Stock Warrants Quotes

Pedigree was the centerpiece of Supreme Court chief justice Roger B. Taney’s majority opinion in the Dred Scott decision (1857). Though this case assessed whether a slave taken into a free state or federal territory should be set free, its conclusions were far more expansive. Addressing slavery in the territories, the proslavery Marylander dismissed Jefferson’s prohibition of slavery in the Northwest Ordinance as having no constitutional standing. He constructed his own version of the original social contract at the time of the Revolution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitutional Convention: only the free white children of the founding generation were heirs to the original agreement; only pedigree could determine who inherited American citizenship and whose racial lineage warranted entitlement and the designation “freeman.” Taney’s opinion mattered because it literally made pedigree into a constitutional principle. In this controversial decision, Taney demonstrably rejected any notion of democracy and based the right of citizenship on bloodlines and racial stock. The chief justice ruled that the founders’ original intent was to classify members of society in terms of recognizable breeds.

We define a bargain issue as one which, on the basis of facts established by analysis, appears to be worth considerably more than it is selling for. The genus includes bonds and preferred stocks selling well under par, as well as common stocks. To be as concrete as possible, let us suggest that an issue is not a true “bargain” unless the indicated value is at least 50% more than the price. What kind of facts would warrant the conclusion that so great a discrepancy exists? How do bargains come into existence, and how does the investor profit from them? There are two tests by which a bargain common stock is detected. The first is by the method of appraisal. This relies largely on estimating future earnings and then multiplying these by a factor appropriate to the particular issue. If the resultant value is sufficiently above the market price—and if the investor has confidence in the technique employed—he can tag the stock as a bargain. The second test is the value of the business to a private owner. This value also is often determined chiefly by expected future earnings—in which case the result may be identical with the first. But in the second test more attention is likely to be paid to the realizable value of the assets, with particular emphasis on the net current assets or working capital. At low points in the general market a large proportion of common stocks are bargain issues, as measured by these standards. (A typical example was General Motors when it sold at less than 30 in 1941, equivalent to only 5 for the 1971 shares. It had been earning in excess of $4 and paying $3.50, or more, in dividends.) It is true that current earnings and the immediate prospects may both be poor, but a levelheaded appraisal of average future conditions would indicate values far above ruling prices. Thus the wisdom of having courage in depressed markets is vindicated not only by the voice of experience but also by application of plausible techniques of value analysis.

Katelyn blows Cindy Lou a kiss with a big "Mwah! You wanna stay with Auntie Katelyn tonight, sweet girl?" Cindy Lou smiles, kicking her pink-striped stock-covered feet, and then returns the kiss. Except it's more like she blows a raspberry, and orange baby food goes everywhere, getting all over James and dribbling down Cindy Lou's chin. "Sum of a bifch!" he shouts in shock, disgust wrinkling his brow. "Oh gawd, it's in ma mouf! I 'eed a 'apkin!" We're all fighting back laughter as Sophie, who hasn't missed a beat of her own dinner, hands him a paper towel. To his credit, he wipes his daughter down first then scrubs at his own face. "Language," Mama Louise corrects. You'd think she'd give up on that by now. We're all pretty rough around the edges, even though we have some decent manners. The language rule just doesn't seem to be one that stuck ... to any of us. Hell, I've even heard the girls go off worse than any of us boys before, depending on the topic and their level of excitement or fury. Mama Louise's fighting a losing battle on a sinking ship, but she combats every instance in her presence and says what we do when she's not around is something we'll have to make our own peace with. "I think it was warranted, Mama. Do you know how gross those carrots are? Blech,

But in other cases, making allowance for conversion rights—and the existence of stock-purchase warrants—can reduce the apparent earnings by half, or more.

All forms of complex causation, and especially nonlinear transformations, admittedly stack the deck against prediction. Linear describes an outcome produced by one or more variables where the effect is additive. Any other interaction is nonlinear. This would include outcomes that involve step functions or phase transitions. The hard sciences routinely describe nonlinear phenomena. Making predictions about them becomes increasingly problematic when multiple variables are involved that have complex interactions. Some simple nonlinear systems can quickly become unpredictable when small variations in their inputs are introduced.23 As so much of the social world is nonlinear, fifty plus years of behavioral research and theory building have not led to any noticeable improvement in our ability to predict events. This is most evident in the case of transformative events like the social-political revolution of the 1960s, the end of the Cold War, and the rise and growing political influence of fundamentalist religious groups. Radical skepticism about prediction of any but the most short-term outcomes is fully warranted. This does not mean that we can throw our hands up in the face of uncertainty, contingency, and unpredictability. In a complex society, individuals, organizations, and states require a high degree of confidence—even if it is misplaced—in the short-term future and a reasonable degree of confidence about the longer term. In its absence they could not commit themselves to decisions, investments, and policies. Like nudging the frame of a pinball machine to influence the path of the ball, we cope with the dilemma of uncertainty by doing what we can to make our expectations of the future self-fulfilling. We seek to control the social and physical worlds not only to make them more predictable but to reduce the likelihood of disruptive and damaging shocks (e.g., floods, epidemics, stock market crashes, foreign attacks). Our fallback strategy is denial.

the data was plotted on mathematical diagrams that I invented. These revealed favorable situations and let me quickly specify the appropriate trades. Each day’s closing prices for a convertible and its stock were plotted as a color-coded dot on that particular convertible’s diagram. The diagrams were prepared with curves that were drawn by a computer from my formula and showed the “fair price” of the convertible. The beauty of this was that I could immediately see from the picture whether we had a profitable trading opportunity. If the dot representing the data was above the curve it meant the convertible was overpriced, leading to a possible hedge: Short the convertible, buy the stock. A data point close to or on the curve indicated the price was fair, which meant liquidate an existing position, do not enter a new one. Below the curve meant buy the convertible, short the stock. The distance of the dot from the curve showed me how much profit was available. If we thought it met our target, we tried to put on the trade the next day. The slope of the curve near the data point on my diagram gave me the hedge ratio, which is the number of shares of common stock to use versus each convertible bond, share of preferred, warrant, or option.

The First Autonomous Teams Autonomous teams are built for speed. When they are aligned toward a common destination, they can go a long way in a short time. But when they are poorly aligned, the team can veer far off course just as quickly. So they need to be pointed in the right direction and have the tools to quickly course-correct when warranted. That’s why, before any proposed two-pizza team was approved, they had to meet with Jeff and their S-Team manager—often more than once—to discuss the team’s composition, charter, and fitness function. For instance, the Inventory Planning team would convene with Jeff, Jeff Wilke, and me to ensure that they were meeting the following criteria: The team had a well-defined purpose. For example, the team intends to answer the question, “How much inventory should Amazon buy of a given product and when should we buy it?” The boundaries of ownership were well understood. For example, the team asks the Forecasting team what the demand will be for a particular product at a given time, and then uses their answer as an input to make a buying decision. The metrics used to measure progress were agreed upon. For example, In-stock Product Pages Displayed divided by Total Product Pages Displayed, weighted at 60 percent; and Inventory Holding Cost, weighted at 40 percent.

The pamphlet explained that a common stock purchase warrant is a security issued by a company that gives the owner the right to buy stock at a specified price, known as the exercise price, on or before a stated expiration date. For instance, in 1964 a Sperry Rand warrant entitled the holder to purchase one share of common stock for $28 until September 15, 1967. On this final day, if the stock trades above that price, you can use one warrant plus $28 to buy one share of stock. This means the warrant is worth the amount by which the stock price exceeds $28. However, if the stock price is below $28, it is cheaper to buy the stock outright, in which case the warrant is worthless. A warrant, like a lottery ticket, was always worth something before it expired even if the stock price was very low, if there was any chance the stock price could move above the exercise price and put the warrant “into the money.” The more time left, and the higher the stock price, the more the warrant was likely to be worth.

Since the prices of the two securities tended to move together, the important idea of “hedging” occurred to me, in which I could use this relationship to exploit any mispricing of the warrant and simultaneously reduce the risk of doing so. To form a hedge, take two securities whose prices tend to move together, such as a warrant and the common stock it can be used to purchase, but which are comparatively mispriced. Buy the relatively underpriced security and sell short the relatively overpriced security. If the proportions in the position are chosen well, then even though prices fluctuate, the gains and losses on the two sides will approximately offset or hedge each other. If the relative mispricing between the two securities disappears as expected, close the position in both and collect a profit.

Short selling overpriced warrants was profitable on average but risky. The same was true for buying stocks. The two risks largely canceled each other when we hedged the warrants by purchasing the associated common stock. In a historical simulation our optimized method made 25 percent a year with low risk, even during the great 1929 stock market crash and its aftermath.

One of these trades could have been right out of the pages of Beat the Market. In 1970 the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) sold warrants to purchase thirty-one million shares of common stock at a price of $12.50 per share. Proceeds to the company were some $387.5 million, at the time the most ever for a warrant. Though it was not sufficiently mispriced then, the history of how warrant prices behaved indicated this could happen before it expired in 1975. When it did we bet a significant part of the partnership’s net worth. — We were guided in this trade and thousands of others by a formula that had its beginnings in 1900 in the PhD thesis of French mathematician Louis Bachelier. Bachelier used mathematics to develop a theory for pricing options on the Paris stock exchange (the Bourse). His thesis adviser, the world-famous mathematician Henri Poincaré, didn’t value Bachelier’s effort, and Bachelier spent the rest of his life as an obscure provincial professor.

Mary Carter Paint Company. Founded in 1958 as the successor to a 1908 company, it started as an acquirer of other paint companies, then evolved into a resort and casino developer in the Bahamas. Changing its name to Resorts International, it divested itself of the paint business and name. In 1972 the company had warrants that sold for 27 cents when the stock traded at $8 a share. The warrants were so cheap because they were worthless unless the stock traded above $40 a share. Fat chance. Since our model said the warrants were worth $4 a share, we bought all we could at the unbelievable bargain price of 27 cents each, which turned out to be 10,800 warrants at a total cost, after commissions, of $3,200. We hedged our risk of loss by shorting eight hundred shares of the common stock at $8. When the stock later fell to $1.50 a share, we bought back our short stock for a profit of about $5,000. Our gain now consisted of the warrants for “free” plus about $1,800 in cash. The warrants were trading close to zero but below the tiny amount the model said they were worth, so I decided we should put them away and forget them. Six busy years passed. Then in 1978 we started getting calls from people who wanted to buy our warrants. The company had purchased property in Atlantic City, New Jersey, after which it successfully lobbied, along with others, to bring casino gambling to the state, limited to Atlantic City. On May 26, 1978, Resorts opened the first US casino outside Nevada. Having received early approval, they had no competition and reaped windfall profits until other casinos opened late in 1979. With the stock now trading at $15 a share, ten times its earlier lowest price, and the warrants trading between $3 and $4, the model said they were worth about $7 or $8. So, instead of selling and reaping a $30,000 to $40,000 profit, I bought more warrants and sold stock short to hedge the risk of loss. As the stock broke through the $100 mark, we were still buying warrants and shorting stock. We finally sold the 27-cent warrants and others for above $100 each. We ultimately made more than $1 million.

In exchange, the FDIC would get $12 billion in Citigroup preferred stock and warrants, giving it a way to potentially recoup money for its fund.

he offered his money, but at the enormous interest rate of 14 percent. He bargained for warrants to buy 16 million shares of Times stock in six years for $6.36 a share, which would give him a 17 percent stake in the company. This would make him one of the paper’s largest shareholders and its largest creditor. For Slim, the warrants were the most important part of the deal. For the Times, facing the possibility of insolvency, six years seemed like an eternity. The warrants were approved.

Whatever the truth of this story, it is certain that one of the very first acts of the Long Parliament in 1640 was to abolish the Court of Star Chamber, in which evidence obtained by torture was received, and since then no torture warrant has been issued in England. By one of the first enactments of the Westminster Parliament following the Act of Union in 1707, Scotland followed suit. But in continental Europe the practice continued for many years: drawings survive of handsome young men in wigs and fine stockings inflicting horrific torments on their bound victims. In France, torture was abolished in 1789; in different parts of