Napster Quotes

In June 1999, an 18-year-old Northeastern University dropout by the name of Shawn Fanning debuted a new piece of software he had developed called Napster.

Skype demonetized long-distance telephony; Craigslist demonetized classified advertising; Napster demonetized the music industry. This list goes on and on. More critically, because demonetization is also deceptive, almost no one within those industries was prepared for such radical change.

Facebook’s strategy, as he described it, was not so different from Napster’s. But rather than exploiting weaknesses in the music industry, it would do so for the human mind. “The thought process that went into building these applications,” Parker told the media conference, “was all about, ‘How do we consume as much of your time and conscious attention as possible?’” To do that, he said, “We need to sort of give you a little dopamine hit every once in a while, because someone liked or commented on a photo or a post or whatever. And that’s going to get you to contribute more content, and that’s going to get you more likes and comments.” He termed this the “social-validation feedback loop,” calling it “exactly the kind of thing that a hacker like myself would come up with, because you’re exploiting a vulnerability in human psychology.” He and Zuckerberg “understood this” from the beginning, he said, and “we did it anyway.

The harder you fight a decentralized opponent, the stronger it gets. The labels had the power to annihilate Napster and destroy Kazaa. But waging that battle was possibly the worst strategic move the labels made. It started a chain reaction that now threatens the entire industry. As the labels go after the Napsters and Kazaas of the world, little programs like eMule start popping up. Now, it's not that MGM and the other labels are stupid, nor are they alone. It's just that MGM hasn't stopped to fully understand this new force. What we've seen with the P2P companies is just the tip of the iceberg.

Napster co-founder and former Facebook President Sean Parker says he used the election cycle as “a laboratory for learning” on how the ballot initiative process works. Next year, he plans to expand with the opening of San Francisco startup Brigade, dedicated to political engagement. He is planning to go bigger in 2016.

Theories of generational difference make sense if they are expressed as theories of environmental difference rather than of psychological difference. People, especially young people, will respond to incentives because they have much to gain and little to lose from experimentation. To understand why people are spending so much time and energy exploring new forms of connection, you have to overcome the fundamental attribution error and extend to other people the set of explanations that you use to describe your own behavior: you respond to new opportunities, and so does everybody else, and these changes feed on one another, amplifying some kinds of behavior and damping others. People in my generation and older often tut-tut about young people’s disclosing so much of their lives on social networks like Facebook, contrasting that behavior with our own relative virtue in that regard: “You exhibitionists! We didn’t behave like that when we were your age!” This comparison conveniently ignores the fact that we didn’t behave that way because no one offered us the opportunity (and from what I remember of my twenties, I think we would have happily behaved that way if we’d had the chance). The generational explanations of Napster’s success fall apart because of the fundamental attribution error. The recording industry made that error when it became convinced that young people were willing to share because their generation was morally inferior (a complaint with obvious conceptual appeal to the elders). This thesis never made sense. If young people had become generally lawless, we’d expect to see a rise not just in sharing music but also in shoplifting and other forms of theft.

Disruptive companies often pick fights they can’t win. Think of Napster:

Joseph Menn in his book All the Rave, the definitive account of Napster’s rise and

Os participantes das redes de compartilhamento de arquivos compartilham diferentes tipos de conteúdos. Podemos dividi-los em quatro tipos. A-Esses são aqueles que usam as redes P2P como substitutos para a compra de conteúdo. Dessa forma, quando um novo CD da Pitty é lançado, ao invés de comprar o CD, eles simplesmente o copiam. Podemos argumentar se todos os que copiaram as músicas poderiam comprá-las caso o compartilhamento não permitisse baixá-las de graça. Muitos provavelmente não poderiam, mas claramente alguns o fariam. Os últimos são os alvos da categoria A: usuários que baixam conteúdo ao invés de comprá-lo. B-Há alguns que usam as redes de compartilhamento de arquivos para experimentarem música antes de a comprar. Dessa forma, um amigo manda para outro um MP3 de um artista do qual ele nunca ouviu falar. Esse outro amigo então compra CDs desse artistas. Isso é uma forma de publicidade direcionada, e que tem grandes chances de sucesso. Se o amigo que está recomendando a música não ganha nada recomendando porcarias, então pode-se imaginar que suas recomendações sejam realmente boas. O saldo final desse compartilhamento pode aumentar as compras de música. C-Há muitos que usam as redes de compartilhamento de arquivos para conseguirem materiais sob copgright que não são mais vendidos ou que não podem ser comprados ou cujos custos da compra fora da Net seriam muito grandes. Esses uso da rede de compartilhamento de arquivos está entre os mais recompensadores para a maioria. Canções que eram parte de nossa infância mais que desapareceram há muito tempo atrás do mercado magicamente reaparecem na rede. (Um amigo meu me disse que quando ele descobriu o Napster, ele passou um fim de semana inteiro "relembrando" músicas antigas. Ele estava surpreso com a gama e diversidade do conteúdo disponibilizado.) Para conteúdo não vendido, isso ainda é tecnicamente uma violação de copyright, embora já que o dono do copgright não está mais vendendo esse conteúdo, o dano econômico é zero o mesmo dano que ocorre quando eu vendo minha coleção de discos de 45 RPMs dos anos 60 para um colecionador local. D-Finalmente, há muitos que usam as redes de compartilhamento de arquivos para terem acesso a conteúdos que não estão sob copgright ou cujo dono do copyright os disponibilizou gratuitamente. Como esses tipos diferentes de compartilhamento se equilibram? Vamos começar de alguns pontos simples mas importantes. Do ponto de vista legal, apenas o tipo D de compartilhamento é claramente legal. Do ponto de vista econômico, apenas o tipo A de compartilhamento é claramente prejudicial. [78] O tipo B de compartilhamento é ilegal mas claramente benéfico. O tipo C também é ilegal, mas é bom para a sociedade (já que maior exposição à música é bom) e não causa danos aos artistas (já que esse trabalho já não está mais disponível). Portanto, como os tipos de compartilhamento se equilibram é uma pergunta bem difícil de responder e certamente mais difícil do que a retórica envolvida atualmente no assunto sugere.

A TV a cabo também nasceu de uma forma de pirataria. Quando os empreendedores do cabo começaram a fornecer às comunidades com TV a cabo em 1948, muitos deles negaram-se a pagar às redes de TV pelo conteúdo que eles redistribuíam aos seus consumidores. Mesmo quando as companhias de cabo começaram a vender acesso às redes de TV, eles negavam-se a pagar pelo que elas vendiam. As companhias do cabo estavam, na prática, Napsterizando o conteúdo das redes de TV, mas de forma pior do que qualquer coisa que o Napster tenha feito o Napster jamais cobrou pelo conteúdo que ele permitia que os outros dessem.

I’m not sure why I thought it would be a good idea to bring Kanish to Mel Odious Sound yesterday. Bringing a Billionheir to a large recording complex full of Producers is like opening a bag of chips at a seagull convention. It wouldn’t be long before every Producer within earshot swooped in to aggressively pitch his latest and greatest pet project, most of which would likely prove unprofitable. Rev is obviously going to pitch a project, and it very well may be something amazing. But as I’ve pointed out, in order for Kanish to make a profit, he would have to pick up half the Publishing—a non-starter for the Rev. He’s not a Songwriting Producer, so he likely doesn’t have a sufficient portion of the Publishing to share. And even if he did, no seasoned Producer is going to give half of their equity in a song in order to basically secure a small loan from an outside investor. There’s no upside. For starters, Kanish has no channels of Distribution beyond Streaming, which is already available to anyone and everyone who wants it, and which is currently only profitable for the Major Labels and the stockholders of the Streaming services themselves. Everyone else is getting screwed. And please don’t quote me the Douchebag Big Tech Billionaires running big Streaming Corporations. They are literally lining their pockets with the would-be earnings of Artists and Songwriters alike. What they claim as fair is anything but. Frankly, I don’t think we should be comfortable with Spotify taking a 30 percent margin off the top, and then disbursing the Tiger’s Share of the remaining 70 percent to the Major Labels who have already negotiated top dollar for access to their catalog. This has resulted in nothing but some remaining scraps trickling down to the tens of thousands of Independent Artists out there who just want to make a living. You can’t make a living off scraps, or even a trickle, for that matter. Mark my words, we are currently witnessing the greatest heist in the annals of the Music Business, and that’s saying something given its history. Can you say Napster? Stunningly, the only place that Songwriters can make sufficient Performance Royalties is radio—a medium that is coming up on its hundred-year anniversary. To make matters worse, the Major Distributors still have radio all locked up, and without airplay, there’s no hit. So even now, more than twenty years into the Internet revolution, the odds of breaking through the artistic cacophony without Major-Label Distribution are impossibly low. So much for the Internet leveling the playing field. At this point, only Congress can solve the problem. And despite the fact that Streaming has been around since the mid-aughts, Congress has done nothing to deal with the issue. Why? Because it’s far cheaper for Big Tech to line the pockets of lobbyists and fund the campaigns of politicians who gladly ignore the issue than it is to pay Artists and Songwriters a fair rate for their work, my friends. Same is it ever was. Just so I’m clear, there is a debate to be had as to how much Songwriters and Artists should be paid for Streaming. A radio Spin can reach millions. A Stream rarely reaches more than a few listeners. Clearly, a new method of calculation is required. But that doesn’t mean that we should just sit by as the Big Tech Douchebags rob an entire generation of royalties all so they can sell their Streaming Corporation for billions down the line. I mean, that is the end game, after all. At which point, profit for the new majority stockholder will be all but impossible. How will anyone get paid then?

Shawn Fanning and Sean Parker, Napster’s then-teenage founders, credibly threatened to disrupt the powerful music recording industry in 1999. The next year, they made the cover of Time magazine. A year and a half after that, they ended up in bankruptcy court.

creating a company for acquisition or IPO is different from building a profitable enterprise; it’s about building a sellable enterprise. Startups are not trying to earn revenue (which is a liability); they are setting themselves up to win more capital. They are not part of the real economy or even the real world but part of the process through which working assets are converted into new stockpiles of dead ones. That’s all they have really accomplished with whatever digital fad they’ve foisted onto the market or sold to yesterday’s tech winners. They thought they were engineering a new technology, when they were actually engineering a reallocation of capital. That’s why digital entrepreneurs who do win often end up becoming the next generation of venture capitalists. Everyone from Marc Andreessen (Netscape) to Sean Parker (Napster) to Peter Thiel (PayPal) to Jack Dorsey (Twitter) now runs venture funds of his own. Facebook and Google, once startups themselves, now acquire more businesses than they incubate internally. With each new generation, firms and investors leverage the startup economy more deliberately, or even cynically. After all, a win is a win.

Own nothing. Have everything. —Napster

PayPal could be seen as disruptive, but we didn’t try to directly challenge any large competitor. It’s true that we took some business away from Visa when we popularized internet payments: you might use PayPal to buy something online instead of using your Visa card to buy it in a store. But since we expanded the market for payments overall, we gave Visa far more business than we took. The overall dynamic was net positive, unlike Napster’s negative-sum struggle with the U.S. recording industry. As you craft a plan to expand to adjacent markets, don’t disrupt: avoid competition as much as possible.

the fact that his businesses were built on copyright theft (Napster) and deep consumer surveillance (Facebook) leads us to question what exactly these attention harvesting industries create and whether they’re aiding the larger culture or destroying it. Disruption of critical cultural infrastructure is only worthy if the replacement is more beneficial to the society at large than the original institution was.

The dotcoms as a whole were little more than a publicly supported pyramid scheme built on the long-true presumption that an even dumber investor was just down the road. With more finesse Kleiner Perkins', John Doerr called the process, "The largest legal creation of wealth, in the history of the planet.

Thiel’s Randian ethical framework makes it easy to cast Parker as someone who’s “turning the wheels of history” despite the morally challenged projects his fame is built upon. The notion that Parker is a great disrupter cannot be disputed, but the fact that his businesses were built on copyright theft (Napster) and deep consumer surveillance (Facebook) leads us to question what exactly these attention harvesting industries create and whether they’re aiding the larger culture or destroying

Right now, over 90 percent of the world’s currency is digital. It exists as a numeric concept: Money has value only because we agree that it’s valuable. The value is illusory and dependent on our collective willingness to agree that the illusion is real. And for that illusion to work in perpetuity, money needs to be somewhat finite. If it were possible for a random citizen to flawlessly photocopy a $1 bill ten thousand times, it would not create ten thousand new dollars of equal value. It would imperceptibly devalue all available currency, and if fourteen thousand people did the same thing every minute, the perceived value of a $1 bill would microscope to nothing. This is what file sharing did to music. Napster did not make people like songs less. It probably made people like songs more. But it turned the larger concept of music into an abstraction that signified less.

Governments are good at cutting off the heads of centrally controlled networks like Napster, but pure P2P networks like Gnutella and Tor seem to be holding their own.”24 It’s clear from this quote that Satoshi was not creating Bitcoin to slip seamlessly into the existing governmental and financial system, but instead to be an alternative system free of top-down control, governed by the decentralized masses.

As had happened with several previous decentralized systems, this one had naturally tended toward greater centralization because of the efficiency made possible by specialization. This looked, increasingly, like Napster giving way to iTunes. In that case, the old power brokers—the record labels—were destroyed, but they were mostly just replaced by a new set of power players.

Does this mean that religious consumption will increase online? That could be. We do not know yet, but to expect religion to disappear because of online technology is like expecting people to stop listening to music because Napster, Spotify and Wimp are offering us all the music we want online

of those buzzword-addicted startups are definitely not Web 2.0, while some of the applications we identified as Web 2.0, like Napster and BitTorrent, are not even properly web applications!) We began trying to tease out the principles that are demonstrated in one way or another by the success stories of web 1.0 and by the most interesting of the new

Eileen Richardson: What people didn’t understand then was that Napster was not a technology, it was an invention.

Sean Parker: Prior to the release of Napster, prior to that pivotal moment, the web was one-way. It was a client-server model, you accessed information that was stored on a server. It was very much this broadcast model where individuals passively consumed what had been published. It wasn’t a two-way street. But the moment Napster launched, you were fully utilizing the capabilities of the internet. Everybody was sharing content. Everybody was downloading content. Everything is interactive. That was the original potential of the internet. Napster was ahead of its time.