Market Volatility Quotes

By integrating ESG principles into the core business strategy, companies can foster innovation and build resilient supply chains that withstand market volatility.

Volatility is good. Stock Market volatility is what helps it give you stellar returns.

Life has immense analogy with stock market. It is volatile, but if you stick on long enough, it has the potential to reward you with handsome returns in the long run.

One of my rules was to get out when the volatility and the momentum became absolutely insane.

Smart Risk will shatter the emotional myths to investing and help Canadians see the opportunities in today's volatile market.

Markets can be volatile from time to time; however, stock prices follow earnings accumulation over the long term.

Discontinuities, irregularities, and volatilities seem to be proliferating rather than diminishing. In the world of finance, new instruments turn up at a bewildering pace, new markets are growing faster than old markets, and global interdependence makes risk management increasingly complex. Economic insecurity, especially in the job market, makes daily headlines. The environment, health,

[..] neoproletariat caste, the future cybercattle of neurocracy, joyous sophisticate of the always-incomplete chain of predation, primed by silos of soya, stocks of onions, pork bellies…and completed by the global apotheosis of the Great Futures Market of neurolivestock, more volatile (and more profitable) than all the livestock of the Great Plains. Neurolivestock certainly enjoy an existence more comfortable than serfs or millworkers, but they do not easily escape their destiny as the self-regulating raw material of a market as predictable and as homogeneous as a perfect gas, a matter counted in atoms of distress, stripped of all powers of negotiation, renting out their mental space, brain by brain.

Seen through the lens of human perception, cycles are often viewed as less symmetrical than they are. Negative price fluctuations are called “volatility,” while positive price fluctuations are called “profit.” Collapsing markets are called “selling panics,” while surges receive more benign descriptions (but I think they may best be seen as “buying panics”; see tech stocks in 1999, for example). Commentators talk about “investor capitulation” at the bottom of market cycles, while I also see capitulation at the top, when previously prudent investors throw in the towel and buy.

capital flows to wherever the social or environmental standards are lowest. Not only this, but capitalism is designed to create the instability that we have seen in the markets, and those that suffer the most from this volatility are always the most vulnerable, namely the poor of the world.

Benoit Mandelbrot can be considered the Euclid of fractal geometry. He has collected the observations of mathematicians concerned with "monsters," or objects not definable by euclidean geometry. By combining the work of these mathematicians with his own insight, he has created a geometry of nature that thrives on asymmetry and roughness. Mandelbrot has said that "mountains are not cones, and clouds are not spheres.

Like all financial schemes, the Mississippi Scheme was constructed upon the volatile foundation of confidence. For the public to continue to use the Banque Royale’s banknotes, it had to remain confident that those banknotes would retain and represent their stated face value. And for the public to continue to invest in Mississippi Company shares, it had to remain confident that the prospects of the Mississippi Company justified the market price of the shares.

Money? It’s the oh-so-simple miracle that allows you to take home veal in your shopping bag…’, the Trader-Knights repeat, forgetting that behind the head of veal or the pork cutlet there is a futures market in livestock and pork bellies, and that behind that market looms the futures market of exchange rates, interest rates and so many other levels all the way down to absolute volatility, all utterly inaccessible to those bit-part players in the great comedy of trading, the small individual shareholders.

It’s important to remember that market participants have always tended to pull back and do less trading during market crises, suggesting that any reluctance by quants to trade isn’t so very different from past approaches. If anything, markets have become more placid as quant investors have assumed dominant positions. Humans are prone to fear, greed, and outright panic, all of which tend to sow volatility in financial markets. Machines could make markets more stable, if they elbow out individuals governed by biases and emotions. And computer-driven decision-making in other fields, such as the airline industry, has generally led to fewer mistakes.

Many aspects of how the Chinese political class manages its economy are antithetical to the Western values of democracy and free markets. But this stance has not put off foreign investors, who are attracted to the government’s willingness to prioritize physical infrastructure, political security, and stability over the health of the population, transparency in decision making, and transparency in the rule of law (if not necessarily the system of governance). In essence, the pursuit of economic growth overrides any views on the political system they invest in. Currently China’s political class has a strategy to evolve from an investment-led exporting economy to one more in line with Western economies, relying on domestic consumption. The transition to this new economic equilibrium will not be linear. China will likely experience significant economic volatility and market gyrations as the structure of its economy shifts. There is also mounting skepticism about China’s ability to manage its debt levels, and the country’s lack of individual political freedoms will continue to hamper its growth prospects. But Chinese policymakers will, no doubt, be focused on continuing to show economic progress in advance of two target dates: 2021—one hundred years after the formation of the Communist Party—and 2049, one hundred years after the formation of the People’s Republic of China.

Finance is concerned with the relations between the values of securities and their risk, and with the behavior of those values. It aspires to be a practical, like physics or chemistry or electrical engineering. As John Maynard Keynes once remarked about economics, “If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that would be splendid.” Dentists rely on science, engineering, empirical knowledge, and heuristics, and there are no theorems in dentistry. Similarly, one would hope that nance would be concerned with laws rather than theorems, with behavior rather than assumptions. One doesn’t seriously describe the behavior of a market with theorems.

Mercantilists promote the view that private market activity often drives the economy into difficulties which require government to intervene and set matters back on course. They typically characterize the economy as cyclical, driven to excesses by human emotions of greed and fear, which cause “bubbles” and “crashes” and interrupt steady progress of society. Government, they say, must prevent these cycles, smooth these bubbles and crashes, so as to achieve less volatility and greater stability in economic growth. Then they persuade government to adopt policies which produce cycles, bubbles, crashes, volatility, high taxes and unemployment, and economic instability —and monstrously large, illicit gains for themselves.

Around this time, McDonald’s had conceived of a new product, the Chicken McNugget, but they were reluctant to bring it to market because of their concern that chicken prices might rise and squeeze their profit margins. Chicken producers like Lane wouldn’t agree to sell to them at a fixed price because they were worried that their costs would go up and they would be squeezed. As I thought about the problem, it occurred to me that in economic terms a chicken can be seen as a simple machine consisting of a chick plus its feed. The most volatile cost that the chicken producer needed to worry about was feed prices. I showed Lane how to use a mix of corn and soymeal futures to lock in costs so they could quote a fixed price to McDonald’s. Having greatly reduced its price risk, McDonald’s introduced the McNugget in 1983. I felt great about helping make that happen.

(BDO) October 22: The Dollar Squeeze A debt is a short cash position—i.e., a commitment to deliver cash that one doesn’t have. Because the dollar is the world’s reserve currency, and because of the dollar surplus recycling that has taken place over the past few years…lots of dollar denominated debt has been built up around the world. So, as dollar liquidity has become tight, there has been a dollar squeeze. This squeeze…is hitting dollar-indebted emerging markets (particularly those of commodity exporters) and is supporting the dollar. When this short squeeze ends, which will happen when either the debtors default or get the liquidity to prevent their default, the US dollar will decline. Until then, we expect to remain long the USD against the euro and emerging market currencies. The actual price of anything is always equal to the amount of spending on the item being exchanged divided by the quantity of the item being sold (i.e., P = $/Q), so a) knowing who is spending and who is selling what quantity (and ideally why) is the ideal way to get at the price at any time, and b) prices don’t always react to changes in fundamentals as they happen in the ways characterized by those who seek to explain price movements in connection with unfolding news. During this period, volatility remained extremely high for reasons that had nothing to do with fundamentals and everything to do with who was getting in and out of positions for various reasons—like being squeezed, no longer being squeezed, rebalancing portfolios, etc. For example, on Tuesday, October 28, the S&P gained more than 10 percent and the next day it fell by 1.1 percent when the Fed cut interest rates by another 50 basis points. Closing the month, the S&P was down 17 percent—the largest single-month drop since October 1987.

A few years ago my friend Jon Brooks supplied this great illustration of skewed interpretation at work. Here’s how investors react to events when they’re feeling good about life (which usually means the market has been rising): Strong data: economy strengthening—stocks rally Weak data: Fed likely to ease—stocks rally Data as expected: low volatility—stocks rally Banks make $4 billion: business conditions favorable—stocks rally Banks lose $4 billion: bad news out of the way—stocks rally Oil spikes: growing global economy contributing to demand—stocks rally Oil drops: more purchasing power for the consumer—stocks rally Dollar plunges: great for exporters—stocks rally Dollar strengthens: great for companies that buy from abroad—stocks rally Inflation spikes: will cause assets to appreciate—stocks rally Inflation drops: improves quality of earnings—stocks rally Of course, the same behavior also applies in the opposite direction. When psychology is negative and markets have been falling for a while, everything is capable of being interpreted negatively. Strong economic data is seen as likely to make the Fed withdraw stimulus by raising interest rates, and weak data is taken to mean companies will have trouble meeting earnings forecasts. In other words, it’s not the data or events; it’s the interpretation. And that fluctuates with swings in psychology.

Having studied workplace leadership styles since the 1970s, Kets de Vries confirmed that language is a critical clue when determining if a company has become too cultish for comfort. Red flags should rise when there are too many pep talks, slogans, singsongs, code words, and too much meaningless corporate jargon, he said. Most of us have encountered some dialect of hollow workplace gibberish. Corporate BS generators are easy to find on the web (and fun to play with), churning out phrases like “rapidiously orchestrating market-driven deliverables” and “progressively cloudifying world-class human capital.” At my old fashion magazine job, employees were always throwing around woo-woo metaphors like “synergy” (the state of being on the same page), “move the needle” (make noticeable progress), and “mindshare” (something having to do with a brand’s popularity? I’m still not sure). My old boss especially loved when everyone needlessly transformed nouns into transitive verbs and vice versa—“whiteboard” to “whiteboarding,” “sunset” to “sunsetting,” the verb “ask” to the noun “ask.” People did it even when it was obvious they didn’t know quite what they were saying or why. Naturally, I was always creeped out by this conformism and enjoyed parodying it in my free time. In her memoir Uncanny Valley, tech reporter Anna Wiener christened all forms of corporate vernacular “garbage language.” Garbage language has been around since long before Silicon Valley, though its themes have changed with the times. In the 1980s, it reeked of the stock exchange: “buy-in,” “leverage,” “volatility.” The ’90s brought computer imagery: “bandwidth,” “ping me,” “let’s take this offline.” In the twenty-first century, with start-up culture and the dissolution of work-life separation (the Google ball pits and in-office massage therapists) in combination with movements toward “transparency” and “inclusion,” we got mystical, politically correct, self-empowerment language: “holistic,” “actualize,” “alignment.

The ownership of land is not natural. The American savage, ranging through forests who game and timber are the common benefits of all his kind, fails to comprehend it. The nomad traversing the desert does not ask to whom belong the shifting sands that extend around him as far as the horizon. The Caledonian shepherd leads his flock to graze wherever a patch of nutritious greenness shows amidst the heather. All of these recognise authority. They are not anarchists. They have chieftains and overlords to whom they are as romantically devoted as any European subject might be to a monarch. Nor do they hold as the first Christians did, that all land should be held in common. Rather, they do not consider it as a thing that can be parceled out. “We are not so innocent. When humanity first understood that a man’s strength could create good to be marketed, that a woman’s beauty was itself a commodity for trade, then slavery was born. So since Adam learnt to force the earth to feed him, fertile ground has become too profitable to be left in peace. “This vital stuff that lives beneath our feet is a treasury of all times. The past: it is packed with metals and sparkling stones, riches made by the work of aeons. The future: it contains seeds and eggs: tight-packed promises which will unfurl into wonders more fantastical than ever jeweller dreamed of -- the scuttling centipede, the many-branched tree whose roots, fumbling down into darkness, are as large and cunningly shaped as the boughs that toss in light. The present: it teems. At barely a spade’s depth the mouldy-warp travels beneath my feet: who can imagine what may live a fathom down? We cannot know for certain that the fables of serpents curving around roots of mighty trees, or of dragons guarding treasure in perpetual darkness, are without factual reality. “How can any man own a thing so volatile and so rich? Yet we followers of Cain have made of our world a great carpet, whose pieces can be lopped off and traded as though it were inert as tufted wool.

The Delusion of Lasting Success promises that building an enduring company is not only achievable but a worthwhile objective. Yet companies that have outperformed the market for long periods of time are not just rare, they are statistical artifacts that are observable only in retrospect. Companies that achieved lasting success may be best understood as having strung together many short-term successes. Pursuing a dream of enduring greatness may divert attention from the pressing need to win immediate battles. The Delusion of Absolute Performance diverts our attention from the fact that success and failure always take place in a competitive environment. It may be comforting to believe that our success is entirely up to us, but as the example of Kmart demonstrated, a company can improve in absolute terms and still fall further behind in relative terms. Success in business means doing things better than rivals, not just doing things well. Believing that performance is absolute can cause us to take our eye off rivals and to avoid decisions that, while risky, may be essential for survival given the particular context of our industry and its competitive dynamics. The Delusion of the Wrong End of the Stick lets us confuse causes and effects, actions and outcomes. We may look at a handful of extraordinarily successful companies and imagine that doing what they did can lead to success — when it might in fact lead mainly to higher volatility and a lower overall chance of success. Unless we start with the full population of companies and examine what they all did — and how they all fared — we have an incomplete and indeed biased set of information. The Delusion of Organizational Physics implies that the business world offers predictable results, that it conforms to precise laws. It fuels a belief that a given set of actions can work in all settings and ignores the need to adapt to different conditions: intensity of competition, rate of growth, size of competitors, market concentration, regulation, global dispersion of activities, and much more. Claiming that one approach can work everywhere, at all times, for all companies, has a simplistic appeal but doesn’t do justice to the complexities of business. These points, taken together, expose the principal fiction at the heart of so many business books — that a company can choose to be great, that following a few key steps will predictably lead to greatness, that its success is entirely of its own making and not dependent on factors outside its control.

By now, though, it had been a steep learning curve, he was fairly well versed on the basics of how clearing worked: When a customer bought shares in a stock on Robinhood — say, GameStop — at a specific price, the order was first sent to Robinhood's in-house clearing brokerage, who in turn bundled the trade to a market maker for execution. The trade was then brought to a clearinghouse, who oversaw the trade all the way to the settlement. During this time period, the trade itself needed to be 'insured' against anything that might go wrong, such as some sort of systemic collapse or a default by either party — although in reality, in regulated markets, this seemed extremely unlikely. While the customer's money was temporarily put aside, essentially in an untouchable safe, for the two days it took for the clearing agency to verify that both parties were able to provide what they had agreed upon — the brokerage house, Robinhood — had to insure the deal with a deposit; money of its own, separate from the money that the customer had provided, that could be used to guarantee the value of the trade. In financial parlance, this 'collateral' was known as VAR — or value at risk. For a single trade of a simple asset, it would have been relatively easy to know how much the brokerage would need to deposit to insure the situation; the risk of something going wrong would be small, and the total value would be simple to calculate. If GME was trading at $400 a share and a customer wanted ten shares, there was $4000 at risk, plus or minus some nominal amount due to minute vagaries in market fluctuations during the two-day period before settlement. In such a simple situation, Robinhood might be asked to put up $4000 and change — in addition to the $4000 of the customer's buy order, which remained locked in the safe. The deposit requirement calculation grew more complicated as layers were added onto the trading situation. A single trade had low inherent risk; multiplied to millions of trades, the risk profile began to change. The more volatile the stock — in price and/or volume — the riskier a buy or sell became. Of course, the NSCC did not make these calculations by hand; they used sophisticated algorithms to digest the numerous inputs coming in from the trade — type of equity, volume, current volatility, where it fit into a brokerage's portfolio as a whole — and spit out a 'recommendation' of what sort of deposit would protect the trade. And this process was entirely automated; the brokerage house would continually run its trading activity through the federal clearing system and would receive its updated deposit requirements as often as every fifteen minutes while the market was open. Premarket during a trading week, that number would come in at 5:11 a.m. East Coast time, usually right as Jim, in Orlando, was finishing his morning coffee. Robinhood would then have until 10:00 a.m. to satisfy the deposit requirement for the upcoming day of trading — or risk being in default, which could lead to an immediate shutdown of all operations. Usually, the deposit requirement was tied closely to the actual dollars being 'spent' on the trades; a near equal number of buys and sells in a brokerage house's trading profile lowered its overall risk, and though volatility was common, especially in the past half-decade, even a two-day settlement period came with an acceptable level of confidence that nobody would fail to deliver on their trades.

Some at SpaceX who have not been through a public company experience may think that being public is desirable. This is not so. Public company stocks, particularly if big step changes in technology are involved, go through extreme volatility, both for reasons of internal execution and for reasons that have nothing to do with anything except the economy. This causes people to be distracted by the manic-depressive nature of the stock instead of creating great products. For those who are under the impression that they are so clever that they can outsmart public market investors and would sell SpaceX stock at the “right time,” let me relieve you of any such notion. If you really are better than most hedge fund managers, then there is no need to worry about the value of your SpaceX stock, as you can just invest in other public company stocks and make billions of dollars in the market. Elon

Many people report that the greatest fear they face today is the fear of not having enough money to maintain their lifestyle throughout retirement. Does this sound like you? Social Security is still a vital role in retirement income. The greatest benefit Social Security provides is regular income that is guaranteed to increase over time and continue as long as you live. Keep in mind, Social Security taxes are just that – taxes. As a result, a worker’s retirement security is entirely dependent upon political decisions. Nevertheless, for now, this benefit makes Social Security one of the most valuable sources of income during one’s retirement. Unfortunately, most Americans do not know much about Social Security. They know even less about how to maximize the benefits that may help sustain them throughout retirement. Whether you are depending upon Social Security to make a significant impact on your retirement income or just a part of your entire financial portfolio, it would be wise to understand which claiming options are available to get the most out of your Social Security income. Even in these tough times and volatile markets, we help our clients take a comprehensive approach to their retirement planning. We offer a complimentary service that we call Social Security Maximization or SSI Max. There are hundreds of ways to claim your Social Security, but which one is right for you and your family? One simple mistake or misjudgment of the program can cost you thousands of dollars that you rightfully deserve. Download our free eBook: 4 Myths about Social Security Income to learn a few common misconceptions about Social Security Income. Find out your SSI Max Strategy Our team of experts use a proprietary system that links to the government’s official Social Security website. It only takes a few minutes to generate your SSI Max Report. Click here to see a sample report and act quickly to get your very own personalized report. Just schedule a call with me to find out your very own, optimal SSI Max Strategy! Click here to schedule now! P.S. – Be sure to ask me about including a “Shortfall Analysis” in your report. Our clients are LOVING this feature! Seriously! What is it? Our Advanced Case Design team builds a comprehensive financial plan best suited for your specific situation by considering all of your retirement vehicles. This is, without a doubt, the best retirement planning offer you will see in a very, very long time!

I would add that I am not persuaded that international funds are a necessary component of an investor’s portfolio. Foreign funds may reduce a portfolio’s volatility, but their economic and currency risks may reduce returns by a still larger amount. The idea that a theoretically optimal portfolio must hold each geographical component at its market weight simply pushes me further than I would dream of being pushed. (I explore the pros and cons of global investing in Chapter 8.) My best judgment is that international holdings should comprise 20 percent of equities at a maximum, and that a zero weight is fully acceptable in most portfolios.

Gold belongs only in the portfolios of fearmongers and speculators. If you own gold in your portfolio, expect to not get paid an income, pay higher taxes on your returns, take a more volatile ride than the stock market, and get a long-term return lower than bonds.

Rather than be fearful and sell out at the worst time or get greedy when the market is way up, investors should control their emotions and not only avoid panic, but embrace the market volatility for what it is: an opportunity and a gift. Suffocate the instincts that want to make you a bad investor and rather embrace the chaos that normally causes them to rise to the surface.

With that said, if you were to be a long-term investor in Ethereum, you have to focus on the long-term timeline, with short-term volatility being a necessary even to find traction within the market, and for value to solidify. Thus, if you believe that the demand for Ethereum will be higher in one, two, five, or ten years (your duration in which you plan to hold), then you need not worry about the fluctuations that occur in the interim. Let’s

The world is entering a period of stagnation, the new mediocre. The end of growth and fragile, volatile economic conditions are now the sometimes silent background to all social and political debates... A confluence of influences is behind the ignominious end of an era of unprecedented economic expansion. Since the early 1980's, economic activity and growth has been increasingly driven by financialisation - the replacement of industrial activity with financial trading, and increased levels of borrowing to finance consumption and investment. By 2007, US$5 of new debt was necessary to create an additional US$1 of American economic activity, a fivefold increase from the 1950s.... Ever-increasing amounts of debt now act as a brake on growth. These financial problems are compounded by lower population growth and ageing populations; slower increases in productivity and innovation; looming shortages of critical resources, such as water, food and energy; and man-made climate change and extreme weather conditions. Slower growth in international trade and capital flows is another retardant. Emerging markets that have benefited from and, in recent times, supported growth are slowing. Rising inequality has an impact on economic activity.

Just before Thanksgiving, I met with Bunker Hunt, then the richest man in the world, at the Petroleum Club in Dallas. Bud Dillard, a Texan friend and client of mine who was big in the oil and cattle businesses, had introduced us a couple of years before, and we regularly talked about the economy and markets, especially inflation. Just a few weeks before our meeting, Iranian militants had stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking fifty-two Americans hostage. There were long lines to buy gas and extreme market volatility. There was clearly a sense of crisis: The nation was confused, frustrated, and angry. Bunker saw the debt crisis and inflation risks pretty much as I saw them. He’d been wanting to get his wealth out of paper money for the past few years, so he’d been buying commodities, especially silver, which he had started purchasing for about $ 1.29 per ounce, as a hedge against inflation. He kept buying and buying as inflation and the price of silver went up, until he had essentially cornered the silver market. At that point, silver was trading at around $ 10. I told him I thought it might be a good time to get out because the Fed was becoming tight enough to raise short-term interest rates above long-term rates (which was called “inverting the yield curve”). Every time that happened, inflation-hedged assets and the economy went down. But Bunker was in the oil business, and the Middle East oil producers he talked to were still worried about the depreciation of the dollar. They had told him they were also going to buy silver as a hedge against inflation so he held on to it in the expectation that its price would continue to rise. I got out.

In this volatile market, be a risky investor than a safe spectator.

The key is to remember that the market exists to serve you, not instruct you. Volatility is a huge plus to real investors.

Sleep promotes wellbeing but giving up on a well-constructed investment strategy when markets become volatile is not in the best interest of your financial health.

If a stock suddenly becomes much more volatile than usual, just get out, or at least sharply scale back your position in the stock.

Not only did this gain Sharpe his PhD, but it eventually evolved into a seminal paper on what he called the “capital asset pricing model” (CAPM), a formula that investors could use to calculate the value of financial securities. The broader, groundbreaking implication of CAPM was introducing the concept of risk-adjusted returns—one had to measure the performance of a stock or a fund manager versus the volatility of its returns—and indicated that the best overall investment for most investors is the entire market, as it reflects the optimal tradeoff between risks and returns.

In Money: Master the Game, Ray Dalio elaborated for Tony: “When people think they’ve got a balanced portfolio, stocks are three times more volatile than bonds. So when you’re 50/50, you’re really 90/10. You really are massively at risk, and that’s why when the markets go down, you get eaten alive. . . . Whatever asset class you invest in, I promise you, in your lifetime, it will drop no less than 50% and more likely 70% at some point. That is why you absolutely must diversify.

Successful long-term investors like Warren Buffett know that bear markets are buying opportunities.

Modern capitalism seemed to favor giant entities, which could coordinate activities through standardized policies and central planning, achieve economies of scale, borrow more cheaply and access the large capital markets, and insulate themselves from the volatility of the business cycle. In spirit, free enterprise was akin to other democratic freedoms, but in practice over time, the function of the individual practitioner was often superseded and replaced by the large institution.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain what it means for skillful investors to add value. To accomplish that, I’m going to introduce two terms from investment theory. One is beta, a measure of a portfolio’s relative sensitivity to market movements. The other is alpha, which I define as personal investment skill, or the ability to generate performance that is unrelated to movement of the market. As I mentioned earlier, it’s easy to achieve the market return. A passive index fund will produce just that result by holding every security in a given market index in proportion to its equity capitalization. Thus, it mirrors the characteristics—e.g., upside potential, downside risk, beta or volatility, growth, richness or cheapness, quality or lack of same—of the selected index and delivers its return. It epitomizes investing without value added. Let’s say, then, that all equity investors start not with a blank sheet of paper but rather with the possibility of simply emulating an index. They can go out and passively buy a market-weighted amount of each stock in the index, in which case their performance will be the same as that of the index. Or they can try for outperformance through active rather than passive investing.

Pro-risk, aggressive investors, for example, should be expected to make more than the index in good times and lose more in bad times. This is where beta comes in. By the word beta, theory means relative volatility, or the relative responsiveness of the portfolio return to the market return. A portfolio with a beta above 1 is expected to be more volatile than the reference market, and a beta below 1 means it’ll be less volatile. Multiply the market return by the beta and you’ll get the return that a given portfolio should be expected to achieve, omitting nonsystematic sources of risk. If the market is up 15 percent, a portfolio with a beta of 1.2 should return 18 percent (plus or minus alpha). Theory looks at this information and says the increased return is explained by the increase in beta, or systematic risk. It also says returns don’t increase to compensate for risk other than systematic risk. Why don’t they? According to theory, the risk that markets compensate for is the risk that is intrinsic and inescapable in investing: systematic or “non-diversifiable” risk. The rest of risk comes from decisions to hold individual stocks: non-systematic risk. Since that risk can be eliminated by diversifying, why should investors be compensated with additional return for bearing it? According to theory, then, the formula for explaining portfolio performance (y) is as follows: y = α + βx Here α is the symbol for alpha, β stands for beta, and x is the return of the market. The market-related return of the portfolio is equal to its beta times the market return, and alpha (skill-related return) is added to arrive at the total return (of course, theory says there’s no such thing as alpha). Although I dismiss the identity between risk and volatility, I insist on considering a portfolio’s return in the light of its overall riskiness, as discussed earlier. A manager who earned 18 percent with a risky portfolio isn’t necessarily superior to one who earned 15 percent with a lower-risk portfolio. Risk-adjusted return holds the key, even though—since risk other than volatility can’t be quantified—I feel it is best assessed judgmentally, not calculated scientifically.

Of course, I also dismiss the idea that the alpha term in the equation has to be zero. Investment skill exists, even though not everyone has it. Only through thinking about risk-adjusted return might we determine whether an investor possesses superior insight, investment skill or alpha . . . that is, whether the investor adds value. The alpha/beta model is an excellent way to assess portfolios, portfolio managers, investment strategies and asset allocation schemes. It’s really an organized way to think about how much of the return comes from what the environment provides and how much from the manager’s value added. For example, it’s obvious that this manager doesn’t have any skill: Period Benchmark Return Portfolio Return 1 10 10 2 6 6 3 0 0 4 −10 −10 5 20 20 But neither does this manager (who moves just half as much as the benchmark): Period Benchmark Return Portfolio Return 1 10 5 2 6 3 3 0 0 4 −10 −5 5 20 10 Or this one (who moves twice as much): Period Benchmark Return Portfolio Return 1 10 20 2 6 12 3 0 0 4 −10 −20 5 20 40 This one has a little: Period Benchmark Return Portfolio Return 1 10 11 6 2 8 3 0 −1 4 −10 −9 5 20 21 While this one has a lot: Period Benchmark Return Portfolio Return 1 10 12 2 6 10 3 0 3 4 −10 2 5 20 30 This one has a ton, if you can live with the volatility: Period Benchmark Return Portfolio Return 1 10 25 2 6 20 3 0 −5 4 −10 −20 5 20 25 What’s clear from these tables is that “beating the market” and “superior investing” can be far from synonymous—see years one and two in the third example. It’s not just your return that matters, but also what risk you took to get it.

volatility seems to be determined not by the actual moves but by the tone of the media.

Look at stocks as part ownership of a business. 2. Look at Mr. Market—volatile stock price fluctuations—as your friend rather than your enemy. View risk as the possibility of permanent loss of purchasing power, and uncertainty as the unpredictability regarding the degree of variability in the possible range of outcomes. 3. Remember the three most important words in investing: “margin of safety.” 4. Evaluate any news item or event only in terms of its impact on (a) future interest rates and (b) the intrinsic value of the business, which is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out during its remaining life, adjusted for the uncertainty around receiving those cash flows. 5. Think in terms of opportunity costs when evaluating new ideas and keep a very high hurdle rate for incoming investments. Be unreasonable. When you look at a business and get a strong desire from within saying, “I wish I owned this business,” that is the kind of business in which you should be investing. A great investment idea doesn’t need hours to analyze. More often than not, it is love at first sight. 6. Think probabilistically rather than deterministically, because the future is never certain and it is really a set of branching probability streams. At the same time, avoid the risk of ruin, when making decisions, by focusing on consequences rather than just on raw probabilities in isolation. Some risks are just not worth taking, whatever the potential upside may be. 7. Never underestimate the power of incentives in any given situation. 8. When making decisions, involve both the left side of your brain (logic, analysis, and math) and the right side (intuition, creativity, and emotions). 9. Engage in visual thinking, which helps us to better understand complex information, organize our thoughts, and improve our ability to think and communicate. 10. Invert, always invert. You can avoid a lot of pain by visualizing your life after you have lost a lot of money trading or speculating using derivatives or leverage. If the visuals unnerve you, don’t do anything that could get you remotely close to reaching such a situation. 11. Vicariously learn from others throughout life. Embrace everlasting humility to succeed in this endeavor. 12. Embrace the power of long-term compounding. All the great things in life come from compound interest.

2. Don’t trade penny stocks. A penny stock is any stock that trades under $5. Unless you are an advanced trader, you should avoid all penny stocks. I would extend this by encouraging you to also avoid all stocks priced under $10. Even if you have a small trading account ($5,000) or less, you are better off buying fewer shares of a higher-priced stock than a lot of shares of a penny stock. That is because low-priced stocks are most often associated with lower quality companies. As a result, they are not usually allowed to trade on the NYSE or the Nasdaq. Instead, they trade on the OTCBB ("over the counter bulletin board") or Pink Sheets, both of which have much less stringent financial reporting requirements than the major exchanges do. Many of these companies have never made a profit. They may be frauds or shell companies that are designed solely to enrich management and other insiders. They may also include former “blue chips” that have fallen on hard times like Eastman Kodak or Lehman Brothers. In addition, penny stocks are inherently more volatile than higher-priced stocks. Think of it this way: if a $100 stock moves $1, that is a 1% move. If a $5 stock moves $1, that is a 20% move. Many new traders underestimate the kind of emotional and financial damage that this kind of volatility can cause. In my experience, penny stocks do not trend nearly as well as higher-priced stocks. They tend to be more mean-reverting (Mean reversion occurs when a stock moves up sharply from its average trading price, only to fall right back down again to its average trading price). Many of them are eventually headed to zero, but they are still not good short candidates. Most brokers will not let you short them. And even if you do find a broker who will let you short a penny stock, how would you like to wake up to see your penny stock trading at $10 when you just shorted it at $2 a few days before? I learned that lesson the hard way. It turned out that I was risking $8 to make $2, which is not a good way to make money over the long term. To add injury to insult, a penny stock might appear to be liquid one day, and the next day, the liquidity dries up and you are confronted by a $2 bid/ask spread. Or the bid might completely disappear. Imagine owning

Purina’s exposure to the hog business was not limited at all. The volatile markets exposed that fact. In 1998, the US hog market experienced a shock comparable to the stock market crash of 1929—a market convulsion that obliterated all the rules everyone thought applied to the business. The root of the problem could be traced to the very industrialization that created Purina Mills’ feed business in the first place. Now that hogs were raised on factory farms, the supply of animals was enormous and inflexible. Farmers were raising herds of tens or even hundreds of thousands of pigs. When prices started to fall, these industrial farms couldn’t adapt quickly. They had mortgage payments to meet on the big pig houses, and they needed to keep production high. Factory farms were a machine that wasn’t easily turned off. The flow of pigs continued into the slaughterhouses, and prices fell even further. Then everything spun out of control. Hog prices plummeted, sucking the entire business into the ground almost instantly. The price of hogs fell from about 53 cents per pound to 10 cents per pound in a matter of months. When adjusted for inflation, this was the lowest price for pigs in US history. It cost far more to raise a pig than the animal was worth. Purina Mills should have been insulated against this crisis. It only sold feed, not the hogs themselves. But with its decision in 1997 to start buying baby hogs, Purina had exposed itself to the risk of falling pork prices. Dean Watson began to discover just how large that exposure was. As one farm economist put it at the time, the rational number of hogs to own in 1998 was zero. Purina discovered this fact quickly. It bought baby hogs, and turned around to sell them to the farmers. But there were no buyers. The farmers refused to take them. “The people who we were supposed to be selling the pigs to were basically saying: ‘Sue me.’ The people we had bought the pigs from were saying: ‘You’re not getting out of my contract or I am suing you,’ ” Watson said. “All of this ownership risk that I was assured didn’t exist started to just come out of the woodwork.

The machinery and supply chains that Dubose oversaw were exceedingly complicated. But the economic rules that he lived by remained relatively simple. The rules had not changed for him since he had been an oil gauger roving the backwaters of the bayou on a skiff back in the early 1970s. Dubose knew that his career still hinged on whether he was over or short. When he was an oil gauger, Dubose made sure he was over when he drained small oil tanks. Now he had to make sure he was over on a shipping network that covered many states. The reasons for this had to do with the nature of the pipeline business. Koch made its money in the transportation business by moving oil, not just by selling it. The actual value of the oil in its pipeline was of secondary importance to Koch Industries. What really mattered was ensuring that the oil was moving. When the oil was moving, Koch was paid to collect it and to deliver it. This means that Koch was somewhat protected from the volatility in prices that continued to roil markets during the 1980s.

O’Neill honed his trading strategies over the year. And he began to make one bet more than any other. He didn’t bet that gas prices were going to rise, and he didn’t bet that they were starting to fall. He just started betting that they would be volatile. He did this by snapping up options and then snapping up their underliers in the futures markets, buying them and selling them in a way that stripped out the price component of the bet. He didn’t want to bet on price. He wanted to bet that the price was going to change and change more than people expected it to. One reason he kept betting this way was because it kept making money. After the natural gas markets were deregulated, volatility started to become the norm. The sleepy days of price controls were over, and now the price could shoot up or down in minutes. That’s why, when he came into work in the early winter months of 2000, O’Neill started to get excited. He was starting to see a very large play unfolding, one that would dwarf anything he’d attempted at Koch before. All of the data that he’d amassed was pointing in one direction as the weather got colder in January and February. All of the signs were pointing toward unprecedented volatility.

The development group that Brad Hall oversaw resembled these private equity firms in some ways. But there was a fundamental difference. Koch’s development group had patience. It thought on a timeline of ten or twenty years, not twelve to eighteen months. And, unlike virtually any other private equity firm, Koch’s group had only two shareholders to answer to: Charles and David Koch. For these reasons, Koch made acquisitions like nobody else. It tended to rush into markets when others were leaving. It tended to buy companies only when they were distressed and no one else wanted them. Koch was accustomed to the wild volatility of energy markets, so the company knew that most downturns were temporary.

While traders might have seen what was coming, it appeared that the general public did not. O’Neill saw a gap in the market in early 2000. A giant gap. The price of gas options was cheap—too cheap to account for what was apparently coming down the road. In other words, the insurance policies against a sudden price spike were not as expensive as they ought to have been. So O’Neill started snapping up the options and holding on to them, knowing that they would become more valuable. As usual, he wasn’t just making a bet that prices were going to go up. He was primarily betting that markets were about to become more volatile. He built up a large position with his natural gas options and underliers that was “long volatility,” meaning that he bet volatility would increase. He assumed that the positions would provide a good return for Koch Industries. He was wrong. He grossly underestimated the riches that the coming volatility was about to deliver. Senior executives in Koch Supply & Trading realized that they could no longer pay their traders like engineers. There was a competition for talent, and too many well-trained people were bleeding off the Koch trading floor. There was one person who seemed to resist big paydays for the traders: Charles Koch. The business failures of the 1990s impressed on Charles Koch the need for humility among his workforce. The thinking went that it was the high-flying ambition and loose planning that led to many of the business losses at Purina Mills.

Despite arguments against speculation and its place in the commodity markets that shape our economy—and, therefore, our lives—without it, producers and users of commodities would have a difficult time facilitating transactions. Thanks to speculators, there is always a buyer for every seller and a seller for every buyer. Without them and the liquidity they provide, hedgers would likely be forced to endure much larger bid/ask spreads and, in theory, price volatility. Consumers would also suffer in the absence of speculators simply because producers would be forced to pass on their increased costs to allow for favorable profit margins.

Business was good but volatile. Farmers were discovering the unique economy of growing chickens, which was riskier than selling crops or raising cattle. One rooster with six hens could produce enough chickens to fill a chicken house in weeks, and the birds grew to maturity in a matter of a few months, rather than the two years it took to raise a cow or the season it took for cotton and corn. That meant the chicken population fluctuated with the frenzy of a stock market. This made John Tyson’s business almost entirely unpredictable. One day he might have too many birds to ship and need to hire extra drivers. Another day, after the price crashed and farmers cut back, he would have nothing. He needed a way to steady his income, since it was seemingly impossible to steady the market. For Tyson, controlling the chicken farms was paramount to his success. What he needed more than anything in the early 1940s was a steady supply of birds. He had more demand than ever from customers up north. World War II was making big demands on resources and the government had rationed beef and pork but not chicken. Grocery stores wanted to buy all the chicken that Tyson could sell them to help fill up their meat counters. But if he came up empty-handed, the grocery chains would look to other suppliers to meet their needs. Left on their own, farmers couldn’t be counted on to supply Tyson enough chickens. They overproduced when prices were up, then grew gun-shy and refused to raise new flocks when prices were low. As orchards disappeared they were being replaced with casino-like poultry farms.

Many have been supposedly foolproof but zany formulae that have made no one rich but the hucksters who sold them to the gullible. But over the years there have been some approaches that have enjoyed at least a modicum of success. These range from the Dow Theory first espoused by Wall Street Journal founder Charles Dow—essentially using technical indicators to try to identify and profit from different market phases—and David Butler’s CANSLIM system, to the value investing school articulated by Benjamin Graham. The earth-shattering suggestion of the research conducted in the 1960s and 1970s was that the code might actually be unbreakable, and efforts to decipher it were expensive and futile. Harry Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory and William Sharpe’s CAPM indicated that the market itself was the optimal balance between risks and return, while Gene Fama presented a cohesive, compelling argument for why that was: The net effect of the efforts of thousands upon thousands of investors continually trying to outsmart each other was that the stock market was efficient, and in practice hard to beat. Most investors should therefore just sit on their hands and buy the entire market. But in the 1980s and 1990s, a new round of groundbreaking research—some of it from the same efficient-markets disciples who had rattled the investing world in the 1960s and 1970s—started revealing some fault lines in the academic edifice built up in the previous decades. Perhaps the stock market wasn’t entirely efficient, and maybe there were indeed ways to beat it in the long run? Some gremlins in the system were always known, but often glossed over. Already in the early 1970s, Black and Scholes had noted that there were some odd issues with the theory, such as how less volatile stocks actually produced better long-term returns than choppier ones. That contradicted the belief that return and risk (using volatility as a proxy for risk) were correlated. In other words, loopier roller coasters produce greater thrills. Though the theory made intuitive sense, in practice it didn’t seem to hold up to rigorous scrutiny. This is why Scholes and Black initially proposed that Wells Fargo should set up a fund that would buy lower-volatility stocks (that is, low-beta) and use leverage to bring the portfolio’s overall volatility up to the broader stock market.7 Hey, presto, a roller coaster with the same number of loops as everyone else, but with even greater thrills. Nonetheless, the efficient-markets hypothesis quickly became dogma at business schools around the United States.

Don Tyson saw something special as he looked over the balance sheets of his small network of experimental hog farms. He saw a possible new future for his company, one that made it less vulnerable to the brutal swings of the poultry market. Tyson Foods could raise pigs without spending too much money, and it made a decent profit when it sold them to meatpackers like Armour. Tyson realized that pork prices rose and fell on a completely different cycle than chicken prices. If Tyson kept growing hogs, it might buffer the company from chicken’s permanent boom and bust pricing cycles. The hog barns could be an insurance policy of sorts, a hedge against the volatility that drove modern chicken companies out of business.

To simplify Markowitz’s model, Sharpe stipulated one fundamental underlying factor—the return of the overall stock market—and instead calculated the variation of individual securities relative to this, rather than each security relative to each other. In his formula, it was given the Greek letter beta. So if Coca-Cola’s shares rise by 0.8 percentage points for every 1 percent the broader stock market climbs, it has a beta of 0.8. If a racier stock gains 2 percent, it has a beta of 2. Higher-beta stocks are more volatile, and should therefore offer greater returns than steadier, lower-beta securities. And thus beta became the lingua franca for the returns of the stock market as a whole, while “alpha” later emerged as the term for the extra returns generated by a skilled investor.

One thing that is clear is that the future of employment will be very volatile. Our big problem won’t be an absolute lack of jobs, but rather retraining and adjusting to an ever-changing job market. There will likely be financial difficulties—who will support people who lost their old job while they are in transition, learning a new set of skills? There will surely be psychological difficulties, too, since changing jobs and retraining are stressful. And even if you have the financial and psychological ability to manage the transition, this will not be a long-term solution. Over the coming decades, old jobs will disappear, new jobs will emerge, but the new jobs too will rapidly change and vanish. So people will need to retrain and reinvent themselves not just once but many times, or they will become irrelevant. If three years of high unemployment could bring Hitler to power, what might never-ending turmoil in the job market do to democracy?

value at risk, a technique used to estimate the probability of portfolio losses based on the statistical analysis of historical price trends and volatilities. It measures the worst expected loss under normal market conditions over a specific time interval at a given confidence level. Which means it measures both fear and optimism.

as modern portfolio theory. MPT, invented in the 1950s, was a technique to build an investment portfolio by examining the past returns and volatility of disparate asset classes. The trick was to split money among investments that don’t necessarily correlate, or move together, to avoid the chance that any one market event could cause calamity.

In a volatile market, high leverage trading can be a double-edged sword. If you’re not an experienced trader, it is best to avoid taking large leverage positions. Protect your capital—start small, learn, and scale wisely.

In the 16th century, it was widely believed by scientists that projectiles, like cannonballs fired toward an enemy, fell straight down after they reached their apex, because gravity pulled them down in a linear fashion, as specified by Aristotle. Practitioners (in this case, soldiers) said that this theory was nonsense: cannonballs followed a curved path. They knew, because they were busy knocking down castles. Not until Descartes' work in the 17th century would mathematicians admit that they (and Aristotle) had been wrong.

With such theories, economists developed a very elaborate toolkit for analyzing markets, measuring the "variance" and "betas" of different securities and classifying investment portfolios by their probability of risk. According to the theory, a fund manager can build an "efficient" portfolio to target a specific return, with a desired level of risk. It is the financial equivalent of alchemy. Want to earn more without risking too much more? Use the modern finance toolkit to alter the mix of volatile and stable stocks, or to change the ratio of stocks, bonds, and cash. Want to reward employees more without paying more? Use the toolkit to devise an employee stock-option program, with a tunable probability that the option grants will be "in the money." Indeed, the Internet bubble, fueled in part by lavish executive stock options, may not have happened without Bachelier and his heirs.

Blaming wild market volatility on the “animal spirits” of the herd mentality takes the focus off where it belongs: on the actions of the government. Instead of functioning as instruments of information, signaling to entrepreneurs how and when best to serve consumers, interest rates are perpetually manipulated by central bank actions to the point of meaninglessness. Artificial changes in interest rates become a deceptive feint by which entrepreneurs succumb to malinvestment, because they believe there are more resources (i.e., savings) in the system than there really are. Monetary policy insidiously plays with our time preferences and our very ability to engage in economic calculation. The greater the distortion, the greater destruction needed to correct it.

Fundamental analysis often works, but it often fails. Technical analysis often works, and then it does not work. Economists speak of economic cycles, but none can be found analytically. Traders speak of market cycles; they too cannot be proven. To top it off, the critics of the EMH have been unable to offer an alternative that takes all the discrepancies into account. In few other areas are theory and practical experience in such little agreement.

To see how transfer of antifragility works, consider two scenarios, in which the market does the same thing on average but following different paths. Path 1: market goes up 50 percent, then goes back down to erase all gains. Path 2: market does not move at all. Visibly Path 1, the more volatile, is more profitable to the managers, who can cash in their stock options. So the more jagged the route, the better it is for them. And of course society—here the retirees—has the exact opposite payoff since they finance bankers and chief executives. Retirees get less upside than downside. Society pays for the losses of the bankers, but gets no bonuses from them. If you don’t see this transfer of antifragility as theft, you certainly have a problem. What is worse, this system is called “incentive-based” and supposed to correspond to capitalism. Supposedly managers’ interests are aligned with those of the shareholders. What incentive? There is upside and no downside, no disincentive at all.

Diversification keeps you financially fit and also protect you from volatility of the market, as it reduces the risk exposure in your portfolio.

Our view is that, contrary to its popular presentation, neoliberalism differs from classical liberalism in ascribing a significant role to the state.7 A major task of neoliberalism has therefore been to take control of the state and repurpose it.8 Whereas classical liberalism advocated respect for a naturalised sphere supposedly beyond state control (the natural laws of man and the market), neoliberals understand that markets are not ‘natural’.9 Markets do not spontaneously emerge as the state backs away, but must instead be consciously constructed, sometimes from the ground up.10 For instance, there is no natural market for the commons (water, fresh air, land), or for healthcare, or for education.11 These and other markets must be built through an elaborate array of material, technical and legal constructs. Carbon markets required years to be built;12 volatility markets exist in large part as a function of abstract financial models;13 and even the most basic markets require intricate design.14 Under neoliberalism, the state therefore takes on a significant role in creating ‘natural’ markets.

In these uncertain days, bond funds are an especially important option for investors. Unlike stock funds, they have high predictability in at least these five ways: (1) The current yields (on longer-term issues) are an excellent—if imperfect—predictor of future returns. (2) The range of gross returns earned by bond managers clusters in an inevitably narrow range that is established by the current level of interest rates in each sector of the market. (3) The choices are wide. As the maturity date lengthens, volatility of principal increases, but volatility of income declines. (4) Whether taxable or municipal, bond fund returns are highly correlated with one another. Municipal bond funds are fine choices for investors in high tax brackets, and inflation-protected bond funds are a sound option for those who believe that much higher living costs will result from the huge federal government deficits of this era. (5) The greatest constant of all is that—given equivalent portfolio quality and maturity—lower costs mean higher returns. (Don’t forget that index bond funds—or their equivalent—carry the lowest costs of all.)

Market doesn't like volatility. It always rewards steady, predictable growth. Aditya Puri controls himself in good times and doesn't lose control in bad times. Since

We should remember why those programs were started: before the arrival of Medicare and Social Security, the private sector left most elderly bereft of support, the market for annuities essentially didn’t exist, and the elderly couldn’t get health insurance. Even today, the private sector doesn’t provide the kind of security that Social Security provides—including protection against market volatility and inflation. And the transactions costs of the Social Security Administration are markedly lower than those in the private sector. In addition, many of the people who receive government benefits without paying for them are our young, obviously unable to pay, say, for their own education. But spending on them is an investment in the country’s future. An

Relationships still matter—in fact, more than ever. As markets become more volatile, it’s even more essential that leaders know firsthand the people who are actually carrying the business forward and the work they are doing every day.

Going Public Per my recent comments, I am increasingly concerned about SpaceX going public before the Mars transport system is in place. Creating the technology needed to establish life on Mars is and always has been the fundamental goal of SpaceX. If being a public company diminishes that likelihood, then we should not do so until Mars is secure. This is something that I am open to reconsidering, but, given my experiences with Tesla and SolarCity, I am hesitant to foist being public on SpaceX, especially given the long term nature of our mission. Some at SpaceX who have not been through a public company experience may think that being public is desirable. This is not so. Public company stocks, particularly if big step changes in technology are involved, go through extreme volatility, both for reasons of internal execution and for reasons that have nothing to do with anything except the economy. This causes people to be distracted by the manic-depressive nature of the stock instead of creating great products. For those who are under the impression that they are so clever that they can outsmart public market investors and would sell SpaceX stock at the “right time,” let me relieve you of any such notion. If you really are better than most hedge fund managers, then there is no need to worry about the value of your SpaceX stock, as you can just invest in other public company stocks and make billions of dollars in the market.

Here’s a great test. Take a moment and give me your best answer to this question: Suppose you’re putting $1,000 a year into an index fund for five years. Which of these two indexes do you think would be better for you? Example 1 • The index stays at $100 per share for the first year. • It goes down to $60 the next year. • It stays at $60 the third year. • Then in the fourth year, it shoots up to $140. • In the fifth year, it ends up at $100, the same place where you started. Example 2 • The market is at $100 the first year. • $110 the second year. • $120 the third. • $130 the fourth, and • $140 the fifth year. So, which index do you think ends up making you the most money after five years? Your instincts might tell you that you’d do better in the second scenario, with steady gains, but you’d be wrong. You can actually make higher returns by investing regularly in a volatile stock market. Think about it for a moment: in example 1, by investing the same amount of dollars, you actually get to buy more shares when the index was cheaper at $60, so you owned more of the market when the price went back up! Here’s Burt Malkiel’s

Chris Krueger, long-time Capitol Hill watcher for Guggenheim Securities, says the people expecting this kind of kumbaya moment are “Pollyannas”. He said: “My reading of the White House is that they already feel pretty good about their legacy, having done what no administration since Harry Truman has done and extended access to healthcare.” These are the facts on the ground, which bode ill for investors, but there is a conundrum: history suggests we are at a point in the political cycle when markets usually do well. After some volatility around the midterms, the stock market has historically settled into a very strong year in the third year of the presidential cycle, according to an analysis by Jeff Hirsch, editor of the Stock Trader’s Almanac. Sweeping in 180 years of data on the Dow Jones Industrial Average and predecessor indices, he calculates the average Year 3 gain to be 10.4 per cent, almost double the next best year, the presidential election year itself.

The number of people seeking unemployment benefits fell last week, a steady decline that suggests a strengthening job market. Weekly applications for unemployment aid dipped 3,000 to a seasonally adjusted 302,000, the Labor Department said Thursday. The four-week average, a less volatile measure, dropped 3,000 to 309,000, the lowest level since June 2007, about five months before the start of the recession. Hiring is at its healthiest clip since the late 1990s, and the 6.1 percent unemployment rate is a 5 1/2-year low. Employers added 288,000 jobs in June, the fifth straight month of job gains above 200,000.

In the short run, however, stock returns are very volatile, driven by changes in earnings, interest rates, risk, and uncertainty, as well as psychological factors, such as optimism and pessimism as well as fear and greed.

IT may seem counterintuitive to use uncertainty to quell volatility. But a small amount of uncertainty surrounding short-term interest rates may act much like a vaccine immunizing the stock market against bubbles. More generally, if we view humans as embodied brains instead of disembodied minds, we can see that the risk-taking pathologies found in traders also lead chief executives, trial lawyers, oil executives and others to swing from excessive and ill-conceived risks to petrified risk aversion. It will also teach us to manage these risk takers, much as sport physiologists manage athletes, to stabilize their risk taking and to lower stress.

The price volatility within each trading day in the U.S. stock market between 2010 and 2013 was nearly 40 percent higher than the volatility between 2004 and 2006, for instance. There were days in 2011 in which volatility was higher than in the most volatile days of the dot-com bubble.

Perhaps, since the measurement of potential gain and loss from a particular stock is so subjective, it is easier, if you are a professional or academic, to use a concept like volatility as a substitute or a replacement for risk than to use some other measure. Whatever the reason for everyone else’s general abdication of common sense, your job remains to quantify, by some measure, a stock’s upside and downside. This is such an imprecise and difficult task, though, that a proxy of your own may well be in order.

it is being misused by many MFs by bringing in NFO (new fund offer) with NAV of Rs. 10 in a bull market. Factors, such as the fund manager, fund management, performance track record, volatility in return, consistency, etc. are important and should be the determining criteria for selecting the MF and not the NAV.

The market is an imperfect mirror of the macro environment, our world. The world and the market are volatile, unpredictable, and out of your control. If you let your environment dictate your feelings and decisions, you surrender your life to randomness. Instead, live your life intentionally and focus on what you can control.

As he grew, the young Prince became very dear to the Spider Mage. He had his mother's charm and grace, without her volatile nature. He had his father's intellect, without his anger and sullenness. And he had a kind and loving heart, which longed for one thing only: for his parents to love each other, as he loved them both.

The credit cycle deserves a very special mention for its inevitability, extreme volatility and ability to create opportunities for investors attuned to it. Of all the cycles, it’s my favorite. The longer I’m involved in investing, the more impressed I am by the power of the credit cycle. It takes only a small fluctuation in the economy to produce a large fluctuation in the availability of credit, with great impact on asset prices and back on the economy itself. The process is simple: • The economy moves into a period of prosperity. • Providers of capital thrive, increasing their capital base. • Because bad news is scarce, the risks entailed in lending and investing seem to have shrunk. • Risk averseness disappears. • Financial institutions move to expand their businesses—that is, to provide more capital. • They compete for market share by lowering demanded returns (e.g., cutting interest rates), lowering credit standards, providing more capital for a given transaction and easing covenants. At the extreme, providers of capital finance borrowers and projects that aren’t worthy of being financed.

According to the academicians who developed capital market theory, risk equals volatility, because volatility indicates the unreliability of an investment. I take great issue with this definition of risk. It’s my view that—knowingly or unknowingly—academicians settled on volatility as the proxy for risk as a matter of convenience. They needed a number for their calculations that was objective and could be ascertained historically and extrapolated into the future. Volatility fits the bill, and most of the other types of risk do not. The problem with all of this, however, is that I just don’t think volatility is the risk most investors care about. There are many kinds of risk.... But volatility may be the least relevant of them all. Theory says investors demand more return from investments that are more volatile. But for the market to set the prices for investments such that more volatile investments will appear likely to produce higher returns, there have to be people demanding that relationship, and I haven’t met them yet. I’ve never heard anyone at Oaktree—or anywhere else, for that matter—say, “I won’t buy it, because its price might show big fluctuations,” or “I won’t buy it, because it might have a down quarter.” Thus, it’s hard for me to believe volatility is the risk investors factor in when setting prices and prospective returns. Rather than volatility, I think people decline to make investments primarily because they’re worried about a loss of capital or an unacceptably low return.

Dr. Etienne Archambault stands as a leading authority in financial risk management, expertly weaving together his knowledge of personal finance, corporate finance, and investment. By addressing risks such as market fluctuations, credit exposure, and investment volatility, Dr. Archambault crafts tailored solutions that help clients build resilient financial portfolios, ensuring long-term stability and success in a rapidly changing economic environment.

Ultimately, there are dozens of valuation models but only two valuation approaches: intrinsic and relative. In intrinsic valuation, we begin with a simple proposition: the intrinsic value of an asset is determined by the cash flows you expect that asset to generate over its life and how uncertain you feel about these cash flows. Assets with high and stable cash flows should be worth more than assets with low and volatile cash flows. You should pay more for a property that has long-term renters paying a high rent than for a more speculative property with not only lower rental income but more variable vacancy rates from period to period. While the focus in principle should be on intrinsic valuation, most assets are valued on a relative basis. In relative valuation, assets are valued by looking at how the market prices similar assets. Thus, when determining what to pay for a house, you would look at what similar houses in the neighbourhood sold for. With a stock, that means comparing its pricing to similar stocks, usually in its “peer group.

You don’t want to hesitate to get in the market trying to have perfect timing; instead, use dollar-cost averaging and know that volatility can be your friend,

Understanding Financial Risks and Companies Mitigate them? Financial risks are the possible threats, losses and debts corporations face during setting up policies and seeking new business opportunities. Financial risks lead to negative implications for the corporations that can lead to loss of financial assets, liabilities and capital. Mitigation of risks and their avoidance in the early stages of product deployment, strategy-planning and other vital phases is top-priority for financial advisors and managers. Here's how to mitigate risks in financial corporates:- ● Keeping track of Business Operations Evaluating existing business operations in the corporations will provide a holistic view of the movement of cash-flows, utilisation of financial assets, and avoiding debts and losses. ● Stocking up Emergency Funds Just as families maintain an emergency fund for dealing with uncertainties, the same goes for large corporates. Coping with uncertainty such as the ongoing pandemic is a valuable lesson that has taught businesses to maintain emergency funds to avoid economic lapses. ● Taking Data-Backed Decisions Senior financial advisors and managers must take well-reformed decisions backed by data insights. Data-based technologies such as data analytics, science, and others provide resourceful insights about various economic activities and help single out the anomalies and avoid risks. Enrolling for a course in finance through a reputed university can help young aspiring financial risk advisors understand different ways of mitigating risks and threats. The IIM risk management course provides meaningful insights into the other risks involved in corporations. What are the Financial Risks Involved in Corporations? Amongst the several roles and responsibilities undertaken by the financial management sector, identifying and analysing the volatile financial risks. Financial risk management is the pinnacle of the financial world and incorporates the following risks:- ● Market Risk Market risk refers to the threats that emerge due to corporational work-flows, operational setup and work-systems. Various financial risks include- an economic recession, interest rate fluctuations, natural calamities and others. Market risks are also known as "systematic risk" and need to be dealt with appropriately. When there are significant changes in market rates, these risks emerge and lead to economic losses. ● Credit Risk Credit risk is amongst the common threats that organisations face in the current financial scenarios. This risk emerges when a corporation provides credit to its borrower, and there are lapses while receiving owned principal and interest. Credit risk arises when a borrower falters to make the payment owed to them. ● Liquidity Risk Liquidity risk crops up when investors, business ventures and large organisations cannot meet their debt compulsions in the short run. Liquidity risk emerges when a particular financial asset, security or economic proposition can't be traded in the market. ● Operational Risk Operational risk arises due to financial losses resulting from employee's mistakes, failures in implementing policies, reforms and other procedures. Key Takeaway The various financial risks discussed above help professionals learn the different risks, threats and losses. Enrolling for a course in finance assists learners understand the different risks. Moreover, pursuing the IIM risk management course can expose professionals to the scope of international financial management in India and other key concepts.

A 15% return with a 10% volatility (or uncertainty) per annum translates into a 93% probability of success in any given year. But seen at a narrow time scale, this translates into a mere 50.02% probability of success over any given second as shown in Table 3.1. Over the very narrow time increment, the observation will reveal close to nothing. Yet the dentist’s heart will not tell him that. Being emotional, he feels a pang with every loss, as it shows in red on his screen. He feels some pleasure when the performance is positive, but not in equivalent amount as the pain experienced when the performance is negative.

The highest-risk investments include: Futures Commodities Limited partnerships Collectibles Rental real estate Penny stocks (stocks that cost less than $5 per share) Speculative stocks (such as stock in new companies) Foreign stocks from volatile nations “Junk” (or high-yield corporate) bonds Moderate-risk investments include: Growth stocks (companies that reinvest most of their profits to grow the business) Corporate bonds with lower (but still investment-grade) ratings Mutual funds or exchange-traded funds (ETFs) Real estate investment trusts (REITs) Blue chip stocks Limited-risk investments include: Top-rated investment-grade corporate and municipal bonds The lowest-risk investments include: Treasury bills and bonds FDIC-insured bank CDs (certificates of deposit) Money market funds Practicing

These findings map directly onto the rise and fall of Polaroid. After Land invented the instant camera in 1948, the company took off, its revenues jumping from under $7 million in 1950 to nearly $100 million in 1960 and $950 million by 1976. Throughout that period, the photography industry remained stable: Customers loved high-quality cameras that printed instant pictures. But as the digital revolution began, the market became volatile, and Polaroid’s once-dominant culture was left in the dust.

Since the Firm’s IPO, the Founder and the partners have realized that the listed market seems to value more highly the stable, recurring management fees that the Firm brings in, come rain or shine—the two percent—over the larger, supposedly more volatile performance fees that crystallize when investment gains are monetized—the twenty percent. The stock price is largely driven by a regular stream of management fees under long-term contracts, and as assets under management grow for the Firm, the stock’s attractiveness to public market investors increases because this fee pile grows alongside the assets. Of course, there is a strong track record of delivering performance fees on top, because the funds perform well, but these are incremental to the equity story; they do not underpin it. For the stock market, the Two is mission-critical. The Twenty is important, but it is not taken for granted.

Could you evolve into a star? Are you Number Two in a high-growth market - BCG’s ‘question mark’ position? The issue here is simple. Can you overtake the leader? Your chances are greater if: ★ your market share is not far below the leader’s; ★ you are gaining on the leader; ★ the leader makes an unexpected blunder; ★ the niche is young; ★ market positions are volatile and one or two large customers can swing it; ★ the market is growing very fast; ★ you understand the customers in the niche better; ★ even though you are in the same market, your approach is different and customers like it better; ★ your people have better empathy with the customers; ★ your approach has fatter margins than the leader, or would do so if you had the same volume of business; ★ you are better financed than the leader; ★ objective observers say your product is better; ★ the leader’s advantage rests on distribution advantages that you can gradually overcome; ★ key employees from the leader are defecting to you; ★ the leader is only dimly aware of the threat you pose.

FID employees sold and traded bonds, including government bonds, junk bonds, mortgages, and emerging markets debt. FID salesmen and traders took huge risks, and FID profits were much more volatile than those of IBD, but when Morgan Stanley had a really good year, it was because of FID. FID was on the trading floor, where there were no flip books. A new sales-and-trading associate had only three tasks: (1) Feed your boss, (2) withstand abuse, and (3) learn.

Few investors have the disposition to say, “I’m actually fine if I lose 20% of my money.” This is doubly true for new investors who have never experienced a 20% decline. But if you view volatility as a fee, things look different. Disneyland tickets cost $100. But you get an awesome day with your kids you’ll never forget. Last year more than 18 million people thought that fee was worth paying. Few felt the $100 was a punishment or a fine. The worthwhile tradeoff of fees is obvious when it’s clear you’re paying one. Same with investing, where volatility is almost always a fee, not a fine. Market returns are never free and never will be. They demand you pay a price, like any other product. You’re not forced to pay this fee, just like you’re not forced to go to Disneyland. You can go to the local county fair where tickets might be $10, or stay home for free. You might still have a good time. But you’ll usually get what you pay for. Same with markets. The volatility/uncertainty fee—the price of returns—is the cost of admission to get returns greater than low-fee parks like cash and bonds. The trick is convincing yourself that the market’s fee is worth it. That’s the only way to properly deal with volatility and uncertainty—not just putting up with it, but realizing that it’s an admission fee worth paying. There’s no guarantee that it will be. Sometimes it rains at Disneyland. But if you view the admission fee as a fine, you’ll never enjoy the magic. Find the price, then pay it.

Simons’s team appeared to have discovered something of a holy grail in investing: enormous returns from a diversified portfolio generating relatively little volatility and correlation to the overall market. In the past, a few others had developed investment vehicles with similar characteristics. They usually had puny portfolios, however. No one had achieved what Simons and his team had—a portfolio as big as $5 billion delivering this kind of astonishing performance.

The actual risk is the permanent loss of capital or, to a lesser extent, a sub-par return. Temporary volatility in market price is not a real risk.

All capital investments inherently suffer the risk of permanent capital loss. As an investor, it is your job to differentiate between market volatility and a permanent capital loss. You can only achieve this when you fundamentally understand why you bought the asset in the first place.

To produce even steadier returns, we hedged the overall risk from our entire collection of hedges by neutralizing the impact on our portfolio of shifts in interest rates (across the spectrum of quality and maturity). We also offset the danger to the portfolio from sudden large shifts in overall stock market prices and in the volatility level of the market. From the 1980s on, some of these techniques came into usage by modern investment banks and hedge funds. They also adopted a notion we rejected, called VaR or “value at risk,” where they estimated the damage to their portfolio for, say, the worst events among the most likely 95 percent of future outcomes, neglecting the extreme 5 percent “tails,” then acted to reduce any unacceptably large risks. The defect of VaR alone is that it doesn’t fully account for the worst 5 percent of expected cases.

Coates and his new colleagues examined a group of financial traders working on a London trading floor, asking each one to identify the successive moments when he felt his heart beat—a measure of the individual’s sensitivity to bodily signals. The traders, they found, were much better at this task than were an age- and gender-matched group of controls who did not work in finance. What’s more, among the traders themselves, those who were the most accurate in detecting the timing of their heartbeats made more money, and tended to have longer tenures in what was a notably volatile line of work. “Our results suggest that signals from the body—the gut feelings of financial lore—contribute to success in the markets,” the team concluded. Confirming Coates’s informal observations, those who thrived in this milieu were not necessarily people with greater education or intellect, but rather “people with greater sensitivity to interoceptive signals.