Representations Of The Intellectual Quotes

إحدى مهام المثقف هي بذل الجهد لتهشيم الآراء المقولبة والمقولات التصغيرية, التي تحدُّ كثيراً من الفكر الإنساني والإتصال الفكري. ص12-13 كتاب صُوَر المثقف

مهمة المثقف و المفكر تتطلب اليقظة والانتباه على الدوام ، ورفض الانسياق وراء أنصاف الحقائق أو الأفكار الشائعة بإستمرار

المثقفين "تلك الشخصيات التي لا يمكن التكهّن بأدائها العلني؛ أو إخضاع تصرفها لشعار ما, أو خط حزبي تقليدي, أو عقيدة جازمة ثابتة. وما سعيت إلى اقتراحه هو وجوب بقاء المثقف أميناً لمعايير الحق الخاصة بالبؤس الإنساني والاضطهاد, رغم انتسابه الحزبي, وخلفيته القومية, وولاءاته الفطرية. ولا شيء يشوه الأداء العلني للمثقف أكثر من تغيير الآراء تتبعاً للظروف, وإلتزام الصمت الحذر, والتبجح الوطني, والردّة المتأخرة التي تصور نفسها بأسلوب مسرحي" ص14 - صَور المثقف

ان جميع الناس مفكرون ولكن.... وظيفة المفكر او المثقف في المجتمع لا يقوم بها كل الناس #أنطونيو جرامشي

إذا أردت إعلاء شأن العدالة الإنسانية الأساسية فلا بد أن تطبق ذلك على الجميع، لا أنا تقتصر على اختيار أولئك الذين يسمح لك بهم الطرف الذي تنتمي إليه، وتسمح بهم لك ثقافتك أو أمتك.

The workers went along with the Nazis, the Church stood by and watched, the middle classes were too cowardly to do anything, and so were the leading intellectuals. We allowed the unions to be abolished, the various religious denominations to be suppressed, there was no freedom of speech in the press or on the radio. Finally we let ourselves be driven into war. We were content for Germany to do without democratic representation and put up with pseudo-representation by people with no real say in anything. Ideals can’t be betrayed with impunity, and now we must all take the consequences.

There has been no major revolution in modern history without intellectuals; conversely there has been no major counterrevolutionary movement without intellectuals. Intellectuals have been the fathers and mothers of movements, and of course sons and daughters, even nephews and nieces.

Any beautiful mind, full of ideas, would always express itself in the most natural, simple and straightforward way, anxious to communicate its thoughts to others (if this is at all possible) and thus relieve the solitude that he must experience in a world such as this: but conversely, intellectual poverty, confusion and wrong-headedness, clothe themselves in the most laboured expressions and obscure turns of phrase in order to conceal petty, trivial, bland or trite thoughts in difficult and pompous expressions.

فمهمومي لمصطلح المثقف أو المُفكر يقول أنه ,في جوهره , ليس داعيةَ مُسالمةٍ ولا داعية اتفاق في الآراء, لكنه شخص يخاطر بكيانه كله باتخاذ موقفه الحساس, وهو موقف الإصرار على رفض الصيغ السهلة , والأقوال الجاهزة والتأكيدات المهذبة القائمة على المصالحات اللبقة والاتفاق على كل ما يقوله وما يفعله أصحاب السلطة وذوو الأفكار التقليدية. ولا يقتصر رفض المثقف على الرفض السلبي, بل يتضمن الاستعداد لإعلان رفضه على الملأ.

The strangest thing about humans is the way they pair up, males and females. Constantly at war with each other, never content to leave each other alone. They never seem to grasp the idea that males and females are separate species with completely different needs and desires, forced to come together only to reproduce Of course you feel that way. Your mates are nothing but mindless drones, extensions of yourself, without their own identity. We know out lovers with perfect understanding. Humans invent an imaginary lover and put that mask over the face of the body in their bed. That is the tradegy of language, my friend. Those who know each other only through symbolic representations are forced to imagine each other. And because their imagination is imperfect, they are often wrong, This is the source of their misery. And some of their strength, I think. Your people and mine, each for their own evolutionary reasons, mate with vastly unequal partners. Our mates are always, hopelessly, our intellectual inferiors. Humans mate with beings who challenge their supremcy. They have conflicts between mates, not because their communication is inferior to ours, but because they commune with each other at all.

على المفكر أن يشتبك في نزاع مدى حياته مع الأوصياء على الرؤية المقدسة أو النص المقدس

على المثقف أن يتحمل تمثيل "الحقيقة " بأقصى ما يستطيع من طاقة على السماح لراع أو سلطة بتوجيهه

The intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public. And this role has an edge to it, and cannot be played without a sense of being someone whose place ti is publicly to raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to produce them), to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose raison d'etre is to represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug.

إن الجميع اليوم يتكلمون اللغة الليبرالية والتناغم بين الجميع ، ومشكلة المثقف هي كيف يطبق هذه الأفكار على الحالات الواقعية حيث نجد أن الهوة التي تفصل بين القول بالمساواة والعدل من ناحية ، وبين الواقع الأقل جمالاً وتهذيباً ، من ناحية آخرى ، هوة شاسعة إلى حد بعيد

Intellectual representations are the activity itself, dependent on a kind of consciousness that is skeptical, engaged, unremittingly devote to rational investigation and moral judgement; and this puts the individual on record and on the line. Knowing how to use language well and knowing when to intervene in language are two essential features of intellectual action.

وأنا لا أرى ما هو أجدر بالإستهجان مما يكتسبه المثقف من عادات فكرية تنزع به نحو ما يسمى "التفادى" أى النكوص أو التخلى (الذى يمارسه الكثيرون) عن الثبات فى موقفه القائم على المبادئ, على صعوبة ذلك, وهو يعلم علم اليقين أنه الموقف الصائب ولكنه يختار ألا يلتزم به, فهو لا يريد أن يظهر فى صورة من اكتسى لونا سياسيا أكثر مما ينبغى له, وهو يحاول ألا يظهر فى صورة من يختلف الناس عليه, وهو يحتاج إلى رضاء رئيسه عنه, أو رضاء من يمثل السلطة, ويريد الحفاظ على سمعته باعتباره متوازنا, موضوعيا, معتدلا, وهو يأمل أن يُطلب من جديد لإسداء المشورة, أو للاشتراك فى عضوية مجلس أو لجنة ذائعة الصيت, وأن يظل من ثم فى التيار الرئيسى للقادرين على تحمل المسؤولية, ويأمل أن يحصل يوما على شهادة فخرية, أو جائزة كبرى, وربما منصب سفير فى دولة أجنبية.

يعتبر الفنان المستقل والمفكر المستقل من الشخصيات القليلة الباقية المؤهلة لمقاومة ومحاربة تنميط كل ما يتمتع بالحياة حقا وقتله ونضرة الرؤيا الان تتضمن القدرة علي مداومة نزع الاقنعة وتحطيم الاشكال النمطية للرؤية والفكر التي تغرقنا فيها وسائل الاعلام والاتصالات الحديثة ان عالمي الفن الجماهيري والفكر الجماهيري يزداد تسخيرهما لتلبية متطلبات السياسة ولذلك فلابد من تركيز التضامن والجهود الفكرية في مجال السياسة فاذا لم يرتبط المفكر بقيمة الحقيقة في الكفاح السياسي فلن يستطيع تلبية متطلبات الحياة الواقعية بصفة عامة بمستوي المسؤولية اللازم #سي رايت ميلز

Despite their pervasiveness, each of them can be countered by what I shall call amateurism, the desire to be moved not by profit or reward but by love for and unquenchable interest in the larger picture, in mak­ing connections across lines and barriers, in refusing to be tied down to a specialty, in caring for ideas and values de­spite the restrictions of a profession.

ان اتخاذ المثقف موقفا هامشيا وغير مستوعب في بيئته مثل الذي يعيش فعليا في المنفي معناه ان يستجيب استجابة فذة الي العابر لا الي صاحب السلطان والي ما هو مؤقت ويتضمن المخاطرة لا الي ما هو معتاد ومألوفوالي التجديد والتجريب لا الي الوضع الراهن الذي تمليه السلطة ان المثقف الذي يدفعه احساس المنفي لا يستجيب الي منطق ما هو تقليدي عرفي بل الي شجاعة التجاسر والي تمثيل التغيير والتقدم الي الامام لا الي الثبات دون الحركة

No group has any proper intellectual leadership today or any proper representation.

Van Houten was still staring at the ceiling beams. He took a drink. The glass was almost empty again. 'Lidewij, I can't do it. I can't. I can't.' He leveled his gaze to me. 'Nothing happens to the Dutch Tulip Man. He isn't a con man or not a con man; he's God. He's an obvious and unambiguous metaphorical representation of God, and asking what becomes of him if the intellectual equivalent of asking what becomes of the disembodied eyes of Dr. T.J. Eckleburg in Gatsby. Do he and Anna's man get married? We are speaking of a novel, dear child, not some historical enterprise.

The particular threat to the intellectual today, whether in the West or the non-Western world, is not the academy, nor the suburbs, nor the appalling commercialism of journalism and publishing houses, but rather an attitude that I will call professionalism. By professionalism I mean thinking of your work as an intellectual as something you do for a living, between the hours of nine and five with one eye on the clock, and another cocked at what is considered to be proper, professional behavior—not rocking the boat, not straying outside the accepted paradigms or limits, making yourself marketable and above all presentable, hence uncontroversial and unpolitical and “objective.

يوجد في كل مجتمع بعض الاشخاص الذين يتمتعون بحساسية فذة للقداسة وبقدرة خاصة علي تامل طبيعة الكون الذين يعيشون فيه والقواعد التي تحكم مجتمعهم وتوجد في كل مجتمع اقلية من الذين يتمتعون بمقدرة تفوق طاقة من سواهم من البشر العاديين علي التساؤل والبحث وتحفزهم الرغبة في التواصل المتكرر مع الرموز الاعم الاشمل من المواقف العملية في الحياة اليومية هي الرموز ذات الدلالات الابعد والاوسع زمانا ومكانا ويحتاج افراد هذه الاقلية الي اخراج وتجسيد بحثهم ومطلبهم في كلام شفوي ومكتوب وفي ما يعبر عنه شعرا او فنا تشكيليا وبالذكريات او الكتابة التاريخية وبالوان الاداء الطقسي وضروب العبادة وهذه الحاجة الباطنة للنفاذ الي ما وراء ستار الخبرة العملية الواقعية هي الدليل الذي يميز المثقفين او المفكرين في كل مجتمع #تعريف المثقف عند ادوارد شيلز

Our intellectual maturation as individuals can be traced through the way we draw pictures, or maps, of our surroundings. We begin with primitive, literal renderings of the features of the land we see around us, and we advance to ever more accurate, and more abstract, representations of geographic and topographic space. We progress, in other words, from drawing what we see to drawing what we know.

[T]he whole talk about the absolute, is nothing but the cosmological proof incognito. This proof, in consequence of the case brought against it by Kant, deprived of all right and declared outlawed, dare no longer show itself in its true form, and therefore appears in all kinds of disguises - now in distinguished form, concealed under intellectual intuition or pure thought now as a suspicious vagabond, half begging, half demanding what it wants in more unpretending philosophemes. If an absolute must absolutely be had, then I will give one which is far better fitted to meet all the demands which are made on such a thing than these visionary phantoms: it is matter. It has no beginning, and it is imperishable; thus it is really independent, and quod per se est et per se concipitur; from its womb all proceeds, and to it all returns; what more can be desired of an absolute?

المثقف الذي يهم في النهاية هو ذاك المتمتع بالصفة التمثيلية - إنسان يمثّل بوضوح وجهة نظر ذات طبيعة ما ، و يعبّر بجلاء لجمهوره عن تلك الأفكار التي يمثّلها ، برغم كل أنواع العوائق .

There are no rules by which intellectuals can know what to say or do; nor for the true secular intellectual are there any gods to be worshiped and looked to for unwavering guidance.

When a young woman discovers her power, both sexual and intellectual, she unleashes her own voice, her righteousness. The first things she has to jettison are the Devil and any religious representation of her gender as stained or subservient. She's just naturally going to be attracted to Goddesses or witches or, as in my case, a scientific understanding of the body and a historical view of sexual politics.

A condition of marginality, which might seem irresponsible or flippant, frees you from having always to proceed with caution, afraid to overturn the applecart, anxious about upsetting fellow members of the same corporation.

The particular threat to the intellectual today, whether in the West or the nonWestern world, is not the academy, nor the suburbs, nor the appalling commercialism of journalism and publishing houses, but rather an attitude that I will call professionalism. By professionalism I mean thinking of your work as an intellectual as something you do for a living, between the hours of nine and five with one eye on the clock, and another cocked at what is considered to be proper, professional behavior-not rocking the boat, not straying outside the accepted paradigms or limits, making yourself marketable and above all presentable, hence uncontroversial and unpolitical and "objective.

What is knowledge? it is primarily and essentially idea. What is idea? A very complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a picture there. Clearly the relation between such a picture and something entirely different from the animal in whose brain it exists can only be a very indirect one. This is perhaps the simplest and most comprehensible way of disclosing the deep gulf between the ideal and the real. This belongs to the things of which, like the motion of the earth, we are not directly conscious; therefore the ancients did not observe it, just as they did not observe the motion of the earth. Once pointed out, on the other hand, first by Descartes, it has ever since given philosophers no rest. But after Kant had at last proved in the most thorough manner the complete diversity of the ideal and the real, it was an attempt, as bold as it was absurd, yet perfectly correctly calculated with reference to the philosophical public in Germany, and consequently crowned with brilliant results, to try to assert the absolute identity of the two by dogmatic utterances, on the strength of a pretended intellectual intuition. In truth, on the contrary, a subjective and an objective existence, a being for self and a being for others, a consciousness of one's own self, and a consciousness of other things, is given us directly, and the two are given in such a fundamentally different manner that no other difference can compare with this. About himself every one knows directly, about all others only very indirectly. This is the fact and the problem.

Somewhere during the process of intellectual development there was a disconnect in the believer’s ability to discern fantasy from reality and the outlandish, scientifically impossible, physically unrealistic, historically erroneous, intellectually retarded drabble that is contained within the pages of the bible became not only viable, but a more accurate representation of the truth than, well, the actual truth.

To know causality is the sole function of the understanding, its only power, and it is a great power embracing much, manifold in its application, and yet unmistakable in its identity throughout all its manifestations. Conversely, all causality, hence all matter, and consequently the whole of reality, is only for the understanding, through the understanding, in the understanding. The first, simplest, ever-present manifestation of understanding is perception of the actual world. This is in every way knowledge of the cause from the effect, and therefore all perception is intellectual.

Now everyone knows that to try to say something in the mainstream Western media that is critical of U.S. policy or Israel is extremely difficult; conversely, to say things that are hostile to the Arabs as a people and culture, or Islam as a religion, is laughably easy. For in effect there is a cultural war between spokespersons for the West and those of the Muslim and Arab world. In so inflamed a situation, the hardest thing to do as an intellectual is to be critical, to refuse to adopt a rhetorical style that is the verbal equivalent of carpet-bombing, and to focus instead on those issues like U.S. support for unpopular client re­gimes, which for a person writing in the U.S. are somewhat more likely to be affected by critical discussion. Of course, on the other hand, there is a virtual cer­tainty of getting an audience if as an Arab intellectual you passionately, even slavishly support U.S. policy, you attack its critics, and if they happen to be Arabs, you invent evi­dence to show their villainy; if they are American you confect stories and situations that prove their duplicity; you spin out stories concerning Arabs and Muslims that have the effect of defaming their tradition, defacing their history, accentuating their weaknesses, of which of course there are plenty. Above all, you attack the officially ap­ proved enemies-Saddam Hussein, Baathism, Arab na­tionalism, the Palestinian movement, Arab views of Israel. And of course this earns you the expected accolades: you are characterized as courageous, you are outspoken and passionate, and on and on. The new god of course is the West. Arabs, you say, should try to be more like the West, should regard the West as a source and a reference point. · Gone is the history of what the West actually did. Gone are the Gulf War's destructive results. We Arabs and Mus­lims are the sick ones, our problems are our own, totally self-inflicted. A number of things stand out about these kinds of performance. In the first place, there is no universalism here at all. Because you serve a god uncritically, all the devils are always on the other side: this was as true when you were a Trotskyist as it i's now when you are a recanting former Trotskyist. You do not think of politics in terms of interrelationships or of common histories such as, for instance, the long and complicated dynamic that has bound the Arabs and Muslims to the West and vice versa. Real intellectual analysis forbids calling one side innocent, the other evil. Indeed the notion of a side is, where cultures are at issue, highly problematic, since most cultures aren't watertight little packages, all homogenous, and all either good or evil. But if your eye is on your patron, you cannot think as an intellectual, but only as a disciple or acolyte. In the back of your mind there is the thought that you must please and not displease.

Kant’s teaching produces a fundamental change in every mind that has grasped it. The change is so great that it may be regarded as an intellectual rebirth. It alone is capable of really removing the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect. Neither Berkeley nor Malebranche is competent to do this, for these men remain too much in the universal, whereas Kant goes into the particular. And this he does in a way which is unexpected either before or after him, and one which has quite a peculiar, one might say immediate, effect on the mind. In consequence of this, the mind undergoes a fundamental undeceiving, and thereafter looks at all things in another light. But only in this way does man become susceptible to the more positive explanations that I am going to give. On the other hand, the man who has not mastered the Kantian philosophy, whatever else he may studied, is, so to speak, in a state of innocence; in other words, he has remained in the grasp of that natural and childlike realism in which we are all born, and which qualifies one for every possible thing except philosophy.

At the present time, political power is everywhere constituted on insufficient foundations. On the one hand it emanates from the so-called divine right of kings, which is none other than military force; on the other from universal suffrage, which is merely the instinct of the masses, or mere average intelligence. A nation is not a number of uniform values or ciphers; it is a living being composed of organs. So long as national representation is not the image of this organization, right from its working to its teaching classes, there will be no organic or intelligent national representation. So long as the delegates of all scientific bodies, and the whole of the Christian churches do not sit together in one upper council, our societies will be governed by instinct, by passion, and by might, and there will be no social temple. ...We are beginning to understand that Jesus, at the very height of his consciousness, the transfigured Christ, is opening his loving arms to his brothers, the other Messiahs who preceded him, beams of the Living Word as he was, that he is opening them wide to Science in its entirety, Art in its divinity, and Life in its completeness. But his promise cannot be fulfilled without the help of all the living forces of humanity. Two main things are necessary nowadays for the continuation of the mighty work: on the one hand, the progressive unfolding of experimental science and intuitive philosophy to facts of psychic order, intellectual principles, and spiritual proofs; on the other, the expansion of Christian dogma in the direction of tradition and esoteric science, and subsequently a reorganization of the Church according to a graduated initiation; this by a free and irresistible movement of all Christian churches, which are also equally daughters of the Christ. Science must become religious and religion scientific. This double evolution, already in preparation, would finally and forcibly bring about a reconciliation of Science and Religion on esoteric grounds. The work will not progress without considerable difficulty at first, but the future of European Society depends on it. The transformation of Christianity, in its esoteric sense would bring with it that of Judaism and Islam, as well as a regeneration of Brahmanism and Buddhism in the same fashion, it would accordingly furnish a religious basis for the reconciliation of Asia and Europe.

... higher intellectual power makes those very few susceptible to much greater sufferings than duller men can ever feel. Moreover, it makes them feel lonely among beings that are noticeably different from them, and in this way also matters are made even. But purely intellectual pleasures are not accessible to the vast majority of men. They are almost wholly incapable of the pleasure to be found in pure knowledge; they are entirely given over to willing. Therefore, if anything is to win their sympathy, to be interesting to them, it must (and this is to be found already in the meaning of the word) in some way excite their will, even if it be only through a remote relation to it which is merely within the bounds of possibility. The will must never be left entirely out of question, since their existence lies far more in willing than in knowing; action and reaction are their only element. The naive expressions of this quality can be seen in trifles and everyday phenomena; thus, for example, they write their names up at places worth seeing which they visit, in order thus to react on, to affect the place, since it does not affect them. Further, they cannot easily just contemplate a rare and strange animal, but must excite it, tease it, play with it, just to experience action and reaction. But this need for exciting the will shows itself particularly in the invention and maintenance of card-playing, which is in the truest sense an expression of the wretched side of humanity.

In this impossibility of reapprehending the world through images and of moving from information to a collective action and will, in this absence of sensibility and mobilization, it isn't apathy or general indifference that's at issue; it is quite simply that the umbilical cord of representation is severed. The screen reflects nothing. It is as though you are behind a two-way mirror: you see the world, but it doesn't see you, it doesn't look at you. Now, you only see things if they are looking at you. The screen screens out any dual relation (any possibility of 'response'). It is this failure of representation which, together with a failure of action, underlies the impossibility of developing an ethics of information, an ethics of images, an ethics of the Virtual and the networks. All attempts in that direction inevitably fail. All that remains is the mental diaspora of images and the extravagant performance of the medium. Susan Sontag tells a good story about this pre-eminence of the medium and of images: as she is sitting in front of the television watching the moon landing, the people she is watching with tell her they don't believe it at all. 'But what are you watching, then?' she asks. 'Oh, we're watching television!' Fantastic: they do not see the moon; they see only the screen showing the moon. They do not see the message; they see only the image. Ultimately, contrary to what Susan Sontag thinks, only intellectuals believe in the ascendancy of meaning; 'people' believe only in the ascendancy of signs. They long ago said goodbye to reality. They have gone over, body and soul, to the spectacular.

Kant argued that the mind has both receptive capacities and spontaneous capabilities, both operative in human knowledge. For Kant (1787/1933, B74, B93), knowledge has its origin in sensory capacities to receive representations and in intellectual capabilities for knowing objects through them.

Certainly, we can no longer look upon the canon of Western art - Greco-Roman as revived, extended, and graced by the Renaissance - as -the- tradition in art, or even any longer as distinctly and uniquely -ours-. That canon is in fact only one tradition among many, and indeed in its strict adherence to representational form is rather the exception in the whole gallery of -human- art. Such an extension of the resources of the past, for the modern artist, implies a different and more comprehensive understanding of the term "human" itself: a Sumerian figure of a fertility goddess is as "human" to us as a Greek Aphrodite. When the sensibility of an age can accommodate the alien "inhuman" forms of primitive art side by side with the classic "human" figures of Greece or the Renaissance, it should be obvious that the attitude toward man that we call classical humanism - which is the intellectual expression of the spirit that informs the classical canon of Western art - has also gone by the boards.

Exilic Intellectuals 1 "It is part of morality not to be at home in one's home." —Theodore W. Adorno "[I am] the outlander, not only regionally, but down bone deep for good...my Texas grandfather has something to do with that." —C. Wright Mills Edward Said's Representations of the Intellectual must be considered a landmark in radically reawakening the crucial consciousness of that critical community of counter-interpreters we have habitually called "The Intellectuals." It appears that the problem of intellectuals in the United States is reformulated periodically as a crucial barometer of issues and concerns centered around, but much beyond, the immediate conception of this social category. It was in Democracy in America that Tocqueville opened his second, theoretically more significant, volume with the startling pronouncement that: I think that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States. The Americans have no philosophical school of their own, and they care but little for all the schools into which Europe is divided, the very names of which are scarcely known to them. 2

Underlying the doctrines which disregard the radical novelty of each moment of evolution there are many misunderstandings, many errors. But there is especially the idea that the possible is less than the real, and that, for this reason, the possibility of things precedes their existence. They would thus be capable of representation beforehand; they could be thought of before being realised. But it is the reverse that is true. If we leave aside the closed systems, subjected to purely mathematical laws, isolable because duration does not act upon them, if we consider the totality of concrete reality or simply the world of life, and still more that of consciousness, we find there is more and not less in the possibility of each of the successive states than in their reality. For the possible is only the real with the addition of an act of mind which throws its image back into the past, once it has been enacted. But that is what our intellectual habits prevent us from seeing.

Examples include the patterns of muscular activation of the face. They are so closely associated with certain emotional states that their deployment in our faces can rapidly conjure up feelings such as joy and surprise. We do not need to look in the mirror to know that we are experiencing such states. In sum, feelings are experiences of certain aspects of the state of life within an organism. Those experiences are not mere decoration. They accomplish something extraordinary: a moment-to-moment report on the state of life in the interior of an organism. It is tempting to translate the notion of a report into pages of an online file that can be swiped, one at a time, telling us about one part or another of the body. But digitized pages, neat, lifeless, and indifferent, are not acceptable metaphors for feelings, given the valence component we just discussed. Feelings provide important information about the state of life, but feelings are not mere “information” in the strict computational sense. Basic feelings are not abstractions. They are experiences of life based on multidimensional representations of configurations of the life process. As noted, feelings can be intellectualized. We can translate feelings into ideas and words that describe the original physiology. It is possible, and not infrequent, to refer to a particular feeling without necessarily experiencing that feeling or simply experiencing a paler version of the original

Time to Bury All Divide (The Sonnet) It's time we bury the nationality nonsense, Person is known by their behavior not nation. It's time we bury the holy book nonsense, Person becomes holy by compassion not religion. It's time we bury the representation nonsense, Social reform starts with civic duty not delegation. It's time we bury the intellectualism nonsense, Society is civilized by heart not cocky argumentation. It's time we abolish the royalty nonsense, Humans are known by behavior, animals by bloodline. It's time we dissolve all moronity of hierarchy, True advancement lies in the abolition of divide. Even the mighty sun doesn't differentiate between first world and third world humanity. It is only the lowly beings who can't help but practice some good old exclusivity.

Objects are repositories of what we can learn about people. Pleasure is selfish. Luxury is something you share. The aim of perfumery, as of all the arts, is to create products that arouse sensual pleasure. The pleasure of the senses is also an intellectual choice. Memory works in such a way that the perfumes which are not experienced with excitement and passion, which are not linked with a personal story, are devoid of meaning and leave no trace in the memory. - The Baroques are defined by exaggeration and the space they occupy; the creation of tension through the accentuation of detail. - The Classics are perfumes that have become emblems, archetypes of perfumery. - The Abstracts are perfumes that do not imitate nature in any way. - The Figuratives seek to provide a faithful representation of a specific odor. - The Narratives tell a story and describe a place or a journey. - The Minimalists express odor for its own sake, stripped of all sentiment.

In the tradition that developed in the West, "wisdom" lost the concrete sense it originally had in Homer. In religious texts, on the one hand, "wisdom" tended towards the mystical. In science, on the other hand, "wisdom" remained connected to the knowledge of nature, but with the advent of idealizations such as the frictionless surface and the perfect vacuum, science, too, adopted a paradoxically otherworldly ideal of how we come to know nature: through mental constructions that are more intellectually tractable than material reality, hence amenable to mathematical representation.

Like the article you are reading now, most works on whiteness are intended to explode the myth of white supremacy. While there are numerous works in this tradition, what I want to focus on here is a recent trend in white intellectual self-representation which is sometimes called the “new abolitionism.” Demonstrated most profoundly in Noel Ignatiev and John Garvey’s anti-racist journal Race Traitor, it is also adopted by David Roediger in his latest collection of essays called Towards the Abolition of Whiteness, and to a lesser extent in Fred Pfeil’s White Guys.

Nothing disfigures the intellectual's public performance as much as trimming, careful silence, patriotic bluster, and retrospective and self-dramatizing apostasy.

The particular threat to the intellectual today, whether in the West or the non-Western world, is not the academy, nor the suburbs, nor the appalling commercialism of journalism and publishing houses, but rather an attitude that I will call professionalism. By professionalism I mean thinking of your work as an intellectual as something you do for a living, between the hours of nine and five with one eye on the clock, and another cocked at what is considered to be proper, professional behavior-not rocking the boat, not straying outside the accepted paradigms or limits, making yourself marketable and above all presentable, hence uncontroversial and unpolitical and "objective.

The particular threat to the intellectual today, whether in the West or the non-Western world, is not the academy, nor the suburbs, nor the appalling commercialism of journalism and publishing houses, but rather an attitude that I will call professionalism. By professionalism I mean thinking of your work as an intellectual as something you do for a living, between the hours of nine and five with one eye on the clock, and another cocked at what is considered to be proper, professional behavior-not rocking the boat, not straying outside the accepted paradigms or limits, making yourself marketable and above all presentable, hence uncontroversial and unpolitical and "objective”.

When dealing with the concrete fact of belief, it is important to clarify the conceptual and emotional differences between the concept of God and the images of God which, combined in multiple forms, produce the prevailing God representation in a given individual at a given time. The concept of God is fabricated mostly at the level of secondary-process thinking. This is the God of the theologicians, the God whose existence is debated by metaphysical reasoning. But this God leaves us cold. The philosophers and mystics know this better than anybody else. This God is only the result of rigorous thinking about causality or philosophical premises. Even someone who believes intellectually that there must be a God may feel no inclination to accept him unless images of previous interpersonal experience have fleshed out the concept with multiple images that can now coalesce in a representation that he can accept emotionally.

Representations that do not make sense are the best Trade Marks

After observing animals for millions of years, as our most important intellectual activity, we deformed the messenger itself. We made our animal fellow something to be possessed rather than someone to be encountered as a spiritual being. Our prehistoric “agreements” with the animal nations, our “negotiations” with wild animals, were once the biggest part of human culture. This was not a simple “identification with nature,” as the conservationists phrase it today. It was a lifetime work, to build covenants, or treaties of affiliation, with the nations of the Others. With domestication wild things became the enemies of tame things, materially and psychologically. The wild unconscious of mankind, its fears and dreams and subconscious impulses, lost their affiliation or representation by wild things, and those were the very things by which, for a million years, we had worked out a meaningful relationship with the sentient universe. The wild unconscious was driven away into the wilderness. We began to view the planet as a thing, rather than a thou.” We began to see our world as an organism to be possessed, rather than a spiritual moment to be encountered." -J.T. Winogrond

The sheep don’t need to be instructed by a zoologist to seek escape if a tiger approaches; it knows by its signature and without argumentation that it is its enemy. Is it not much more important for the sheep to know the ferocious character of the tiger than to be informed that the latter belongs to the genus Felis? If, by some miracle, a sheep should become intellectual, it might learn so much about the external form, anatomy, physiology, and genealogy of the tiger that it would lose sight of its internal character and be devoured by it. Absurd as this example may appear, it is nevertheless the true representation of what is done in your schools daily. There the rising generation receives what they call a scientific education. They are taught all about the external form of humans and how that form may be comfortably fed, lodged, and housed. However, the sight of the real human who occupies that form is entirely lost. Their needs are neglected, starved, ill-treated, and tortured, and some of your ‘great lights of science’ have become so short-sighted that they even deny they exist.

The crow symbolizes many things in different cultures. Magic, transcendence, destiny, intellectual awakening. A physical representation of the space between heaven and earth. The interpretations are vast and far-reaching. But when the magic and lore have been stripped away, all that’s left is reality. For me, only one interpretation comes to mind. At its most basic, and especially to me, the crow symbolizes death.

The theoretical concepts of Freudianism are corrected and affirmed once they are understood, as suggested in the work of Melanie Klein, in terms of corporeality taken as itself the search of the external in the internal and of the internal in the external, that is, as a global and universal power of incorporation... A philosophy of the flesh finds itself in opposition to any interpretation of the unconscious in terms of "unconscious representations," a tribute paid by Freud to the psychology of bis day. The unconscious is feeling itself, since feeling is not the intellectual possession of "what" is felt, but a dispossession of ourselves in favor of it, an opening toward that which we do not have to think in order that we may recognize it...The double formula of the unconscious ( "I did not know" and "I have not always known it'') corresponds to two aspects of the flesh, its poetic and its oneiric powers. When Freud presents the concept of repression in all its operational richness, it comprises a double movement of progress and regression, of openness toward the adult universe and of a relapse to the pregenital life, but henceforth called by its name, having become unconscious "homosexuality." Thus the repressed unconsciousness would be a secondary formation, contemporary with the formation of a system of perception-consciousness -- and the primordial unconsciousness would be a permissive being, the initial yes, the undividedness of feeling. The preceding leads to the idea of the human body as a natural symbolism...We may ask what could be the relation between this tacit symbolism, or undividedness, and the artificial or conventional symbolism, which seems to be privileged, to open us toward ideal being and to truth.

Once the relation of science and metaphysics with “intellectual intuition” is misunderstood, Kant has no difficulty in showing that our science is entirely relative and our metaphysics wholly artificial. Because he strained the independence of the understanding in both cases, because he relieved metaphysics and science of the “intellectual intuition” which gave them their inner weight, science with its relations presents to him only an outer wrapping of form, and metaphysics with its things, an outer wrapping of matter. Is it surprising, then, that the first shows him only frameworks within frameworks, and the second phantoms pursuing phantoms? He struck our science and metaphysics such rude blows that they have not yet entirely recovered from their shock. Our mind would willingly resign itself to see in science a wholly relative knowledge and in metaphysics an empty speculation. It seems to us even today that Kantian criticism applies to all metaphysics and to all science. In reality it applies especially to the philosophy of the ancients, as well as to the form—still ancient—that the moderns have given most often to their thought. It is valid against a metaphysics which claims to give us a unique and ready-made system of things, against a science which would be a unique system of relations, finally against a science and a metaphysics which present themselves with the architectural simplicity of the Platonic theory of Ideas, or of a Greek temple. If metaphysics claims to be made up of concepts we possessed prior to it, if it consists in an ingenious arrangement of pre-existing ideas which we utilize like the materials of construction for a building, in short, if it is something other than the constant dilation of our mind, the constantly renewed effort to go beyond our actual ideas and perhaps our simple logic as well, it is too evident that it becomes artificial like all works of pure understanding. And if science is wholly the work of analysis or of conceptual representation, if experience is only to serve as the verification of “clear ideas,” if instead of starting from multiple and varied intuitions inserted into the movement proper to each reality but not always fitting into one another, it claims to be an immense mathematics, a single system of relations which imprisons the totality of the real in a mesh prepared for it, it becomes a knowledge purely relative to the human understanding. A close reading of the Critique of Pure Reason will show that for Kant this kind of universal mathematics is science, and this barely modified Platonism, metaphysics. To tell the truth, the dream of a universal mathematics is itself only a survival of Platonism. Universal mathematics is what the world of Ideas becomes when one assumes that the Idea consists in a relation or a law, and no longer in a thing.

I am saying, however, that to be as marginal and as undomesticated as someone who is in real exile is for an intellectual to be unusually responsive to the traveler rather than to the potentate, to the provisional and risky rather than to the habitual, to innovation and experiment rather than the authoritatively given status quo. The exilic intellectual does not respond to the logic of the conventional but to the audacity of daring, and to representing change, to moving on, not standing still.

In a more consistent and sustained way, I think, intellectuals who are close to policy formulation and can control patronage of the kind that gives or withholds jobs, stipends, promotions tend to watch out for individuals who do not toe the line professionally and in the eyes of their superiors gradually come to exude an air of controversy and noncooperation. Understandably of course, if you want a job done—let us say that you and your team have to provide the State Department or Foreign Office with a policy paper on Bosnia by next week—you need to surround yourself with people who are loyal, share the same assumptions, speak the same language. I have always felt that for an intellectual who represents the kinds of things I have been discussing in these lectures, being in that sort of professional position, where you are principally serving and winning rewards from power, is not at all conducive to the exercise of that critical and relatively independent spirit of analysis and judgment that, from my point of view, ought to be the intellectual’s contribution. In other words, the intellectual, properly speaking, is not a functionary or an employee completely given up to the policy goals of a government or a large corporation, or even a guild of likeminded professionals. In such situations the temptations to turn off one’s moral sense, or to think entirely from within the specialty, or to curtail skepticism in favor of conformity are far too great to be trusted. Many intellectuals succumb completely to these temptations, and to some degree all of us do. No one is totally self-supporting, not even the greatest of free spirits.

I have already suggested that as a way of maintaining relative intellectual independence, having the attitude of an amateur instead of a professional is a better course.

The hallucination is not a perception, but it has the value of reality, and it alone counts for the hallucinating person. The perceived world has lost its expressive force, and the hallucinatory system has usurped this force. Although the hallucination is not a perception, there is a hallucinatory deception, and this is what we will never understand if we turn the hallucination into an intellectual operation. As different as it may be from a perception, the hallucination must be able to supplant it and to exist for the patient even more than his own perceptions do. This is only possible if hallucination and perception are modalities of a single primordial function by which we arrange around ourselves a milieu with a definite structure, and by which we situate ourselves sometimes fully in the world and sometimes on the margins of the world...This fiction can only count as reality because reality itself is reached for the normal subject in an analogous operation. Insofar as he has sensory fields and a body, the normal subject himself also bears this gaping wound through which illusion can be introduced; the normal subject's representation of the world is vulnerable. If we believe what we see, this is prior to all verification, and the error of classical theories of perception is in introducing, into perception itself, intellectual operations and a critique of sensory evidence to which we resort only when direct perception flounders in ambiguity. For the normal subject, and without any explicit verification, private experience links up with itself and with the experiences of others, and the landscape opens onto a geographical world and tends toward absolute plenitude. The normal subject does not revel in subjectivity, he flees from it, he is really in the world, he has a direct and naive hold on time, whereas the hallucinating subject makes use of being in the world in order to carve out a private world within the common world, and always runs into the transcendence of time.

The world is originally perceived as a total, if not complete, organization where effects are still bound up with causes before all intellectual representation...In perception causality is elucidated.

He was clearly out of his depth in Egyptian politics and accepted uncritically the opinion that, as he put it in a telegram, Zaghlul represented the "opinion of majority of Egyptian intellectuals" ; as though "Egyptian intellectuals' were a known or intelligible entity, as though their opinions - whatever they were or however ascertained - had overriding or primordial importance, and as though it made the smallest sense in such a situation to speak - except in the loosest and most misleading manner - of representation or representativeness.

PICASSO HAD A POINT OF VIEW When Georges Braque and the early Cubists first painted portraits that had two eyes on one side of a woman's face, critics were outraged. Art lovers were appalled. Intellectuals were brawling with each other in bistros in Montmartre and Saint-Germain-des-Prés. But Braque knew. Picasso knew. Leger knew. They had a point of view. The Cubists could draw a representational face. But that wasn't what they wanted. That wasn't their point of view. Caesar had a point of view. Gandhi had a point of view. Martin Luther King, Jr. had a point of view. The artist can answer any question (including those posed by herself) when she has a point of view.