Salary Is The Bribe Quotes

Do we see a college education, for example, as a ticket to privilege or as a training for service to the needy? What do we teach our teenagers in this matter? Do we urge them to enter college because it will better equip them to serve? Or do we try to bribe them with promises of future status and salary increases? No wonder they graduate more deeply concerned about their standard of living than about suffering humanity. As

Between state building and economic growth Having a state is a basic precondition for intensive economic growth. The economist Paul Collier has demonstrated the converse of this proposition, namely, that state breakdown, civil war, and interstate conflict have very negative consequences for growth.20 A great deal of Africa’s poverty in the late twentieth century was related to the fact that states there were very weak and subject to constant breakdown and instability. Beyond the establishment of a state that can provide for basic order, greater administrative capacity is also strongly correlated with economic growth. This is particularly true at low absolute levels of per capita GDP (less than $1,000); while it remains important at higher levels of income, the impact may not be proportionate. There is also a large literature linking good governance to economic growth, though the definition of “good governance” is not well established and, depending on the author, sometimes includes all three components of political development.21 While the correlation between a strong, coherent state and economic growth is well established, the direction of causality is not always clear. The economist Jeffrey Sachs has maintained that good governance is endogenous: it is the product of economic growth rather than a cause of it.22 There is a good logic to this: government costs money. One of the reasons why there is so much corruption in poor countries is that they cannot afford to pay their civil servants adequate salaries to feed their families, so they are inclined to take bribes. Per capita spending on all government services, from armies and roads to schools and police on the street, was about $17,000 in the United States in 2008 but only $19 in Afghanistan.23 It is therefore not a surprise that the Afghan state is much weaker than the American one, or that large flows of aid money generate corruption.

The other principals took paying bribes for granted, but my father argued that if all the schools joined together they could resist. “Running a school is not a crime,” he told them. “Why should you be paying bribes? You are not running brothels; you are educating children! Government officials are not your bosses,” he reminded them; “they are your servants. They are taking salaries and have to serve you. You are the ones educating their children.

According to North Korea, my grandfather Park and my parents were criminals. My father bought and sold goods for a profit; in other countries he’d simply be called a businessman. He bribed officials—whose salaries weren’t enough to feed their families—in order to travel freely in his own country. And while it’s true that my grandfather and my parents stole from the government, the government stole everything from its people, including their freedom.

Hiring a novice reporter of Times of India, who was barely drawing a monthly salary of about Rs.7,000 (Rajdeep Sardesai) for about Rs.75,000 a month as Political Editor of NDTV because he got married to the only child of incumbent Information and Broadcasting Secretary (Bhaskar Ghose, IAS West Bengal) or an incompetent small time stringer (Abhisar Sharma) for his IRS spouse Shumana Sen for a whopping salary of Rs.70,000 per month are but a few instances of sinecure appointments or, to be more accurate, an alternate way of paying bribes.

Five months later, Goldman launched Project Maximus, buying another $1.75 billion in bonds to finance 1MDB’s acquisition of power plants from the Malaysian casino-and-plantations conglomerate Genting Group. Again, the fund paid a high price, and, like Tanjong, Genting made payments to a Najib-linked charity. This time, $790.3 million disappeared into the look-alike Aabar. David Ryan, president of Goldman’s Asia operations, argued to lower the fee on the second bond, given how easy it had been to sell the first round. But he was overruled by senior executives, including Gary Cohn. While Goldman was working on the deal, Ryan was effectively sidelined; the bank brought in a veteran banker, Mark Schwartz, a proponent of the 1MDB business, as chairman in Asia, a post senior to Ryan’s. Goldman earned a little less than the first deal, making $114 million—still an enormous windfall. For bringing in the business, Leissner was paid a salary and bonuses in 2012 of more than $10 million, making him one of the bank’s top-remunerated employees. But that was just the tip of the iceberg. Unknown to his bosses at Goldman, and three months after the first bond, millions of dollars began to flow into a British Virgin Islands shell company controlled by Leissner, some of which he shared with Roger Ng, according to Department of Justice filings. Millions of dollars more moved through Leissner’s shell company to pay bribes to 1MDB officials. Over the next two years, more than $200 million in 1MDB money, raised by Goldman, would flow through accounts controlled by Leissner and his relatives. He could have taken his hefty Goldman salary and disavowed knowledge of the bribery carried out by Low and others. Perhaps he would have gotten away with it, as many Wall Street bankers do in countries far from headquarters. But he decided to take a risk by becoming a direct accomplice in the fraud, rather than just greasing its wheels. He had seen the kind of life Low was leading, and he must have thought that a mere $10 million wasn’t going to cut it, not if he wanted to buy super yachts and host parties himself. Soon he would be doing just that.

Richard Joseph’s seminal work on Nigerian governance—to which this book owes an intellectual debt—appeared in 1987 and a lively academic discussion of “prebendalism,” its core idea, continues right up to the present, though mostly in academic rather than policy circles.[5] Prebendalism and neopatrimonialism can exist anywhere; their essence is the privatization and exploitation of public resources by those who control the government and its bureaucracy.[6] By origin, “prebendal” refers to Anglican and Roman Catholic clergy assigned to cathedrals that were entitled to a share of the foundation’s income by virtue of their position—not as a return for the services they might or might not perform. The income itself is called a “prebend” and the recipient is called a “prebendary.” In the Nigerian context, prebendal describes the behavior of elites that access and share the government’s oil revenue, not because of their services to the state, but because they are entitled to do so. There is the expectation that prebendal beneficiaries will share their prebend with their patrons and their clients. This relationship, in which patrons distribute wealth to their clients, is often described as neopatrimonial.[7] Hence, prebendalism is intimately related to the neopatrimonial patronage-clientage organization of Nigerian society. Prebendal behavior is most salient among elites, but its spirit and that of neopatrimonialism extend throughout society. A policeman at a checkpoint is salaried. But because he controls the checkpoint, he is entitled to ask for a bribe, and does so: “What do you have for me today?” He is expected to share a portion of the bribe he receives with his boss or patron and with subordinates and family. The system is partly a product of poverty: the policeman at the checkpoint may not have received his salary for months, and, if he had, it is too small to support a family. So, his bribe collection is part of a system of work-arounds. This system of entitlements and sharing is unregulated except by various local customs and wide open to abuse.

Page 1-2 One of the most serious concerns of the Thai government for the past forty years or so has been the presence within the national society of an economically powerful minority group whose way of life is alien, and in some respects incompatible, to the Thai way of life. How to assimilate this minority, or at least to reduce its influence nationally, is a question which has troubled a succession of Thai monarchs and prime ministers. To speak of the Chinese minority as constituting a problem is only to recognize this concern felt in varying degrees by all Thai political leaders. Yet, the Chinese living in Thailand are peaceful and self-disciplined, a thrifty and very industrious people who have made significant contributions to their adopted land—to what extent, then, can they be regarded as a ‘problem’? While the Chinese problem has many dimensions, at is first of all an economic problem, and it is precisely this aspect which looms largest for the Thai. As they see it, the Chinese, welcomed into the Kingdom years ago by a generous government, have since that time subtly undermined the livelihood of the Thai people themselves. They have driven the latter from various skilled crafts, monopolized new occupations, and through combination of commercial know-how and chicanery have gained a stranglehold over the trade and commerce of the entire Kingdom. The Thai see the Chinese as exploiting unmercifully their advantageous economic position: the Thai are obliged to pay high prices to the Chinese for the very necessities of life, and on the other hand are forced to accept the lowest price for the rice they grow. Through deliberate profiteering, according to standard Thai thinking, this minority has driven up living costs, hitting especially hard government employees on fixed salaries. It is also charged that profits made by the Chinese go out of the country in the form of remittances to China, which means a continuous and gigantic draining away of the Kingdom’s wealth. To protect their favored economic position, one hears, the Chinese have not hesitated to bribe officials, which in turn has undermined the efficiency and morale of the public service. Efforts to protect the economic interests of the Thai people through legislation have been only partially effective, again because of Chinese adeptness at evasion and dissimulation.

Nothing ever works out when you are at the whims of others. It doesn’t matter if you are an entrepreneur or an employee. Once someone is bribing you to do something (a salary is a form of bribery if you are only doing the work for the money and not for the meaning) then you become a prisoner.