Sanders Peirce Quotes

To know what we think, to be masters of our own meaning, will make a solid foundation for great and weighty thought.

We think only in signs.

Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.

All human affairs rest upon probabilities, and the same thing is true everywhere. If man were immortal he could be perfectly sure of seeing the day when everything in which he had trusted would betray his trust, and, in short, of coming eventually to hopeless misery. He would break down, at last, as every great fortune, as every dynasty, as every civilization does. In place of this we have death.

Let it be considered that what is more wholesome than any particular belief is integrity of belief; and that to avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous.

If liberty of speech is to be untrammeled from the grosser forms of constraint, the uniformity of opinion will be secured by a moral terrorism to which the respectability of society will give its thorough approval.

Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to that of other men.

I hear you say: ‘All that is not /fact/ : it is poetry’. Nonsense! Bad poetry is false, I grant; but nothing is truer than true poetry. And let me tell the scientific men that the artists are much finer and more accurate observers than they are, except of the special minutiae that the scientific man is looking for.

The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.

Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis.

What the pragmatist has his pragmatism for is to be able to say, Here is a definition and it does not differ at all from your confusedly apprehended conception because there is no practical difference.

Notwithstanding all that has been discovered since Newton’s time, his saying that we are little children picking up pretty pebbles on the beach while the whole ocean lies before us unexplored remains substantially as true as ever, and will do so though we shovel up the pebbles by steam shovels and carry them off in carloads.

Signs are of three classes, namely, Icons (or images), Indices, and Symbols. Article 6. An icon is a sign which stands for its object because as a thing perceived it excites an idea naturally allied to the idea that object would excite.

Kepler’s discovery would not have been possible without the doctrine of conics. Now contemporaries of Kepler—such penetrating minds as Descartes and Pascal—were abandoning the study of geometry ... because they said it was so UTTERLY USELESS. There was the future of the human race almost trembling in the balance; for had not the geometry of conic sections already been worked out in large measure, and had their opinion that only sciences apparently useful ought to be pursued, the nineteenth century would have had none of those characters which distinguish it from the ancien régime.

All human affairs rest upon probabilities, and the same thing is true everywhere. If man were immortal, he could be perfectly sure of seeing the day when everything in which he had trusted should betray his trust, and, in short, of coming eventually to hopeless misery. He would break down, at last, as every good fortune, as every dynasty, as every civilization does. In place of this we have death. But what, without death, would happen to every man, with death must happen to some man . . . It seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate, but must embrace the whole community.

[…] it has never been in my power to study anything,—mathematics, ethics, metaphysics, gravitation, thermodynamics, optics, chemistry, comparative anatomy, astronomy, psychology, phonetics, economics, the history of science, whist, men and women, wine, metrology, except as a study of semiotic.

Are you sure twice two are four? Not at all. A certain percentage of the human race are insane and subject to illusions. It may be you are one of them, and that your idea that twice two is four is a lunatic notion, and your seeming recollection that other people think so, the baseless fabric of a vision.

Some persons fancy that bias and counter-bias are favorable to the extraction of truth–that hot and partisan debate is the way to investigate. This is the theory of our atrocious legal procedure. But Logic puts its heel upon this suggestion. It irrefragably demonstrates that knowledge can only be furthered by the real desire for it, and that the methods of obstinacy, of authority and every mode of trying to reach a foregone conclusion, are absolutely of no value. These things are proved. The reader is at liberty to think so or not as long as the proof is not set forth, or as long as he refrains from examining it. Just so, he can preserve, if he likes, his freedom of opinion in regard to the propositions of geometry; only, in that case, if he takes a fancy to read Euclid, he will do well to skip whatever he finds with A, B, C, etc., for, if he reads attentively that disagreeable matter, the freedom of his opinion about geometry may unhappily be lost forever.

Over the next year, he practiced every day. In his diary, he wrote as if his control over himself and his choices was never in question. He got married. He started teaching at Harvard. He began spending time with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who would go on to become a Supreme Court justice, and Charles Sanders Peirce, a pioneer in the study of semiotics, in a discussion group they called the Metaphysical Club.9.30 Two years after writing his diary entry, James sent a letter to the philosopher Charles Renouvier, who had expounded at length on free will. “I must not lose this opportunity of telling you of the admiration and gratitude which have been excited in me by the reading of your Essais,” James wrote. “Thanks to you I possess for the first time an intelligible and reasonable conception of freedom.… I can say that through that philosophy I am beginning to experience a rebirth of the moral life; and I can assure you, sir, that this is no small thing.” Later, he would famously write that the will to believe is the most important ingredient in creating belief in change. And that one of the most important methods for creating that belief was habits. Habits, he noted, are what allow us to “do a thing with difficulty the first time, but soon do it more and more easily, and finally, with sufficient practice, do it semi-mechanically, or with hardly any consciousness at all.” Once we choose who we want to be, people grow “to the way in which they have been exercised, just as a sheet of paper or a coat, once creased or folded, tends to fall forever afterward into the same identical folds.” If you believe you can change—if you make it a habit—the change becomes real. This is the real power of habit: the insight that your habits are what you choose them to be. Once that choice occurs—and becomes automatic—it’s not only real, it starts to seem inevitable, the thing, as James wrote, that bears “us irresistibly toward our destiny, whatever the latter may be.

2.1 Abduction No, we’re not talking about kidnapping but, rather, an important dimension of scientific and ordinary as well as philosophical rationality. Consider the following example. A man is found in a cabin in a remote forest, with all the doors and windows securely locked from the inside, hanging dead from a noose. A suicide note in the man’s handwriting lies on the table nearby. What would best explain this set of facts? Abduction, a term coined by the American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), is a tool to do just that.

Они који извршавају на различите начине организовану моћ у држави неће се никада моћи уверити у то да опасна размишљања не треба на неки начин потчињавати. Тамо где право говора није отворено спречавано, јединство мнења се постиже моралним терором са којим су поштовани у друштву изричито сагласни. Следити мишљење владајућих значи ићи стазом мира. Нека су скретања допуштена, друга која важе као несигурна, забрањена. Она су различита у различитим земљама и различитим епохама, али ма где био: ако је познато да припадаш табуисаној вери можеш бити сигуран да ће с тобом поступати с окрутношћу која је мање брутална, али рафинованија од лова на вука. Највећи духовни доброчинитељи човечанства никада се нису усудили а и данас се не усуђују да изнесу своје мисли. Сенка сумње прима фацие пада на свако размишљање које се чини важним за сигурност друштва. По правилу прогањање долази само споља: човек се сам раздире и често је преплашен тиме што заступа ставове против којих су га његовог мишљења ауторитету учили да се бори. Мирном и добронамерном карактеру стога тешко пада да се супротстави покушају потчињавања.

„Oni koji izvršavaju na različite načine organizovanu moć u državi neće se nikada moći uveriti u to da opasna razmišljanja ne treba na neki način potčinjavati. Tamo gde pravo govora nije otvoreno sprečavano, jedinstvo mnenja se postiže moralnim terorom sa kojim su poštovani u društvu izričito saglasni. Slediti mišljenje vladajućih znači ići stazom mira. Neka su skretanja dopuštena, druga koja važe kao nesigurna, zabranjena. Ona su različita u različitim zemljama i različitim epohama, ali ma gde bio: ako je poznato da pripadaš tabuisanoj veri možeš biti siguran da će s tobom postupati s okrutnošću koja je manje brutalna, ali rafinovanija od lova na vuka. Najveći duhovni dobročinitelji čovečanstva nikada se nisu usudili a i danas se ne usuđuju da iznesu svoje misli. Senka sumnje prima facie pada na svako razmišljanje koje se čini važnim za sigurnost društva. Po pravilu proganjanje dolazi samo spolja: čovek se sam razdire i često je preplašen time što zastupa stavove protiv kojih su ga njegovog mišljenja autoritetu učili da se bori. Mirnom i dobronamernom karakteru stoga teško pada da se suprotstavi pokušaju potčinjavanja.

All human affairs rest upon probabilities, and the same thing is true everywhere. If man were immortal, he could be perfectly sure of seeing the day when everything in which he had trusted should betray his trust, and, in short, of coming eventually to hopeless misery. He would break down, at last, as every good fortune, as every dynasty, as every civilization does. In place of this we have death. But what, without death, would happen to every man, with death must happen to some man . . . It seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate, but must embrace the whole community.

American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce’s observation that no new idea in the history of the world has been proven in advance analytically, which means that if you insist on rigorous proof of the merits of an idea during its development, you will kill it if it is truly a breakthrough idea, because there will be no proof of its breakthrough characteristics in advance. If you are going to screen innovation projects, therefore, a better model is one that has you assess them on the strength of their logic—the theory of why the idea is a good one—not on the strength of the existing data. Then, as you get further into each project that passes the logic test, you need to look for ways to create data that enables you to test and adjust—or perhaps kill—the idea as you develop it.

A idéia de elaborar uma ciência dos signos, batizada, na sua origem, como semiologia ou semiótica, e que serviria para estudar os diferentes tipos de signos que interpretamos, integrando-os numa tipologia e encontrando as leis de funcionamento das diferentes categorias de signos, essa idéia é recente e remonta ao principio do nosso século. Os seus grandes precursores foram o lingüista suíço Ferdinand de Saussure (1857- 1913), ma Europa e o cientista Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), nos Estados Unidos.

Vemos portanto que tudo pode ser signo a partir do momento em que daí se deduza uma significação que depende da minha cultura, assim como do contexto da aparição do signo. Um objeto real não é um signo daquilo que é mas poder ser o signo de algo (13) Charles Sanders Peirce, Écrits sur le signe, Seuil, 1978. diferente (13). Pode constituir um ato de comunicação a partir do momento em que me é intencionalmente destinado (uma saudação, uma carta) ou fornecer-me informações simplesmente porque aprendi a decifrá-lo (uma postura, um tipo de vestuário, um céu cinzento). Para Peirce, um signo é algo que significa outra coisa para alguém, devido a uma qualquer relação ou a qualquer título. Esta definição tem o mérito de mostrar que um signo mantém uma relação solidária entre pelo menos três pólos (e já não apenas dois como em Saussure): a face perceptível do signo – representamen ou significante (St); aquilo que representa: objeto u referente; e aquilo que significa: interpretante ou significado (Sd). Esta triangulação é também representativa da dinâmica de todo o signo enquanto processo semiótico, cuja significação depende tanto do contexto da sua aparição como da expectativa do seu receptor.

Now if we are to accept the common idea of continuity . . . we must either say that a continuous line contains no points or . . . that the principle of excluded middle does not hold of these points. The principle of excluded middle applies only to an individual . . . but places being mere possibilities without actual existence are not individuals.

Now it is plainly not an essential part of this method in general that the tests were made by the observation of natural objects. For the immense progress which modern mathematics has made is also to be explained by the same intense interest in testing general propositions by particular cases — only the tests were applied by means of particular demonstrations. This is observation, still, for as the great mathematician Gauss has declared — algebra is a science of the eye, only it is observation of artificial objects and of a highly recondite character.