Mohammed Bin Salman Quotes

It’s just like playing Monopoly with a bunch of guys, but you are in charge of everything and you can change the rules,” he said. “But everyone has to stay at the table and play with you.

The official Islam of the kingdom was not any Islam, but Wahhabism, the ultraconservative and intolerant interpretation that was woven into the kingdom’s history.

Mohammed bin Salman declined to be interviewed for this book

Capitalism doesn’t incentivize charity unless it’s a relatively small marketing expense.

Here again Trump accepted the words of a foreign autocrat, just as he had believed Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman did not order the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and as he had believed Russian president Vladimir Putin did not interfere in the 2016 U.S. election. Trump said that Kim “felt very badly,” but claimed to only know about Warmbier’s case after the fact. “He tells me that he didn’t know about it,” Trump said, “and I take him at his word.

The startling juxtaposition between Davos in the Desert and the Ritz’s transformation into a prison—and the reversal of so many extraordinarily wealthy men’s fortunes—make the crackdown a singular event in recent world political and business history. Never have so many billionaires, titans of finance who could move heaven and earth with their immense wealth, been deprived of their liberty and treasure so abruptly.

The kingdom’s population was growing, costs were rising, and the rest of the world was talking with more urgency about using less oil. What would happen when oil prices dropped? To ward off a catastrophe, Alwaleed argued, Saudi Arabia needed to diversify, invest in solar and nuclear energy, and start moving some of its oil wealth abroad so it would have diversified sources of income.

Mohammed bin Salman developed a fascination with consultants when he was setting up his own companies and his MiSK foundation before his father became king. One idea he loved was the creation of key performance indicators, soon to be known throughout the ministries and government-linked companies as “KPIs.” Mohammed didn’t respond to strategies that weren’t backed up by numbers. He had an impressive memory for them as well, often recounting to underlings forecasts they had showed him months beforehand to prove he had a strong understanding of the underlying issues.

Consultants make money by getting assigned to giant projects, not by telling their employers that such projects are bad ideas.

The rise of Mohammed bin Salman was as remarkable as it was unexpected. In 2010 he was the unknown younger son of the governor of Riyadh; by 2019 he was arguably the single most prominent leader in the Arab world. In 2010 he had held no official position, spending his time trading stocks, developing real estate, and buying expensive cars—most notably, a multi-million-dollar fire-engine-red Bugatti.

The core of Mohammed bin Salman’s vision was political, not social or economic.

Mohammed bin Salman intended to speak to young Saudis with a voice that was modern and pious, but not democratic.

Within four years of ascending to the throne, King Salman has thus dramatically changed Saudi Arabia’s political structure. The old system—in which various senior princes ran independent, uncoordinated ministries and where senior technocrats were allied to one senior prince or another—has been dismantled. The king has appointed dozens of new judges and replaced every minister and military service chief, some more than once. Across the Saudi government, all senior technocrats now owe their position not to a variety of princely patrons but solely to the patronage of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Saudi Arabia now suffers from what investors call “key man risk.” Too much is riding on one person. Should Mohammed bin Salman leave the scene for whatever reason, all bets would be off with regard to Saudi stability. There is no obvious replacement. No deputy crown prince has been named,

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been very careful to show respect for the tribes, their sheikhs, and tribal culture.

Early in 2017, the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Saleh Al al-Sheikh, hosted a dinner at his home in Riyadh for the Committee of Senior Scholars, during which Mohammed bin Salman outlined his plans for economic and social reform. The prince told the religious scholars that economic development was crucial to the kingdom’s future but could not advance without social liberalization. He assured them that Islam and their role as its guardians would always be respected in Saudi Arabia but insisted that some things would have to change and that their support was both needed and expected.

Like King Faisal, but unlike Mustapha Kemal Ataturk in Turkey or Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran, Mohammed bin Salman would also make an effort to preserve the dignity, influence, and incomes of the clerics.

Had King Abdullah overseen the effective use of the Allegiance Council, the evolution of succession in Saudi Arabia might have been very different. As it was, when the Council approved Mohammed bin Naif as crown prince in 2015 and Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince in 2017, it was regarded as little more than a rubber stamp for the king’s decision. As stated in the Basic Law of Governance, succession remained very much the prerogative of the king.

On the day of King Abdullah’s death, King Salman appeared to resolve this difficult issue by appointing his nephew, the 55-year-old Prince Mohammed bin Naif or MBN to be the deputy crown prince and third in line of succession. This move to a third-generation prince was an historic event, which effectively ended the political hopes of Abdulaziz’s few remaining sons. Many in Riyadh believed that by making the transition to third-generation leadership while a second-generation king was still on the throne to supervise the process, King Salman had taken the most important step of his reign on his first day in office.

The entire world saw Mohammed bin Salman kneel and kiss the hand of his deposed cousin, promising to always seek his advice. Mohammed bin Naif shook his younger cousin’s hand and swore allegiance to him as the new crown prince. No new deputy crown prince was named then—or has been since. The following month an entirely new security agency, reporting directly to the king through the Royal Diwan and Mohammed bin Salman, was created. Known as the Presidency for State Security, it took over nearly all police and internal intelligence work

From that bitter defeat, the Al Saud learned another strategic lesson: above all else, do not use force against each other; keep family disputes peaceful and private; and unite quickly and firmly against anyone who violates this rule. Modern-era Kings Faisal, Khalid, Fahd, and Abdullah all respected this stabilizing principle. King Salman and his ambitious Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, have not.

Mohammed bin Salman’s plan should probably have been called Vision 2050. That would have represented a more realistic, if a less-motivating, time frame for transforming the Saudi economy from one based almost entirely on oil-funded transfer payments into one based partially on productive enterprise. Even by 2050, the existing plan will not turn Saudi Arabia into South Korea.

MBZ is a man of contradictions.

setting up a peaceful nuclear energy program, building a New York University outpost that accepts mainly students from abroad, often on full scholarships, and the creation of a Louvre museum on an island near the city’s main island.

the king very deliberately engineered the unconventional, complicated, and controversial rise of the young and relatively inexperienced Mohammed bin Salman because, to paraphrase The New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman, If you think there are another dozen princes in Riyadh with the steel, cunning, and ruthlessness as Mohammed bin Salman, you are wrong.

Another factor in Al Saud cohesiveness has been the fact that aged kings never stayed in power too long. In fairly rapid succession they handed over power to another brother from a different branch of the family. It paid to wait your turn rather than rock the boat. That incentive to cooperate is no longer present as Mohammed bin Salman could easily be king for the next fifty years.

In some ways, the Saudi response to Iran has followed its long-established security policies; spend billions of dollars on advanced weapons and turn to traditional partners for support. In 2019, Riyadh made the first payments on an estimated $15 billion contract for Lockheed Martin’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) air defense system. That summer, Saudi Arabia reopened the Prince Sultan Air Base for the deployment of US aircraft, air defense missile batteries, and several thousand soldiers and airmen. Yet in other ways the Saudi response under King Salman and Mohammed bin Salman has been unconventional and may become even more so. Launching an independent air campaign in Yemen or investing seriously in a domestic defense industry were new approaches. Most worryingly, as the former head of Israel’s National Security Council Yaakov Amidor warned—a nuclear armed Iran would not only surround Israel with a “ring of fire,” it would very likely drive Turkey and Saudi Arabia to seek their own nuclear weapons.

he created an independent Supreme Committee for Combating Corruption (the SCCC) chaired by Mohammed bin Salman.

Unlike the Arab Spring uprisings, Riyadh’s anti-corruption campaign was implemented by the highest levels of government in order to preserve, not overthrow, a government. Furthermore, it was not, as is often heard, a power-grab by an ambitious young prince. By November 2017, Mohammed bin Salman and his father had already neutralized any serious opposition.

Saudi Arabia established a robust alliance with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These two neighbors created a very powerful bloc, producing between them nearly half the Arab world’s GDP and 40 percent of OPEC’s oil. Their crown princes, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed, were close personally and professionally. Although their interests were not completely aligned, from 2015 onward the two neighbors fought together against the Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen. In June 2018, their de-facto alliance was given a formal structure through a new Saudi–Emirati Coordination Council. Led by the two crown princes, the new body issued a “Strategy for Resolve” listing forty-four joint economic and military projects that the two nations planned to carry out over the following five years.

It is worth remembering that in March 2015, Mohammed bin Salman was not the king of Saudi Arabia nor the crown prince or even the deputy crown prince. He was the newly appointed minister of defense. The experienced Saud al-Faisal, though ill, was still foreign minister. The popular view that 30-year-old Mohammed bin Salman recklessly took his country to war and that ten sovereign states, including Britain and the United States, blithely followed him, is a misreading of history. King Salman made the decision in order to stop the “Hezbollahization” of Yemen. Major Western powers supported the Saudis in order to prevent the expansion of Iranian influence into the Red Sea, especially in the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb strait, and to maintain Saudi support for then-ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran.

the Israeli state has used NSO to further its national security agenda, perhaps most prominently in securing the support of Arab dictatorships: Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. For example, in 2020, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman called then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to demand that his country’s access to Pegasus be restored when the Israeli Defense Ministry declined to renew the tool’s license after the Sunni theocracy had abused it.6 He was soon granted his wish because Israel viewed Saudi Arabia as a key ally against Iran in the Middle East.

Instead of secure calls with official translators, they swapped emojis on WhatsApp and other messaging platforms.

The United Arab Emirates reportedly had its contract with NSO cancelled in 2021 when it became clear that Dubai’s ruler had used it to hack his ex-wife’s phone and those of her associates. The New York Times journalist Ben Hubbard, Beirut chief for the paper, had his phone compromised while reporting on Saudi Arabia and its leader Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, a man who has invested huge amounts of money in commercial spyware.45 Palestinian human rights activists and diplomats in Palestine have also been targeted by Pegasus, including officials who were preparing complaints against Israel to the International Criminal Court. NSO technology was used by the Israeli police to covertly gather information from Israelis’ smartphones. Pegasus had become a key asset for Israel’s domestic and international activities.46 Saudi Arabia is perhaps the crown jewel of NSO’s exploits, one of the Arab world’s most powerful nations and a close ally of the US with no formal relations with the Jewish state. It is a repressive, Sunni Muslim ethnostate that imprisons and tortures dissidents and actively discriminates against its Shia minority.47 Unlike previous generations of Saudi leaders, bin Salman thought that the Israel/Palestine conflict was “an annoying irritant—a problem to be overcome rather than a conflict to be fairly resolved,” according to Rob Malley, a senior White House official in the Obama and Biden administrations.48

Saudi Oger’s Saad Hariri, a dual citizen who also happened to be the prime minister of Lebanon, was struggling to keep the cash flowing too. The Oger business was poorly managed, so it had little cushion for a slowdown in payments. Saad desperately tried to win Mohammed bin Salman’s approval, building an extension to King Salman’s expansive seaside palace in Tangier for Mohammed. And when Mohammed suggested he’d like a more direct passageway in the Royal Court to access the foyer of his cousin Mohammed bin Nayef’s section, Saad himself stayed up through the night with workers to cut through marble and concrete to get the job done. Mohammed thanked him but clearly felt no exchange had taken place. Saad hadn’t won any goodwill.

As a matter of fact, Islam does not negate critical inquiry. Muslim scholars who understand this viewpoint are supportive of stem cell research, genetic engineering and robotics within ethical bounds. Even traditional Muslim scholarship in early-twentieth century was not skeptical of evolution as a scientific explanation, which can be seen in the writings of Syed Qutb and Maulana Syed Abul-Ala Maududi. Several Muslim scientists conduct research in evolutionary biology and also teach it including Mohammed Alassiri of King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Ehab Abouheif, Canada Research Chair at McGill University; Fatimah Jackson, Professor of Biological Anthropology at the University of North Carolina and Rana Dajani, Associate Professor at Hashemite University, Jordan.

I don’t believe in that,” Kushner said. “You don’t believe in what?” Bannon responded. “In history,” Kushner said. “I don’t read history. It bogs you down.

The new generation of Saudis are not like the old generation. They have no nostalgia for Lebanon,” Yacoubian says. “It was their oasis of freedom.

has no culture of ambling around for pleasure;

Only a month before Americans were due to go to the polls, the UAE—and later joined by a coalition of Islamic countries—gave Kushner the greatest gift of his four years as advisor to the president by agreeing to normalize relations with Israel. Behind the scenes, the leaders of the UAE and Israel had developed strong intelligence and security ties over more than a decade, but this was a public coming-out ceremony that put Abu Dhabi in the hot seat as far as much of the Arab world was concerned.

Each of the men Mohammed would meet in the United States had some vision for how he could use a huge Saudi investment and little to say about putting his own money into the kingdom. The studio chiefs hoped Mohammed would back new movie projects. Silicon Valley wanted capital to further inflate bubbles like WeWork and the dog-walking app Wag. Even the curious magazine that showed up across the United States celebrating the prince’s visit seemed to be a sales pitch.

While titans of finance were gravitating toward the kingdom, Mohammed started to develop some nagging suspicions about the consultants he’d been relying on to formulate his vision. The McKinsey and BCG people were certainly smart, but such consultants were also mercenaries, and they had an intrinsic conflict of interest: It never behooved the consultants to say no. If the prince asked whether some outlandish scheme was feasible it would always be in their interests to say yes. Consultants make money by getting assigned to giant projects, not by telling their employers that such projects are bad ideas.

A veteran of Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds who has grown cynical over the years explains how it works for Gulf investors. All the best deals and opportunities are seized upon by big American institutions with the help of New York City banks. The second-tier deals go to the Europeans. And the lemons are packaged up and rebranded for what derisive bankers call the “dumb money” in the Middle East. “They don’t care about us,” he says. “They only want our money.

Things changed radically between the early 1990s and 2019. The spread of fracking turned the United States into the world’s biggest oil producer by 2013. The American economy wasn’t dependent on Saudi oil anymore. Now it could pump its own. Then Barack Obama made the nuclear deal with Iran, alienating Saudi leaders. Mohammed had high hopes that Donald Trump, with his visit to the kingdom early in his presidency, would renew the kind of relationship Saudi Arabia had under previous presidents. But as Trump showed Mohammed in that embarrassing White House visit, when the president displayed a poster board showing arms sales to the kingdom, this new White House was purely transactional. The decades-long US-Saudi alliance didn’t mean much to Trump and his deputies, and many of the old officials who kept that alliance going for both sides, men like Mohammed bin Nayef and former CIA director John Brennan, had been sent off to retirement, or worse.

Nearby countries like Lebanon had the opposite problem. Lebanon had plenty of educated would-be professionals. The country’s colonial ties to France and long relationship with the United States meant many of those professionals had the language skills to work with foreign partners. But Lebanon didn’t have cash. Its slow-growing economy provided little opportunity for these graduates to work their way toward prosperity.

To understand why Mohammed kidnapped the leader of Lebanon, it’s necessary to go back a half century, to 1964. That’s when a young Lebanese accountant named Rafic Hariri decided he couldn’t make enough money at home to support his young family. So he moved to Saudi Arabia, where burgeoning oil wealth was funding roads, hospitals, and hotels, and all sorts of companies were springing up to build them. Saudi Arabia in the 1960s had lots of oil and money but not much to show for it on the ground. The kingdom’s population was smaller than that of London. The royal family was intent on using the kingdom’s oil income to build new infrastructure across the country, but few domestic companies could handle big construction projects. And there were few universities to produce graduates who could run such companies.

And on the other side of the world, there was Mohammed bin Salman—the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, who was embittered at Bezos for the Washington Post’s coverage of the murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi, and who some cybersecurity experts would come to believe had hacked Bezos’s cell phone.

It was a badly kept secret in foreign policy circles that Mohammed bin Salman—MBS—had a cocaine problem and could disappear for days or longer on benders, or on long and frightening (at least for other passengers) trips on his yacht. He also spent hours every day planted in front of a screen playing video games. Like Trump, he was often described as a petulant child.

Mohammed bin Salman developed a fascination with consultants when he was setting up his own companies and his MiSK foundation before his father became king. One idea he loved was the creation of key performance indicators,

Mohammed didn’t respond to strategies that weren’t backed up by numbers.

Under Mohammed, the ministers would each get several million dollars a year. But they would have to meet their KPIs, and the government would no longer turn a blind eye to kickback schemes.

that required turning the vision into a specific plan, with numbers to demonstrate how it would work and international buy-in to show that it would help boost the kingdom’s global status. He knew where to turn for help.

Instead of providing dry updates and patting themselves on the back and praising the vision of their glorious leaders, ministers were expected to present in stages a vision for their ministries, a strategy for achieving it, and then updates on their progress. Before they could even present, they had to get past a special group within the council that vetted presentations. The then-thirty-year-old Mohammed would ask questions

All success stories start with a vision, and successful visions are based on strong pillars,” the Vision 2030 statement said.

Mohammed proposed he only pay the consultants based on results. “I’ll pay you when you reach the KPIs”—in 2030, the prince said.