Sql Injection Quotes

This had all the earmarks of an SQL-injection attack, and he had a favorite one. In the logon and password boxes he entered: ‘or 1=1--

Applications treating data as code is the root cause of almost every major class of vulnerability. Cross-site scripting happens when applications treat data as HTML or script. SQL injection happens when applications treat data as SQL. Buffer overflows happen when applications treat data as assembly code.

The way xp_ cmdshell works is very simple: It takes a single string argument and then executes that as a command-line call. For example, the call would perform a directory listing of the server’s C drive. Again, at this point the damage is limited only by the attacker’s imagination, and exploiting this through SQL injection is absolutely trivial: If you’re running SQL Server, we strongly recommend disabling or removing the xp_cmdshell stored procedure. You can disable it through use of the sp_configure stored procedure, like so:

The SQL statement is passed as a simple string. If user-controllable input is part of the string parameter, the application is probably vulnerable to SQL injection.

By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as "SQL injection," by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).188 In one instance in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,189 and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.190

Victims included U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities.186 The GRU also targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations.187 The GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity. By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as "SQL injection," by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).188 In one instance in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,189 and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.190 GRU officers [REDACTED: Investigative Technique] scanned state and local websites for vulnerabilities. For example, over a two-day period in July 2016, GRU officers [REDACTED: Investigative Technique] for vulnerabilities on websites of more than two dozen states.