β
Mediation, formulae for settlement: "When a peacemaker moves to lay down the conceptual framework from a settlement, this action tends to rule out and discredit the obvious alternatives. Ripening cannot take place until a consensus develops β not only about the need for a negotiated deal, but also for a specific kind of deal. If a number of approaches remain in play and appear to be equally viable and attractive, the conflict remains unripe. The peacemaker's move may cause the parties to collude tacitly against him, escaping behind the cover of each other's non-cooperation. If this keeps happening, he can prepare his moves with one side first, and claw his way toward agreement like a skipper tacking toward the wind. There may be times when a proposed framework of principles drives the parties towards another approach which has merit. The original initiative will still have served a useful purpose by shaking things up and injecting some movement into the picture. But the most important reason for taking the initiative is to block the parties' unilateral options and discredit their wishful thinking."
β Chester A. Crocker, 1992
Mediation, leverage in: "The richest source of leverage for the peacemaker may already be built into the existing situation. How badly are the parties hurting, and how can they be persuaded that a settlement is their best option? What is it that one or the other side really wants but cannot get on its own? Is one or more of the parties isolated and eager to gain external support for its positions? can their standing and legitimacy be put in question if they fail to cooperate? What pressures are built into the military situation, and what can be done to strengthen or accelerate the necessary stalemate?"
β Chester A. Crocker, 1992
Mediation, motivations of peacemakers: "Peacemakers typically invertene in conflicts precisely because their interests are affected, and they tend to act in support of a settlement compatible with those interests. By the same token, parties are more likely to respond to a peacemaker whose clout and prestige demand that he be taken seriously β even if that response is largely tactical and defensive. Bias (in the sense of having an interest in the issues and a preference about the outcome) is not an obstacle to success. But ignorance or prejudice will guarantee failure. ... It will not be possible to design a 'fair' (win-win) formula without a feel for each party's way of thinking and priorities. This is why the peacemaker must, first invest in knowledge; no one should know the brief better than he. Procedural even-handedness and fair play are important because they signal a readiness to listen, to learn, and to protect the parties' soft parts. They also protect the peacemaker from his own parochialism. There is little room for 'liking' or naively 'trusting.' If the various parties were not in some sense opposed to what he is doing, there would be no need for peacemaking!"
β Chester A. Crocker, 1992
β
β
Chas W. Freeman Jr. (The Diplomat's Dictionary)