duty more exacting than that of material recompense regulates the relations of man and man, while no motion more lofty than that of self-interest animates the exertions of every class, and no hope beyond the limits of this fleeting world lights the struggles of humanity, the most admirable systems will merely succeed in transferring, under different forms and pretexts, the burden of toil, misery, and injustice from one set of human shoulders to another.

From 1942 until 1947, the Federal Reserve—at the behest of the Treasury Department—actively managed the government’s borrowing costs. Even as spending to fight World War II drove the federal deficit to more than 25 percent of GDP in 1943, interest rates trended lower. That’s because the Fed pegged the T-bill rate at 0.375 percent and held the rate on twenty-five-year bonds at 2.5 percent. As MMT economist L. Randall Wray put it, “the government can ‘borrow’ (issue bonds to the public) at any interest rate the central bank chooses to enforce. It is relatively easy for the central bank to peg the interest rate on short-term government debt instruments by standing ready to purchase it at a fixed price in unlimited quantities. This is precisely what the Fed did in the United States until 1951—providing banks with an interest-earning alternative to excess reserves, but at a very low rate of interest.

For most investors, bond funds beat individual bonds hands down (the main exceptions are Treasury securities and some municipal bonds). Major firms like Vanguard, Fidelity, Schwab, and T. Rowe Price offer a broad menu of bond funds at low cost.9

In fact, some investment advisors say the only completely safe bond is one backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. And you can actually buy US bonds called Treasury inflation-protected securities, or TIPS, that rise in value to keep up with inflation through the consumer price index.

Investors would buy shares in their fund. The fund would then take investors’ money and lend it out—to the government, in the form of Treasury bills, and to banks, in the form of big savings accounts. These were short-term, ultra-safe investments. So safe, in fact, that the price of the mutual fund shares didn’t need to fluctuate every day like funds that owned stocks or riskier bonds.

An inverse relationship exists between efficiency in asset pricing and appropriate degree of active management. Passive management strategies suit highly efficient markets, such as U.S. Treasury bonds, where market returns drive results and active management adds little or nothing. Active management strategies fit inefficient markets, such as private equity, where market returns contribute very little to ultimate results and investment selection provides the fundamental source of return.

David Heuwetter was the head trader at Drysdale Government Securities and had a great trading idea. It was really more of a scheme to take advantage of the difference in the market convention between outright Treasury purchases and Repo trades. Still at this time, when someone bought and sold a U.S. Treasury outright, the securities settled with the coupon accrued interest added to the purchase price. That is, when you bought a U.S. Treasury, you had to pay for the amount of interest which had already accrued on the security since the last coupon payment date. When interest rates were low, the accrued interest was small, even negligible. However, in the early 1980s, interest rates shot up above 10%, which meant there was a lot of interest accruing on bonds each day.  Heuwetter realized he could short-sell U.S. Treasurys outright and deliver the securities to the buyer and receive the price plus the accrued interest. Then, when he borrowed the securities in the Repo market, he only had to pay the purchase price. He was getting the full use of the accrued interest on the bonds at no cost.

Overall, it was a pretty good trading strategy. He made money in two out of three possible scenarios. If bond prices went down, he made a lot of money. If the market stayed the same, he earned free interest on the cash. If the Treasury market rallied, he risked a pretty big loss. And guess what? Between February 1982 and May 1982, the Treasury market reversed its decline and started to rally. This was the one chance in three that he wasn’t hoping for. When the May 15, 1982, coupon interest payments were due on a Monday, Drysdale was wiped out and didn’t have enough money to make the payments. That Sunday evening, Heuwetter called Drysdale's clearing bank, Chase Manhattan, and informed them that "we may have a problem" meeting the $160 million interest payment due the next day. Could Chase possibly lend Drysdale $200 million to tide them over? What he didn’t tell them was that, yes, the market rally had wiped them out, but the problem was even worse than that. Drysdale had conducted its Repo trading mostly through Chase's Securities Lending Department.

It’s importance, however, is bigger than that. Treasury securities are the risk-free yield curve for all of the financial markets. That’s right, the yields of Treasury Bills, Notes, and Bonds from overnight to 30 years make up a yield curve that is used to price all other fixed-income securities. The Treasury market is the reference rate for interest rates. Treasurys are a tool for pricing corporate bonds, municipal bonds, emerging market bonds, federal agencies, mortgage-backed securities, and other dollar assets. On top of that, they’re also a tool for speculation and hedging risk.

Treasury Bills are the shortest securities, and they’re discount securities[8]. The Treasury regularly issues 1 Month, 2 Month, 3 Month, 6 Month, and Year Bills. Treasury Notes are securities that were originally issued with maturities between 2 years and 10 years. Currently, the Treasury issues 2 Year Notes, 3 Year Notes, 5 Year Notes, 7 Year Notes, and 10 Year Notes. In the past, there was a 4 Year Note, but it was discontinued. Treasury Bonds[9] are securities originally issued with maturities of either 20 or 30 years. Treasury securities are issued on a very regular schedule. Auction schedules are announced by the Treasury and don’t change very often. Keeping Treasury securities regular and predictable helps keeps the market liquid, and therefore reduces funding costs, in theory, for the government. On top of that, large liquid Treasury issues are good for the financial markets. Just remember, large and liquid is certainly better than small and illiquid! Small issues can experience price distortions, so the Treasury will make adjustments in their debt sales to keep the market liquid, running smoothly and predictably.