Portfolio Update Quotes

Establishing and maintaining an unconventional investment profile requires acceptance of uncomfortably idiosyncratic portfolios, which frequently appear downright imprudent in the eyes of conventional wisdom. Unless institutions maintain contrarian positions through difficult times, the resulting damage of buying high and selling low imposes severe financial and reputational costs on the institution.

most important distinction in the investment world does not separate individuals and institutions; the most important distinction divides those investors with the ability to make high quality active management decisions from those investors without active management expertise. Few institutions and even fewer individuals exhibit the ability and commit the resources to produce risk-adjusted excess returns.

By now, though, it had been a steep learning curve, he was fairly well versed on the basics of how clearing worked: When a customer bought shares in a stock on Robinhood — say, GameStop — at a specific price, the order was first sent to Robinhood's in-house clearing brokerage, who in turn bundled the trade to a market maker for execution. The trade was then brought to a clearinghouse, who oversaw the trade all the way to the settlement. During this time period, the trade itself needed to be 'insured' against anything that might go wrong, such as some sort of systemic collapse or a default by either party — although in reality, in regulated markets, this seemed extremely unlikely. While the customer's money was temporarily put aside, essentially in an untouchable safe, for the two days it took for the clearing agency to verify that both parties were able to provide what they had agreed upon — the brokerage house, Robinhood — had to insure the deal with a deposit; money of its own, separate from the money that the customer had provided, that could be used to guarantee the value of the trade. In financial parlance, this 'collateral' was known as VAR — or value at risk. For a single trade of a simple asset, it would have been relatively easy to know how much the brokerage would need to deposit to insure the situation; the risk of something going wrong would be small, and the total value would be simple to calculate. If GME was trading at $400 a share and a customer wanted ten shares, there was $4000 at risk, plus or minus some nominal amount due to minute vagaries in market fluctuations during the two-day period before settlement. In such a simple situation, Robinhood might be asked to put up $4000 and change — in addition to the $4000 of the customer's buy order, which remained locked in the safe. The deposit requirement calculation grew more complicated as layers were added onto the trading situation. A single trade had low inherent risk; multiplied to millions of trades, the risk profile began to change. The more volatile the stock — in price and/or volume — the riskier a buy or sell became. Of course, the NSCC did not make these calculations by hand; they used sophisticated algorithms to digest the numerous inputs coming in from the trade — type of equity, volume, current volatility, where it fit into a brokerage's portfolio as a whole — and spit out a 'recommendation' of what sort of deposit would protect the trade. And this process was entirely automated; the brokerage house would continually run its trading activity through the federal clearing system and would receive its updated deposit requirements as often as every fifteen minutes while the market was open. Premarket during a trading week, that number would come in at 5:11 a.m. East Coast time, usually right as Jim, in Orlando, was finishing his morning coffee. Robinhood would then have until 10:00 a.m. to satisfy the deposit requirement for the upcoming day of trading — or risk being in default, which could lead to an immediate shutdown of all operations. Usually, the deposit requirement was tied closely to the actual dollars being 'spent' on the trades; a near equal number of buys and sells in a brokerage house's trading profile lowered its overall risk, and though volatility was common, especially in the past half-decade, even a two-day settlement period came with an acceptable level of confidence that nobody would fail to deliver on their trades.

years. Just as the secret of real estate is location, location, location, the real secret to Yale’s remarkable continuing success is defense, defense, defense.

Three themes surface repeatedly in the book. The first theme centers on the importance of taking actions within the context of an analytically rigorous framework, implemented with discipline and under-girded with thorough analysis of specific opportunities.

Casual commitments invite casual reversal, exposing portfolio managers to the damaging whipsaw of buying high and selling low. Only with the confidence created by a strong decision-making process can investors sell mania-induced excess and buy despair-driven value.

During the period surrounding the 1987 stock market collapse endowment portfolios first exhibited aspects of disciplined rebalancing in the run up before the crash and then showed signs of perverse market timing in the carnage of the crash.

Cambridge Associates Annual Analysis of College and University Pool Returns.

In relative valuation, you price an asset based on how similar assets are priced in the market. A prospective house buyer decides how much to pay for a house by looking at the prices paid for similar houses in the neighborhood. In the same vein, a potential investor in Twitter's IPO (initial public offering) in 2013 could have estimated its value by looking at the market pricing of other social media companies. The three essential steps in relative valuation are: Find comparable assets that are priced by the market; Scale the market prices to a common variable to generate standardized prices that are comparable across assets; and Adjust for differences across assets when comparing their standardized values. A newer house with more updated amenities should be priced higher than a similar-sized older house that needs renovation, and a higher growth company should trade at a higher price than a lower growth company in the same sector. Pricing can be done with less information and much more quickly than intrinsic valuations, and it is more likely to reflect the market mood of the moment. Not surprisingly, most of what passes for valuation in investment banking and portfolio management is really pricing.

A one-year CD will typically charge an early withdrawal penalty of three months or so of interest. For a five-year CD, the penalty might be six to eight months interest. Every CD issuer has its own policy. Be sure you know the rules before you invest. A portfolio of CDs with different maturities can be a smart strategy to increase your overall yield, while reducing the chances you will need to make an early withdrawal. For instance you could invest equal amounts in five different CDs: one-year, two-year, three-year, four-year, and five-year. That way you have some money maturing every year. When the one-year CD matures, invest it in a new five-year. Your two-year CD now has just one more year to go, so it becomes your one-year CD. When it matures, invest that in a five-year CD too. Keep doing this and eventually you will have a portfolio of five-year CDs, with one maturing every year. That will pay you more interest than if you kept all of your money in a one-year CD that you had to reinvest annually. I think the CD ladder can be a terrific option for some of your cash, but if you are aiming for a two-year cash reserve, I would still keep at least six months of that in a simple savings account where

am not suggesting you keep all your money in stocks. No way! My message is that you should keep some money in stocks. If you are in your 50s and 60s today, depending on your situation, you should already have a significant portion of your portfolio—maybe half—invested in bonds. But the other half of your investable assets most likely are in stocks.

The tax-deferred bucket has become the default investment account for most Americans, primarily because of the ease with which contributions are made. In the case of a 401(k) and other employer-sponsored plans, money gets zapped right out of your check and into a mutual fund portfolio. Out of sight, out of mind—what could be better? Throw in a matching contribution from your employer and it seems like a no-brainer.

Equally important to Yale’s own success has been its extensive network of professional friendships throughout the world of investing. Among the very bright and well-connected, how they spend their time is always a matter of free choice because everyone has lots of alternatives about how they share insights and information—and with whom.

The sixth secret is that, as Charles Darwin tried to explain, survival of the fittest is not determined by competitive strength, but rather by social desirability. There’s more money than certified talent in the world of investing, so outstanding investment managers have many choices because so many investors want to be their clients.

If nothing is so useless as an “ivory tower” academic theory that goes unused, nothing is so very practical as the theory that works. At

In fact, Yale’s return for the ten years ending June 30, 1998 amounted to 15.5 percent per annum, more than three full percentage points short of the S&P 500’s 18.6 percent result. The endowment’s deficit relative to the then-highest-performing asset class of domestic equity caused naysayers to question the wisdom of undertaking the difficult task of creating a well-diversified equity-oriented portfolio.

rich understanding of human psychology, a reasonable appreciation of financial theory, a deep awareness of history, and a broad exposure to current events all contribute to development of well-informed portfolio strategies.

investment success requires sticking with positions made uncomfortable by their variance with popular opinion. Casual commitments invite casual reversal, exposing portfolio managers to the damaging whipsaw of buying high and selling low. Only with the confidence created by a strong decision-making process can investors sell mania-induced excess and buy despair-driven value.

By operating in the institutional mainstream of short-horizon, uncontroversial opportunities, committee members and staff ensure unspectacular results, while missing potentially rewarding longer term contrarian plays.

The perpetual nature of colleges and universities makes endowment management one of the investment world’s most fascinating endeavors. Balancing the tension between preserving long-run asset purchasing power and providing substantial current operating support provides a rich set of challenges, posing problems unique to endowed educational institutions.

John Maynard Keynes criticized fiduciaries for preferring to “fail conventionally” rather than taking, as Swensen so often does, direct responsibility for independent, even pioneering thought and action.

superior results over the long term, including: unorthodox and rational asset class allocations; pioneering and logical strategies within each asset class; unconventional and timely commitments to out-of-favor asset classes; original and disciplined selection of little known asset managers; training and empowerment of relatively young professionals; sensible and innovative structures of investment manager relationships; and disciplined leadership in the integration of endowment management with the overall financial management of the university.

carefully constructed, rigorously tested portfolio structure and decision-making process that are clearly defensive.

you will marvel at how very unusual Yale’s team of star performers is in combining rigor and objectivity with the personal warmth and trust that avoids “politics” or “positioning” and maximizes real listening for full understanding every day.

Fourth, Swensen & Co. are extraordinarily thoughtful about and engaged with their client, Yale University.

Third, those bonds of professional respect and personal friendship extend out to the hundreds of key people working at Yale’s many investment managers and engage them in unusually beneficial ways,

The fifth secret may well be the most important: personal respect and affection. Visitors to Yale’s Investments Office are invariably impressed by the open architecture and informal “happy ship” climate that is almost as obvious as the disciplined intensity with which the staff work at their tasks and responsibilities. Positive professionals perform at their peak productivity and teams get better with low turnover.

One secret in Yale’s success has been David Swensen’s ability to engage the committee in governance—and not in investment management. Contributing factors include: selection of committee members who are experienced, hard-working, and personally agreeable; extensive documentation of the due diligence devoted to preparing each investment decision; and full agreement on the evidence and reasoning behind the policy framework within which individual investment decisions will be made.

Finally, David Swensen has made it fun to work on investing for Yale—recruiting a team of exceptionally talented Yale graduates,

Awareness of the breadth and seriousness of agency issues constitutes the first line of defense for fund managers. By evaluating each participant involved in investment activities with a skeptical attitude, fiduciaries increase the likelihood of avoiding or mitigating the most serious principal-agent conflicts.

Most asset classes contain investment vehicles exhibiting some degree of agency risk, with corporate bonds representing an extreme case. Structural issues render corporate bonds hopelessly flawed as a portfolio alternative. Shareholder interests, with which company management generally identifies, diverge so dramatically from the goals of bondholders that lenders to companies must expect to end up on the wrong side of nearly every conflict.

The harsh reality of the negative-sum game dictates that, in aggregate, active managers lose to the market by the amount it costs to play in the form of management fees, trading commissions, and dealer spread. Wall Street’s share of the pie defines the amount of performance drag experienced by the would-be market beaters.

Many investors believe that a law of finance dictates that policy allocation decisions dominate portfolio returns, relegating market timing and security selection actions to secondary status. In a 2000 study, Roger Ibbotson and Paul Kaplan survey a number of articles on the contribution of asset allocation to investment returns. The authors note that “[o]n average, policy accounted for a little more than all of total return,” implying that security selection and market timing make no material contribution to returns.1 In another nod to the centrality of the asset-allocation decision, Ibbotson and Kaplan conclude that “. . . approximately 90 percent of the variability of a fund’s return across time is explained by the variability of policy returns.”2

Given the difficulties in timing markets and the challenges of security selection, such behavior provides a rational foundation for investment management. By avoiding extreme allocation shifts and holding diversified portfolios, investors cause asset allocation to account for the largest share of portfolio returns.

An inverse relationship exists between efficiency in asset pricing and appropriate degree of active management. Passive management strategies suit highly efficient markets, such as U.S. Treasury bonds, where market returns drive results and active management adds little or nothing. Active management strategies fit inefficient markets, such as private equity, where market returns contribute very little to ultimate results and investment selection provides the fundamental source of return.

Emphasizing inefficiently priced asset classes with interesting active management opportunities increases the odds of investment success. Intelligent acceptance of illiquidity and a value orientation constitute a sensible, conservative approach to portfolio management.

Market participants willing to accept illiquidity achieve a significant edge in seeking high risk-adjusted returns. Because market players routinely overpay for liquidity, serious investors benefit by avoiding overpriced liquid securities and by embracing less liquid alternatives.

A strong portfolio management framework rests on asset allocation decisions and incorporates a bias toward equity assets with an appropriate level of diversification. Since market timing actions generally prove unrewarding and always cause portfolios to deviate from desired characteristics, serious investors avoid market timing. Security selection decisions, while extremely difficult to execute with consistent success, contain the potential to add value to portfolio returns. Investors enhance opportunity for beating the market by pursuing excess returns where the degree of opportunity appears largest, by accepting reasonable degrees of illiquidity, and by maintaining a value orientation.

Table 4.1 Equities Generate Superior Returns in the Long Run Wealth Multiples for U.S. Asset Classes and Inflation December 1925–December 2005 Asset Class Multiple Inflation 11 times Treasury bills 18 times Treasury bonds 71 times Corporate bonds 100 times Large-capitalization stocks 2,658 times Small-capitalization stocks 13,706 times Source: Ibbotson Associates, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation, 2006 Year Book.

Market studies focusing only on returns for securities in the United States miss important information. Recent academic work by Will Goetzmann and Philippe Jorion on investor experience in other countries reduces confidence in the long-run superiority of equity investing.

Investment returns stem from decisions regarding three tools of portfolio management: asset allocation, market timing, and security selection.

For the online investor who wants a ‘hands off’ approach to investing, the Wealth Report provides an economic outlook, trading guide and trade advice for Cash Flow strategies and medium-term positioning.Our focus is on the US equity markets, utilizing stock and option strategies such as Covered Calls for an investment portfolio, and Exchange Traded Funds (ETF’s) which provide exposure to global stocks, indices and commodities.To assist in updating you with global market activity, we provide Financial News in terms of the Weekly Economic Outlook written report at the start of each week, outlining our views of market activity, a revision of the previous weeks’ influences, and a discussion of scheduled events for the coming week.

By relying on the decisions of others to drive portfolio choices, investors fail to take responsibility for the most fundamental fiduciary responsibility—designing a portfolio to meet institution-specific goals.