Rhetoric Aristotle Quotes

It is absurd to hold that a man should be ashamed of an inability to defend himself with his limbs, but not ashamed of an inability to defend himself with speech and reason; for the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs.

What makes a man a 'sophist' is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. (1355b 17)

They are fond of fun and therefore witty, wit being well-bred insolence.

Even hackneyed and commonplace maxims are to be used, if they suit one's purpose: just because they are commonplace, every one seems to agree with them, and therefore they are taken for truth.

It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of the poetical forms, as also of compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.

Avoid the enthymeme form when you are trying to rouse feeling; for it will either kill the feeling or will itself fall flat: all simultaneous motions tend to cancel each other either completely or partially.

If there are two definitive features of ancient Greek civilization, they are loquacity and competition.

There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions-that is, to name them and

To say this, however, is not to claim that it was the object of theoretical study.

The peculiar circumstances arising out of the fall of the Syracusan tyranny seem to have produced the first practitioners of the art of rhetorical

rhetoric was to be surveyed from the standpoint of philosophy.

Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise.

Further, the orator should be able to prove opposites, as in logical arguments;

Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever.

Well-drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges.

We shall learn the qualities of governments in the same way as we learn the qualities of individuals, since they are revealed in their deliberate acts of choice; and these are determined by the end that inspires them.

How can a man who, for a significant phase of his formation, shared his master’s opposition to rhetoric have in maturity composed a masterpiece of the formal study of rhetoric? This

Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of three kinds. The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove. [4]

It is this simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences—makes them, as the poets tell us, 'charm the crowd's ears more finely.' Educated men lay down broad general principles; uneducated men argue from common knowledge and draw obvious conclusions.

Some [jests] are becoming to a gentleman, others are not; see that you choose such as become you. Irony better befits a gentleman than buffoonery; the ironical man jokes to amuse himself, the buffoon to amuse other people.

since we are most strongly convinced when we suppose anything to have been demonstrated; that rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme,

wherefore one who divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well in regard to probabilities. It

However, it is not the same with the subject matter, but, generally speaking, that which is true and better is naturally always easier to prove and more likely to persuade.

the fact that it took the rise of democracies and otherwise open societies at Athens and elsewhere to create the climate in which public eloquence became a political indispensability.

Again, it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.

[Young people] are high-minded because they have not yet been humbled by life, nor have they experienced the force of circumstances. … They think they know everything, and are always quite sure about it." Rhetoric, fourth century BCE (BC)

If, however, the poetic end might have been as well or better attained without sacrifice of technical correctness in such matters, the impossibility is not to be justified, since the description should be, if it can, entirely free from error.

For instance, it is not the function of medicine to restore a patient to health, but only to promote this end as far as possible; for even those whose recovery is impossible may be properly treated.

Dialectic as a whole, or of one of its parts, to consider every kind of syllogism in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most capable of examining the matter and forms of a syllogism will be in the highest degree a master of rhetorical argument,

Now since shame is a mental picture of disgrace, in which we shrink from the disgrace itself and not from its consequences, and we only care what opinion is held of us because of the people who form that opinion, it follows that the people before whom we feel shame are those whose opinion of us matters to us.

All terrible things are more terrible if they give us no chance of retrieving a blunder—either no chance at all, or only one that depends on our enemies and not ourselves. Those things are also worse which we cannot, or cannot easily, help. Speaking generally, anything causes us to feel fear that when it happens to, or threatens, others causes us to feel pity.

Now if you have proofs to bring forward, bring them forward, and your moral discourse as well; if you have no enthymemes, then fall back upon moral discourse: after all, it is more fitting for a good man to display himself as an honest fellow than as a subtle reasoner.

Nevertheless, Rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are naturally superior to their opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly made, they must owe their defeat to their own advocates; which is reprehensible.

Aristotle, on the other hand, saw poetry as having a positive value: “It is a great thing, indeed, to make proper use of the poetic forms, . . . But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor” (Poetics 1459a); “ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh” (Rhetoric 1410b).

logographos, a writer of speeches for others to use

Death is evil. So the gods decided. Otherwise they would die.

Whatever creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do.

The present work is, then, the masterpiece of one particular literary genre that flourished in the fourth century BC in Greece, that of the rhetorical manual, and it is a remarkable fact that it should have fallen to Aristotle to write it. It

It was at this point that the transition was first made to the conception that rhetoric was a teachable skill, that it could, usually in return for a fee, be passed from one skilled performer on to others, who might thereby achieve successes in their practical life that would otherwise have eluded them.

Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said than about what he meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions; nor this or that detail so much as the whole story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually been.

not that we should do both （for one ought not to persuade people to do what is wrong）, but that the real state of the case may not escape us, and that we ourselves may be able to counteract false arguments, if another makes an unfair use of them.

We maintain, therefore, that the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of Tragedy is the Plot; and that the Characters come second—compare the parallel in painting, where the most beautiful colours laid on without order will not give one the same pleasure as a simple black-and-white sketch of a portrait.

For there are two reasons why human beings face danger calmly: they may have no experience of it, or they may have means to deal with it: thus when in danger at sea people may feel confident about what will happen either because they have no experience of bad weather, or because their experience gives them the means of dealing with it.

It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing means of persuasion.

When Simonides was discussing wisdom and riches with Hieron's wife, and she asked him which was better, to become wise or to become wealthy, he replied, 'To become wealthy. For I see the wise sitting on the doorsteps of the rich.

But there is a difference: in Rhetoric, one who acts in accordance with sound argument, and one who acts in accordance with moral purpose,are both called rhetoricians; but in Dialectic it is the moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialectician being one whose arguments rest, not on moral purpose but on the faculty. Let

Fourth, it would make no sense for an inability to defend oneself by physical means to be a source of shame, while an inability to defend oneself by verbal means was not, since the use of words is more specifically human than the use of the body.

The truth is that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole.

These are the three things—volume of sound, modulation of pitch, and rhythm—that a speaker bears in mind. It is those who do bear them in mind who usually win prizes in the dramatic contests; and just as in drama the actors now count for more than the poets, so it is in the contests of public life, owing to the defects of our political institutions.

Rhetoric is the art of influence, friendship, and eloquence, of ready wit and irrefutable logic. And it harnesses the most powerful of social forces, argument.

For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity.

Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit.

Trusting people, the kind who are not on their guard and do not take precautions, because it is always easy to get away with wronging them.

É belo morrer antes de se fazer algo digno da morte. - Anaxândrias

Conferring

Concluons donc qu'on est ami dès qu'on souhaite à un autre ce qu'on souhaite pour soi-même.

Le début de l'amour, c'est toujours lorsque non seulement on est heureux de la présence de la personne qu'on chérit, mais qu'on l'aime rien que de souvenir, quand elle est absente.

The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case.

And retaliation too is pleasant, because if failing at it is painful, succeeding at it is pleasant.

Une chose, quand elle n'est pas excessive, est un bien ; du moment qu'elle est plus grande qu'il ne faut, elle devient un mal.

The tragic fear and pity may be aroused by the Spectacle; but they may also be aroused by the very structure and incidents of the play—which is the better way and shows the better poet. The Plot in fact should be so framed that even without seeing the things take place, he who simply hears the account of them shall be filled with horror and pity at the incidents; which is just the effect that the mere recital of the story in Oedipus would have on one. To produce this same effect by means of the Spectacle is less artistic, and requires extraneous aid.

Learning and wonder are also usually pleasant. For wonder is a form of desire† and so the object of one’s wonder is desirable, and learning is a form of restoring one’s natural condition.*

Dialectic as a whole, or of one of its parts, to consider every kind of syllogism in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most capable of examining the matter and forms of a syllogism will be in the highest degree a master of rhetorical argument, if to this he adds a knowledge of the subjects with which enthymemes deal and the differences between them and logical syllogisms.

even if we possessed the most accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it easy to persuade them by the employment of such knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned with instruction, but in the case of such persons instruction is impossible; our proofs and arguments must rest on generally accepted principles, as we said in the Topics, when speaking of converse with the multitude.

Honour and a good reputation are very pleasant, because the individual imagines himself a good man, and his estimation of his worth increases the more he can trust the people who are saying this about him —

The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence; for we feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in regard to everything in general, but where there is no certainty and there is room for doubt, our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must be due to the speech itself, not to any preconceived idea of the speaker’s character;

Il y a trois causes qui font que l'orateur persuade son auditoire, parce qu'il y a trois causes qui déterminent notre acquiescement, en dehors des démonstrations. Ces trois causes sont : la raison, la probité et la bienveillance.

If the pleasure is immediate and the pain distant, or if the profit is immediate and the punishment distant. This is the kind of thing that moves weak-willed people, and there is no human impulse that is not liable to moral weakness.

The maxim, as has been already said, is a general statement, and people love to hear stated in general terms what they already believe in some particular connexion: e.g. if a man happens to have bad neighbors or bad children, he will agree with any one who tells him 'Nothing is more annoying than having neighbors,' or, 'Nothing is more foolish than to be the parent of children.' The orator has therefore to guess the subjects on which his hearers really hold views already, and what those views are, and then must express, as general truths, these same views on these same subjects. This is one advantage of using maxims.

means of succeeding in the object we set before us. We must make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is. Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us;

The most important thing to accept here is the complete impossibility of compromise or even meaningful communication with your attackers. SJWs do not engage in rational debate because they are not rational, and they do not engage in honest discourse because they do not believe in objective truth. They do not compromise because the pure spirit of enlightened progressive social justice dare not sully itself with the evil of the outdated Endarkenment. They are the emotion-driven rhetoric-speakers of whom Aristotle wrote: “Before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct.

what young men in our colleges learn through those of Greek and Latin—that is grammar, rhetoric, and logic. After his seven years of study, the young Muhammadan binds his turban upon a head almost as well filled with the things which appertain to these branches of knowledge as the young man raw from Oxford—he will talk as fluently about Socrates and Aristotle, Plato and Hippocrates, Galen and Avicenna; (alias Sokrat, Aristotalis, Alflatun, Bokrat, Jalinus and Bu Ali Sena); and,

Previous knowledge is required for all scientific studies or methods of instruction. Examples from Mathematics, Dialectic and Rhetoric. Previous knowledge as variously expressed in theses concerning either the existence of a thing or the meaning of the word denoting it. Learning consists in the conversion of universal into particular knowledge.

Being anti-rhetoric is, finally, just another rhetorical strategy. Rhetoric is what the other guy is doing—whereas you, you’re just speaking the plain truth as you see it.

It’s a form of amplification, an essential rhetorical tactic that turns up the volume as you speak. In a presentation, you can amplify by layering your points: “Not only do we have this, but we also

Let us now turn to their circumstances and their victims. People do wrong, then, when they think that the deed can be done, and can be done by them — which is to say that they think either† (a) they can get away with it, or (b) that if they are caught they will avoid punishment, or (c) that if they are punished the penalty paid by themselves or those they care for will be less than their profits.

Moreover, since, in general, all those things which delight us when present usually do so also when we anticipate them or remember them, then even anger is pleasant, as Homer said in describing it as ‘sweeter by far than trickling honey’.* After all, people do not feel anger for those they think beyond the reach of retaliation, nor do they feel anger (or relatively little) for those who have far more power than them.

But people are most likely to think that they can do wrong without paying the penalty if they are good speakers or men of affairs or have wide experience of litigation, or if they have many friends, or if they are rich.

Frequently repeated action is pleasant because, as we saw, things that are familiar are pleasant. Change is also pleasant, because it restores one’s natural condition. For always doing the same thing creates an excess of one’s normal state. Hence the sentiment: ‘Change is ever sweet.’* That is also why people or things that one meets with only once in a while are pleasant: there is a change from the present, and besides anything that happens only once in a while has the value of being scarce.

On peut distinguer trois genres dans la rhétorique ; car il y a aussi trois espèces d'auditeurs des discours que l'on prononce. Tout discours se compose de trois éléments constitutifs : l'orateur qui parle, le sujet dont on parle, et l'auditeur à qui l'on parle.

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

Par une conséquence nécessaire, il y a trois genres distincts pour les discours qu'étudie la rhétorique : le délibératif, le judiciaire et le démonstratif. Quand on délibère, il s'agit d'engager à faire quelque chose que l'on conseille, ou de détourner de quelque chose que l'on dissuade. Soit, en effet, qu'on ait à délibérer sur un intérêt particulier, soit que le peuple réuni discute un intérêt public, on n'a jamais que l'une ou l'autre de ces alternatives. Pour le genre judiciaire, il n'y a que l'accusation et la défense ; car il faut bien, en réalité, que les plaideurs fassent nécessairement l'un ou l'autre. Pour le démonstratif, c'est la louange ou le blâme.

La démocratie est l'État où les fonctions se répartissent par la voie du sort ; l'oligarchie est celui où elles se répartissent selon le cens ; l'aristocratie, selon les lumières et l'éducation. J'entends par éducation celle qu'ont réglée les lois ; et dans toute aristocratie, les chefs sont ceux qui obéissent à la loi fidèlement ; car dès lors ils semblent les meilleurs de tous les citoyens ; et c'est de là que cette forme de gouvernement a tiré son nom. Enfin, la monarchie, comme le mot même l'indique, est l'État où un seul individu est maître de tout. Quand la monarchie est soumise à un certain ordre, c'est une royauté ; quand l'autorité y est sans limites, c'est une tyrannie.

But people are most likely to think that they can do wrong without paying the penalty if they are good speakers or men of affairs or have wide experience of litigation, or if they have many friends, or if they are rich. Their confidence is greatest if they fall into one of these categories themselves, but otherwise if they count these types among their friends, supporters, or accomplices. For these are the factors that enable them to carry out their crimes, avoid detection, and remain unpunished.

Since anything that accords with one’s nature is pleasant and being of the same kind is a natural relationship, then things that are of the same kind and resemble one another also usually please one another. So a human being pleases another human being, a horse a horse, a young man a young man. Hence the proverbs: ‘Youth delights in youth’, ‘Ever like to like’, ‘Beast knows beast’, ‘Birds of a feather flock together’, and so on. Since things that resemble oneself and are of the same kind as oneself are bound to afford one pleasure, and since every individual experiences these things above all in relation to himself, then we are all inevitably to a greater or lesser degree lovers of ourselves, seeing that we stand in these relationships primarily to ourselves. Since we are all lovers of ourselves, we are all bound to find pleasure in things that are our own — our own achievements and words, for instance. That is also why we are usually fond of flatterers, lovers, honour, and our children (who are our own achievements). And it is also pleasant to complete something unfinished, since then it immediately becomes one’s own achievement.

Glad that you thus continue your resolve To suck the sweets of sweet philosophy Only, good master, while we do admire This virtue and this moral discipline, Let's be no Stoics nor no stocks, I pray, Or so devote to Aristotle's checks As Ovid be an outcast quite abjured. Balk logic with acquaintance that you have, And practise rhetoric in your common talk, Music and poesy use to quicken you, The mathematics and the metaphysics Fall to them as you find your stomach serves you. No profit grows where is no pleasure ta'en. In brief, sir, study what you most affect.

But people are most likely to think that they can do wrong without paying the penalty if they are good speakers or men of affairs or have wide experience of litigation, or if they have many friends, or if they are rich. Their confidence is greatest if they fall into one of these categories themselves, but otherwise if they count these types among their friends, supporters, or accomplices. For these are the factors that enable them to carry out their crimes, avoid detection, and remain unpunished. Their confidence is also high if they are on good terms with the victims of their wrongdoing or with the judges. For friends take no precautions against being wronged by friends and would rather make up with them than prosecute; and judges are biased in favour of their friends, and either let them off scot-free or give them an exiguous penalty.

Nature is also what enables one person to recognize another person as a human being. All human beings have a human Nature, which means that all human beings are fundamentally the same—and different from all other things—in their very essence, which is immutable. Hence every human soul is ordered to the same transcendent good, or end. This is what it means to be human. Both Socrates and Aristotle said that men’s souls are ordered to the same good and that therefore there is a single standard of justice that transcends the political order of any city. There should not be one standard of justice for Athenians and another for Spartans. There is only one justice, and it is the same at all times, everywhere, for everyone. As Aristotle wrote in the Rhetoric, “Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as everyone to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other.”5

Compared to the way in which final causality has – in actual practice, if not in theory and rhetoric – maintained its grip on biological thinking, the Darwinian “revolution” is a trivial blip on the continued silent and unacknowledged hegemony of Aristotle.

In book two of his Rhetoric,2 Aristotle identified and explained three means of persuasion that a speaker may use: logos, pathos, and ethos. Logos is the logical argumentation and patterns of reasoning used to effect persuasion. Pathos includes the emotional involvement of both the speaker and the audience as they achieve persuasion. Ethos refers to the character of the speaker

Good master, while we do admire This virtue and this moral discipline, Let’s be no stoics nor no stocks, I pray, Or so devote to Aristotle’s checks As Ovid be an outcast quite abjured. 5 Balk logic with acquaintance that you have, And practice rhetoric in your common talk. Music and poesy use to quicken you; The mathematics and the metaphysics, Fall to them as you find your stomach serves you. 10 No profit grows where is no pleasure ta’en. In brief, sir, study what you most affect. —TRANIO, The Taming of the Shrew, 1.1.29–40 In other words: Listen, boss. We all think highly of ethics and morality. But—please—let’s not eliminate fun altogether, or turn ourselves into stuffed shirts. Let’s not dedicate ourselves to a life of restraint and throw away pleasure altogether. (Let’s not get all hung up with that stickler Aristotle about stuff like right and wrong, and throw Ovid’s stories about people who get naked right out the window.) Work on your analytical skills by figuring out how to split the check. Use linguistic theory in your everyday chitchat. By all means listen to music and read poetry, but purely for your enjoyment. As for math and philosophy, get involved in that stuff only when you’re really in the mood. You can’t learn anything if you’re miserable. Here’s my point: as far as study goes, stick to the subjects you like.

We live, thanks to the reach of our technologies, in perhaps the most argumentative age of any in history.

Gerbert’s first loves were the subjects of the trivium, especially rhetoric and logic. His insistence that students learn the rules of logic before embarking on anything else made Aristotle the founder of the medieval university curriculum.18

…the epithet rosy-finger'd, which Homer hath given to the morning. … Aristotle hath observed the effect solely in respect of beauty, but the remark holds equally true of these epithets in respect of vivacity. … It at once gratifies two of the senses, the nose by its fragrance, and the eye by its beauty.

Rhetoric has a name for debating that seeks to win points: eristic.

Well then," said Aristotle, "in accordance with the rules of rhetoric, let us first describe his ancestry, so we don't disobey the teachers of narrative-technique. “This man, then, was a Judean by descent from Coele-Syria. These people are descendants of the philosophers in India. Among the Indians, they say, the philosophers are called Calanoi, and among the Syrians, Judeans, taking their name from the place; for the place they inhabit is called Judea".

Perhaps most important of all, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, you will be seeking to persuade your audience that you are one of them: that your interests and their interests are identical in this case or, to be more convincing, in all cases.

But Aristotle held a deeper interest for Boethius. With the knowledge of Greek steadily disappearing from western Europe, the need for a Latin version of Aristotle seemed more urgent. In fact, Boethius made it his life’s work. “I wish to translate the whole work of Aristotle,” Boethius wrote when he turned thirty. “Everything Aristotle wrote on the difficult art of logic, on the important realm of moral experience, and on the exact comprehension of natural objects, I shall translate in the correct order.”9 Boethius never finished the mammoth project he had set for himself (prison and death also interrupted his plans to translate Plato’s dialogues). Aristotle’s writings on politics, ethics, and rhetoric, along with his central work, the Metaphysics, had to wait another six centuries before they saw the light of day in the West.

Daniel Webster picked up rhetoric at Dartmouth by joining a debating society, the United Fraternity, which had an impressive classical library and held weekly debates. Years later, the club changed its name to Alpha Delta and partied its way to immortality by inspiring the movie Animal House. To the brothers’ credit, they didn’t forget their classical heritage entirely; hence the toga party.

Rome’s fall, some began to say, was the awful price of embracing Christianity. Augustine decided he had to meet the rumors head-on. When he entered his basilica, he addressed his congregation with all the skill and eloquence he could muster from his years as a teacher of rhetoric. “Do not lose heart, brethren,” he told them, “there will be an end of every earthly kingdom.” He told his astonished listeners that the fall of Rome was not actually bad news, but good news. It was merely another step in God’s construction of His new Jerusalem.