Influenza Vaccine Quotes

What we really need is a game-changing influenza vaccine that will target the conserved—or unchanging—features of the influenza viruses that are more likely to cause human influenza pandemics and subsequently seasonal influenza in the following years.

The immune system is also thought to be behind sex-specific responses to vaccines: women develop higher antibody responses and have more frequent and severe adverse reactions to vaccines,19 and a 2014 paper proposed developing male and female versions of influenza vaccines.20

Edward Jenner’s discovery of vaccination drew harsh criticism from the pulpit. Clergymen denounced the doctor for having put himself above God. Only the Almighty, they said, sends illness and only the Almighty cures it. Vaccination, critics charged, was “a diabolical operation,” and its inventor was “flying in the face of Providence

in a letter to the New York Times, Dr. Hans Neumann from the New Haven Department of Health noted that based on the projected scale of the immunizations, within two days of getting a flu shot, about 2,300 people would have a stroke and 7,000 would have a heart attack. “Why?” he asked. “Because that is the number statistically expected, flu shots or no flu shots.” Likewise, in the week following a flu vaccine, another 9,000 people would contract pneumonia, of whom 900 would die. These would certainly occur after a flu shot, but not as a consequence of it. “Yet,” wrote Neumann, “can one expect a person who received a flu shot at noon and who that same night had a stroke not to associate somehow the two in his mind?” Grandma got the flu vaccine in the morning, and she was dead in the afternoon. Although association does not equal causation, this thinking could lead to a public backlash against vaccinations that would threaten future programs.

We follow what is happening with influenza virus strains in the Southern Hemisphere when it is their fall (our spring) to predict which influenza viruses will likely be with us the next winter. Some years that educated guess is more accurate than others. So is it worth getting the vaccination each year? I give that a qualified yes. It might or might not prevent you from getting flu. But even if it is only 30 to 60 percent effective, it sure beats zero protection. What we really need is a game-changing influenza vaccine that will target the conserved—or unchanging—features of the influenza viruses that are more likely to cause human influenza pandemics and subsequently seasonal influenza in the following years. How difficult would such a game-changing influenza vaccine be to achieve? The simple truth is that we don’t know, because we’ve never gotten a prototype into, let alone through, the valley of death. We need a new paradigm—a new business model that pairs public money with private pharmaceutical company partnerships and foundation support and guidance.

No medicine and none of the vaccines developed then could prevent influenza. The masks worn by millions were useless as designed and could not prevent influenza. Only preventing exposure to the virus could. Nothing today can cure influenza, although vaccines can provide significant—but nowhere near complete—protection, and several antiviral drugs can mitigate its severity. Places that isolated themselves—such as Gunnison, Colorado, and a few military installations on islands—escaped. But the closing orders that most cities issued could not prevent exposure; they were not extreme enough. Closing saloons and theaters and churches meant nothing if significant numbers of people continued to climb onto streetcars, continued to go to work, continued to go to the grocer. Even where fear closed down businesses, where both store owners and customers refused to stand face-to-face and left orders on sidewalks, there was still too much interaction to break the chain of infection. The virus was too efficient, too explosive, too good at what it did. In the end the virus did its will around the world.

Vaccination works,” my father explains, “by enlisting a majority in the protection of a minority.” He means the minority of the population that is particularly vulnerable to a given disease. The elderly, in the case of influenza. Newborns, in the case of pertussis. Pregnant women, in the case of rubella. But when relatively wealthy white women vaccinate our children, we may also be participating in the protection of some poor black children whose single mothers have recently moved and have not, as a product of circumstance rather than choice, fully vaccinated them.

Those citizens employed at the resort had been induced to submit to injections sixteen months earlier, when their employer offered free flu vaccinations and implied that anyone refusing wouldn’t be paid for work missed due to influenza. Because these inoculations were also provided free of charge to family members of employees and anyone else in town who wanted them, within two weeks 386 of the 604 residents were programmed with nanomachine command mechanisms. During the next two months, those who hadn’t been converted in the first wave were, at the most opportune moments, sedated without their knowledge by family members; while sleeping, they were brought into the fellowship of the adjusted. Only seven had a chance to resist, and only two had of necessity been killed.

Because the second wave was so much more severe than the first, a lot of people refused to believe it could be the same disease. It had to be terrorism. They didn't care what medical experts kept telling them, about how it was the nature of influenza to occur in waves and that there was nothing about this pandemic, terrible though it was, that wasn't happening more or less as had long been predicted. No, not bioterrorism, others said, but a virus that had escaped from a laboratory. These were the same people who believed that both Lyme disease and West Nile virus were caused by germs that had escaped many years ago from a government lab off the coast of Long Island. They scoffed at the assertion that it was impossible to say for sure where the flu had begun because cases had appeared in several different countries at exactly the same time. Cover-up! Everyone knew the government was involved in the development of bioweapons. And although the Americans were not the only ones who were working on such weapons, the belief that they were somehow to blame--that the monster germ had most likely been created in an American lab, for American military purposes--would outlive the pandemic itself. In any case, according to a poll, eighty-two percent of Americans believed the government knew more about the flu than it was saying. And the number of people who declared themselves dead set against any vaccine the government came up with was steadily growing.

Two weeks after the CDC doctor had announced that the flu vaccine was a danger to the population, the electrical grid started to fail in their small university town.

In other cases, the reasons for forgetting are more prosaic, more epidemiological, more related to numbers: the particular pandemic disease was not fatal enough (2009 H1N1 influenza), or it did not afflict enough people because it was not infectious enough (MERS), or it burned out too fast (SARS-1), or it afflicted a confined subgroup of the human population (Ebola), or it was brought low by a vaccine (measles and polio), or by treatment (HIV), or by eradication (smallpox), allowing most people to simply push the disease out of their minds. While the way we have come to live in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic might feel alien and unnatural, it is actually neither of those things. Plagues are a feature of the human experience. What happened in 2020 was not new to our species. It was just new to us.

improving the scientific basis to improve readiness.” By “the scientific basis” he meant the understanding of which virus groups to watch, the field capabilities to detect spillovers in remote places before they become regional outbreaks, the organizational capacities to control outbreaks before they become pandemics, plus the laboratory tools and skills to recognize known viruses speedily, to characterize new viruses almost as fast, and to create vaccines and therapies without much delay. If we can’t predict a forthcoming influenza pandemic or any other newly emergent virus, we can at least be vigilant; we can be well-prepared and quick to respond; we can be ingenious and scientifically sophisticated in the forms of our response.

knows exactly how serious this threat could be. Nevertheless, we cannot afford to take a chance with the health of our nation.” With that preamble, Ford announced that he was asking Congress to appropriate $135 million “for the production of sufficient vaccine to inoculate every man, woman, and child in the United States,” for a disease that no one could even prove to exist.

They had not done the wild things that had no basis in their understanding of the workings of the body. They had not given quinine or typhoid vaccine to influenza victims in the wild hope that because it worked against malaria or typhoid it might work against influenza. Others had done these things and more, but they had not.

Public health experts monitor this drift and each year adjust the flu vaccine to try to keep pace. But they will never be able to match up perfectly, because even if they predict the direction of mutation, the fact that influenza viruses exist as mutating swarms means some will always be different enough to evade both the vaccine and the immune system.

Public health was and is where the largest numbers of lives are saved, usually by understanding the epidemiology of a disease—its patterns, where and how it emerges and spreads—and attacking it at its weak points. This usually means prevention. Science had first contained smallpox, then cholera, then typhoid, then plague, then yellow fever, all through large-scale public health measures, everything from filtering water to testing and killing rats to vaccination. Public health measures lack the drama of pulling someone back from the edge of death, but they save lives by the millions.

They had not done the wild things that had no basis in their understanding of the workings of the body. They had not given quinine or typhoid vaccine to influenza victims in the wild hope that because it worked against malaria or typhoid it might work against influenza.

As I write in 2015, scientists are looking at the next potential pandemics. It may take only a few mutations for a strain of bird flu to evolve into a new strain of human influenza virus. Reassortment could accelerate the change. No one can say when, or if, any particular strain will make the jump. But we are not helpless as we wait to see what evolution has in store for us. We can do things to slow the spread of the flu, such as washing our hands. And scientists are learning how to make more effective vaccines by tracking the evolution of the flu virus so they can do a better job of predicting which strains will be most dangerous in flu seasons to come.

Unintentional spreading of infection due to poor hygiene (e.g., neglecting to cover coughs) and lack of vaccination is a more likely way in which influenza will be disseminated during the next pandemic.

In 1950 Koprowski tested his vaccine on intellectually disabled children at Letchworth Village in Thiells, New York, an institution where “naked residents, unkempt and dirty, huddled in sterile dayrooms.”25 His use of people with mental disorders was not without precedent. During the war, under the sponsorship of the U.S. government, leading researchers had infected psychotic residents at an Illinois state hospital with malaria to test the effectiveness of experimental drugs.26 They had also tested trial influenza vaccines by requiring intellectually disabled people to breathe in influenza virus through aviation masks or to inhale a nebulized spray into their nostrils for four minutes; both vaccinated people and unvaccinated controls were forced to breathe in the virus.27 One of the leaders of these experiments was the young Jonas Salk.

In 1918, the Spanish flu killed about 2.7 percent of the world's population. [60] The risk of an outbreak of influenza against which we do not have a vaccine remains a threat constant, which we should take extremely seriously. During the first months of 2009, thousands of people died from swine flu. For two weeks, it was a recurring topic on the news. However, unlike Ebola in 2014, the number of cases was not doubling, not even increasing in a linear fashion. Some researchers concluded that the flu was not as aggressive as the first warning signs had indicated. However, journalists continued to stoke fear for several weeks.

They had not given quinine or typhoid vaccine to influenza victims in the wild hope that because it worked against malaria or typhoid it might work against influenza.

course, if developing a universal vaccine were easy it would have been done, but for decades few resources went to such research. Consider for a moment that prior to the emergence of H5N1, the U.S. government was spending more money on the West Nile virus than on influenza. While influenza was killing as many as 56,000 Americans a year, West Nile in its deadliest year killed 284.

Yet even under a best case scenario, even with the new technologies, it will still take months to deliver large quantities of vaccine. In addition, much of the U.S. vaccine supply is manufactured outside the country; in a lethal pandemic, there is a question whether another government would allow its export before its own population was protected.

But as Bill Gates said to us when Mark and I met with him in his Seattle-area office, “People invest in high-probability scenarios: the markets that are there. And these low-probability things that maybe you should buy an insurance policy for by investing in capacity up front, don’t get done. Society allocates resources primarily in this capitalistic way. The irony is that there’s really no reward for being the one who anticipates the challenge.” Every time there is a new, serious viral outbreak, such as Ebola in 2012 and Zika in 2016, there is a public outcry, a demand to know why a vaccine wasn’t available to combat this latest threat. Next a public health official predicts a vaccine will be available in x number of months. These predictions almost always turn out to be wrong. And even if they’re right, there are problems in getting the vaccine production scaled up to meet the size and location of the threat, or the virus has receded to where it came from and there is no longer a demand for prevention or treatment. Here is Bill Gates again: Unfortunately, the message from the private sector has been quite negative, like H1N1 [the 2009 epidemic influenza strain]: A lot of vaccine was procured because people thought it would spread. Then, after it was all over, they sort of persecuted the WHO people and claimed GSK [GlaxoSmithKline] sold this stuff and they should have known the thing would end and it was a waste of money. That was bad. Even with Ebola, these guys—Merck, GSK, and J & J [Johnson & Johnson]—all spent a bunch of money and it’s not clear they won’t have wasted their money. They’re not break-even at this stage for the things they went and did, even though at the time everyone was saying, “Of course you’ll get paid. Just go and do all this stuff.” So it does attenuate the responsiveness. This model will never work or serve our worldwide needs. Yet if we don’t change the model, the outcome will not change, either.

Before addressing those questions, we need to understand the commonalities of the few pandemics we have information about: 1889, 1918, 1957, 1968, and 2009. First, all five came in waves. (A few scientists argue that the difference in lethality between 1918’s first and second waves mean that these were caused by different viruses, but evidence showing otherwise seems overwhelming. For one thing, exposure to the first wave provided as high as 94 percent protection against the second wave, far better protection than the best modern vaccine affords, and that’s just one piece of the evidence that the same virus caused both waves.) In fact, some investigators now speculate that the 1918 virus circulated in humans for several years before mutations allowed it to spread easily. If true, this would of course explode the hypothesis that Haskell was the origin. The 1889 pandemic virus did follow this pattern, generating two and a half years of sporadic outbreaks around the world, including

For of course as Miguel de Unamuno said, the more desperate one is, the more one hopes. But for all their frenzy of activity, they had still always avoided chaos, they had always proceeded from well-grounded hypotheses. They had not, as Avery said with contempt, poured material from one test tube into another. They had not done the wild things that had no basis in their understanding of the workings of the body. They had not given quinine or typhoid vaccine to influenza victims in the wild hope that because it worked against malaria or typhoid it might work against influenza.

All sorts of risk-benefit analyses and models of herd immunity tend to produce the conclusion that vaccination benefits the individual as well as the public. When Harvard researchers recently used game theory to build a mathematical model of vaccination behavior during an influenza epidemic, they found that even “a population of self-interested people can defeat an epidemic.” No altruism is required.

The pediatrician Paul Offit mentioned to me, during an interview about his work, that he had recently seen two children hospitalized with influenza. Both had been immunized against everything on the childhood schedule except the flu, and both ended up on heart and lung machines. One lived, and the other died. “And then the next day, when someone comes into your office and says, ‘I don’t want to get that vaccine,’ you’re supposed to respect that decision?” Offit asked me. “You can respect the fear. The fear of vaccines is understandable. But you can’t respect the decision—it’s an unnecessary risk.

It is important to realize that while vaccines are considered “smart bombs” that work by stimulating antibodies to just one microbe such as influenza or pertussis, in reality vaccines contain adjuvants that can stimulate widespread immune activation. In other words, vaccines can precipitate a cytokine cascade and systemic inflammation. This may result in a relapse or exacerbation of symptoms in patients with Lyme disease complex.21 I have witnessed several patients relapse after routine vaccinations.

RNA viruses mutate relatively quickly, and many, like influenza, are able to undergo a process known as antigenic drift, by which the virus is able to alter the surface antigens that are the targets of our antibodies—thus evading our existing immunity. Some viruses, like measles, cannot change their genomic sequence in ways that substantially alter enough of their surface proteins, so measles remains susceptible to our vaccines or the immunity that we get from prior infection. However, for viruses like influenza, as their surface proteins undergo change, the virus is able to dodge the protective antibodies that we’ve developed from past infection or vaccination

All this tinkering was creating superviruses that did not exist outside the lab and that might be more easily transmissible between different species, or more virulent, or more resistant to any influenza vaccine. Most researchers were insistent that these “gain of function” studies were needed to better understand how the flu virus might evolve, but the federal government saw things differently. These experiments were a security risk.

First, they needed to understand the epidemiology of influenza, how it behaved and spread. Scientists had already learned to control cholera, typhoid, yellow fever, malaria, bubonic plague, and other diseases by understanding their epidemiology even before developing either a vaccine or cure. Second, they needed to learn its pathology, what it did within the body, the precise course of the disease. That too might allow them to intervene in some way that saved lives. Third, they needed to know what the pathogen was, what microorganism caused influenza. This could allow them to find a way to stimulate the immune system to prevent or cure the disease. It was also conceivable that even without knowing the precise cause, they could develop a serum or vaccine.

still can't believe that). Babies just eight-weeks-old have a single jab against diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, haemophilus influenzae type b and polio and another against pneumococcal disease. Then, as if that were not enough, babies of three

In the fall of 2020, as we got closer to flu season, I started to worry. Every year, influenza kills tens of thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of people around the world, nearly all of them elderly. Even more are hospitalized. At a time when COVID was overwhelming or at least sorely testing virtually every health system on the planet, a bad flu season could have been disastrous. But there was not a bad flu season that year. In fact, there was hardly any flu season at all. Between the flu seasons of 2019–20 and 2020–21, cases dropped 99 percent. As of late 2021, one particular type of flu known as B/Yamagata had not been detected anywhere in the world since April 2020. Other respiratory viruses also dropped dramatically. By the time you read this book, of course, things may have changed. Flu strains have a way of disappearing for long periods and then suddenly recurring without explanation. But the huge decline in cases across the board is unmistakable, however long it lasts, and we know why: Nonpharmaceutical interventions made a dramatic difference in reducing flu transmission when combined with the prior immunity and vaccinations that people had.

Various pathogens that can cause life-threatening infections such as HIV, hepatitis C virus, Mycobacterium tuberculosis and Plasmodium parasites (the source of malaria) can evade antibodies, and an effective vaccine against these pathogens would need to stimulate robust T cell responses.

Many natural infections have at least one benefit in that a bout of illness confers lifelong immunity against the causative pathogen. An ideal vaccine would also offer such lasting protection, preferably with a single dose, and perhaps even protect against related threats, such as all members of the ever evolving family of human flu viruses.

Someday there may be a vaccine that can fend off all subtypes of influenza, but such a vaccine remains a dream for now.

So your solution is a universal vaccine. You need a vaccine that is not invalidated by drift and shift.

The results of the studies opened up a whole new avenue of research into live-attenuated vaccines: synthetic attenuated virus engineering (SAVE). A virus was created with 631 synonymous mutations in its P1 coding sequence, designed to bias it toward the use of codons that rarely preferred in human cells. The result was a highly attenuated virus that caused no disease in an animal model of virus infection, and like the naturally evolved live-attenuated polioviruses developed by Sabin, it proved to be a highly effective vaccine. Unlike Sabin's strains, however, the multiplicity of genetic changes contributing to attenuation is expected to render the phenotype far more stable and resilient to reversion in vivo. This technology could prove extremely useful in the development of safe and stable attenuated viruses that raise an immune response almost identical to that against the natural infection. There are now many examples of the genetic engineering of synthetic attenuated virus vaccines; most notably it has been employed to create a live-attenuated vaccine against a strain of human influenza, a virus that, unlike poliovirus or smallpox virus, we cannot hope to eradicate and for which vaccination remains the lynchpin of disease management.

Dr. Fauci had reason to know that this weary bogeyman was a canard. In 2008, he coauthored a study for the Journal of Infectious Disease confessing that virtually all of the “influenza” casualties in 1918 did not actually die from flu but from bacterial pneumonia and bronchial meningitis, which are, today, easily treated with antibiotics unavailable in 1918.52 The Spanish flu that government virologists have invoked to terrorize generations of Americans with vaccine compliance is, after all, a paper tiger.