Mullah Omar Quotes

Alcohol makes other people less tedious, and food less bland, and can help provide what the Greeks called entheos, or the slight buzz of inspiration when reading or writing. The only worthwhile miracle in the New Testament—the transmutation of water into wine during the wedding at Cana—is a tribute to the persistence of Hellenism in an otherwise austere Judaea. The same applies to the seder at Passover, which is obviously modeled on the Platonic symposium: questions are asked (especially of the young) while wine is circulated. No better form of sodality has ever been devised: at Oxford one was positively expected to take wine during tutorials. The tongue must be untied. It's not a coincidence that Omar Khayyam, rebuking and ridiculing the stone-faced Iranian mullahs of his time, pointed to the value of the grape as a mockery of their joyless and sterile regime. Visiting today's Iran, I was delighted to find that citizens made a point of defying the clerical ban on booze, keeping it in their homes for visitors even if they didn't particularly take to it themselves, and bootlegging it with great brio and ingenuity. These small revolutions affirm the human.

The friends of Galtieri, Saddam Hussein, Mullah Omar and Milosevic make unconvincing defenders of humanitarian values, and it can be seen that their inept and sometimes inane arguments lack either the principles or the seriousness that are required in such debates.

Given that the Taliban is a Pashtun movement, the tendency of the Pashtun man to emphasize his individuality through disagreement rather than agreement will come to the fore after the disappearance of the already 'loose' authority of Mullah Omar.

I admit to a feeling of pride that my father had saved the day yet again, although I also thought that nothing would have been better for me personally than for the mullah to force my father's departure within the hour. Either way, I know now that nothing would have stopped my father from his Jihad. If he could not remain in Afghanistan, he would go to Pakistan. If Pakistan pulled the welcome mat, he would go to Yemen. If Yemen threw him out, he would journey to the middle of the most hostile desert where he would plot against the West. Violent Jihad was my father's life; nothing else really mattered. Nothing.

Bin Laden tried to get Sami, who as the LIFG’s ideological guide had profound influence on the group, to change his mind. “He tried to persuade me that we should fight America from Afghanistan, but I knew that Mullah Omar didn’t agree with it either,” he told me. Two months before 9/11, Sami saw bin Laden in Kandahar. “We had a long discussion. I said he should obey Mullah Omar, but he believed what he was about to do was legitimate from an Islamic point of view,” he said. “Everyone in Kabul and Kandahar knew bin Laden would carry out activities against America, but we had no details.

But the author of the letter told me it was never sent to the UN headquarters in New York. “Mullah Omar had problems with trusting Hamid Karzai. He had too many links with the foreigners.” Also staff members in the ministry had doubts. “He is working for the CIA, I am sure”, they assumed.26

The CIA team in the north expected Washington to take action earlier.58 One Taliban leader or al-Qaeda operative after the next was fleeing to Pakistan. There had been some delay at first as Pakistan tried to persuade its old ally Mullah Omar to hand bin Laden over peacefully. In the mean time Mullah Omar secretly had tried to arrange with the CIA Bin Laden’s transfer to a neutral third country, but Washington demanded an uncondtioonal handover. For two days, leading Pakistanis and Taliban leaders conferred about the extradition. While the Americans had high hopes, messengers from Pakistani president Musharraf did the opposite. They warned Mullah Omar of the plans of the US to invade, so he could prepare himself. Within the ISI (the Pakistani secret service) chaos reigned. Some helped the Americans by pointing out possible targets while others swiftly transferred truckloads of weapons, munitions and fuel to Kandahar to reinforce the Taliban

Musharraf considered the Taliban’s emir, Mullah Mohammad Omar, to be a stubborn man with a tenuous grasp of international politics. Negotiating with him, Musharraf had found, was like “banging one’s head against the wall.

If you have a problem with me, it is OK, because Mullah Omar does too.

During the 1980s, across a long, bitter uprising against the Soviet Union, Afghan mujaheddin had not participated in suicide attacks. The mujaheddin’s prideful, family-supported ethos of jihad emphasized individual bravery and, where possible, living to fight another day. When the Taliban conquered Afghanistan during the late 1990s, Mullah Mohammad Omar and his commanders did not employ suicide bombers, either.

Prayer is an absolute obligation on Muslims, he pointed out, which cannot be avoided even on one’s deathbed. Mullah Omar agreed. “But what if a snake approaches while you are in the midst of prayers?” the I.S.I. chief asked. “You abandon your prayers and deal with the danger first and then resume your prayers,” Mullah Omar answered. “Don’t you see this giant anaconda approaching Afghanistan?” Mahmud asked. He meant the United States. “As emir of 25 million Afghans, is your oath of hospitality to Osama more sacrosanct than protection of your people?

The C.I.A. had identified individuals in the Taliban leadership who claimed to disagree with Mullah Mohammad Omar’s policy of providing sanctuary to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda because harboring terrorists deprived the Taliban government—formally known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—of international recognition and aid.

homes and streets buzzing with rickshaws is the most visible symbol of the fading Western legacy in this onetime fortress of Taliban rule: a giant white balloon, bristling with photo lenses and listening equipment. The surveillance blimp is tethered to the former home of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, which for the past 13 years has been a base for the C.I.A. and the Afghan paramilitary forces. Officials say there are no immediate plans to close that complex, the last Western military base inside the city limits. And so, what remains of the Western presence is marked by this all-seeing eye, watching over Afghanistan’s second city as it jolts into an uncertain post-American future. For years, Kandahar has been a testing