Demographic Transition Quotes

In little countries and big countries, capitalist countries and communist countries, Catholic countries and Moslem countries, Western countries and Eastern countries—in almost all these cases, exponential population growth slows down or stops when grinding poverty disappears. This is called the demographic transition. It is in the urgent long-term interest of the human species that every place on Earth achieves this demographic transition. This is why helping other countries to become self-sufficient is not only elementary human decency, but is also in the self-interest of those richer nations able to help.

when fertility rates began collapsing in the late 1960s, another demographic transition was occurring, the result of a fundamental restructuring: People no longer put children at the center of their lives. Instead, they put themselves there.

Demographic transition is associated with an increase in the quality of health care and sanitation as well as improved access to education, especially for women.

The obvious pollution occurring in many places - worst of all, in the planned societies- has encouraged the growth of the environmental movement, which, however, as shown in previous chapters, has an agenda that goes far beyond clean-up and beautification, far beyond the stewardship of nature that is commanded by ancient religious tradition. Embracing the "biospheric vision" in the "spirit of deep ecology", the movement sees human beings as the chief enemy in the struggle on behalf of a deified Nature. The environmental movement, therefore, is the perfect vehicle for population control. It is popular - people do love trees and animals and beautiful scenery - and it is unequivocal in its devotion to reducing human numbers. The environmental agencies of the United Nations, with their chilling blueprints for "demographic transition" and a standardless, undefined but totally planned and controlled "sustainable development", combine the fervor of nature worship with the lack of accountability of an unelected, international bureaucracy.

In rural societies, large families are almost always the norm. In urban societies, families choose to have fewer children. This is the crux of the demographic transition, one of the most fundamental of all social changes during the era of modern economic growth.

Before the 1900s, a high fertility rate provided no guarantee that a child would live long enough to support her parents. In a preindustrial, pre-demographic transition society with high fertility (say six children per couple) and high mortality (in which a child had only a one in three chance of outliving his father), the likelihood that a father would die without a living heir is at least one in six. In Britain between 1330 and 1729, 27 percent of all married men and 23 percent of all married women died without surviving children.

the dull old facts of altered climate, vanishing forests, creatures and polar ice. Profitable and poisonous agriculture obliterating biological beauty. Oceans turning to weak acid. Well above the horizon, approaching fast, the urinous tsunami of the burgeoning old, cancerous and demented, demanding care. And soon, with demographic transition, the reverse, populations in catastrophic decline. Free speech no longer free, liberal democracy no longer the obvious port of destiny, robots stealing jobs, liberty in close combat with security, socialism in disgrace, capitalism corrupt, destructive and in disgrace, no alternatives in sight.

This is not true for other creatures, not even brainy ones like chimpanzees, bottlenose dolphins, parrots and octopi. They may occasionally use tools, they may occasionally shift their ecological niche, but they do not ‘raise their standard of living’, or experience ‘economic growth’. They do not encounter ‘poverty’ either. They do not progress from one mode of living to another – nor do they deplore doing so. They do not experience agricultural, urban, commercial, industrial and information revolutions, let alone Renaissances, Reformations, Depressions, Demographic Transitions, civil wars, cold wars, culture wars and credit crunches.

Seen this way, the ´origins of farming´ start to look less like an economic transition and more like a media revolution, which was also a social revolution, encompassing everything from horticulture to architecture, mathematics to thermodynamics, and from religion to the remodelling of gender roles. And while we can´t know exactly who was doing what in this brave new world, it´s abundantly clear that womenś work and knowledge were central to its creation; that the whole process was a fairly leisurely, even playful one, not forced by any environmental catastrophe or demographic tipping point and unmarked by major violent conflict. What´s more, it was all carried out in way that made radical inequality and extremely unlikely outcome.

In short, the combined effects of lower infant mortality, higher longevity, and increased fertility have fueled an explosion in the world’s population, as figure 18 graphs. Since population growth is intrinsically exponential, even small increases in fertility or decreases in mortality spark rapid population growth. If an initial population of 1 million people grows at 3.5 percent per year, then it will roughly double every generation, growing to 2 million in twenty years, 4 million in forty years, and so on, reaching 32 million in a hundred years. In actual fact, the global growth rate peaked in 1963 at 2.2 percent per year and has since declined to about 1.1 percent per year,60 which translates into a doubling rate of every sixty-four years. In the fifty years between 1960 and 2010, the world’s population more than doubled, from 3 to 6.9 billion people. At current rates of growth, we can expect 14 billion people at the end of this century. FIGURE 21. The demographic transition model. Following economic development, death rates tend to fall before birth rates decrease, resulting in an initial population boom that eventually levels off. This controversial model, however, only applies to some countries. One major by-product of population growth plus the concentration of wealth in cities has been a shift to more urbanization. In 1800, only 25 million people lived in cities, about 3 percent of the world’s population. In 2010, about 3.3 billion people, half the world’s population, are city dwellers.

rupture contains at least some seeds of useful contrast. What is perhaps most significant here is that those living through the postwar transitions perceived the demographic transformations unfolding around them as qualitatively different—a new kind of diversity.

The demographic transition model, in isolation, can be taken to predict that birth rates will continue to go down as societies grow increasingly wealthy; however, recent data contradicts this, suggesting that beyond a certain level of development birth rates increase again. Scholars debate whether industrialization and higher incomes lead to lower population, or whether lower populations lead to industrialization and higher incomes.

John Judis and Ruy Teixeira identified a useful distinction between members of this seemingly homogenous demographic—a distinction that can help to explain why two white-collar Americans might vote in opposite ways. They suggested that a group they call “professionals” tend toward the Democratic side. These professionals are typically white-collar workers with college or advanced degrees. They include “academics, architects, engineers, scientists, computer analysts, lawyers, physicians, registered nurses, teachers, social workers, therapists, fashion designers, interior decorators, graphic artists, writers, editors, and actors.” In the 1950s, according to Judis and Teixeira, such professionals represented only 7 percent of the workforce. Today, after a decades-long transition from a blue-collar, industrial economy to one where the engine of growth is ideas and services, they represent more than 15 percent of American workers.

Generational transitions are filled with opportunities, yet history is filled with examples of mistakes, bad decisions and wasted resources trying to cater to a new generation. Will it be a stormy ride, or a smooth sail for you? It all depends on how well you prepare.

Human societies can reshape many environmental components at rapid rates, including (but not limited to) migration into new ecologies/landscapes with novel pathogens and UV exposure, introduction to novel foods, inhaling carcinogens through smoking, pollution from industrialisation, increase in energetic consumption and demographic transitions that impact fertility rates.

Another important contributing factor to Rome’s collapse was a demographic deficit caused by the Antonine plagues.

It sounds like you feel ashamed that you did not live up to your parents’ expectations,” she said. His eyes filled with tears. That was it. The need to belong. To be seen. To be loved. To succeed. To matter. His rage was a symptom of his pain. “Pain that is not transformed is transferred,” says Franciscan priest Richard Rohr. When we leave people alone with their pain, their alienation becomes the precondition for radicalization. But in listening to people’s pain, we can help them transform it. If you are like Sister Simone, you might be in a position to listen to disaffected white people in your family or community who are terrified by our nation’s demographic transition. You might be able to help them grieve the illusion that America ever belonged only to them. Maybe you can invite them to see that they do not need to fear or hate us. Maybe you can show them spaces where white people and people of color are congregating around common pain to push for change—in healthcare, criminal justice, and education. Then again, maybe you can’t move them at all. But what you learn can still help someone like me. I want to hold up a vision of an America that has a place for all of us—them, too.

Thus we can say that nations that industrialize go through a power transition somewhat similar to the demographic transition described by writers on population changes. In the courses of the power transition, a nation passes from a stage of little power to a stage of greatly increased power. For convenience, the power transitions can be divided into three distinct stages: the stage of potential power; the stage of the transitional growth; the stage of the power maturity (pp. 300-306).

The third stage of the power transition is the stage of the power maturity… when the nation is fully industrial… technological change is still rapid, economic efficiency is high, national income continues to rise, but at a slower rate than previously… Bureaucratization seems to be increasing both in political and economic institutions... There is still room for much improvement in producing greater wealth and in distributing it… But the great burst of energy characteristic of nations in the early stages of industrialization lies in the past for mature nations. They cannot again double and triple and quadruple their capital investment as they did in the early years… The internal qualities that give a nation international power do not disappear in the stage of power maturity. They may even continue to increase, but not at the rate they did before, and to slow down even a little in a race where everyone is running forward is to run the risk of falling behind eventually. This is why the power of a nation must decline in the stage of power maturity, even though the nation continues to grow richer, more industrial and more efficient. We must remember that power is relative, not absolute… Had all nations of the world gone through the industrial revolution and the concomitant demographic transition at the same time and at the same speed, the result would have been a great change in international relations but not necessarily any major shift in the distribution of power among nations. There would have been no power transition. However, industrialization has proceeded unevenly though the world… It is the differential spread of industrialization to the world and the resulting power transition, not some automatic `balancing` process`, that provides the framework of modern international politics (304-306).

Population momentum is a consequence of the demographic transition. Population momentum explains why a population will continue to grow even if the fertility rate declines. Population momentum occurs because it is not only the number of children per woman that determine population growth, but also the number of women in reproductive age. Eventually, when the fertility rate reaches the replacement rate and the population size of women in the reproductive age bracket stabilizes, the population achieves equilibrium and population momentum comes to an end. Population momentum has implications for population policy for a number of reasons. 1. With respect to high-fertility countries (for example in the developing world), a positive population momentum, meaning that the population is increasing, states that these countries will continue to grow despite large and rapid declines in fertility. 2. With respect to lowest-low fertility countries (for example in Europe), a negative population momentum implies that these countries may experience population decline even if they try to increase their rate of fertility to the replacement rate of 2.1. For example, some Eastern European countries show a population shrinkage even if their birth rates recovered to replacement level. Population momentum can become negative if the fertility rate is under replacement level for a long period of time.

If some Mexican-Americans have their way, they will not have to go back to Mexico for burial; Mexico will come to them. What is called the Reconquista movement aims to break the Southwest off from the United States and reattach it to Mexico or establish it as an independent, all-Hispanic nation, thus reversing the territorial consequences of the Mexican-American war. Reconquista is widely promoted on college campuses. Charles Truxillo, a professor of Chicano studies at the University of New Mexico, thinks “Republica del Norte” would be a good name for a new Hispanic nation, which would contain all of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas and the southern part of Colorado. The Albuquerque-born Prof. Truxillo says the new nation is “an inevitability,” and should be created “by any means necessary.” He doubts violence will be necessary, however, because shifting demographics will make the transition seem natural.